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Abstract
This thesis offers a new answer for an old question. Since the inception of public policy
and administrative studies, the field has grappled with the problem of how to define the
relationship between politics and administration. An examination of the policy literature
suggests the existence of two major views: disjunctive and integrative. On one hand,
those scholars who favour a disjunctive view construe politics and administration as
mutually exclusive spheres. In this case, the study of policy and administration tends to
emphasize the technical  aspects  and ignore the political  factors.  On the other  hand,
theorists who embrace an integrative view suggest that administration is fundamentally
a  political  activity.  Expanding  the  focus  beyond  managerial  concerns,  integrative
scholars  argue  that  public  policies  should  not  be  confined to  technocratic  styles  of
policy-making that  inhibit  citizen engagement  and depoliticize the public  sphere.  In
spite  of  their  commendable  attention  to  politics,  however,  integrative  theorists
(particularly  those  embracing  an  interpretive  orientation  or  a  deliberative  approach)
have not yet been able to convincingly delineate a policy model that fully recognizes the
political.  The  key  argument  of  this  thesis  is  that  an  agonistic  vision  has  a  strong
potential to think politics and administration together that has not yet been considered
by contemporary  policy  scholarship.  Drawing  on  the  work  of  Chantal  Mouffe,  the
Agonistic Policy Model (APM) proposed here attempts to fill an important gap in the
literature.  Although agonistic  theories  have been widely recognized in  the academic
discipline of political science, they have not yet been translated into an implementable
policy model. It is argued that an APM elucidates how politics and administration can
be construed as interdependent spheres, thus offering a solution that helps to envisage
how the political can be properly integrated into public policy and administration. In
addition, besides an original interpretation of the policy process, the APM provides an
innovative way of thinking how policy-making can contribute to  deepen democratic
values and institutions.
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Introduction
This thesis addresses one of the perennial questions of public administration: how are
politics  and  administration  related?  Are  they  mutually  exclusive  or  interdependent
phenomena? An interesting way of answering this question is through the examination
of  the  academic  literature  developed  within  the  fields  of  public  administration  and
policy analysis. 
In broad terms, the relationship between politics and administration has been construed
along two distinctive lines: the disjunctive and the integrative. The first approach – the
disjunctive – depicts  politics and administration as independent spheres.  It  has been
most  explicitly  advocated  by the  ‘classical’ scholars  of  public  administration  (most
emblematically by Woodrow Wilson)  and later by the proponents of policy analysis
(particularly Harold Lasswell).  Both of  these theoretical  orientations  share a  similar
disinterest for politics and propose that politics should be excluded from policy and
administrative studies.
The rejection  of  the  political  dimension has  been criticized  by alternative  views of
public  policy.  Embracing  an  integrative vision  of  politics  and  administration,  more
recent developments in policy scholarship have considered that administrative practices
are  fundamentally  political  phenomena.  Policy  paradigms,  such  as  the  interpretive
orientation and the deliberate approach, insist that administrative practices are part of
the  political  life.  Hence,  it  would  be  mistaken to  confine  policy and administrative
studies to technical and managerial issues. In spite of their commendable attention to
politics, however, the solutions proposed by these emerging paradigms is problematic.
The purpose of this thesis is to delineate an innovative policy vision – the agonistic –
whose  theoretical  potential  has  not  yet  been  appreciated  in  the  literature.  The  key
challenge is to construct a policy paradigm capable of bringing ‘the political’ into public
policy and administration. Drawing on the work of Chantal Mouffe, which has received
significant  attention  in  the  realm of  political  science,  but  has  not  yet  been given a
‘policy translation’, this thesis develops an Agonistic Policy Model (APM).
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In order to accurately frame the object of the thesis, it is necessary to briefly examine
how  different  policy  paradigms  have  construed  the  relation  between  politics  and
administration  and  failed  to  provide  a  convincing  solution  to  the  problem of  their
integration, thus revealing the need for an alternative approach.
Key arguments of the thesis
Since its inception as a self-conscious field of academic research, public administration
has grappled with the problem of how to define the relationship between politics and
administration.  Particularly  in  the  United  States,  which  privileged  an  anti-statist
orientation,  politics  and  administration  have  been  usually  construed  as  independent
spheres. According to this perspective, public administration should focus exclusively
on the administrative side and ignore the political dimension. 
The idea that public administration is an apolitical field of knowledge has its roots in the
history of the field. Woodrow Wilson, widely acknowledged as the founder of public
administration as an academic discipline, famously asserted that proper administrative
questions were not political questions. In his view, politics was outside the purview of
public  administration.  Moreover,  as  he  indicated,  the  answer  for  administrative
questions was to be found in the emerging science of management1.
The  aspiration  for  a  politics-free,  managerial  science  of  government  was  given  an
important  impetus  with the  advent  of  policy analysis.  Although critical  of  orthodox
public administration (Fischer, 2003) policy analysis preserved its inattention to politics.
If the decisions of the government were guided by scientific knowledge and technical
expertise, the founder of policy analysis Harold Lasswell noted, there would be less
need  for  politics.  In  his  view,  enlightened  experts  were  much  better  placed  (than
political actors) to make decisions concerning public problems (Lasswell, 1951).
1 Although his ideas were developed in the late nineteenth century, when public administration
was still a fledgling academic discipline, they have endured the test of time and have not
been completely discarded even today (Wilson, 1887; Hughes, 2003).
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Policy analysis perpetuated a distrust for politics that was well entrenched in the field of
public  administration.  This  tendency  to  ignore  political  aspects  –  which  for  some
scholars  (e.g.  Rosenbloom,  1993;  Lee,  1995)  still  permeates  contemporary  policy
scholarship – is predicated on the possibility of developing a  science of government,
based  solely  on  technical  knowledge  (expertise)  and  hence  devoid  of  politics.  In
practice, this rejection of politics in public policy and administrative studies meant that
societal  problems could be construed as managerial  issues to be solved on a purely
technical basis, without interference from politics.
The aspiration  for  an apolitical  science  of  government,  however,  has  been severely
criticized on both empirical and theoretical grounds. From an empirical perspective, the
observation of actual governmental practices has consistently revealed that politics and
administration are difficult to disentangle. With the onset of the interventionist state,
governmental agencies have been given wide discretion to initiate policies without prior
congressional consent. This is a clear case in which administrative institutions wield
political functions: public administrators not only execute policies but they also decide
them. The political functions bestowed upon governmental agencies indicate, as Waldo
(1948) noted, that the spheres of politics and administration are not independent at all.
In practice, evidence has shown that public administration carries out administrative as
well as political tasks. Public administration is a political actor (Nabatchi, 2010). 
Apart  from empirical evidence,  there are also theoretical reasons to suspect that the
separation  between  politics  and  administration  is  untenable.  A large  literature  has
convincingly demonstrated that the boundaries between politics and administration are
much  more  blurred  than  (orthodox)  public  administration  scholarship  and
(conventional) policy analysis studies would like to admit. It became increasingly clear,
paraphrasing Wildavsky, that administrative questions are political questions as much as
political questions are administrative questions. Two theoretical objections illustrate the
inconsistency of thinking politics and administration as disjointed phenomena.
Discussing policy-making in pluralist liberal democracies, Dahl (1947) has shown that
means  (administration)  and  ends  (politics)  cannot  be  extricated  because  they  are
14
mutually  dependent.  The  choice  of  means,  he  argues,  is  not  indifferent  to  the
achievement of particular ends, which implies that administrative factors influence (if
not  determine)  political  goals.  Therefore,  because  means  and  ends  are  intertwined,
administration cannot be fully dissociated from politics. 
Along similar lines, a vindication of the political role of public administration has also
been put forward by Charles Lindblom. In his  book  The Intelligence of Democracy
Lindblom (1965) asserts  that the policy process is fundamentally a political  – not a
technical  –  activity.  In  his  view,  public  policies  result  from the interaction between
competing  groups and not  from analytical  calculation carried  out  by experts.  If  the
political  dimension is  overlooked,  he  clarifies,  theory fails  to  reflect  how decision-
making  effectively  takes  place  in  daily  administrative  life.  Again,  the  relationship
between politics and administration is more accurately described as mutual dependence
rather than separation.
The growing acceptance that politics and administration pervade each other led to the
development  of  policy  streams  that  duly  recognize  their  interdependence.  The
disjunctive views, embraced by Early Public Administration and Policy Analysis, are
considered inadequate representations of policy and administration, and thus challenged
by integrative paradigms that assert their indissociable condition.
More recent theoretical developments – particularly the interpretive orientation and the
deliberative approach – criticize the apolitical view that has long pervaded the fields of
public administration and policy analysis. They reject the notion that public problems
are technical issues to be solved by experts.  In contrast,  they explicitly declare that
policy and administrative issues are political phenomena. 
Interpretive  and deliberative  views  of  public  policy are  part  of  an  emerging  policy
perspective  that  conceptualizes  politics  and  administration  as  interdependent
phenomena. Departing from Wilson’s politics-administration dichotomy and Lasswell’s
belief  on  science  and  expertise,  these  approaches  consider  that  politics  and
administration are inextricably linked. Highlighting the role of argumentation (in the
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case of the interpretive orientation) and the potential of public deliberation (in the case
of  the  deliberative  approach),  these  policy  paradigms  aim  to  elaborate  a  political
understanding of the policy process.
In spite of their commendable efforts to integrate politics and administration, however,
their  solutions  are  not  convincing.  On one  hand,  interpretive  ideas  remain  a  purely
analytical framework that lacks an empirical counterpart. The absence of an interpretive
‘tool-kit’, capable  of  guiding  policy  implementation,  is  a  serious  deficiency.  Thus,
although  the  interpretive  orientation  offers  valuable  theoretical  insights,  it  does  not
provide practical advice for policy-makers. 
On the other hand, the deliberative approach encourages the creation of participatory
settings that allow dialogue between public authorities and civil society. Advocates of a
deliberative public administration argue for the opening up of participatory venues so
that citizens can voice their opinions and influence policy-making. The key idea of the
deliberative approach is that public policies will be more legitimate and democratic if
citizens  are  enabled to  voice their  preferences  and demands in  the  decision-making
process.
Although the idea of enhancing public participation in the policy process is certainly
positive, the deliberative solution is nonetheless questionable. In particular, the belief
that a consensus can be formed so that the plurality of views of the participants can be
harmonized – and conflict overcome – is problematic2. By insisting on the construction
of agreement, the deliberative approach ultimately fails to recognize that in pluralistic
contemporary  democracies  there  are  political  positions  that  cannot  be  ultimately
reconciled.
2 It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  more  recent  developments  in  deliberative  policy
scholarship have recognized the impracticability of reaching a fully inclusive consensus that
would  be  valid  once  and  for  all.  Instead,  it  is  accepted  that:  i)  consensus  tends  to  be
provisional and open to future revision; ii) when consensus is only partially achievable, more
moderate forms of agreement – such as mutual understanding – should be encouraged. See in
particular Gutmann and Thompson (2004).
16
The absence of a theoretically sound and practically effective policy paradigm capable
of  integrating  politics  and administration  elicits  an  important  question:  is  there  any
alternative framework that can properly link politics and administration? Attempting to
answer this  question,  an innovative policy model,  whose potential  has not  yet  been
appraised in the literature, is proposed in the thesis.
The key  purpose  of  this  thesis  is  the  delineation of  an  Agonistic  Policy  Model
(APM). It is surprising (if not perplexing) that agonistic ideas have not yet penetrated
the  field  of  public  policy.  Although  they  have  enjoyed  a  favourable  reputation  in
political  science,  in  which  agonism  represents  an  important  (and  to  some  extent
popular) intellectual trend, so far very few inroads have been attempted to  ‘translate’
agonism to the policy level. This thesis aims to bridge this gap by offering an agonistic
interpretation of the policy process. 
The  political  theory  developed  by  Chantal  Mouffe  offers  an  adequate  theoretical
framework to think how agonistic principles can be transplanted to the domain of public
policy.  In  particular,  Mouffe’s  concept  of  ‘the  political’ sheds  light  of  how proper
political  phenomena  can  be  conceptualized.  As  such,  it  provides  a  solid  analytical
ground to understand in  which  circumstances  policies  can be properly construed as
political.
In  order  to show which conditions are  required to  ‘politicize’ the policy domain,  it
might be convenient to briefly indicate the tenets of the Agonistic Policy Model (whose
full theorization will be presented in chapters 5 and 6). From the agonistic perspective
advocated here, the policy process is defined as antagonistic, hegemonic and power-
laden. It is  antagonistic because in pluralistic democratic societies policy actors hold
different  –  and  irreconcilable  –  perceptions  of  the  common  good.  It  is  hegemonic
because only one position is ultimately sanctioned by the policy process. Finally, the
policy process is  power-laden, because the capacity of policy groups to achieve their
goals is predicated on their relative strength to influence decision-making.
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Hence, from an agonistic perspective, the policy process is depicted as an interaction
that is inherently conflictive. Due to the antagonistic condition of the social order, the
goals pursued by multiple policy actors cannot be fully reconciled. Furthermore, since
the  goals  of  different  policy actors  cannot  be  simultaneously satisfied,  exclusion  is
inevitable. This means, as Schneider and Ingram (2005) put it, that there will always be
winners and losers.
The inevitability of conflict,  however,  does not necessarily lead to disruption of the
policy system. Conflict, when properly ‘domesticated’, can have beneficial effects. For
instance,  when  policy  institutions  create  channels  for  the  expression  of  conflict,
democratic values and practices can be deepened. As illustrated by the application of
agonistic principles in the Finnish planning process, acceptance of conflict can empower
citizens,  who  are  recognized  as  legitimate  participants  of  the  policy  process,  and
therefore become co-authors of public policies (Bäcklund, and Mäntysalo, 2010).
The acknowledgement that conflict is not necessarily a disturbance to be eradicated, but
the very nature of the policy process, is one of the important advantages of the APM
over alternative approaches. It raises, however, the question of how the role of conflict
should be envisaged. It also elicits the problem of the potential instability (or in more
extreme cases disarray) caused by the presence of conflicting views within the policy
process. As critics of agonism might object, does not the focus on conflictuality stymie
(if  not preclude) decision-making? How can policies be implemented when they are
construed as outcomes of unyielding strife (Hillier, 2002)? 
Embracing an agonistic view requires understanding the policy process as a continuous
contestation  that  is  never  finally  resolved.  This  is  not  to  deny  that  temporary
accommodations (partial agreements) are not possible. It is to recognize that solutions to
public problems are always provisional.  When public policies are portrayed through
agonistic  lenses,  they  are  interpreted  as  forever  open  to  revision,  as  a  constant
negotiation  between adversarial  positions.  As  Latin  American  policy theorist  Carlos
Matus contends, the policy process is ‘always ready, but at the same time it is always
being made’ (Matus, 2007d, p. 31; own translation).
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Thus, an APM departs from alternative policy orientations that emphasize either the
centrality of  expertise  (particularly Policy Analysis)  or  the importance  of  consensus
building (especially the Deliberative Policy Approach). Differently, it draws attention to
the impossibility of achieving definitive closures that settle disputes once and for all. By
conceptualizing the construction of public policies as a continuous articulation of social
forces, the APM brings to the fore the hegemonic condition of the policy process. It is
precisely this emphasis on the hegemonic character of policy-making that enables APM
to offer a political interpretation of public policy and administration.
As such, the APM offers an answer to the main question addressed in this thesis:  how
can the political dimension be integrated into policy and administration? To put in a
nutshell, the agonistic response could be summarized in the following way: the political
can only be fully taken into account when the conflictual condition of the policy process
is recognized as constitutive, and hence ineradicable.
Methodology
Before delineating the APM (chapters 5 and 6), the thesis discusses how the relationship
between politics and administration has been represented in policy and administrative
studies (chapters 1 to 4). This task has been undertaken through a comprehensive and
in-depth literature review that revealed the existence of key intellectual movements  –
here designated as ‘policy paradigms’ – that offered a privileged standpoint to reflect on
the  disjunction/integration  between  politics  and  administration.  Since  the
‘reconstruction’ of the relationship between politics and administration could have been
carried  out  in  multiple  ways,  it  is  convenient  to  indicate  the  specific  methodology
employed in this thesis3.
3 The examination of various policy streams has enabled the construction of a  ‘cartography’
that depicts how the political dimension has been construed by policy and administrative
studies.  Arguably,  this  conceptual  map  has  heuristic  value  and  can  thus  help  other
researchers to envisage how politics has been interpreted in different ways throughout the
evolution of the disciplines of public administration and policy analysis. Other useful policy
maps that might complement the one employed here can be found in Frederickson (1976),
McCurdy (1986), Stacey (1996), Raadschelders (1999), Frederickson (2010),  Hoppe (2010),
and Raadschelders (2011).
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Initially, the thesis explores the orthodox or classical period of administrative studies
(here denoted as Early Public Administration), whose key analytical concept is the so-
called politics-administration dichotomy (the idea that politics and administration are
independent spheres). The thesis then shows how Policy Analysis has in many ways
perpetuated  the  aspiration  of  public  administration  early  theorists  to  develop  an
apolitical science of government. The analysis of both these paradigms – Early Public
Administration (EPA) and Policy Analysis (PA) – has benefited from an examination of
a policy literature developed particularly in the United States, whose studies offer a
clear picture of the persistent endeavour to separate politics and administration.
The critique of this separation, however, has been based on an investigation not only of
American  but  also  of  European-led  scholarship.  Indeed,  integrative  public  policy
frameworks  (devoted  to  connect  politics  and  administration)  have  strong  European
influences. For instance, Interpretive Public Policy (IPP) was particularly influenced by
French  post-structuralism,  whereas  the  Deliberative  Policy  Approach  (DPA)  drew
significantly on the work of German philosopher Jürgen Habermas. 
The delineation of an Agonistic Policy Model (APM), for its turn, has required a more
diversified  literature  review.  It  encompasses  three  streams  of  policy  literature:  i)
American  policy  studies  (critical  of  the  expertise-centred,  technocratic  attitude  of
conventional  policy  analysis);  ii)  European  public  policy  (including  Dutch  and
Scandinavian  policy  scholarship);  iii)  Latin  American  postwar  planning  theorizing
(particularly the contribution of policy scholar and practitioner Carlos Matus). In spite
of  the  wide  range  of  theoretical  sources,  the  key  analytical  inspiration  for  the
development of the APM has been nonetheless provided by (Belgian) political scientist
Chantal Mouffe.
To facilitate the visualization of the methodology employed for the ‘reconstruction’ of
the politics-administration relationship, the table below describes the main intellectual
strands examined for the understanding of each policy paradigm.
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Table 0.1 – Research methodology
Policy Paradigm Methodological Approach
Early Public 
Administration
Review of U.S. literature on public administration (based
on analysis of classical studies and first textbooks)
Policy Analysis Review  of  U.S.  literature  on  policy  analysis  (focusedparticularly on historical and empirical aspects)
Interpretive Public 
Policy
Review  of  U.S.  and  European  literatures  of  an
interpretive/argumentative  inclination  (exploration  and
integration of various disparate intellectual streams)
Deliberative Policy 
Approach
Review  of  U.S.  and  European  literatures  on  public
deliberation  (with  salience  to  the  work  of  German
philosopher Jürgen Habermas)
Agonistic Policy Model 
Review  of  U.S.  (especially  critical  policy  studies),
European  (including  Dutch  and  Scandinavian
scholarship),  and  Latin  American  literature  (notably
postwar planning theorizing) literatures
Source: the author
It is important to emphasize that the methodological approach followed in the thesis is
fundamentally  theoretical.  By  discussing  the  relationship  between  politics  and
administration  through  policy  paradigms,  the  main  focus  remains  on  how  policy
scholarship has  responded  to  the  challenge  of  thinking  through  the
connection/disjunction  between  spheres  of  politics  and  administration.  Although
empirical  illustrations are  provided for  each paradigm, in  order  to clarify how their
analytical contentions have resonated in practice, the thesis does not offer an account of
major  political  economy movements  (e.g.  Keynesian  economics,  neoliberal  reforms,
contemporary globalization trends). The absence of these more  ‘practical’ aspects of
policy-making does not imply that they are not relevant, but simply that they are beyond
the scope of the thesis.
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The discussion of policy and administrative studies undertaken here should also not
convey  the  impression  that  these  five  paradigms  represent  ‘a  history  of  public
administration or policy analysis’. To be sure, the empirical evolution of public policy
and administration is a highly intricate combination of ideas, models and institutions
involving a multitude of actors (politicians, administrators, policy advisers, journalists,
interest groups etc) that would be impossible to summarize, let alone to reproduce, in a
theoretical analysis, as the one developed here in the thesis. Therefore the attempt to
understand how the relationship between politics and administration has been conceived
– either as integrated or as dissociated – through policy paradigms does not claim to be
a representation of actual practice. It is rather a theoretical exploration that privileges
particular, though arguably crucial, analytical approaches that have been influential in
the development of policy and administrative scholarship.
It  should  also be recognized that  in  spite  of  their  theoretical  potential  and growing
penetration  in  academic  circles  and  policy  institutions,  the  last  three  paradigms
discussed in the thesis (the interpretive, the deliberative, and the agonistic), still have
not been widely disseminated in administrative settings. Public administration, as the
examination of any recently published textbook reveals, has been – and continues to be
– a discipline pervaded by a technocratic view that renders politics and administration
as  separate  spheres.  Thus,  it  would  be inadequate  to  think  that  the  real  practice  of
governments has mirrored the neat, linear, and possibly progressive evolution conveyed
by the paradigms analysed in the thesis.
In  relation  to  the  methodology employed  in  the  thesis,  there  is  a  lack  of  a  precise
distinction  between  the  normative  and  explanatory  aspects  of  the  proposed  policy
paradigms.  Although  more  ‘traditional’ methodological  approaches  recommend  that
normative propositions should be clearly distinguished from explanatory statements, the
reconstruction undertaken here has revealed that ideas of ‘how things should be’ cannot
be  completely separated  from  ‘how things  actually are’.  Particularly in  the  field  of
public policy and administration, in which advocacy and understanding are frequently
intertwined, normative and explanatory views are difficult to ‘unpack’. 
22
In fact, the analyses developed in the thesis have suggested that prescriptions tend to
follow explanations: those policy scholars who consider that politics and administration
are distinctive realms of practice also tend to make the case for a dissociative orientation
that  prescribes  the  separation  between  the  two  spheres.  On  the  other  hand,  those
theorists who describe politics and administration as inextricably linked usually favour
an  integrative  attitude  thus  arguing  for  a  politicization  of  the  administrative  arena.
Therefore, and not completely unsurprising4, the strategy of thinking the relationship
between politics and administration through paradigms has shown that prescriptive and
explanatory factors are not easily disentangled.  
Structure of the thesis
In terms of structure, this thesis has six chapters (apart from this introduction and the
conclusion). Each chapter is dedicated to the exploration of a specific policy paradigm,
with the exception of the two last chapters that focus on the Agonistic Policy Model
(APM). Chapter 1 explores the Early Public Administration (EPA) and discusses how
the idea of politics-administration dichotomy underpinned the orthodox view of public
administration in its formative years. Chapter 2 discusses Policy Analysis (PA) whose
tenet was the development of a scientific approach to public policy geared to improve
the  rationality  of  the  decision-making  process.  Chapter  3  examines  the  Interpretive
Public Policy (IPP) orientation that elaborated a critique of technocratic views of public
policy and asserted an explicit concern with the political dimension within policy and
administrative  studies.  Chapter  4  depicts  the  Deliberative  Policy  Approach  (DPA)
whose  advocates  suggested  that  public  administration  could  be  politicized  by  the
construction of deliberative arenas capable of channelling the voices of civil society to
the  bureaucratic  structures  of  the  government.  Chapter  5  presents  the  ontological
underpinnings of the Agonistic Policy Model (APM) that are derived from the agonistic
framework developed by Chantal Mouffe. Chapter 6 delineates the Agonistic Policy
Model (APM) and shows how different theorists  help to elucidate how an agonistic
4 In his  discussion of  models  of  democracy,  British political  theorist  David Held offers  a
supportive  argument  for  the  notion  that  prescription  and  explanation  are  frequently
intertwined. He notes the existence of  ‘a shifting balance between descriptive-explanatory
and normative statements; that is, between statements about how things are and why they are
so, and statements about how things ought to or should be’ (Held, 2006, p. 6).
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policy process can be conceptualized. In the conclusion, the advantages of the APM
over alternative policy approaches are outlined and an agonistic policy research agenda
is proposed. 
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Chapter 1 – Early Public Administration (EPA): the rise and fall of the politics-
administration dichotomy
1.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the first paradigm of public administration and policy studies,
which is designated here as Early Public Administration (EPA)5. It describes the main
ideas  embodied  in  EPA and  gives  salience  to  its  fundamental  feature,  the  politics-
administration dichotomy. It claims that understanding this dichotomy is crucial because
the field of public administration is to this day still searching for an appropriate way of
‘combining’ politics and administration. Although in modern scholarship, politics and
administration are recognized to be largely interdependent,  there is no consensus on
how they are related. The main purpose of this chapter is to explain how and why public
administration has been developed – in  both theory and practice – in opposition to
politics. 
The studies  on  the  field  of  public  administration  emerged as  a  reaction  against  the
perceived  ‘wickedness’ of  politics.  On  one  hand,  politics  was  usually  denigrated
because  of  its  association  with  socially  harmful  practices,  such  as  corruption  and
patronage. Besides, politics was also interpreted as a partisan form of running the polity,
which necessarily generated conflict and disagreement. On the other hand, a science of
administration  was  conceived  as  a  technical  way of  solving  societal  problems  that
avoided  the  pitfalls  of  politics.  Because  administration  was  non-partisan  it  could
potentially  reveal  a  scientific  way of  identifying  the  common  good.  In  a  nutshell,
society would be much better off if the process of making collective decisions could be
divested of political intermediation and instead be taken solely on a scientific basis. 
The main advantage of the emerging field of administration was understood to reside in
its scientific nature. Moreover, the scientific credentials of administration – embodied in
the adoption of methodological procedures such as data gathering, hypotheses testing,
5 EPA has also  been  referred  to  as  classical,  traditional  or  orthodox public  administration
(Hughes, 2003; Hyde and Shafritz, 2008).
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quantification  of  variables  –  would  place  it  in  a  wiser  position  to  prescribe  how
governments  should  be  run.  The development  of  a  science  of  administration  would
eliminate  the  need  for  politics  and  encourage  progress  and  efficiency  instead  of
manipulation and favouritism.
 
The  opposition  between politics  and administration,  which  is  one  of  the  distinctive
features of EPA, is the main theme of this chapter. It is crucial to understand why public
administration emerged in opposition to politics in order to properly grasp why later
scholarship would face the challenge of bringing politics into public administration. The
politics-administration dichotomy has been embedded to such an extent in the theory
and  practice  of  administration  that  to  this  day  academics  and  practitioners  are  still
searching  for  a  paradigm capable  of  reconnecting  them.  The  challenge  of  thinking
politics  and administration together,  it  is  worth reminding,  is  the main topic of this
thesis.
How EPA rose and fell is a story that deserves to be told in some detail. In particular,
because  it  reveals  that  attempts  to  ‘sanitize’ society  from  politics  through  the
development  of  a  science  of  administration  is  an  old  issue.  In  fact,  the  idea  that
administration was the remedy to liberate society from political interference harks back
to  the  nineteenth  century,  when  administrative  reforms  in  the  United  States  were
introduced with the purpose of eradicating patronage. The solution envisaged by the
reformers consisted in the replacement of patronage for a civil service system, in which
employees  of  the  government  would  have  no  allegiance  to  political  parties,  being
admitted  solely on the  basis  of  their  merits  and qualifications.  By being politically
neutral  and  organized  according  to  technical  criteria,  the  civil  service  system  was
deemed convenient to impart efficiency to the performance of the government. Thus,
from earlier times, politics was targeted as the enemy of efficiency and construed as
conducive to anarchy and disorder. The advent of a science of administration, however,
would eliminate the need for politics. 
For  several  decades,  the  politics-administration  dichotomy  would  remain  as  the
hallmark of the field of public administration. Theorists and practitioners would praise
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the  separation  between  politics  and  administration  as  the  condition  for  efficient
government. However, with the emergence of the interventionist state in the aftermath
of  the Great  Depression,  the dichotomy was given a  hard blow. In order  to restore
economic  development,  public  agencies  were  endowed  with  ‘political’ powers  to
formulate  public  policies.  The  recognition  that  the  government  wielded  both
administrative  and  political  functions  elicited  theoretical  difficulties  for  public
administration.  In particular,  it  challenged its  cornerstone,  the politics-administration
dichotomy. It became clear that the boundaries that divided politics and administration
were more blurred than frequently assumed. This awareness, however, implied that the
discipline had to rethink its foundations, if not reconsider its own identity6. With the
demise  of  the  politics-administration  dichotomy,  the  field  of  public  administration
began  to  search  for  broader  perspectives  triggering  the  emergence  of  new research
agendas (Raadschelders, 2003; Keller, 2007).
This chapter aims to describe the main features of EPA, giving salience to the pivotal
role  played  by the  politics-administration  dichotomy.  It  is  structured  in  three  main
sections  (besides  this  introduction).  Section  1.2  contextualizes  EPA by depicting  its
historical background in particular by alluding to the rise of the administrative state.
Section 1.3 discusses the intellectual foundations of EPA through the examination of the
contributions  of  three  influential  theorists,  Woodrow  Wilson,  Frederick  Taylor  and
Luther Gulick. Section 1.4 examines the demise of EPA and explains why the politics-
administration dichotomy had been increasingly discredited.
1.2 The historical context of EPA: the rise of the administrative state
This section contextualizes the emergence of Early Public Administration (EPA) from
an administrative historical perspective. Initially, drawing particularly on the experience
of the United States, it describes the rise of administrative state and emphasizes how
modern administration originated from a series of reforms aimed at removing political
interference.  Then,  by alluding  to  the  figure  of  the  city-manager,  it  delineates  how
6 It is worth noting that in spite of the demise of the politics-administration dichotomy, there
are scholars who still believe that EPA’s principles remain very much alive and influence the
theory and practice  of  public  administration (Adams,  1992;  Rosenbloom,  1993;  Holden,
1996; Hughes, 2003; Bertelli and Lynn, 2006).
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administration has  also acquired an anti-political  connotation at  the local  level.  The
section closes with a brief comparison between the administrative models followed by
the United States and Europe with the purpose of clarifying that the idea of politics-
administration dichotomy cannot be considered universal. 
The emergence of modern administration is inscribed within the advent of the industrial
society (Weber, 1946; Waldo, 1948). Throughout the nineteenth century, the advanced
capitalist  nations  were  experiencing  major  societal  changes.  Agriculture  was  being
progressively  supplanted  by  industry  as  the  dominant  occupation.  The  size  of  the
factories was increasing and corporations were being created to cope with the rising
demand for  manufactured products.  The industrial  development,  however,  posed the
problem of workforce supply. Attracted by job opportunities in the industrial centres,
large  swaths  of  people  were  pushed  away  from  the  countryside  and  abandoned
agricultural life,  flocking massively to urbanized areas. The advent of industrial and
urban societies deeply affected the role and scope of the government.
It is worth reminding that the provision of public services by the government, in the
nineteenth century (except in some parts of Europe), was very limited when compared
with subsequent periods. Governmental institutions usually comprised no more than the
tax collection agency, the post office, police and the military, besides parliaments and
courts. And yet their nature and magnitude would progressively change as a response to
urbanization and industrialization stimuli. People in cities needed a wide range of goods
and services that had to be provided (or at least coordinated) by a central administration.
These  services  usually  covered  areas  such  as  housing,  waste  and  sewage  systems,
streetlights, medical assistance,  schooling,  transportation etc.  Although some kind of
public  service  provision  might  have  existed  before,  they  were  not  required  in  vast
quantities  and  their  funding  and  implementation  was  carried  out  through  private
donations.  The  scale  of  industrialization  and  urbanization,  however,  compelled  the
government to embrace the responsibility for collective service provision.
Public administration theorists writing in the first decades of the twenty-century noticed
how  major  social  and  economic  changes  were  affecting  the  scope  and  size  of
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administration. White (1926, p. 8) argued that the emergence of modern administration
was not only a product of the progressive urbanization and industrialization, but also of
technological  advancement.  In  his  view,  improvements  in  transportation  (especially
railways) and communication (particularly postal  services and the telegraph) created
new  opportunities  for  business  expansion  and  ‘increased  the  area  and  intensity  of
administrative activity’. Along similar lines, Willoughby (1927) noted that the level of
government activity had increased and penetrated into to broader areas of social life.
The province of government is now held to embrace all forms of activities which
contribute in any way to the promotion of the public welfare. There is hardly a field
of activity into which our governments have not entered. Their operations are now
on  a  vast  scale  and  require  for  their  performance  organization  and  technical
processes  exceeding  in  size  and  complexity  those  of  any  private  undertaking
(Willoughby, 1927, p. viii).
The growing demand for public  services,  however,  could not be met under  existing
administrative practices and institutions. Rampant corruption, widespread patronage and
the lack of a professional administrative staff were considered major obstacles for the
development  of  an  efficient  and  responsive  administration.  Thus,  advocates  of
administrative reform contended that  unless fundamental changes were introduced –
particularly the civil service system – public services would continue to be inefficient
and inadequate to meet the demand. Noteworthy, the dominant perception at the time
associated the anarchy and disorder of the administration with the harmful penetration
of politics in administrative affairs. Not surprisingly, calls for a  ‘moralization’ of the
administration were frequently understood as an attempt to insulate it from politics7. 
The  trenchant  corruption  that  afflicted  not  only  the  administration  but  was  also
pervasive throughout society had one of its causes in the  ‘spoils system’, which had
been introduced in the United States by President Andrew Jackson in the 1820s as part
of his project of ‘democratization’ (Schultz and Maranto, 1998). According to President
Jackson, public service jobs should be filled by  ‘ordinary’ citizens, instead of being
7 Civil service reforms were not only a matter of morality, since the professionalization of the
public service was also essential to cope with the increasing complexity of administrative
tasks. The clerkship type of administration was increasingly unsuitable to handle the growing
demands for public services. On the professionalization of American public administration,
see  Karl  (1976).  For  a  discussion  of  the  major  social  implications  of  a  professional
administration, see Weber’s (1946) classical study of bureaucracy.
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offered as sinecures to the economically privileged elites of society, as was the common
practice. In his view, public service tasks could be handled by ordinary citizens because
they  were  simple,  repetitive  and  did  not  require  previous  technical  knowledge.  In
practice, however, public service jobs were treated as  ‘spoils’ to be distributed to the
political  parties  that  won the  elections.  The  recruitment  of  administrative  staff  was
‘politicized’ with nominations made to reward partisan loyalty. 
The problem was that, contrary to Jackson’s expectations, his spoils system produced
several  unintended  consequences,  the  most  dramatic  being  a  process  of  rampant
corruption. An additional difficulty was the significant turnover caused by the complete
removal  of  government  officials  when  the  party  in  power  lost  the  elections.  The
constant turn over of personnel caused organizational dysfunctions and created disarray
in  the  administration  of  public  services.  The  dissatisfaction  with  the  spoils  system
reached its climax when a frustrated job seeker assassinated President Garfield in 1881,
thus triggering claims for the adoption of an alternative administrative system.
The  modern  concept  of  public  administration  emerged  then  as  an  offshoot  of  the
reforms  introduced  to  overthrow  the  spoils  system8.  The  professionalization  of  the
administrative staff, which would be carried out by the introduction of the civil service
system,  aimed  primarily  at  recruiting  politically  neutral  employees  who  had  no
allegiance  to  political  parties.  By severing  the  ties  with  electoral  politics,  the  civil
service  was  predicated  on  a  non-partisan,  merit-based  recruitment  model  in  which
employees were admitted solely based on their qualifications. 
Inspired by the British administrative reforms, the civil service system in the United
States was officially instituted with the passage of the Pendleton Act in 1883. Initially, it
8 Thus  Raadschelders  (2003,  p.  192)  writes  that  ‘the  emergence  of  the  study  of  public
administration in the United States at the end of the nineteenth century was a response both
to growing local government activity and to major discontent with corruption’. The history
of civil service system and its contribution to shape public administration can be found in
Schultz and Maranto (1998).  For the formation of the administrative state of the United
States,  see  also Chandler  (1987)  and Stillman (2010).  Accounts  of  the  history of  public
administration as an academic discipline can be found in Mosher (1976) and Raadschelders
(2011). Gladden (1972) offers an important historical analysis of public administration from
a European perspective.
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covered less than 12% of the overall workforce, but it was progressively expanded by
subsequent  administrations  and  by 1900 most  government  personnel  were  recruited
through the civil service system, with fewer positions still dependent on the political
discretion (Schultz and Maranto, 1998; Keller, 2007)9. 
The  advent  of  the  civil  service  system  led  to  the  professionalization  of  the
administration.  From  that  moment  onwards,  the  administration  of  the  state  was
considered an apolitical task to be carried out by non-partisan, politically neutral civil
servants. Remarkably, the constitution of the modern administrative state was predicated
on depoliticization,  hence enshrining one of  the  distinctive features  of  Early Public
Administration (EPA): the notion that administration and politics were distinct spheres
(a concept that would be later described by the literature as the politics-administration
dichotomy). 
In addition, this dissociation between politics and administration was not confined to the
federal  level.  This  section  now addresses  how the politics-administration  dichotomy
also  reached  the  municipal  sphere.  How  administration  came  to  be  secluded  from
politics is exemplified by the city of New York, in which professional groups and other
civil  society  associations,  concerned  with  the  lack  of  responsiveness  of  local
government,  initiated  a  movement  to  prevent  politics  from  interfering  in  the
management of the city. The precedent set by New York would later be transplanted to
several other cities scattered around the United States. 
Distrustful of political meddling in the city management, these groups propagated the
idea that the local government should be administered by professional experts, not by
elected politicians.  Thus,  the figure of the city-manager  came to replace that  of the
elected mayor. Usually an engineer, the city-manager embodied the anti-political vision
of administration and expressed the notion that experts were more apt than politicians to
rule. The rationale was that supplied with data and free from political interference, the
9 The model adopted in the United States was inspired by the English experience, which was
deemed very successful in lessening the influence of politics. Following the publication of
the Northcote-Trevelyan Report in 1854, the English civil service was also envisaged as an
attempt  to  eliminate  widespread  patronage  practices  by  carrying  out  a  merit-basis
recruitment process through open competition. 
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city-manager  was better  qualified to actualize the common good. Political  problems
were  interpreted  as  technical  issues  and  where  politics  failed,  management  would
succeed (Waldo, 1948; Lee, 1995; Keller, 2007). 
It would not take long before these local initiatives gained high visibility and awakened
the interest of other cities. They helped to generalize a view that experts acted on behalf
of  the  public  interest,  which  led  to  the  idea  that  an  apolitical  administration  was
consistent with democratic values. Embodying this vision, the creation of the New York
Bureau of Municipal Research in 1906 set an important precedent that would later be
disseminated to other cities of the United States.  The proliferation of these research
institutes attested to the strength of the idea of the city-manager. It also reflected the
faith  on scientific  management  to  replace politics  in  the  administration of  the local
government  (Waldo,  1948).  Their  philosophy  revealed  distaste  for  politics  and  a
preference  for  science  and expertise:  social  grievances  were no longer  perceived as
political issues, but as technical problems that required managerial solutions. Instead of
politics, which was inherently partisan, conflictive and biased, expertise would promote
progress,  efficiency  and  harmony.  Collective  issues,  which  had  been  previously
construed as political affairs, were now redefined as management questions (Lee, 1995).
Another  important  feature of  the city-manager  experience resided in  the notion that
corporate business should set the guiding principles of the administration. The idea that
management  techniques  employed  by  private  corporations  could  be  transplanted  to
public  administration  also  played  a  pivotal  role  in  the  formation  of  the  modern
administrative state. It also contributed to reinforce the notion that governmental affairs
could be conducted on a purely technical and apolitical basis10. As a result, the politics-
administration dichotomy also became entrenched in the municipal sphere.
The  separation  of  powers  was  effectively  eliminated  at  the  local  level  and  a
politics-administration  dichotomy  was  implemented  by  vesting  a  city-manager
appointed by the commission with all of the administrative power. The only non-
elected chief  executive in American political  history (the president  is  indirectly
elected via the electoral  college) was to  be filled on the basis  of  demonstrated
10 During public administration early years, it was common sense that the government could be
understood  as  a  business  corporation  with  the  political  leader  compared  to  the  chief
executive officer of a private company (Haber, 1964, p. 107).
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competence  that  would  increase  the  scope  of  administration  and  dramatically
reduce that of politics (Keller, 2007, p. 10).
Keller  (2007)  provides  an  illuminating  account  of  the  dichotomy  in  the  public
administration of the United States, pointing out decisive moments of its evolution. He
depicts, decade by decade, covering the period from 1880 until 1940, the progressive
managerialization  of  public  administration  and the  entrenchment  of  an anti-political
vision.  Table 1.1 below helps to  visualize the main episodes that contributed to the
consolidation of the dichotomy politics-administration.
Table 1.1 – Entrenching the dichotomy politics-administration: key episodes in the
public administration of the United States 
Decade Main episodes
1880s: 
intimations and 
foundations
 Reforms (e.g civil service system) to eradicate political corruption set the
scene for the creation of public administration
 Wilson  (1887)  called  for  a  businesslike  approach  to  government  that
would replace partisan politics
 Creation of Municipal Bureaus of Research that brought a managerial
orientation to local government
1890s: extension
of reforms
 Managerial-based  reforms  extended  to  various  policy  areas  (health,
housing, water, sewage)
 As forerunners of the dichotomy, municipal reform initiatives spurred by
businesslike mentality that strived to stymie political interference
1900s: 
transformation 
in practice
 Development  of  the  Commission-manager  form  of  government:
concentration  of  all  the  administrative  power  on the  (unelected)  city-
manager
 Politics is virtually suppressed and the dichotomy is established at the
local level; emphasis on science and morality; cities run by experts
 Bureaus of government research, which provided education and training
for reforms (which later became graduate courses), disseminate politics-
free, science-based applied research as replacement for local politics
1910s: 
intensification of
reforms
 Taylor’s scientific management principles are transferred to the public
sector  with  his  ideas  grounding  the  recommendations  of  the  Taft
Commission (1912)
 Establishment of the Committee on Practical Training for Public Service
 Universities begin to create public administration schools 
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1920s: 
deepening of the
dichotomy
 Publication of the first textbooks in public administration
 Important  reforms  at  the  national  level:  set  up  of  the  Bureau  of  the
Budget  and  the  General  Accounting  Office  driven  by  scientific
management principles
 Strengthening  of  the  dichotomy  by  the  ‘application  of  scientific
management to large-scale government organizations’ (p. 13)
1930s: rise of 
the 
administrative 
state
 The  dominant  vision  is  that  administrative  solutions  are  capable  of
solving societal problems
 Specialists in public administration apply scientific management to the
reorganization of executive branch
 Creation (in 1939) of the American Society for  Public Administration
(ASPA) and the Public Administration Review (PAR)
1940s: reflection
on the 
administrative 
state
 Demise of the classical orthodoxy: public administration searches for its
identity;  the  application  of  scientific  management  philosophy  is
questioned
 Acknowledgement  of  the  role  of  democratic  values  leading  to  the
problem of how management and democracy could be reconciled
 Growing  awareness  of  the  limitations  of  dichotomy  politics-
administration;  public  and  private  management  are  perceived  as
distinctive
Source: own elaboration based on Keller (2007)
This table reveals key episodes in the evolution of public administration in the United
States that contributed to enshrine the politics-administration dichotomy. Before moving
to the next section, which is dedicated to the analysis of the intellectual foundations of
public  administration,  it  is  convenient  to  make a  remark.  The fact  that  the politics-
administration dichotomy is best elucidated through the experience of the United States
should not lead to the conclusion that the dichotomy was a universal phenomenon. It is
worth briefly considering how the administration of the state in Europe took a different
path that was much more sensitive to the importance of political factors. Whereas in the
United States (and in England) administration had a strong anti-political connotation,
the type of administration practised in Europe was much less sceptical of politics. 
Stillman (1997) offers an illuminating account of these distinctions by depicting the
main differences between the models of public administration adopted in the United
States and in Europe. He suggests that their differences should be considered in the light
of their distinct perceptions of the role played by the state in the administration of public
34
affairs. Whereas the United States followed a deeply anti-state vision of administration
whose foundation was associated with management, Europe developed a state-centric
approach in which administration was intimately identified with law.
The main reason for these different perceptions of the importance of the state, Stillman
(1997) argues, is rooted in their diverse historical development. In the case of Europe,
the centrality of the state was connected to an enduring tradition that hearkened back to
ancient times. Besides, administrative studies existed for a long time and preceded the
advent of the modern state. They were first known as Cameralism (whose main focus
was the management of the king’s estate) and later, with the decline of the absolute state
and the rise of parliaments, the study of administration continued within the field of law,
with which it was largely identified. In short, the evolution of public administration in
Europe  was  state-centric,  and  administration  was  understood  as  intertwined  with
politics.  Hence,  the  European  experience  witnessed  nothing  similar  to  a  politics-
administration dichotomy.
In  contrast,  in  the  United  States,  public  administration  was  construed  as  a  field  of
management (Waldo, 1948). Public administration emerged as a series of bottom-up,
localist, and experimental reforms and showed a deep hostility to the state11. Besides an
anti-statist orientation, it paid less attention to history, and emphasized the importance
of the study of management in opposition to law. It praised efficiency in opposition to
the  raison d’état. Different from Europe, in which public administration was already
well entrenched, the history of the discipline in the United States has its roots in the late
nineteenth century and has faced a long-term struggle to consolidate its legitimacy and
to  define  its  identity.  It  is  convenient  to  depict  the  main  differences  between  both
traditions. As the table 1.2 below shows, there are remarkable differences between the
European and United States approaches to public administration.
11 After all, it is the absence of a sense of the state that has been the great hallmark of American
political culture (Skowronek, 1982, p. 3).
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Table 1.2 – The different traditions of public administration in Europe and in the United
States
Issue United States Europe
Name of the discipline Public administration Administrative sciences
Current status of the discipline Legitimacy and identity are continuously questioned Established
Framework of the discipline Assumes that there are principles of universal validity
Every country has its own 
version of public 
administration
Perception of the state Anti-statist State-centric
‘Inception’ of the discipline Late 19th century Rise of the absolute state (16
th 
and 17th centuries)
Historical origins of the 
discipline
Series of reforms (civil service
system, scientific 
management, city-manager)
Management of the king’s 
estate
First university chairs 
dedicated to the study of the 
discipline
1920s
Germany (polize wissenschaft) 
and France (science de la 
police) by the end of 18th 
century
Leading tradition influencing 
the discipline Management Law
Method of administrative 
logic
Bottom-up, inductive, 
empirical (e.g. case studies)
Top-down, deductive, 
theoretical
Politics-administration 
relationship
Dichotomy (administration as 
apolitical)
Intertwined (state-centric 
approach to public 
administration)
Source: own elaboration based on Stillman (1997)
From this  comparison between the  two traditions,  it  is  possible  to  conclude  that  in
Europe public administration (or rather  ‘administrative sciences’, as they were called)
was strongly connected with the state and thus administration and politics tend to be
envisaged as intertwined. In the case of the United States, in contrast, administration
emerged in opposition to politics and gave rise to the dichotomy. It is for this reason that
in order to grasp the nature of this dichotomy (and then later examine its limitations), it
is indispensable to investigate how public administration emerged as a field of inquiry
in the United States, which is the task of the next section.
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1.3 The theoretical foundations of EPA: the emergence of public administration as a
field of inquiry
This  chapter  has  so  far  described  the  dichotomy  politics-administration  from  the
perspective of the rise of the administrative state, in particular those reforms introduced
to  curb  political  corruption  and  eliminate  patronage  practices,  whose  origins  are
associated  with  Jackson’s  spoils  system.  As  discussed  earlier,  the  advent  of  a  civil
service system (at the federal level) and the dissemination of the city-manager model (at
the municipal level) aimed at protecting the administration of the government from the
encroachment  of  political  interference.  Different  from  what  happened  in  Europe,
politics and administration had been dichotomized. 
It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  the  dichotomy  politics-administration  was  not
confined to  the  ‘practice’ of  modern  administration.  As  will  be  now discussed,  the
dichotomy  also  became  a  theoretical  concern  in  the  emerging  field  of  public
administration.  With  theory  reflecting  practice,  public  administration  scholars
considered that administration and politics were two distinct analytical domains. The
idea  that  ‘administrative  questions  were  not  political  questions’ synthesizes  the
dominant thinking of EPA.
In order to grasp how politics and administration drifted apart, in the early studies of
public administration, it is worth examining the contribution of three seminal authors:
Woodrow Wilson (who proposed the dichotomy), Frederick Taylor (who invented the
method to actualize the dichotomy) and Luther Gulick (who implemented the method in
the government).
1.3.1 Woodrow Wilson: the theorization of the politics-administration dichotomy
The  politics-administration  dichotomy  that  underpinned  EPA  was  more  than  an
empirical phenomenon. With the inception of the discipline of public administration, the
dichotomized  view  penetrated  research  scholarship.  The  founding  fathers  of  public
administration expressed their acknowledgement that politics and administration were
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not  only  different  activities,  but  accordingly  argued  that  they  were  also  distinct
analytical domains. And, as will be shown later in this section, the first textbooks in
public administration also incorporated the dichotomized view in their analyses.
The publication of ‘The Study of Administration’ in 1887 by political scientist Woodrow
Wilson is largely acknowledged as having inaugurated the field of public administration
and  set  its  intellectual  cornerstones.  In  his  pioneering  article,  and  reflecting  the
dichotomy, Wilson argued that politics and administration were independent fields of
inquiry. He famously stated that administrative questions were not politics questions.
According  to  him,  ‘administration  lies  outside  the  proper  sphere  of  politics.
Administrative questions are not political questions’ (Wilson, 1887, p. 210).
In his view, the roles of politics and administration were distinct. Politics, which was
concerned with the definition of policies,  should set  the tasks for administration.  In
contrast, administration, which was subordinated to politics, had the responsibility of
implementing the policies.  Because politicians were elected by the people,  they had
legitimacy  to  decide  which  policies  were  most  appropriate.  For  their  turn,
administrators, who were not elected, should not have discretion to formulate policies.
Their duties were strictly technical.
Reflecting his appreciation for reforms that paved the way for the administrative state
(discussed in the previous section), Wilson contended that in order to attain the most
efficient execution of public policies, the administration of the government should be
organized according to the civil service system. In similar lines with Weber’s (1946)
classical study on bureaucracy, he claimed that hierarchy, neutrality, and specialization
were crucial for efficient performance of tasks (Fry, 1989). 
Wilson emphasized the importance of hierarchy to preclude politics and administration
from encroaching on each other’s spheres.  Hierarchy was crucial  to  ensure that  the
policies set by the political system would be accomplished without any distortion. If the
government was organized hierarchically, then the subordinates would have to comply
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with  the  commands  given  by  their  superiors.  Government  employees  would  act
neutrally, that is, fulfilling their duties without personal discretion. 
Although  hierarchy  was  necessary  for  protecting  the  administration  from  political
meddling, it  was not sufficient to ensure that its tasks would be performed with the
utmost  efficiency.  Wilson  argued  in  favour  of  the  development  of  a  science  of
administration  and contended  that  the  pursuit  of  efficiency could  be  more  properly
achieved through scientific  advice.  In  the absence of  a  science of  administration to
guide public administrators, he argued, they had to rely on sheer experience, trial-and-
error attempts in order to cope with the facts.
In his call for a science of public administration, Wilson (1887, p. 218) pointed out that
it already existed outside the United States12, particularly in France and Germany, where
it was very advanced. Wilson rejected the argument that because these countries were
autocratically  ruled,  their  administrative  models  were  not  applicable  to  democratic
governments.  In  his  view,  because  the  spheres  of  politics  and  administration  were
independent, techniques of administration could be transplanted without concern with
the type of regime13. 
Wilson justified the dissociation between administrative system and political regime by
arguing that ‘the legitimate ends of administration are the same’ (Wilson, 1887, p. 218)
whether the country is a  ‘monarchy or a republic, a tyranny or a democracy’. Hence,
politics  and administration are conceived as  independent  phenomena.  In his  famous
quote:
If I see a murderous fellow sharpening a knife cleverly, I can borrow his way of
sharpening the knife without borrowing his probable intention to commit murder
with it; and so, if I see a monarchist dyed in the wool managing a public bureau
well,  I  can learn his business methods without  changing one of my republican
12 Arguably,  for  Wilson,  the  science  of  administration  was  universal.  He  considered  that
knowledge  about  administration  was  interchangeable  between  countries.  Universality,
however, did not imply that administration was insensitive to specific contexts. In his view,
provided  that  it  could  be  adapted  to  national  particularities,  there  was  no  reason  why
successful administrative theories and practices could not be transferred between nations. 
13 ‘We can borrow the science of administration with safety and profit’, Wilson (1887, p. 219)
explains, ‘we have only to filter it through our constitutions, only to put it over a slow fire of
criticism and distil away its foreign gases’. 
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spots. He may serve his king; I will continue to serve the people; but I should like
to serve my sovereign as well as he serves his (Wilson, 1887, p. 220). 
Wilson went further than stating that politics and administration should be dissociated.
He  also  expressed  his  belief  that  a  science  of  administration  should  be  guided  by
managerial values. In his view, administration was not only apolitical but also business-
oriented.  ‘The field  of  administration  is  a  field  of  business’ which  entails  that  it  is
‘removed  from the  hurry  and  strife  of  politics’ (Wilson,  1887,  p.  209).  Besides,  a
science  of  administration  should  contribute  to  impart  a  business  mentality  in  the
government  and  ‘make its  business  less  unbusinesslike,  to  strengthen and purify its
organization, and to crown its duties with dutifulness’ (Wilson, 1887, p. 201).
In arguing that administration should follow a business orientation, Wilson suggested
that the management methods that were being developed for the industry could also be
beneficial to public administrators. In addition, as the next section shows, it would be in
the teachings of Frederick Taylor  and in  the strategies  of  Luther  Gulick that  public
administration would find organisational solutions to improve its efficiency. Together,
Taylor  and  Gulick,  contributed  to  make  the  politics-administration  dichotomy (that
Wilson so clearly theorized) fully operational in the government. 
1.3.2  Frederick  Taylor  and  Luther  Gulick:  the  operationalization  of  the  politics-
administration dichotomy
Although Wilson did mention that efficiency was the chief goal of administration, he
did  not provide  detailed  explanation  of  how it  could  be  empirically  achieved.  The
development  of  methods  and  techniques  to  operationalize  efficiency  in  business
organizations  was  carried  out  by Frederick  Taylor  who published his  Principles  of
Scientific  Management  in  1911.  The  translation  of  the  scientific  principles  of
management  from the  private  to  the  public  sector  would  be  later  accomplished  by
Luther  Gulick  in  the  late  1930s.  Initially,  this  section  discusses  Taylor’s  scientific
management.
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Taylor,  a  mechanical  engineer  by  profession,  realized  that  as  a  general  trend  the
industrial business sector lacked proper management techniques, and usually relied on
rules-of-thumb, if not on mere improvisation. Through his observations and experiments
(such as  his  famous time-and-motion  studies),  he set  the task of  devising  scientific
principles,  which  through  quantitative  measurement  and  systematic  testing,  would
indicate the one-best way to maximize the efficiency of the industrial process. 
Taylor  (1911)  realized  that  the  application  of  scientific  methods  to  the  factory
production was essential to increase its productivity. He argued that the key factor to the
efficient  performance  was  the  specialization  of  functions  (within  the  factory).  In
practice, the specialization of functions meant that the responsibilities of the manager
should be clearly distinguished from those of the line employees. In Taylor’s view, the
manager set the tasks and supervised their execution. 
First, the work process had to be carefully studied and planned. Then, when the main
stages of production were identified, they should be precisely and clearly communicated
to the line employees. The manager was responsible for explaining in detail how each
task  should  be  performed14.  What  was  important,  Taylor  ascertained,  was  that  the
worker should be spared the task of thinking15. Deprived of any discretion, the workers
should be strictly devoted to the execution of the commands spelled out by the manager.
The complete separation between manager and worker responsibilities was crucial to
ensure that the one-best way was achieved. Thus, the specialization of functions was an
indispensable step to improve organisational performance16.
It should be noted, however, that when Taylor developed his ideas he had in mind the
private  sector,  not  the  government.  Although  it  is  true  that  he  cooperated  in  some
14 This is why Taylor asserted that besides coordinating the production process, the manager
also played an educational role in the factory because he advised his subordinates on the best
way of accomplishing their job.
15 Because of this suggestion, Taylor would be later criticized for the de-humanizing effects of
scientific management.
16 But  efficiency could also be  encouraged by other  means.  Taylor  argued that  apart  from
technical  improvements  in  the  production  process,  employers  could  introduce  additional
incentives to foster the productivity of the organization. In particular, he proposed a wage
incentive system, in which the most productive workers would get compensation for their
exceptional performance.
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government studies and even held positions in the public sector, his philosophy was
originally  conceived  for  improving  the  performance  of  the  industry17.  Nevertheless,
given the increasing popularity of his methodology, it would not take long before his
scientific management penetrated into the government.
Taylor’s  principles  provided  a  solution  for  the  government’s  search  for  efficiency
techniques  capable  of  improving  its  performance.  In  fact,  the  adoption  of  Taylor’s
scientific tools reinforced the conviction that  politics was not  necessary for running
public affairs. Public problems could be construed as technical issues to be solved by
experts, thus helping to generalize the idea that a democratic government could dispense
with politics (Lee, 1995). Taylor’s scientific management fitted in conveniently in the
politics-administration dichotomy. 
Initially, scientific management was introduced at the local level, being influential in the
financial sector of public administration, particularly accounting, finance, and budgeting
(Stillman, 1998). It disseminated the idea that there was one-best way of performing
tasks, which once discovered (through systematic experiments and quantitative analysis)
would enable public organizations to achieve their missions with the utmost efficiency18.
The popularity of Taylor’s methods at the local level also encouraged its adoption by the
federal  government.  Notably,  the principles  of scientific  management  influenced the
recommendations of the President’s Commission on Economy and Efficiency set up by
President Taft in 1912 with the purpose of modernizing the administration of the federal
government.  In  fact,  one  of  the  major  goals  of  the  Commission  was  to  assess  the
viability of adopting business strategies to improve the efficiency of the government. In
17 Stillman (1998) corroborates that Taylor developed his analysis for the business sector but
was highly influential in the public administration: ‘He worked entirely in the business sector
and had few good things to say about government, yet his scientific management doctrines
so thoroughly permeated public life that  few can claim to have left  a  greater  legacy for
shaping the origins and development of the modern administrative state’ (Stillman, 1998, p.
98-9).
18 It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  introduction  of  scientific  management  in  public
administration  was  considered  compatible  with  democratic  values.  The  advocates  of
scientific management suggested that by enabling the local government to make the best
feasible use of public resources the general interest was also being served. In this sense,
efficiency was construed as a vehicle of democracy, an instrument capable of actualizing the
will of the people.
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the  two  subsequent  decades,  Taylor’s  ideas  would  spread  throughout  the  federal
government  covering  an  extensive  range of  activities.  Public  administration  theorist
Leonard  White,  writing  in  the  late  1920s,  analysed  the  penetration  of  scientific
management in the government and noted that 
It can hardly be said that the scientific management has made great progress in
government  departments.  It  would  be  a  mistake,  however,  to  conclude  that  its
influence has been negligible. The constant refinement of methods in government
work,  the  invention  and  adoption  of  machine  operations,  the  development  of
standards,  all  reflect  in  substantial  measure  the  influence  of  the  exponents  of
scientific management (White, 1926, p. 16).
White’s  testimony  suggests  that  the  influence  of  scientific  management  though
significant was not still well entrenched in the government19. As mentioned earlier, the
adaptation of the principles of scientific management to the administrative apparatus of
the government was not the work of Taylor himself. It would be up to Luther Gulick,
both a scholar and a practitioner of public administration (Hughes, 2003, p. 31; Keller,
2007,  p.  13)  to  think  how  efficiency  methods  devised  for  the  industry  could  be
transposed to governmental agencies. What Taylor had previously done for the business
field,  Gulick  would  accomplish  for  public  administration.  Together  they  were
responsible for making the politics-administration dichotomy operational. 
This section now turns to the examination of Gulick’s contribution to EPA20. It discusses
how Gulick envisaged a new organisational ‘architecture’ for the federal government
that  contributed  to  entrench  the  principles  of  scientific  management  developed  by
Taylor. As an active participant in various groups of administrative reforms, especially
in the Brownlow Committee21 set up by President Roosevelt in the late 1930s, Gulick
19 Ten years later, in the Frontiers of Public Administration, whilst discussing the meaning of
principles in public administration, White (1936, p. 23) concluded that ‘in the United States
the  most  significant  effort  in  the  search  for  principles  is  that  of  the  Taylor  Society,
representing the scientific management movement’.
20 For insightful analyses on Gulick’s work see Fry (1989) and Van Riper (1998).
21 Gulick  was  one  of  the  three  members  of  the  President’s  Committee  on  Administrative
Management (also known as the Brownlow Committee), which had been set up to streamline
the  organization of  the  federal  government  of  the  United States  and devise  a  reform to
restore its administrative rationality. One of the main outcomes of this Committee was to
propose a revision of the organizational structure of the executive branch.
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faced the task of finding organisational solutions to streamline the federal government,
which was in profound disarray and confusion22. 
In one famous document (which later became an essay), titled  Notes on the theory of
organization, Gulick proposed the adoption of the principles of classical management –
specialization, hierarchy, unit of command – to the executive branch of the government.
He considered that if the government could discover the one-best way of carrying out its
tasks,  it  would eliminate  dysfunctions  and improve its  efficiency23.  By adapting the
principles of classical management to the federal government, Gulick was contributing
to make the politics-administration dichotomy operational. 
His  proposal  described  in  the  Notes encompassed  three  main  strategies.  First,  he
advocated that  the structure and functioning of  the government  should be based on
organizational principles – such as specialization, unity of command, hierarchy, control
and supervision – that were indispensable for increasing the rationality and efficiency of
administration. Second, he emphasized the importance of developing mechanisms of
coordination so that all functions of the government could be harmoniously integrated24.
Third, he recommended concentration of power in the hands of the executive branch –
which he designated as ‘executive leadership’ – arguing that the legislative was less apt
to devise policy planning. Moreover, this leadership, Gulick insisted, should be based
on  the  principles  of  scientific  management  as  a  condition  for  the  attainment  of
maximum efficiency. 
22 In  the  1930s,  in  an  attempt  to  make  the  economy recover  from the  Great  Depression,
Roosevelt  launched the  New Deal.  A new set  of  public  agencies  were  created  to  boost
development with the effect of greatly enhancing the size of the public sector. In the absence
of  a  rational  plan  to  coordinate  the  roles  of  the  newly  created  agencies,  the  federal
government went into disarray. The multiplicity of organizations gave rise to duplication of
functions  with  various  agencies  performing  similar  tasks,  which  generated  conflict  of
responsibilities, disorganization and inefficiency.
23 Gulick retained Taylor’s idea that there is one-best way of performing tasks that maximize
administrative efficiency. In fact, he championed the value of efficiency, which for him was
‘the number one axiom’ of public administration (Hughes, 2003, p. 33).
24 The absence of coordination,  Gulick warned,  could lead to dysfunctional  results  such as
administrative conflict between departments that hampered the achievement of efficiency. In
this  sense,  he  suggested  that  ‘if  subdivision  of  work  is  inescapable  [specialization],  co-
ordination becomes mandatory’ (Gulick, 1937, p. 6).
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Gulick  averred  that  the  introduction  of  these  three  components  –  principles  of
management,  mechanisms  of  coordination,  executive  leadership  –  in  the  federal
government would eliminate organizational dysfunctions and increase the performance
of the administration. Particularly important in Gulick’s scheme was the role ascribed to
the President, which he compared with the role of the chief executive officer (CEO) of a
corporation. In his view, the Presidential Office should perform a series of functions that
were designated by the acronym POSDCORB and comprised:
1. Planning, definition of the goals and methods to be achieved by the agency;
2. Organizing, ‘establishing of a formal structure of authority’;
3. Staffing, selection and training of the workers;
4. Directing, decision-making process of the organization;
5. Coordinating, harmonizing the activities of the different work units;
6. Reporting, keeping the chief executive well informed and updated;
7. Budgeting, ‘fiscal planning, accounting and control’ (Gulick, 1937, p. 13).
The  adoption  of  POSDCORB,  Gulick  believed,  would  restore  the  rationality  and
improve the efficiency of the federal government. His ideas gained notoriety not only
inside  the  government  but  also in  academia and came later  to  be celebrated as  the
orthodoxy of the field (Keller, 2007, p. 13). By translating the principles of classical
management to the organization of the federal government, he further contributed to the
operationalization of the politics-administration dichotomy25. 
The dichotomy – in theory and in practice – became embedded in public administration.
Conceptualized  by Wilson,  instrumentalized  (for  the  industry)  by Taylor’s  scientific
management, and devised (for the government) as organizational reform by Gulick, the
politics-administration dichotomy was both a practice and a theory. As a practice, it was
25 Gulick  (1937,  p.  10)  argued  that  politics  and  administration  should  be  separated,  thus
expressing sympathy for the dichotomy: ‘we are faced here by two heterogeneous functions,
“politics” and “administration”, the combination of which cannot be undertaken within the
structure of the administration without producing inefficiency’. On Gulick’s vision of the
relation between politics and administration, see Justice and Miller (2007, p. 276).
45
pervasive in modern administrative institutions. As a theory, as the next section shows,
it was widely discussed within the discipline of public administration.
1.3.3  The  entrenchment  of  the  dichotomy:  illustrations  from  EPA’s  textbooks  and
classical studies
This chapter has argued that the dissociation between politics and administration has
both empirical roots and theoretical underpinnings. Empirically, it has suggested that the
rise  of  the  administrative  state  was  predicated  on  the  exclusion  of  politics  from
administration (illustrated for instance by the adoption of a civil service system). On the
theoretical side, by alluding to the influential ideas of Wilson, Taylor and Gulick, it has
noted  how  these  theorists  have  contributed  to  formulate  (Wilson)  and  then
operationalize  (Taylor  and  Gulick)  the  dichotomy.  It  is  convenient  at  this  point  to
discuss how the dichotomy was accepted and disseminated by the first-generation of
EPA scholars. 
This ‘exegetic’ exercise serves two purposes. First, it offers evidence that the dichotomy
was incorporated in the first textbooks produced by the discipline. Second, it makes
clear the central role played by the dichotomy in the writings of EPA scholars. In fact,
the dichotomy was conceived as crucial to define the identity and purpose of public
administration. Next,  a series of quotations extracted from EPA’s first textbooks and
classical  studies  will  be  presented.  They  will  help  to  show  how  widespread  and
entrenched the politics-administration dichotomy was.
Frank Goodnow, in 1900, wrote his Politics and Administration: A Study in Government
in which he divided the responsibilities of politics (to establish the will of the state) and
administration  (to  execute  the  will  of  the  state).  The  dichotomy  is  explicit  in  his
writings:
There are then in all governmental systems two primary or ultimate functions of
government, viz.: the expression of the will of the state and the execution of that
will. There are also in all state separate organs, each of which is mainly busied with
the discharge of one of these functions. These functions are, respectively, politics
and administration (Goodnow, 1900, p. 12).
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The  first  textbooks  in  the  field  of  public  administration  explicitly  recognized  the
dichotomy.  Leonard  White,  in  his  pioneering  study,  published  originally  in  1926,
conceived of politics and administration as independent realms. In his view, politics was
concerned with the formulation of policies, whereas administration was responsible for
their implementation. 
Most administrative action can be summed up by saying that it is the application of
the law to individual cases on the basis of specific rules and regulations intended to
guide and restrict  the  discretion  of  officials.  Their  work  is  normally subject  to
reasonably clear differentiation from policy making, which is the primary function
of legislative bodies; and from adjudication, which is the primary function of the
courts. Administration is usually no more than the application of public policy to
the particular case, the characteristic function of the executive branch (White, 1926,
p. 9).
Law  provides  the  immediate  framework  within  which  public  administration
operates ... While, therefore, law is not administration, it has a powerful influence
upon  administration.  Law  is  the  formulation  of  policy;  administration  is  its
execution (White, 1926, p. 11).
Similarly,  Willoughby  who  published  his  influential  manual  Principles  of  Public
Administration in 1927 acknowledged the dichotomy, and noted that with the advent of
the  administrative  state  the  problem  of  public  administration  had  precedence  over
electoral and legislative politics. He considered that 
The whole problem of government has largely shifted from that of the organization
and  operation  of  the  electoral  and  legislative  branches  of  government  through
which the popular will is formulated and expressed to that of the organization and
operation of the administrative branch through which this will as thus determined is
actually put into execution ... But it can hardly be questioned that, as regards our
national government at least, the great political problem now confronting us is that
of securing economy and efficiency in the actual administration of governmental
affairs (Willoughby, 1927, p. viii).
White’s and Willoughby’s textbooks, however, were not the only ones to mention the
dichotomy.  In  his  text  Public  Administration,  originally  published in  1935,  Pfiffner
clearly  showed  how  the  objective  of  public  administration  was  predicated  on  the
dichotomy. Noticeably, politics is construed as a source of disturbance that interferes
negatively with the efficient administration of the government. According to him,
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Every discipline has a theoretical foundation and basic ideology. The keystone for a
study of public administration is the distinction between the concepts of politics
and administration ... From these premises, therefore, is derived the keystone of the
new public administration - the conclusion that politics should stick to its policy-
determining sphere and leave administration to apply its own technical processes
free from the blight of political meddling. This two-way division of governmental
powers is a practical operating principle (Pfiffner, 1949, p. 21).
Furthermore,  another  influential  scholar,  Marshall  Dimock,  subscribed  to  the
dichotomy. Remarkably, he sustained that the separation of the functions of politics and
administration was an outcome of the emergence of representative government and the
democratic regime. He argued that  ‘under monarchy a clear line between policy and
execution  was hard  to  draw’ but  in  democratic  societies,  these  functions  had to  be
distinguished and ‘definite distinction between policy formulation and execution’ had to
be established26:
In early governments the formation of policy and the carrying out of law were
placed in the same hands ... But a clear line was not drawn between the formulation
of law and its execution, nor did public administration receive particular notice or
study  as  such.  However,  the  development  of  democracy  and  representative
government has meant a division of governmental labour and a specialization of
function (Dimock, 1936a, p. 3).
Larry Walker, who wrote another important textbook in public administration, published
in 1937, also stated his view on the relationship between politics and administration,
which  he  depicted  as  fundamentally  dichotomous.  Moreover,  in  line  with  Wilson’s
advocacy  of  a  business  mentality  in  public  administration,  Walker  emphasized  the
importance of expertise to conduct the administration of the government.
There are only two phases to any business, public or private. One is to make the
decision as to what is to be done. That is legislation. The other is to see that the
decision  is  carried  out.  That  is  administration.  For  the  legislative  function,
representatives  are  needed,  and  the  process  of  election  is  appropriate.  For  the
administrative function, experts are needed, and the only method of securing them
which has proved successful is that of appointment under a merit system (Walker,
1937, p. 15-16 cited by Waldo, 1948, p. 115-116).
26 It should be noted, however, that in spite of the separation between policy formulation and
execution  in  modern  representative  democracies,  Dimock  (1936b)  concludes  that  public
administrators  are  granted  vast  opportunities  to  yield  their  discretion.  On  the  topic  of
administrative  discretion  within  Early Public  Administration  (EPA)  scholarship,  see  also
Dimock and Dimock (1953) and Lynn (2001a, 2001b).
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These excerpts suggest how widespread the acceptance of the politics-administration
dichotomy was. They also point out to the importance of the dichotomy for the identity
of  public  administration.  Indeed,  the  fate  of  the  dichotomy and the  discipline  were
intertwined. As discussed in the next section, when the dichotomy became discredited,
the very foundations of the discipline of public administration came into question.
1.4 The demise of EPA: the discredit of the politics-administration dichotomy
The decade of the 1940s was a period of reflection for public administration. A decade
earlier,  with  the  advent  of  the  interventionist  state,  doubts  were  raised  about  the
feasibility of the dichotomy. In the aftermath of the Great Depression, the government
exerted  an  active  role  in  the  economy with  public  agencies  not  only implementing
policies,  but  also  formulating  them.  The  fact  that  public  agencies  made  political
decisions,  which had previously been interpreted as  a  prerogative of the legislative,
raised conceptual difficulties for those who advocated the dichotomy.
According to Keller (2007), the field started soul-searching in an attempt to rethink its
identity.  At  the  roots  of  the  revision  was  the  acknowledgement  that  the  politics-
administration  dichotomy was  problematic  and  unrealistic.  Three  theorists  played  a
major  contribution  in  denouncing  the  limitations  of  public  administration  as  an
academic  discipline.  Their  critiques  are  now  examined.  While  Simon  and  Dahl
contended that public administration’s credentials as a science were debatable, Waldo
pointed  out  that  once  the  politics-administration  dichotomy  was  recognized  as
untenable,  the  discipline  of  public  administration had to  redefine  its  own analytical
foundations.
1.4.1 Questioning the scientificity of EPA: Simon’s devastating blow
Herbert  Simon  formulated  a  critique  that  undermined  the  underpinnings  of  public
administration by showing that its principles were incompatible. He claimed that the
discipline  did  not  meet  scientific  standards  because  it  lacked  sound  theoretical
foundations. In 1947, Simon (1976) published his book  Administrative Behaviour,  in
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which  he  set  out  the  task  of  defining  the  grounds  of  a  science  of  administration.
According to him, if (public) administration aspired to be a science, it should adopt a
new subject of analysis. Instead of focusing on the so-called principles of administration
–  specialization,  unity  of  command,  span  of  control,  organization  – a  science  of
administration should in his view concentrate on decision-making.
By proposing to  change the subject  from principles  to  decision-making,  Simon was
challenging the core of EPA. As discussed earlier, not only Wilson, Taylor and Gulick,
but also several other public administration theorists subscribed to the notion that the
principles were central to EPA. This section examines why Simon advocated a science
of administration grounded on decision-making by discussing three main aspects of his
critique:  i)  the  fallacious  foundations  of  Early Public  Administration  (EPA);  ii)  the
positivistic solution and the fact-value divide; iii) the nature of administrative rationality
(as opposed to the economic).
In relation to the first point, Simon suggested that the theoretical foundations of EPA
were problematic, especially because the principles of public administration were not
scientific. In his text ‘The Proverbs of Administration’, Simon (1946) claimed that the
so-called principles were mere ‘proverbs’. The main problem with the principles resided
in their mutual incompatibility. He considered that ‘for almost every principle one can
find an equally plausible and acceptable contradictory principle’ (Simon, 1946, p. 53).
The simultaneous  application of  the  principles  – e.g.  hierarchy and specialization –
could  produce  inefficiency  because  they  were  conflicting27.  In  Simon’s  view,  EPA
theorists  mistakenly assumed that  all  principles  were  mutually compatible  and their
joint implementation would inevitably lead to an efficient administration. He challenged
this claim and asserted that the lack of consistency among the principles thwarted the
scientificity of public administration. 
27 Simon sustained that commonly accepted principles of administration could be conflicting
because they presupposed different organizational attitudes. For instance, the principle of
specialization requires decisions to be made by whoever possesses expertise, whereas the
principle of  hierarchy dictates that  decisions  should be taken by the highest  hierarchical
level. 
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Simon contended that  the  inconsistency of  the  principles  created  an  impasse  in  the
administrative theory. He suggested that instead of principles they should be interpreted
as  ‘criteria for describing and diagnosing administrative situations’ (Simon, 1946, p.
62). By downgrading the principles to descriptors, Simon intimated that they were not
sufficient analytical  foundations to  establish a  scientific framework that  could guide
administrative behaviour. How did Simon then propose to restore the scientific character
of public administration? 
Simon explained that if public administration aimed at being regarded as a scientific
discipline, it should reform its methodology of inquiry. He proposed that a science of
administration  should  adopt  reliable  methodological  procedures,  such  as  systematic
testing of hypothesis, which would enable the confirmation or rejection of statements.
The adoption of a sound methodology equipped administration to accept  only those
theories that had been satisfactorily tested. ‘These concepts, to be scientifically useful’,
he wrote,  ‘must be operational; that is, their meanings must correspond to empirically
observable  facts  or  situations’ (Simon,  1946,  p.  62).  Thus,  for  Simon,  public
administration  lacked  sound  analytical  foundations  –  because  the  principles  were
mutually  incompatible  –  and  only  the  shift  to  a  new  methodology  would  confer
scientificity  to  the  discipline.  But  which  methodology  did  Simon  advise  (public)
administration to embrace? 
In Simon’s view, a positivistic methodological approach was appropriate for the science
of administration. He argued that the model of scientificity for public administration
could  be  found  in  logical  positivism28.  One  of  the  advantages  of  a  positivistic
methodology  resided  in  its  ability  to  distinguish  between  facts  and  values.  The
separation between facts and values, Simon argued, was essential to allow empirical
tests of concepts. By focusing only on the facts – and therefore disregarding the values –
public administration would operate scientifically29. Evidently, by confining science to
28 Furthermore,  Simon  (1976)  argues  that  proper  administrative  research  is  empirical  and
follows  a  positivistic  approach:  ‘The  ground  of  first  principles  of  administration  at  the
philosophical level have already been established – logical positivism’ (1976, p. 45).
29 Simon (1976) clarifies that factual decisions are those that involve the implementation of
goals, where value judgements are those decisions that lead toward the selection of final
goals.
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the  domain  of  the  empirical,  value-laden  theories  were  dismissed.  This  was  not  a
problem, because for Simon normative problems and ethical judgements were outside
the scientific scope. To be sure, in his view, administrative sciences were  ‘concerned
purely with factual statements’ since ‘there is no place for ethical assertions in the body
of a science’ (Simon, 1976, p. 253). 
Apart from his methodological considerations, Simon (1976) raised another important
issue.  He contended that  if  (public)  administration aspired to  be scientific  it  should
embrace a new subject: decision-making. For Simon the contribution of administration
should  be  the  understanding  of  how  individuals  take  decisions  in  organisational
contexts. 
In  order  to  investigate  decision-making,  Simon  warned  about  the  importance  of
avoiding unrealistic assumptions,  such as the  ‘economic man’ (sic). In his view, the
main  problem  with  this  concept  resided  in  its  lack  of  recognition  of  how  human
rationality operates.  The  ‘economic man’ was a fiction that distorted the analysis  of
decision-making processes. It mistakenly assumed that individuals had a complete set of
preferences, and they possessed complete information. In the empirical world, however,
these conditions were not verified leading to the conclusion that the ‘economic man’ did
not provide an accurate description of human behaviour. 
According to Simon, the ‘administrative man’ was a more reliable concept that reflected
actual human behaviour. In contrast to the ‘economic man’, the ‘administrative man’
was  defined  as  having  only  partial  information  over  the  choices  available  for  his
decision.  Besides,  the  ‘administrative  man’  did  not  examine  all  the  possibilities
pertinent to a particular problem, but only few of them30 (Simon, 1976, p. 79). This
characterization, Simon suggested, was a more realistic rendering of how individuals
behaved in organizations in every day life. 
30 Simon used the expression ‘satisficing’ to indicate that decisions resulted from the analysis
of a small number of alternatives. Due to cognitive and organizational restraints, decision-
makers concentrate their attention only on a limited range of possibilities. Limitations of
time, information, financial resources prevent decision-makers from achieving the ‘optimal
solution’ that would require the exhaustive investigation of every possible alternative.
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In essence, Simon’s critique of the scientificity of public administration involved three
central  arguments.  First,  the  rejection  of  the  principles,  which  were  internally
inconsistent,  and  contrary  to  what  EPA theorists  believed,  did  not  lead  to  efficient
results. Second, the introduction of a positivistic methodology grounded on a fact-value
divide that would enable theoretical claims to be empirically tested. Third, the adoption
of  a  new  subject  –  the  ‘administrative  man’ –  was  better  suited  to  reflect  actual
organizational behaviour.
As Ostrom (1973) put it,  Simon’s indictment of EPA was a ‘devastating blow’. The
discipline would have to reconstruct its foundations in order to convincingly acquire
scientific status. Simon, however, was not alone in his scepticism over the scientificity
of public administration. As shown next, Robert Dahl also raised doubts about many of
its assumptions.
1.4.2 Dahl’s critique: public administration as value-laden, contextual-based research 
In  ‘The Science of Public Administration: Three Problems’, Dahl (1947) argued that
public administration’s scientific aspirations were unwarranted. Taking issue with the
politics-administration  dichotomy,  Dahl  criticized  the  attempt  to  build  a  science  of
administration  that  completely ignored  political  values  and moral  considerations.  In
democratic societies, Dahl noted, individuals and decision-makers could freely choose
among competing different ends. Therefore, administration could hardly be dissociated
from politics since the selection of the means (administration) was dependent upon the
preference  for  particular  ends  (politics).  Dahl  (1947)  considered  that  the  politics-
administration dichotomy was untenable because facts and values could not be entirely
dissociated.  In  his  view,  political  and  ethical  questions  were  always  present  in
administrative decision-making.
For Dahl, and contrary to Simon’s positivistic beliefs, it was impossible to completely
eliminate normative evaluations from factual statements. Dahl (1947) noted that EPA
aspired to be a science capable of discovering universal laws. Drawing inspiration from
the natural sciences, the principles of EPA were interpreted as independent of moral and
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political issues and insensitive to cultural and social contexts. These assumptions, Dahl
observed,  were  problematic.  In  his  appraisal  of  EPA’s  scientificity,  he  raised  three
objections against the capacity of the field to produce principles of universal validity.
The first  problem was the difficulty of eliminating normative values from analytical
statements. He took issue with the concept of efficiency, which was (and still  is by
many) regarded as the cornerstone of administration. Theorists such as Walker (1937)
highlighted  the  benefits  reaped  by  states  when  their  administrative  apparatus  was
reorganized according to efficiency principles. The problem, as Dahl pointed out, was
that there were values other than efficiency that could be prioritized. After all,  Dahl
asked, why should efficiency be awarded primacy in the studies of administration? He
noted  that  in  pluralist  regimes,  there  were  always  competing  values  (e.g.  equality,
justice),  and  efficiency  was  only  one  among  many.  For  Dahl,  it  was  unclear  why
efficiency should be considered, as Gulick (1937) proposed, the ‘axiom number one in
the scale of administration’. Cleverly, he raised the question of whether the preference
for efficiency was not in itself a normative evaluation. 
Normative  judgements  were  even  more  important  in  public  administration  than  in
private administration. Dahl chastised those theorists who conflated both disciplines and
averred  that  ‘the  basic  problems  of  public administration  as  a  discipline  and  as  a
potential  science  are  much wider  than  the  problems of  administration’ (1947,  p.  2;
italics in the original). In his view, the discipline of public administration was inevitably
involved in the consideration of ethical values. Social ends are disputable in democratic
societies because political values tend to be pluralistic. Since public administration is
concerned with both means and ends, it cannot avoid making normative choices.
The second objection raised against the aspiration of public administration to formulate
laws of universal validity resided in the fact that it  ignored actual human behaviour.
Dahl criticized public administration for neglecting what he designated as the  ‘human
factor’. He argued that by  focusing only on abstract administrative principles, public
administration  forgot  to  take  into  account  the  actual  behaviour  of  the  individuals
involved.  If  the  attitude  of  real  people  were  considered,  then  public  administration
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would come to recognize that it could not possibly elaborate universal laws. For Dahl,
laws  of  universal  validity  could  not  be  formulated  because  human  conduct  was
exceedingly complex, unpredictable and irrational.
There  is  yet  a  third  problem  mentioned  by  Dahl  in  his  critique  of  the  purported
scientificity  of  public  administration.  It  concerned  the  lack  of  attention  to  context
evinced by most theories in the field of public administration. One implication of this
insensitivity to context was the presumption that administrative principles that worked
for one particular culture would be valid for another. For Dahl there was no basis for
assuming that principles that were successful in one context, if replicated, would also be
successful  elsewhere.  Due  to  the  limitations  imposed  by  specific  contexts,  Dahl
encouraged public administration to follow a comparative approach. 
These three objections led Dahl (1947, p. 11) to conclude that ‘we are a long way from a
science of public administration’. In many ways, this was also the opinion of another
influential scholar in the field of public administration, Dwight Waldo, whose critique
of the dichotomy is discussed next.
1.4.3 The discredit of the politics-administration dichotomy: Waldo’s view
Another important critique of EPA was formulated by American theorist Dwight Waldo,
whose  book  The  Administrative  State  published  in  1948  rejected  the  notion  that
administration could be thoroughly dissociated from politics. The subtitle of his book
sheds light on his theoretical perspective: A Study of the Political Theory of American
Public Administration. In order to understand his critique of the dichotomy, this section
summarizes some of his key ideas on this topic.
Waldo (1948) defined the dichotomy as a divide between decision and execution in
policy-making, and argued that for a long time it provided a formula for EPA orthodoxy.
For Waldo, however, this untenable division became clear when the following type of
questions were raised: how should administrators proceed when the law was not clear?
How should administrators  decide  when their  private  judgement  differed from their
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public  responsibility?  Waldo  concluded  that  answers  for  these  questions  required
transcending the politics-administration dichotomy. 
For Waldo, the dichotomy that pervaded the orthodoxy of public administration was
problematic and deserved critical scrutiny. Thus, he contended that 
either as a description of the facts or a scheme of reform, any simple division of
government into politics-and-administration is inadequate. As a description of fact
it is inadequate because the governing process is a ‘seamless web of discretion and
action’. As a scheme of reform it is inadequate because it bears the same defect as
the tripartite scheme [the separation of powers between the Executive, Legislative,
and Judiciary branches] it was designed to replace: it carries with it  the idea of
division, of dissimilarity, of antagonism (Waldo, 1948, p. 128).
Waldo  (1948)  explained  that  the  politics-administration  dichotomy  was  a  working
formula  that  allowed  the  conciliation  of  democratic  values  with  the  search  for
efficiency. By segregating administration from politics, the dichotomy entrusted only
politicians with power to decide while denying any discretion to administrators. This
was coherent in a democratic regime, in which the citizens voted for their leaders but
not for public officials. By being excluded from the decisional process, administration
could  concentrate  exclusively  on  the  means,  namely  the  efficient  performance  of
administrative tasks. In this sense, Waldo noted, the formula was thought as a way of
conciliating the search for efficiency within the broader framework of a representative
government. 
In reality, Waldo insisted, instead of a politics-administration dichotomy, what happened
was  the  suppression  of  politics.  In  the  case  of  the  city-manager,  for  instance,  all
decisional powers concentrated in the hands of unelected experts. Decisions were taken
and implemented by the same body. This represented an abolition of the separation of
powers.  Experts  were  empowered  to  decide  not  only the  means  but  also  the  ends.
Surprisingly,  the  centralization  of  political  power  in  administrative  agents  was  not
deemed undemocratic, because it was supposed that experts aimed at the public good. In
order to control the performance of the manager, institutional mechanisms were created
to ensure accountability and respect for the public thus protecting the citizens ‘against
administrative incompetence, dishonesty, and aggrandizement’ (Waldo, 1948, p. 37). In
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spite  of  these  forms  of  oversight,  the  city-manager  formula  undoubtedly  implied  a
violation of the principle of separation of powers.
In his extensive review of the literature in the field of public administration, Waldo
concluded that the pervasive presence of the dichotomy suggested the existence of an
‘orthodoxy’ in the field of public administration. Thus he explained that ‘almost without
exception the writers accept it as plain fact that there are but two parts or functions in
the  governmental  process:  decision  and  execution,  politics  and  administration;  that
administration is a realm of expertise from which politics can be and should be largely
excluded’ (Waldo,  1948,  p.  115).  In  Waldo’s  view,  however,  the  dichotomy  was
increasingly perceived as problematic, which generated ‘a feeling that the processes and
the study of administration have matured, that they no longer need be isolated from the
germs of politics. Administration can even think about invading the field of politics, the
field of policy determination’ (Waldo, 1948, p. 121).
Recognizing that the dichotomy was untenable, a new literature – which Waldo aptly
named the ‘rise of the heterodoxy’ – had emerged. It emphasized that the government
should be regarded as a unity and thus politics and administration belonged together
within this unity. Therefore, politics and administration were envisaged as components
of a larger structure. The challenge now was how to integrate them. In Waldo’s view, the
heterodox vision showed great awareness that political problems were administrative
problems as well as that administrative problems were political problems.
Waldo’s main contribution to the debate about the fall of EPA resided not only in the
acknowledgement  that  the  dichotomy  was  no  longer  sustainable  but  also  in  the
recognition  that  the  challenge  was  how to  integrate  politics  and administration.  He
concluded his book with the warning that the demise of the dichotomy entailed the
enlargement of the scope of public administration: ‘In any event, if abandonment of the
politics  administration  formula  is  taken  seriously,  if  the  demands  of  present  world
civilization upon public administration are met, administrative thought must establish a
working relationship with every major province in the realm of human learning’ (Waldo,
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1948,  p.  212).  When politics  and administration are thought  together,  Waldo noted,
public administration has to expand its intellectual concerns beyond technical issues. 
The death of the dichotomy also represented the decay of EPA as a discipline. In theory
and  in  practice,  there  was  a  growing  acceptance  that  politics  and  administration
overlapped and could not be completely dissociated. The field of government studies
underwent a period of self-reflection and soul-searching (Keller, 2007). Although to this
day scholarship  still  debates  the  dichotomy politics-administration,  the  principles  of
EPA  have  long  been  dismissed  as  an  inaccurate  representation  of  how  public
administration  effectively  operates31.  In  the  meantime,  a  new  paradigm  was  being
forged. The emergence of Policy Analysis is the topic of chapter 2.
31 Recent  debates about  the validity and explanatory potential  of  the politics-administration
dichotomy have been carried out by Svara (1985, 2001 and 2006) and Overeem (2005). See
also Van Riper (1987).
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Chapter 2 – Policy Analysis (PA): expertise as substitute for politics?
2.1 Introduction
In  the  early  1940s,  serious  doubts  were  raised  about  the  viability  of  Early  Public
Administration  (EPA)  as  a  sound  and  coherent  approach.  A  theory  of  public
administration was increasingly perceived as lacking sound principles, with its (self-
ascribed) scientificity largely discredited. On the practical side, there was recognition
that  new  tools  of  administration  were  required  to  equip  governments  to  face  their
complex challenges. In theory and practice,  a growing acknowledgement that public
administration’s concepts and techniques were inadequate opened the field to alternative
views of public policy.
As EPA was declining as a field of academic research and as a practical orientation to
government,  a  new set  of  ideas  about  policy-making  were  gaining  momentum and
would in future decades be disseminated initially in the United States, and later on in
Europe.  These  innovative  ideas  were  first  developed  as  a  series  of  quantitative
methodologies – known as operations research and systems analysis – applied in the
military  sector  during  the  Second  World  War.  Because  of  their  highly  successful
contribution  to  the  military  performance,  operations  research  and  systems  analysis
gained notoriety in academic circles and in the government. 
Policy  Analysis  (PA),  a  groundbreaking  framework  that  combined  mathematical
modelling  with  a  broader  strategic  emphasis,  emerged  as  an  offshoot  of  operations
research and systems analysis. The main appeal of PA was the possibility of harnessing
the benefits of science and technology to enlighten the process of decision-making in
the government. Although initially restricted to the field of national security, advocates
of PA suggested that its techniques could be expanded to other policy areas. The first
attempts  to  apply PA to non-military governmental  agencies  hark back to  the  early
1960s.
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One basic assumption of PA – which is the second paradigm analysed in this thesis –
was  that  its  scientificity  would  make  it  more  rigorous  and  reliable  than  previous
attempts,  particularly  Early  Public  Administration  (EPA).  In  contrast  to  public
administration’s focus on hierarchy and organizational control, PA concentrated on the
application  of  scientific  knowledge  to  improve  the  quality  of  the  policy  process.
Departing from concerns with personnel, hierarchical structures, organizational charts,
typical  of  public  administration,  the  emerging Policy Analysis  (PA) emphasized  the
importance  of  the  thriving  developments  of  science  and technology to  improve  the
rationality of the governmental action.
The comparison with public administration is fruitful in other aspects as well. As was
discussed  in  chapter  1,  Early Public  Administration  (EPA) attempted  to  set  a  sharp
demarcation  between politics  and administration  and proposed that  public  problems
could be solved by the application of pure administrative means. A similar mistrust for
politics is found throughout the history of PA. Politics was regarded by the advocates of
PA as the realm of sub-optimal solutions in which negotiation, bargaining and conflict
prevailed.  This  chapter  will  attempt  to  show that  PA not  only purported  to  offer  a
scientific orientation to governmental administration, but it also denigrated the value of
politics. Some versions of PA assumed that the penetration of scientific knowledge in
the process of governmental decision-making would eliminate the need for politics. In
fact, this is a claim very similar to that proffered by EPA theorists. The depreciation of
politics seems nonetheless surprising because of the growing recognition that politics
and administration were inevitable intermingled. 
The attempt to overcome the political dimension was recurrently justified in terms of
the rise  of science and technology.  After all,  in  the knowledgeable society,  as Lane
(1966) put it, advanced scientific tools and sophisticated technological devices created
conditions  for  the transcendence of  politics  and ideology.  Along similar  lines,  Price
(1965, p. 222) argued in his book The Scientific Estate that ‘now that great issues turn
on new scientific discoveries far too complicated for politicians to comprehend many
people doubt that representative institutions can still do their job’. Commenting on the
increasing  ‘esoteric  nature  of  the  scientific  processes’,  he  asked  ‘can  the  elected
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representatives  of  the  people  maintain  control  over  the  major  decisions  of  the
government?’. 
Other scholars were more optimistic – among them Harold Lasswell, the founder of PA
– and believed that the unprecedented scientific and technical development meant that
governments  could  entrust  their  decisions  to  experts  who  possessed  the  skills  and
methodologies to prescribe the best remedies to cure the illnesses of society. PA was,
Parsons (2005, p. 20) observed, ‘in all essentials a belief in social science as a form of
engineering or medicine’. 
The attempt to exclude politics was not inconsequential. On the contrary, the aversion of
PA to politics was one of the factors that propelled its decline. As Deleon (1988) noted,
the  expectation  that  social  problems  could  be  addressed  by purely technical  means
ended up in frustration and disappointment. After a period of experimentation, it became
clear that the government could not rely entirely in PA as a decision-making tool. The
ambitions of PA contrasted to its achievements, leading to an important reflection on its
limitations. Sharing a similar fate to Early Public Administration (EPA), it turned out
that (among other problems) the insistent denial of politics constrained the viability of
its project. By the late 1960s, the difficulties of PA were evident, thus contributing to the
search for alternative models and paradigms. Scholars would note that this scepticism
was felt by both politicians and experts:
The use of policy analysis and policy evaluation to shape public decisions has often
been similarly frustrated ... Such disappointments became more numerous as the
volume  of  policy research  grew during  the  1960s.  By the  end  of  the  decade,
politicians and experts alike had begun to express serious doubts about the value
and  efficiency of  extensive  analyses  and  evaluations  that  had  been  undertaken
(Greenberger, Crenson and Crissey, 1976, p. 36).
In distinct ways, and for distinct reasons, various theorists denounced PA’s inattention to
politics. Lindblom claimed that different from textbook’s models, real policy-making
was complex, fluid and conflictual instead of a rational and linear sequence of technical
steps. Wildavsky also reacted to the attempt to reduce policy-making to a formula. He
contended that a purely technical approach to policy-making was unrealistic and based
on false assumptions. Only when inscribed within a broader political framework, could
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policy-making be properly understood. Dryzek, for his turn, argued that PA presupposed
an instrumental rationality that brought harmful consequences for pluralistic societies.
PA, in his view, enforced a technocratic and anti-democratic attitude to policy-making.
The theoretical contributions of these authors, which will be explored in detail in the
chapter,  suggest  that  PA’s  ideal  of  a  politics-free,  expertise-led  approach  to  policy-
making was problematic. 
In  terms  of  structure,  this  chapter  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2.2  provides  a
historical  outline,  describing  how  PA originated  and  how  it  became  a  widespread
analytical tool for decision-making in the government. Section 2.3 discusses PA’s key
concepts  particularly  through  the  examination  of  Lasswell’s  ideas.  Section  2.4
investigates PA’s main limitations and addresses the difficulties it  encountered when
implemented in governmental agencies.
2.2 The historical context of PA
The growing scepticism that pervaded the Early Public Administration (EPA) approach
culminated in the recognition that new concepts and methods were required to guide the
theory and  practice  of  governments.  As  mentioned  earlier,  the  decline  of  EPA was
contemporary to  the  ascendancy of  Policy Analysis  (PA),  which  purported  to  offer
scientific tools to help decision-makers choose the best policies32. While EPA was left in
an identity crisis, alternative frameworks were emerging in the realm of public policy-
making. For three decades, PA occupied a distinct place in the daily life of government
offices and, as Deleon (2006) has indicated, most public agencies (at least in the United
States) created a unit of PA to enlighten their policy formulation. This section explores
how PA became a widespread tool  for  policy-making,  by investigating its  historical
roots.  By PA, it  is  meant  ‘an  applied  social  science  discipline  which  uses  multiple
32 Radin (2000) interprets policy analysis as a continuation of, rather than a departure from,
public administration. Similarly, Dunn (1981) argues that public policy analysis originates
from the studies of public administration. For a contrast between policy and administration,
see Parsons (2005) who suggests that the study of the policy process should be interpreted as
‘an  alternative  focus  to  the  study of  constitutions,  legislatures,  and  interest  groups,  and
public administration’ (Parsons, 2005, p. 21).
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methods of inquiry and arguments to produce and transform policy relevant information
that may be utilized in political settings to resolve policy problems’ (Dunn, 1981, p. 35).
The antecedents of PA can be traced back to early endeavours to draw out ‘intelligence’
for  the  decision-making  process  of  the  government.  In  the  1930s,  the  role  of  the
government had been largely expanded (in an unprecedented scale) as an attempt to
solve  the  economic  crisis  caused  by  the  Great  Depression.  In  the  United  States,
President Franklin Roosevelt faced the challenge of designing effective policies capable
of restoring economic stability. One of his initiatives was to invite social scientists to
work for the government as a strategy to improve the quality of policy-making. By
attracting social scientists to ‘enlighten’ the policy process, Roosevelt expected that the
application of the latest research techniques (especially those related to data gathering,
mathematical  modelling,  statistical  projections)  would  offer  a  sounder  basis  for  the
formulation of public policies (Greenberger, Crenson and Crissey, 1976).
The integration between academic knowledge and policy-making was a novelty, which
opened up the opportunity for social scientists to supply a ‘more informed, theoretically
driven approach to governing’ (Parsons, 2005, p. 17). Since the decade of the 1930s,
and later on during the war, social scientists were given the opportunity to ‘demonstrate
their value in resolving practical problems’ in different fields such as national security
and social welfare (Dunn, 1981, p. 18). Holding positions in important public offices,
sociologists and economists carried out surveys and empirical tests, made evaluations,
identified trends, and ultimately devised policy strategies. Their mission was to gather
knowledge and apply methodologies capable of enhancing the performance of public
policies. The inroad of social scientists, which was originally conceived as provisional,
proved  nonetheless  to  have  lasting  consequences.  The  engagement  of  professional
scientists became institutionalized in the 1940s with the creation of long-term positions
not only in the government but also outside it, particularly in think-thanks and research
centres (Greenberger, Crenson and Crissey, 1976). 
The  marriage  of  scientific  knowledge  with  policy-making  encouraged  by  President
Roosevelt  continued  in  later  decades,  especially  during  the  Second  World  War.
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Technical knowledge was of particular importance in the field of national security. It
was believed that issues such as ‘soldier orientation and morale, combat performance of
troops, estimation of war production, regulation of prices and rationing’ should not be
decided arbitrarily, but rather rely on mathematical and statistical analyses (Dunn, 1981,
p. 18). The adoption of quantitative methods, replacing rules-of-thumb, improvisation or
mere guessing, was seen as indispensable to maximize military performance. 
In  particular,  two  analytical  models  were  widely  employed  in  the  military  sector:
operations  research  and  systems  analysis.  It  is  worth  briefly  describing  their  chief
features, since they would later become the basis for PA. Operations research evolved
during  the  Second  World  War  with  the  aim  of  offering  quantitative  methods  to
strengthen tactical  operations,  such as  anti-submarine design,  weapons management,
and the use of the radar. As Smith (1966, p. 8) explained, the application of operations
research encouraged ‘measurement, control and the mathematical analysis of complex
operations’. The key principle of operations research was the belief in the existence of
an optimal solution for every military problem.
The  limits  of  operations  research,  however,  were  exposed  when  military  decisions
became  more  complex  and  required  more  sophisticated  techniques  capable  of
encompassing a wider range of variables. The need for a tool that combined quantitative
estimates with strategic concerns paved the way for a new research technique called
systems analysis. Growing out of operations research, systems analysis went beyond
mathematical projections to encompass strategic calculations. Systems analysis proved
useful  because  it  was  capable  of  constructing  different  scenarios  of  action  under
conditions of deep uncertainty.  This points out to  a key difference between the two
approaches:  whereas  ‘traditional  operations  research  tends  toward  elaborate
mathematical  techniques  and  the  analysis  of  low-level  tactical  problems  where
objectives are precisely stated and admit of simple solution’, systems analysis assumed
that policy objectives are rarely clear and unambiguous (Smith, 1966, p. 9).
Systems analysis also sought to integrate different skills into a common framework in
order to identify the best solution for a problem. In this way, it worked as a mediator
64
across  different  specializations.  The  idea  was  to  gather  information  from  different
knowledge  sources  (initially  from  physics  and  mathematics,  and  later  shifting  to
economics)  with  the  purpose  of  formulating  alternative  courses  of  action  and  then
assessing their main consequences. In a context marked by unpredictability,  systems
analysis aimed at enlightening the judgement of the decision-maker by providing a set
of policy options. 
As systems analysis emerged to overcome the limits of operations research, so would
Policy Analysis (PA) be developed as an attempt to improve systems analysis. The basic
difference is that systems analysis was conceived for military purposes while PA was
thought  of  as  a  framework  applicable  to  any  policy  area.  Moreover,  PA was  less
concerned with calculations and rather focused on the design of policies that could meet
the targets set by the policy-makers.
The development of PA was not the work of a single individual, but a gradual research
process that encompassed public and private organizations. As Dunn (1981) has pointed
out, Rand Corporation, a non-profit research institute, has played a pivotal role in the
transition  from  systems  analysis  to  PA.  Founded  in  1946,  the  activities  of  Rand
Corporation  focused  initially  on  engineering  and  mathematical  research.  Among  its
major  achievements  were  the  construction  of  sophisticated  analytical  tools  such  as
linear programming and game theory. In the 1950s, however, Rand Corporation’s chief
activities  were  directed  toward  more  strategic  concerns.  Besides  creating  systems
analysis, Rand also developed studies in policy areas such as budgeting and planning.
Paving the way for the advent of PA, Rand scientists devised management techniques to
guide the allocation of financial resources. As Smith (1966) contended, this concern
with  public  management  was  essential  for  a  shift  from  (military-centred)  systems
analysis to (government-oriented) PA33.
33 Remarkably, Rand Corporation employed a vast number of scientists and researchers that
would in later years diffuse their policy knowledge throughout government agencies. The
initial attempts to disseminate Rand’s expertise hark back, according to Smith (1966), to the
growing popularity of systems analysis in the early 1960s. President Kennedy’s decision to
set up working groups to examine the potential contribution of advisory organizations also
enabled organizational knowledge developed by Rand to be transmitted to government units.
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The most important product of Rand’s research was the program-budgeting or PPBS
(which stands for planning-programming-budgeting system).  PPBS, as a policy tool,
aimed at offering a rational basis for definition of programs, selection of strategies and
measurement of results. It was conceived as a managerial instrument that indicated the
costs and benefits of each public policy, therefore helping the decision-maker to choose
among different alternatives. It was through the extension of PPBS to public agencies
that PA penetrated into the government. Although PPBS was conceived originally for
military purposes, it was suggested that the technique had universal applicability34, and
could  therefore  be  extended to  other  policy areas,  such as  education,  health,  social
welfare.
In  1965,  enthusiastic  towards  PPBS,  President  Lyndon  Johnson  issued  a  directive
mandating its implementation in all federal agencies. In spite of its success in the area of
national  security,  the  implementation  of  PPBS  in  the  civilian  agencies  led  to
disappointment. Although theorists diverged on the reason of its failure (which will be
explored later in this chapter), PPBS did not enable governments to improve the quality
of their decisions. It was eventually recognized that most of the societal problems were
exceedingly complex and not amenable to the type of analytical treatment offered by
PPBS. With the growing discredit of PPBS, the popularity of PA also declined. 
By the early 1970s, few government units still applied the PPBS, which was no longer
conceived as a viable and reliable managerial tool. The inability of PPBS to solve public
problems had several causes, particularly: i) lack of consensus on the goals of social
policy, which were frequently contentious and ambiguous; ii) lack of timely, reliable
information needed for evaluation purposes; iii) policy analysts’ lack of familiarity with
specific policy areas (education, health, welfare); iv) difficulties in translating policy
choices into budget decisions (Greenberger, Crenson and Crissey, 1976, p. 34-5).
The demise of PPBS, however, does not necessarily imply that it was entirely removed
from  policy-making.  They  left  a  valuable  legacy  and  even  today  practitioners  in
34 PPBS elicited strong academic interest because it represented the best example of a practical
application of PA. In fact, the success or failure of PPBS would ultimately determine the
viability of Policy Analysis (PA) as a tool-kit for policy-making.
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government  still  employ  some  of  its  ideas  and  instruments.  Among  other  lasting
impacts, and ‘despite mixed conclusions about its success as a tool for policy analysis’,
Dunn (1981, p. 22) argues that  ‘PPBS seems nevertheless to have diffused systematic
procedures for rigorously testing policy alternatives’.
The dismissal of PPBS and the demise of PA bequeathed important lessons. Possibly,
the most significant one was that few problems, if  any,  could be entirely solved by
purely technical means. In particular, as Deleon (1988) has convincingly suggested, the
hypothesis that analytical tools are fully capable of resolving societal problems has not
been confirmed. As the case of PPBS elucidated, even the most advanced mathematical
tools  failed  to  offer  optimization  solutions  to  tackle  policy  goals  such  as  poverty,
unemployment, illiteracy, criminality, to name just a few.
The  inability  of  PA  – as  illustrated  by  the  experience  of  PPBS  – to  solve  public
problems, however, cannot be understood only through an examination of its empirical
development.  As some scholars have argued,  the eventual  demise of PA was also a
consequence of its intrinsic contradictions. In order to assess PA’s analytical limitations
it is convenient to begin by describing its theoretical principles. This is the task of the
next section. 
2.3 The theoretical principles of PA
The empirical observation of the application of PA suggests that the ideal of an entirely
analytical  style  of  policy-making,  supported  by  sophisticated  scientific  models  and
tools, is problematic and infeasible. Before discussing the analytical shortcomings of
PA, however, it is important to describe what their proponents really advocated. It might
be surprising to learn that the technocratic view that came to dominate PA throughout
the  1960s  (particularly  in  the  United  States)  did  not  derive  directly  from  the
prescriptions of the authors who first formulate it.  In order to clarify the theoretical
assumptions of PA, the chapter now turns to the examination of the work of Harold
Lasswell.
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The  political  scientist  Harold  Lasswell  is  widely  regarded  by  the  literature  as  the
pioneer of PA, understood as a systematic field of inquiry. In 1951, he co-edited with
Daniel  Lerner  the book  The Policy Sciences,  which included a  series  of articles  by
scholars from different disciplines who reflected upon the meaning of PA. In the first
chapter of the book, entitled  ‘The Policy Orientation’, Lasswell articulated the main
concepts of PA, depicted its fundamental features, and explained how it differed from
other  forms  of  inquiry  (particularly  the  social  sciences).  In  the  policy  literature,
Lasswell’s text is regarded as the inaugural study of the field. In his later publications,
Lasswell (1956, 1963, and 1971) further elaborated his ideas. 
Before  analysing  his  theoretical  arguments,  it  is  worth  emphasizing  that  Lasswell
himself  was not  only a  political  theorist  (Lasswell,  1936)  but  also more properly a
policy scientist. Throughout his professional life, which was developed within not only
the  academic  community  (of  political  science)  but  also  inside  research  centres  and
governmental departments, Lasswell was concerned with a type of knowledge that was
simultaneously  theoretical  and  policy-oriented.  As  Farr,  Hacker  and  Kazee  (2006)
noted, many of his propositions derived from his personal involvement in the affairs of
the government. ‘He was himself the policy scientist of democracy ... and his vision of
the policy sciences emerged from his own concrete life experiences in the 1940s and
1950s’ (Farr, Hacker and Kazee, 2006, p. 580). Some biographical facts help to illustrate
his  participation  in  policy-centred  institutions  that  had  a  formative  impact  in  his
research approach.
During the Second World War, Lasswell and several other social scientists joined the
government  with  the  purpose  of  developing sophisticated  analyses  that  could  guide
decision-makers.  Among  other  positions,  Lasswell  worked  for  the  Experimental
Division  for  the  Study  of  War  Time  Communications,  where  his  activities  were
primarily  related  to  the  impact  of  propaganda  (Lasswell,  1927),  although  he
occasionally offered consultancy on a broad range of issues which varied from trading
to  radio  communication.  With  the  experience  he  gathered  in  his  work  for  the
government,  Lasswell  spearheaded  the  foundation  of  various  policy-oriented
organizations. In 1944, he set up the Policy Sciences Council. In 1948, together with
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other  social  scientists,  he created the Policy Sciences  Foundation.  For his  academic
writings  and  policy  formulations,  he  achieved  growing  prestige  and,  among  other
accomplishments,  Lasswell  was  elected  president  of  the  American  Political  Science
Association in 1956 (Farr, Hacker and Kazee, 2006). 
Throughout  his  career,  Lasswell  insisted  that  a  policy orientation  should  weave the
threads  of  theory  (science)  and  practice  (decision-making).  He  contended  that  the
complexity of the issues faced by contemporary societies required the most efficient use
of intelligence and, unless the developments of science and technology were applied to
the policy process, decisions would be based on simplistic criteria. In his view, the best
way  to  tackle  the  complexity  of  public  problems  was  through  the  application  of
scientific knowledge to decision-making. At the heart of his policy orientation was the
assumption that the rationality of the policy process depended on the intensive use of
the  latest  scientific  discoveries.  Encouraging  the  application  of  rigorous  analytical
methodologies  to  policy-making,  Lasswell  advocated  the  adoption  of  quantitative
techniques  and  data-gathering  tools  to  the  decision  process,  which  would  make  a
scientific approach to government possible. 
In  Lasswell’s  view,  much  could  be  gained  if  policy-making  adopted  a  scientific
orientation35.  The  employment  of  quantitative  methods  would  ensure  that  data  was
collected and treated in such a way as to enable decision-makers to choose the right
policies. Different policy options could be measured tested, appraised in order to reveal
the  best  alternative.  By bringing  intelligence  to  the  policy process,  the  progress  of
scientific knowledge would not be confined to the academic community but would find
practical application in the field of public policy.  He claimed that governments (but
actually  any  type  of  organization,  such  as  private  companies,  trade  unions,  and
churches) needed the knowledge produced by universities and research centres if they
wished to improve the quality of their decision-making process.
35 But why should one think that what is created for scientific purposes could be harnessed for
public decision-making? Lasswell (1971, p. 3-4) argues that there are no logical grounds for
excluding  scientific  knowledge  from  being  applied  for  public  policy.  In  his  view,  the
difference between science and policy-making is a matter of degree, not nature. Both are
products of social forces that share a common desire for some kind of public enlightenment.
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Instead of intuition or feeling, Lasswell suggested that decision-makers should rely on
technical advice provided by experts, the policy scientists. Because collective resources
were  scarce,  Lasswell  argued,  decision-makers  should  be  guided  by  scientific
knowledge  and  not  by  improvisation  or  sheer  experience,  as  usually  happened.  In
emphasizing the potential contribution of science and expertise to improve decision-
making in the government, Lasswell was breaking with the tradition enshrined by Early
Public  Administration  (EPA)  that  focused  on  organizational  functions  (hierarchy,
specialization,  unity  of  command)36.  In  contrast,  for  Lasswell,  the  task  of  a  policy
science  was  not  administrative  but  strategic:  ‘if  goals  are  to  be  optimalized,  what
strategies are most advantageous for achieving the objectives sought?’ (Lasswell, 1971,
p. 55).
Lasswell (1971) suggested that his policy model was grounded on four key theoretical
principles. The examination of these principles is important for two reasons. First, they
illuminate the project envisaged by Lasswell,  clarifying its main definitions. Second,
they help to  distinguish the policy project from alternative frameworks or academic
disciplines,  in  particular  Early  Public  Administration  (EPA),  the  first  paradigm
investigated in this thesis. 
Lasswell’s  policy  approach  was  contextual,  problem-oriented,  inter-disciplinary  and
normative. These four principles deserve to be analysed in more detail. 
36 Among its main contributions, PA developed a jargon of its own that would be gradually
incorporated  in  the  daily  life  of  governments.  This  policy  vocabulary  was  not  a  mere
semantic  addition,  but  changed the  perception  of  how governments  operate.  As  Parsons
(2005) remarked, the role of the government was re-framed as the construction of solutions
for public problems through the design of programs. Policy-making was represented as a
sequential  succession  of  stages:  problem  identification,  alternatives  definition,  program
design. It is worth noting that this policy jargon is quite different from the language of EPA
that  was  articulated  in  different  terms,  such  as  personnel,  operation  and  maintenance,
procurement, organization charts, command and control. 
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1. Contextuality. In his writings, Lasswell insisted on the fact that PA was not a
speculative search for abstract knowledge. On the contrary,  it  focused on the
practical problems of society in order to design viable solutions. The task of PA
was  contextual,  he  argued,  in  the  sense  that  it  attempted  to  supply the  best
scientific knowledge available to clarify particular policy options. Consequently,
the function of the policy analysts was to act as mediators between theory and
practice  in  order  to  enlighten  the  decision  process  by  communicating  to
decision-makers the most convenient theories and methodologies applicable to
solve a policy situation. 
2. Problem-orientation. The primary task of PA was the identification of the main
problems  that  afflicted  society.  Again,  its  chief  concern  was  not  knowledge
generation  per se but the provision of support and guidance for the decision-
making process. Lasswell suggested that, from a PA perspective, the determinant
object of inquiry was the public problem, that is, a relevant issue that demanded
government attention and action. He warned, however, that not all problems of a
given  society  were  under  the  purview  of  PA,  but  only  those  that  had  a
meaningful impact on the well-being of citizens. He also clarified that the role of
the policy analyst was not only to help to solve a problem, but prior to that to
contribute  to  elucidate  which  problems  deserved  the  consideration  of  the
decision-makers.
3. Inter-disciplinarity. A contextual and problem-orientated PA required an inter-
disciplinary approach to knowledge. Lasswell  (1951, p. 3) noted the harmful
consequences of ‘an excessive atomization of knowledge’ and lamented the fact
that academic knowledge became insulated and closed off communication and
exchange  across  disciplines.  Lasswell  sustained  that  PA should  employ  an
integrative attitude that sought to bring together the contribution of various kinds
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of knowledge37. In addition, he explained that the type of knowledge proper to
policy-making could be originated from natural, biological or social sciences,
and  would  typically  involve  fields  such  as  physics,  biology,  psychology,
anthropology, political science, public administration, law, and economics. 
4. Normative character. A contextual, problem-oriented and inter-disciplinary PA
also  required  a  fourth  component,  which  according  to  Lasswell,  was  its
normative  condition.  Writing  in  the  historical  context  of  the  Cold  War,  he
advocated the superiority of democratic societies over authoritarian regimes. In
his view, PA should not be blind to this distinction. Thus, he usually spoke of the
policy  sciences  of  democracy, which  reflected  a  normative  commitment  to
democratic  values  and  ideals.  Democracy,  Lasswell  suggested,  was  the
cornerstone  of  PA,  ‘in  which  the  ultimate  goal  is  the  realization  of  human
dignity in theory and fact’ (1951, p. 15).
Lasswell not only defined the theoretical pillars of the policy approach, but he went
further to propose how they should be articulated in more concrete terms. He suggested
that  these  four  principles  could  be  operationalized  in  a  sequence  of  policy  stages,
beginning with the identification of the problem to be tackled and ending in the choice
of a particular course of action. It should be noted that although PA would in later years
decline in popularity,  the policy stages framework would remain as one of its  main
legacies38. It is still recommended by public policy textbooks and it is widely spread in
the daily policy activity of government (Parsons, 2005). For their importance, it is worth
describing the contents of the policy stages framework. The table 2.1 below depicts
Lasswell’s policy stages model.
37 It is worth remarking that Lasswell conceived of his policy approach as an independent field
of inquiry. In his view, policy sciences were not a specialization within the broader field of
social sciences. They were, in contrast, the science that organized knowledge derived from
different disciplines. Thus, he wrote that ‘we have become more aware of the policy process
as  a  suitable  object  of  study in  its  own  right,  primarily  in  the  hope  of  improving  the
rationality of the flow of decision’ (Lasswell, 1951, p. 3).
38 Lasswell’s ideas still have some impact on contemporary policy practices: ‘the early efforts
and dicta of Lasswell remain valuable and continue to provide the foundation upon which
the study of public policy is conducted’ (Howlett, Ramesh and Perl, 2009, p. 20).
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Table 2.1 – Lasswell’s policy stages model
Policy stages Policy content
Goal clarification What situations are desired in the social process that can be modified by policy intervention?
Trend description Which impact have (past and present) events on the achievement of those desired situations?
Analysis of conditions Which factors were relevant to the occurrence of those trends?
Projection of development If current policies are kept, can the desirable situations be achieved?
Invention, evaluation and 
selection of alternatives
What strategies or intermediate objectives should be 
introduced so that the desirable situations can be 
successfully accomplished?
Source: own elaboration based on Lasswell (1971, p. 39).
In practice, these five steps provide a guide for the work of the policy analyst. Initially,
the challenge is the identification of the goal to be pursued (stage 1). In spite of its
apparent simplicity, goals are not ‘out there’ to be picked, but they have to be carefully
crafted. After the goal is established, the next task is to consider which factors have an
impact  on  achieving  these  goals  (stages  2  and  3).  By  examining  the  trajectory  of
previous actions,  the analyst  can deduce how each factor contributes (or not)  to the
achievement  of  the  goal.  Lasswell  also  noted  that  the  analyst  should  consider  the
consequences of keeping current policies, that is, introducing no innovation (stage 4).
After all these steps, the analyst is capable of knowing which realistic courses of action
can be implemented to achieve the goal and solve the problem (stage 5). The selection
of alternatives is a crucial moment of the policy process. And, as Lasswell warned, more
often than not, the policy analyst is confronted with a myriad of policy possibilities,
each yielding different implications.
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Remarkably, the expertise of the policy analyst is taken to be decisive throughout all the
policy  stages.  Quantitative  methods,  computer  simulations,  empirical  tests  –  what
Lasswell conceived as the intelligence in the policy process – could be employed with
the purpose of finding the strategy that led to the best solution. The role of the policy
analyst was to specify which strategies, resources, courses of action were required in
order  to  achieve the goal.  This  information would have to  be communicated to the
decision-makers as guidance for their judgement. The policy analyst would also help to
explain  how those  policy  options  differed  from the  current  situation  (and  therefore
which innovations were required). And, as Lasswell cautioned, the policy analyst should
be flexible enough to tailor policy recommendations to the specific needs of decision-
makers.  Instead of presenting abstract theories,  sophisticated methods,  complex data
tools, the analyst would attempt to interpret and translate them in a simplified language
so that  the advice could be rendered clear and intelligible.  It  was in  this  sense that
Lasswell commented upon the role of policy analysts as mediators between theory and
practice, linking researchers to decision-makers. 
One  of  Lasswell’s  main  arguments  for  a  policy  orientation  was  the  idea  that  the
rationality  of  the  policy  process  depended  on  the  level  of  expertise  available.  By
employing scientific methods, political factors could be ignored. Lasswell (1951, p. 5)
envisaged policy as being ‘free of many of the undesirable connotations clustered about
the word  political,  which is  often believed to imply “partisanship” or “corruption”’.
Although he did not explicitly dismiss the political nature of policy-making, Lasswell
thought  that  the  policy  process  could  be  greatly  improved  if  it  were  grounded  on
expertise  rather  than politics.  A suspicion of politics,  which was pervasive in  Early
Public Administration (EPA), was also a feature of Policy Analysis (PA). 
The emphasis on expertise would eventually pay off, Lasswell believed, by producing
significant benefits for its citizens. A policy-oriented process enabled governments to
gradually overcome economic and social  problems, which meant  in the long-term a
more peaceful, satisfied and democratic society. The advantages of PA, Lasswell (1951,
p. 8) noted, would eliminate the need for more radical political approaches: ‘the basis is
laid for a profound reconstruction of culture by continual study and emendation, and not
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by (or certainly not alone by) the traditional methods of political agitation’. The policy
orientation was therefore an alternative to revolutionary approaches, such as Marxism
and Anarchism. By constant improvement of social institutions, PA created conditions
for the increasing of societal  welfare.  Among other virtues,  Lasswell  contended, PA
would  enhance  the  appreciation  for  democratic  values  and  if  it  were  applied  on  a
worldwide scale it could even reverse the trend toward authoritarianism that prevailed in
several countries. In this sense, Lasswell’s PA was also a remedy against authoritarian
solutions.
Although his opinion varies throughout his writings39, Lasswell found no contradiction
between expertise and democracy. On the contrary, expertise was conceived as crucial
for  the  preservation  of  democratic  practices  and  values.  One strong defence  of  the
democratic  implications of  expertise  can be found in his  book  Analysis  of  Political
Behaviour  (1947)  in  which  he  was  particularly  insistent  on  the  synergy  between
democracy and expertise. He contended that a democratic expert-driven policy process
was the antidote against oligarchic forces that suppressed the freedom of society and
oppressed the many for the benefit of a (privileged) few. Expertise was essential for the
survival  of  democracy,  he  further  noted,  because  democracy  had  to  be  continually
protected.  He  claimed  that  if  democracy was  to  be  preserved,  governments  should
encourage the role of expertise in the policy process: ‘without knowledge, democracy
will surely fall’ (Lasswell, 1947, p. 1). Just to be sure: ‘Without science, democracy is
blind  and  weak.  With  science,  democracy  will  not  be  blind  and  may  be  strong’
(Lasswell, 1947, p. 12).
By  channelling  scientific  intelligence  to  policy-making,  an  expertise-led  PA would
contribute  to  the  strengthening  of  democracy.  Nevertheless,  how  should  the  policy
analyst  act  so  as  to  enhance  democratic  attitudes?  The  task  of  the  policy  analyst,
Lasswell noted, was to advise the decision-maker on which factors are likely to improve
democratic practices and warn against policy changes that might be harmful for the
polity.  For  instance,  the  policy  analyst  could  identify  which  strategies  were  most
conducive to  political  equality and then attempt to  convince the decision-makers  to
39 As Dryzek  (1990,  p.  113)  argues,  ‘the  most  widely spread  accepted  characterization  of
Lasswellian policy sciences remains a technocratic one’.
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implement them. In Lasswell’s view, there was no contradiction between government’s
efficient performance and democratic progress in so far as expertise was guided by the
values  of  a  liberal  and  democratic  civilization.  Therefore,  public  policies  were
simultaneously technical  and ideological,  scientific  and political  (Lasswell,  1947,  p.
122).
In Lasswell’s view, democracy and expertise were complementary – not antagonistic –
forces.  They  are  mutually  reinforcing:  expertise  strengthened  democracy,  and
democracy in turn required expertise.  When PA, however,  began to be employed in
practice as a policy method in the government, it soon became clear that the relationship
between democracy and expertise  was not  so straightforward.  The constitution  of  a
technocratic elite illustrated unintended (anti-democratic) consequences not foreseen in
Lasswell’s writings. As the critics would later elaborate, PA faced important challenges,
which are explored in the next section.
2.4 The limitations of PA
Policy Analysis  (PA), as conceived originally by Lasswell,  was indeed an ambitious
project. If its premises were true, then societies would progressively eradicate social
problems.  This  would  be  made  possible  by increasing  the  rationality  of  the  policy
process, which would depend not on the fallible guessing of decision-makers, but rather
on the intelligence and expertise brought about by policy analysts. 
However, the adoption of PA by governments, initially in the United States and later in
Europe,  revealed  that  those  high  expectations  were  progressively  dashed:  societal
problems were persistent in spite of the sophisticated models employed by analysts. As
Deleon  (1988,  p.  25)  has  indicated,  public  problems  ‘refused  to  be  corrected  by
textbook solutions’. Perplexed theorists would then ask questions of the sort: ‘if you can
land a  man on the moon,  why can’t  you solve the  problems of  the  ghetto?’ as  the
economist Richard Nelson (1977) wrote in his essays on policy issues. Much debate and
controversy tried to make sense of this frustration by examining what went wrong. Why
did PA fail? 
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There is an extensive literature examining the limitations of PA. The critique frequently
gravitates  around four  main  arguments.  Contrary to  PA’s  assumptions:  i)  the  policy
process  was  not  a  purely  rational  and  technical  exercise;  ii)  policy-making  was
complex, uncertain and conflictual; iii) the informational requirements PA imposed on
public  agencies  were  impossible  to  meet;  iv)  its  emphasis  on  expertise  had  anti-
democratic implications. Each of these arguments is now discussed.
2.4.1 The limitations of PA (I): excessive reliance on expertise
One recurrent critique of PA pointed out to its excessive reliance on expertise. Critics of
PA argued that the policy process could not be reduced to purely technical issues. This
section examines  the problems associated with an exclusive technical  conception of
public  policy.  Drawing on empirical  examples,  it  is  shown how decisions  taken by
governments  require  more  than  technical  analysis  and  advice  from  experts,  thus
challenging the claim embraced by PA advocates that problems can be purely resolved
by the application of analytical tools.
Deleon  (1988)  argues  that  the  experience  of  PA needs  to  be  assessed  against  an
empirical  background.  In his  view,  key political  events  in  U.S. history revealed the
limitations of the approach. Each event yielded relevant lessons to be learned about the
development of PA, and in each of these episodes, there were situations that challenged
the capacity of PA to deliver solutions. Policy-makers, as Deleon (1988, p. 38) suggests,
tended to over-emphasize the role  of expertise40 as  if  policy problems were entirely
manageable by analytical modelling. He elaborates this argument by discussing three
important  episodes  that  had a  formative influence in  the development  of  PA. These
episodes deserve closer examination.
40 Thus,  Deleon (1988)  explains that  this  happened because quantitative  methodologies are
believed to be value-free and also because values are thought as the exclusive domain of the
policy-maker. In reality, however, the policy environment is not as sharply demarcated. In
their government experience in the 1960s, policy analysts came to realize that: i) even the
selection  of  methodologies  implies  choice  of  normative  values;  ii)  values  are  pervasive
throughout the policy process. Therefore, policy analysts themselves are not exempted from
making normative choices.
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1. War on Poverty. One important experience in testing the ability of PA to solve
societal problems took place within the War on Poverty initiative carried out in
the United States. In the 1960s, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson launched a
series of policy projects aimed at reducing poverty levels. With the guidance of
policy  analysts,  public  programs  were  devised  and implemented  in  different
sectors,  such  as  health,  housing,  education,  criminality,  judicial  system,  and
social welfare. Most of these programs were under the coordination of the Office
of  Economic  Opportunity,  which  employed  PA to  identify  problems,  define
strategies,  and  find  the  optimal  solutions  (thus  mirroring  Lasswell’s  policy
stages). Despite its initial high expectations and optimism, the War on Poverty
failed to meet its targets.
According to  Deleon,  the main difficulty was the inability to identify the causes of
social problems. It turned out that the understanding of what factors were responsible
for the occurrence of a particular problem was not straightforward (usually, the causes
were  multiple  and  inter-related).  The  complexity  of  singling  out  the  causes  also
complicated  the  design  of  policy  alternatives,  thus  hampering  the  application  of
sophisticated data modelling to generate optimal solutions to public problems.
Another caveat was the lack of consensus over the goals to be pursued. Frequently,
policy analysts could not agree on which problems deserved to be regarded as a priority.
Consequently, they had difficulties in proposing policy solutions as advice to decision-
makers. It turned out that Lasswell’s policy stages could not be properly accomplished.
Goals and problems were unclear and hindered the formulation of policy alternatives.
What had worked in the military field proved more complicated in the social area of
policy-making.  As Deleon (1988,  p.  65)  puts  it,  ‘the  result,  not  surprisingly,  was a
decade of trial, error, and frustration, after which it was arguable if ten years and billions
of dollars had produced any discernible, let alone effective, reliefs’. 
These shortcomings that emerged during the War on Poverty had profound implications
for the development of PA. First, it was acknowledged that PA had some important gaps
that had to be bridged. It became clear, for instance, that it was not enough to formulate
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a policy, because it also had to be implemented and later evaluated. But processes of
implementation  and  evaluation  were  ignored  by  PA’s  theorists.  In  Lasswell’s
conception,  the  role  of  the  policy analyst  finished  with  the  proposition  of  a  policy
alternative. Therefore, there was no guidance on the subsequent stages of public policy
(namely, implementation and evaluation). In order to overcome these deficiencies, new
streams of policy literature, addressing those gaps, flourished in the early 1970s, which
resulted in the creation of two important policy fields: implementation (e.g. Pressman
and Wildavsky, 1973; Bardach, 1977) and evaluation studies (e.g. Nagel, 1990; Fischer,
1995).
A second lesson drawn from the War on Poverty, according to Deleon (1988), was that
policy studies lacked proper theories, methodologies, and even adequate data. In spite of
Lasswell’s  framework, theoretical  models were not  developed enough to inform the
design of public programs. Lasswell’s framework was too general and abstract to offer
concrete solutions to specific problems. Moreover, there was a shortage of reliable and
timely data. The information required for processing the data was missing. Not only
were social problems very complex, but public agencies had no available information to
supply. These unexpected difficulties raised doubts about the power of PA to improve
the  rationality  the  policy  process:  ‘The  War  on  Poverty provided  unprecedented
opportunity for the policy sciences to win their  professional and disciplinary laurels
(but) these opportunities were not seized’ (Deleon, 1988, p. 63; my italics).
2. Vietnam. Another important episode in the history of PA is related to the Vietnam
War.  It  was  assumed  by the  U.S.  military  intelligence  that  those  techniques
developed during the Second World War could be replicated with great success
and ensure the defeat of the opponent. In particular, it has been assumed that
systems analysis, as developed by RAND Corporation, could still be employed
as a useful tool to maximize the attainment of military efficiency. The limitations
of the techniques, however, became evident when it was reported that tactical
strategies had been wrongly designed. Although the defeat in the war could not
be ascribed to the improper application of analytical tools, the experience has
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taught  that  normative  aspects  played  a  decisive  role  but  were  neglected  by
intelligence analysts.
Discussing the development of PA, Deleon suggests that the Vietnam episode teaches
important  lessons,  which  are  worth  synthesizing  here.  First,  the  idea  that  decision-
making can be reduced to technical issues has proven untenable. In the case of the war,
a  purely  rational  decision-making  was  not  sufficient  to  provide  adequate  solutions.
There  were other  considerations  that  could  not  be  decided on exclusively technical
grounds. In addition, as Fischer (2003, p. 9) writes,
Despite  these  extensive  analytical  capabilities,  however,  Washington  seriously
miscalculated and mismanaged the Vietnam war. For many, the reliance on rational
analytical techniques was a major factor contributing to the country’s defeat. Not
only  did  a  heavy emphasis  on  quantitative  analysis  neglect  critical  social  and
political variables, but the analytical results seldom moved from the field back to
Washington without political distortions. Moreover, policy debates in Washington
almost always missed the moral dimensions of the war, which was to become the
grist of the anti-war movement.
Second,  the  problem  of  data  distortion  had  shown  that  information  could  be
manipulated.  Even  though policy analysts  were  scientifically-minded their  scientific
credentials did not necessarily prevent them from adapting data to fit certain purposes.
Their fallibility put in question the assumption that expertise is a sufficient condition to
warrant solutions to public problems. Third,  in spite of analytical recommendations,
policy tended to  be  incremental.  Decision-makers  are  usually reluctant  to  introduce
radical changes that might subvert the status quo (Deleon, 1988, p. 64). These were
valuable lessons that illustrate some of PA’s limitations.
3. Energy Crises. Another formative event in the development of PA took place in
the 1970s, when two energy crises, although highly predictable, could not be
averted with the help of technical knowledge. In order to preclude the collapse
of  energy supply,  the  government  decided  to  invest  in  expertise  and  entrust
policy analysts  to devise pre-emptive solutions.  Employing mathematical and
computational tools,  the policy community made a vast  range of quantitative
simulations, which should have worked as the basis of policy recommendations
capable of forestalling the eminent crises. But in spite of the positive prospects
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of the project, the results were disappointing. Solutions were not achieved and
there were several disruptions in the provision of energy. 
Discussing the failures and lessons to be learnt from the energy crises, Deleon (1988, p.
72) argues that three main aspects deserve attention: i) although data was available, the
policy analysts  did  not  agree  on  which  goals  to  achieve;  ii)  even though advanced
computational tools were at their disposal, there was no consensus on which techniques
to employ; iii) it was recognized that there are factors that are not known and therefore
cannot  be  controlled.  Deleon  also  observed  that  policy  analysts  enjoyed  privileged
research  conditions  (financial  grants,  technological  equipment,  trust  from  the
government, time to identify solutions) but failed to display satisfactory results. Again,
the ambitions of PA seemed to be excessive and signalled the need for more nuanced
approaches that acknowledged the complexity and uncertainty of social phenomena, on
one  hand,  and  the  importance  of  extending  the  scope  beyond  the  purely  technical
aspects, on the other (Lovins, 1977).
What  is  possible  to  learn  from these  episodes?  As  Deleon  (1988)  has  pointed  out,
empirical  evidence  suggests  that  PA failed  to  achieve  many  of  its  promises.  One
important conclusion is that the policy process is not reducible to exclusive technical
aspects. The capacity of expertise alone to provide effective solution to problems can
therefore be questioned. These episodes offer empirical evidence that challenge PA’s
assumption that societal problems are solvable by purely technical and analytical tools.
But these are not the only shortcomings evinced by PA. As argued next, PA has also
been criticized by failing to provide an accurate depiction of policy-making.
2.4.2 The limitations of PA (II): inaccurate description of the policy-making process
Another sustained critique of PA is that it misrepresented the actual process of policy-
making. Contrary to PA’s assumptions, policy-making stages were not clear, sequential
and  linear.  Empirical  observation  suggests  a  much  messier  picture.  In  practice,  the
policy process was more complex, uncertain and conflictual. This section explains how
PA’s description of policy-making has not provided an accurate portrait of how public
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policies actually unfold in practice.  It will  draw particularly on the ideas of Charles
Lindblom,  eminent  political  theorist  whose  contributions  were  deeply  influential  in
policy theorizing. 
In his various writings, Lindblom expressed scepticism over rationalistic interpretations
of  the  policy  process.  His  analyses  offer  a  convenient  standpoint  to  examine  the
inaccuracy of some of PA’s claims, particularly Lasswell’s policy stages model. Most
remarkably,  Lindblom emphasized the uncertainty,  unpredictability and conflictuality
inherent  to  actual  policy-making.  He contested  the  depiction  of  policy-making as  a
sequence of clear and unambiguous stages that eventually lead to an optimal solution. In
his view, the policy-making process is much more complex and conflictual41.
Against  the  idea  that  policies  were  the  result  of  technical  advice  given  by  policy
analysts,  Lindblom argued that policies  originate from a variety of sources,  such as
political negotiation, attempts to harness economic opportunities, or even spontaneous
circumstances, in which individuals are not even aware that a policy is being created.
Not only that,  policies  do not  necessarily evolve in  sequential  and linear  stages,  as
predicted  by  Lasswell’s  policy  stages  model.  In  practice,  policy  stages  can  happen
simultaneously, or even in reserve order.
Lindblom also contended that rationalistic frameworks failed to appropriately depict
how problems are formulated. For him, the task of identifying a policy problem is more
intricate than conventionally assumed. A societal problem, Lindblom sustains, can be
defined from different  angles  and is  never  explicitly  ‘given’ to  policy analysts.  He
exemplifies  with  the  situation  of  an  urban  riot  and  asks  how  the  problem can  be
‘technically’ defined: break of the institutional order? Evidence of racial discrimination?
Lack of empowerment of the black community? Low income? Urban disorganization?
A (policy) problem is neither self-evident nor immediately identifiable through technical
41 Along similar lines, critics also pointed to the conflictual reality of policy-making in which
policy means and goals are inherently disputable. Knowledge in the realm of public policy is
always  contestable  and  any  attempt  to  dictate  a  ‘single  incontrovertible,  objective
understanding of policy problems’ risks degenerating into a technocratic form of governance.
The idea that  policy issues are reducible to technical  analysis is  problematic (Colebatch,
2007; Howlett, Ramesh and Perl, 2009, p. 27). 
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analysis.  Thus,  the task of  formulating  a  problem can be daunting,  and contrary to
Lasswell’s assumptions, there are multiple ways of defining it.
The  issue  of  problem  definition,  Lindblom  suggests,  is  significant  because  it  also
elucidates how politics is implicated in the policy process. There is ‘no way to settle the
controversy by analysis’,  Lindblom (1968,  p.  14)  criticizes  rationalistic  frameworks
such as PA for failing to ‘evoke or suggest the distinctively political aspects of policy-
making’ (Lindblom, 1968, p.  4).  For  him,  in  order  to  correctly describe the policy-
making process,  which  is  uncertain  and conflictual,  it  has  to  be  situated  within  its
broader political context42. Policy-making is not only about expertise, it is also – and
mostly – about politics43.
The vision of policy-making as a political process is examined by Lindblom (1965) in
his book The Intelligence of Democracy, in which he reiterates his disagreement with
sequential  and linear models,  such as Lasswell’s  policy stages model.  In contrast  to
rationalistic  assumptions,  Lindblom develops an analysis  that  takes into account  the
complexity  and conflictuality  of  the  policy  process.  Writing  within  the  tradition  of
liberal  pluralism,  he  proposes  to  envisage  the  policy  process  as  a  mechanism that
coordinates  a  vast  number of  conflicting interests44.  One typical  policy situation,  he
argues,  would  involve  public  agencies,  legislative  bodies,  interest  groups,  political
parties, local community, all these policy actors striving for the accomplishment of their
particular interests. In his view, a rational model of policy optimization is not capable of
processing the different interests of all the groups. For Lindblom, the complexity of the
42 What happens, Lindblom asks, when it is unclear which goals should guide the work of the
policy  analyst?  When  there  is  disagreement  among  experts,  who  should  decide  which
alternative to follow? In his view, the political system is ultimately responsible for resolving
controversies and setting the key values to be followed by experts.
43 Moreover,  Lindblom  (1968,  p.  32)  claims  that  PA itself  should  be  interpreted  as  an
instrument of power insofar as the decision to apply analysis is itself a political choice. PA
can help decision-makers to persuade their audiences and find justification for their choices:
it is a ‘method of fighting’ (Lindblom, 1968, p. 34).
44 In contrast to PA, Lindblom emphasizes the importance of conflict in the policy-making
process.  In  Lindblom’s  (1965,  p.  304-5)  view,  conflict  is  useful  in  the  coordination  of
mutually incompatible  interests.  It  is  how the  policy process  works  within  the  political
system. After all, he asks, how are individuals coordinated when there is no one coordinating
them, when they share no common purpose, and in the absence of rules that determine how
they should relate one to the other? (Lindblom, 1965, p. 3).
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policy  situation  is  only  resolvable  through  the  mediation  of  the  political  system.
Through a series of procedures (such as negotiation, bargaining, compromise) the policy
process  coordinates  the  participation  of  the  various  actors  until  a  final  decision  is
reached. Thus, contrary to what Lasswell advocated, policy solutions are political – not
technical – phenomena.
Lindblom’s  description of the policy-making process  helps  to  visualize some of  the
limitations of PA45. Particularly, it shows that policy-making is, instead of a sequence of
linear stages, a much more complex, uncertain and conflictual process. It also makes
clear  that  a  view  of  policy-making  as  a  purely  technical  undertaking  fails  to
acknowledge the importance of politics in coordinating conflictual interests. 
2.4.3 The limitations of PA (III): impossible informational requirements 
Lindblom was  not  alone  in  his  call  for  a  political  reading  of  the  policy  process46.
Arguing  against  an  excessive  emphasis  on  science  and  expertise,  political  scientist
Aaron Wildavsky also contended that the policy process was fundamentally a political
(and not a technical) activity. In line with Lindblom’s arguments, Wildavsky insisted on
the  centrality  of  the  political  dimension  in  understanding  the  policy  process.  The
purpose of this section is to delineate Wildavsky’s (1979) critique of PA and to highlight
in particular how PA’s methods imposed informational demands that could hardly be
met by public agencies.
45 Lindblom  pointed  to  one  more  interesting  limitation.  Arguing  that  policies  tend  to  be
incremental,  he  contends that  policy analysts  would refrain from more audacious policy
advice  in  order  to  avoid  resistance  from decision-makers,  who  are  usually unwilling  to
introduce radical changes. Otherwise, if ‘revolutionary’ advice is offered it can ‘stimulate
little  support,  and  a  massive  opposition,  in  any  society  attached  to  habitual  rules  and
attitudes’. The practical consequence is that advice will be constrained ‘to a narrow range of
new policy possibilities around the status quo’ (Lindblom, 1968, p. 41).
46 Meltsner (1976) argued that the type of choices policy analysts take contribute to make them
political actors. He claimed that policy analysts could not be purely interpreted as technical
experts because they also performed the role of political actors. Thus he stated that ‘if they
are not political in a grand way, they are certainly so in a small way’ and suggested that
‘whether they know it or not, they make a number of political decisions’ (Meltsner, 1976, p.
11). 
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In  Speaking  truth  to  power  Wildavsky (1979)  discusses  the  informational  demands
imposed  by PA over  public  agencies.  Examining  the  case  of  program-budgeting,  a
variation  of  PPBS,  he  concluded  that  the  amount  of  information  required  was  far
beyond the capacity of the public agencies. In his view, public agencies had limited
knowledge of the costs and benefits of the policies they were implementing. For him the
impossibility  of  gathering  the  information  required  by  PA was  a  crucial  issue  that
explained why it ‘has not succeed anywhere in the world it was tried’ (Wildavsky, 1979,
p. 32). 
The problem, however,  was not  that  public  agencies were ignorant  about  their  own
policies. In reality, the amount of information requested by PA tools was impossible to
meet.  Examining  the  conditions  that  would  have  to  be  fulfilled  to  satisfy  PA’s
requirements, Wildavsky concluded that unless information about all policy alternatives
and their  respective costs and benefits were available,  PA experts  could not provide
advice. Evidently, the quantity of information was beyond human capacity, which led
Wildavsky (1979, p. 32) to argue that the technical requirements of PA were ‘like the
simultaneous equation of society in the sky’.
In spite of the lack of information,  PA was still  employed as a method of decision-
making, with disastrous consequences. PA could not help to provide technical solutions
for  public  problems in the absence of  data.  But  there was reluctance among policy
analysts to acknowledge it. ‘The trouble with experts’, as Wildavsky (1979, p. 35) puts
it, ‘is not only that they may not know what they ought to know, but that they may
pretend to know things that are actually unknown’. The consequence was that PA soon
became discredited because it failed to offer workable solutions to public problems47. 
The frustration with PA led to reflection on what could be reasonably expected from
technical analysis. In Wildavsky’s view, it was mistaken to think that public problems
could be solved technically. He concluded that PA, envisaged as a purely technical tool,
was not a viable mode of making decisions that affected the collectivity (Wildavsky,
47 Moreover, the expectation that problems could be eradicated was unrealistic. Problems do
not disappear: ‘It is our expectation of closure … that is misleading’ (Wildavsky, 1979, p.
83).
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1979, p. 124). Any formula that attempted to provide a final answer would imply the
existence  of  an underlying societal  consensus  (which  is  at  odds with  the  pluralistic
character  of  democracies).  One should  be  cautious  of  being  governed  by scientific
formula devised by experts:
At first glance, the purely intellectual mode seems ideally suited to policy analysis,
which seeks to bring intelligence to bear on policy. But this identity is achieved at
the cost of triviality. Instead of innumerable minds, each with somewhat different
perspective,  there is only one. Instead of conflict  there is  consensus.  Instead of
problem solving, in short, there is suppression of problems. Every one either gets
what  he wants,  or  has  to  want  what  he  gets.  Thought  is  made  supreme at  the
expense of having anything worth thinking about (Wildavsky, 1979, p. 125).
Wildavsky, however, did not argue that PA should be rejected. In his view, the problem
was  the  assumption  that  technical  formulas  could  solve  public  problems.  If  PA
advocates acknowledged that political factors also played a key role in the formulation
of problems as well in their solution, then PA could become a workable tool. When it is
accepted that PA
is infused with politics, however, social forces guide intelligence … By being tied
to power, intellect becomes the hand maiden of power … My conclusion is that
policy analysis  makes  more  sense  as  an  aid  to  (rather  than  substitute  for)  the
politics of social interaction (Wildavsky, 1979, p. 125).
Wildavsky’s  analysis  reveals  clearly  the  impossibility  of  meeting  the  informational
requirements posed by PA tools. It also points out to the problematic assumption that
societal problems can be managed on a purely rational, technical basis. In fact, one of
the  dangers  of  excessive  emphasis  on  technique  and  expertise  (at  the  expense  of
politics) lies in the formation of technocratic elites. This is the topic of the next section.
2.4.4 The limitations of PA (IV): empowering a technocratic elite
Another critical aspect of PA relates to its technocratic implications. The recognition
that  PA displays  technocratic  features  reinforces  doubts  about  its  desirability  and
viability.  After all,  does not the empowerment of a small  elite of experts thwart the
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pluralism  of  liberal  democracies?48 The  problem  with  the  technocratic  orientation
encouraged  by PA resides  in  its  anti-democratic  implications:  experts,  who  are  not
elected and have no political mandate, are ascribed the responsibility of leading society
toward the common good. Moreover,  as a  group of scholars (later  labelled as post-
positivists) have contended, the nature of liberal pluralistic societies is not compatible
with  rule  by an elite  of  experts.  The purpose of  this  section is  to  discuss  the  anti-
democratic implications of PA.
First of all, it is convenient to attempt to define the meaning of technocracy49. Policy
theorist Frank Fischer conceptualizes technocracy as a ‘governance process dominated
by  technically  trained  knowledge  elites’ and  explains  that  ‘the  function  of  the
technocratic elite is to replace or control democratic deliberation and decision-making
processes  (based  on  conflicting  interests)  with  a  more  technocratically  informed
discourse (based on scientific decision-making techniques)’. Not surprisingly the rise of
a technocracy has important implications for how politics is perceived: ‘The result is the
transformation  of  political  issues  into  technically  defined  ends  that  can  be  pursued
through administrative means’ (Fischer, 1993, p. 22).
It is true, however, that there is no consensus in the academic community whether PA is
inherently technocratic, or rather, if it is the context in which it was implemented that
explains its technocratic contours. It is convenient to scrutinize different viewpoints and
examine their arguments. I would like to suggest that it is possible to discern three main
strands in the policy literature: i) PA is technocratic and anti-democratic, and this should
48 Such  a  technocratic  view  of  government  departs  from a  liberal  pluralist  conception  of
politics that interprets policy-making as the result of group competition (political parties and
interest  groups).  Fischer  (1993),  examining  President  Lyndon  Johnson’s  Great  Society,
argues that  political  leaders and their  experts  act  as  an independent  social  force,  largely
protected from public  pressures.  Typically,  in  technocratic  regimes,  a  self-referential  and
secluded  policy  elite  is  divorced  from the  general  public,  interest  groups,  and  political
parties.
49 Investigating the emergence of a technocratic class in the United States, Fischer argues that
the  implementation  of  the  Great  Society  by  President  Lyndon  Johnson  represented  the
heyday of the technocratic regime, which operated according to the following sequence: i)
experts were invited by the President to help devise public sector reforms; ii) experts were
asked to define the problems and advocate solutions; iii) the Presidential cabinet attempted to
involve the media so that a consensus on the importance of the reform was built; iv) reports
were written and then released to the public (Fischer, 1993, p. 25-6).
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be  celebrated;  ii)  PA is  an  ambiguous  combination  of  technocratic  and  democratic
components; iii) PA is inherently technocratic and anti-democratic, and this should be
deplored. These positions deserve to be investigated in more detail.
The first view considers that technocracy may well be the price to pay for larger doses
of expertise and specialized knowledge in the policy process. Some scholars argue that
the  advent  of  a  technological  society  characterized  by  unrelenting  scientific
development inevitably lead to the ascension of science and the demise of politics. One
illustration of a technocratic reading of PA has been put forward by Lane (1966). He
argues that in contemporary knowledgeable societies, in which science and information
play  eminent  roles,  the  growing  importance  of  expertise  naturally  implies  the
dominance of expertise over politics and ideology. In his words, ‘it appears to me that
the political domain is shrinking and the knowledge domain is growing’ (Lane, 1966, p.
658). 
A technocratic  society  entrusts  experts  to  make  decisions.  In  Lane’s  view,  when
expertise is applied to the policy process, decisions are based on rational calculations
that seek the most efficient performance. Politics and ideology become less necessary
and can be increasingly replaced by more sound scientific forms of reasoning. When the
policy process is  delegated to  experts,  political  means of  reaching decisions can be
dispensed  with.  This  is  positive,  Lane  argues,  because  politics  is  not  primarily
concerned with efficiency but with less noble goals such as acquisition of influence,
power and votes. He considers that the political class should acknowledge the benefits
of expertise and voluntarily seek the advice of experts. Although politics is not bound to
disappear, the rise of science implies an inevitable decline of politics that tends to be
progressively substituted by technical analysis. 
Oft-cited  in  the  literature,  President  Kennedy’s  (1962)  discourse  at  Yale  University
summarizes the thrust of technocratic thinking. It is an advocacy of the end of ideology
and the death of politics:
I would like to say a word about the difference between myth and reality. Most of
us are conditioned for many years to have a political  viewpoint,  Republican or
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Democrat—liberal, conservative, moderate. The fact of the matter is that most of
the problems, or at least many of them, that we now face are technical problems,
are administrative problems. They are very sophisticated judgments, which do not
lend themselves to the great sort of ‘passionate movements’ which have stirred this
country so often in the past (JFK, Commencement Address at Yale University, May
21, 1962).
The celebration of technocracy found in Lane (1966) and Kennedy (1962), however,
contrasts with a second theoretical perspective that prefers to conceive the relationship
between technocracy and politics as marked by ambiguity. This is the case of Lasswell’s
policy  sciences  project,  discussed  previously  in  section  2.3.  The  founder  of  PA
attempted to integrate science and expertise within a broader democratic framework,
ultimately embracing a view that  the role  of technocrats  as policy advisers was not
incompatible with the democratic aspirations of liberal societies. Lasswell considered
that PA was simultaneously scientific and democratic. He argued that both orientations
were  reconcilable  because  democracy was  the  end  of  liberal  societies,  but  in  turn,
democracy required expertise to survive. 
Lasswell was ambiguous and throughout his extensive writings has oscillated between
the technocratic  and democratic  poles.  Scholars have argued that  Lasswell  favoured
expertise but was against the elimination of politics (Deleon, 1994a). Those domains –
science and politics – were reconcilable, although they might be in tension with each
other.  Douglas Torgerson, for instance, noted this ambivalence in Lasswell’s project:
‘Lasswell’s early work, as we have seen, was largely congruent with the technocratic
ideal  of  an  insular  elite  of  experts.  As he  endorses  a  policy science  of  democracy,
however, Lasswell advances the prospect that the project of contextual orientation might
expand beyond the professional realm to promote widespread, enlightened participation
in a democratic policy process’ (Torgerson, 1985, p. 253). 
If expertise and politics could be integrated in a coherent framework, then technocratic
implications were not an intrinsic feature of PA, but only a contingent aspect. According
to  this  vision,  the  technocratic  tendencies  displayed  by  PA are  not  derived  from
Lasswell’s propositions, but are a circumstance of its implementation. Therefore, the
technocratic  character  of  PA  is  reversible.  Torgerson  (1995)  suggests  that  more
democratic forms of PA could have been implemented if the lessons taught by Lasswell
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were followed more carefully. But in practice what happened was the triumph of the
technocratic orientation at the expense of democratic values50. 
According  to  Torgerson  (1995),  Lasswell’s  policy  approach  offers  tools  for  the
strengthening of democratic practices, such as the insinuation that citizens should be
educated and encouraged to participate in public life. Citizen participation would foster
a democratic culture capable of checking oligarchic and bureaucratic threats. Yet,  in
spite of Lasswell’s warnings, PA fell prey to technocratic forces (Torgerson, 1995, p.
239)51.  In  conclusion,  this  second  strand  of  the  literature  redeems  Lasswell’s  PA,
conceiving it as being simultaneously technocratic and democratic.
But there is,  yet,  a third strand on the policy literature that assumes that Lasswell’s
project was not ambiguous. These scholars disagree that expertise and democracy can
be reconciled and suggests that PA is irrevocably technocratic and anti-democratic. This
third view is now examined in more detail.
In his writings,  John Dryzek deplores the increasing technocratic features of policy-
making. He suggests that PA has operated according to an instrumental logic that is
detrimental to democratic practices and institutions. In his assessment, a technocratic PA
eventually leads to an oligarchic concentration of power in the hands of a few experts.
Technocracy and democracy can hardly coexist because they have distinct dynamics52.
50 Had PA respected the prescriptions of his original  formulator,  technocratic consequences
might have been avoided. This position has been espoused by Torgerson (1995, p. 230) who
writes that PA as practised in the 1970s ‘followed a tendency within behaviourist political
science to insulate inquiry from the language and experience of politics’. He argues that the
policy orientation has succumbed to the technocratic temptation. In addition, he also clarifies
that Lasswell was well aware of the dangers of oligarchic concentration of power and thus
reinforced the democratic potential of PA.
51 Torgerson (1995, p. 245) further notes that ‘with Lasswell, however, a focus on the threats of
bureaucracy and oligarchy does not become an explicit critique of technocracy … Only with
the advent of post-positivist policy genre in the 1980s does the critique of technocracy enter
an entirely supportive intellectual terrain’. See also Deleon (1994b).
52 Along  similar  lines,  Stone  (2001)  deplores  the  rejection  of  politics  imbued  in  the
technocratic  project.  In  her  view,  technocratic  PA conceives  politics  as  the  realm  of
irrationality. In order to insulate policy from the ‘indignities of politics’, PA purports to adopt
a superior approach based on purely rational, analytic and scientific methodology. What is
forgotten, she suggests, is that policy issues are first and foremost political problems to be
negotiated within the political system. To suppress politics is not possible because the very
strategy of eliminating politics is itself a political attitude.
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PA, Dryzek (1990, p. 3) argues, is geared by an instrumental type of rationality that
interprets  policy-making as a process of selecting the best  means to achieve certain
ends. In practice, the instrumentalization of policy-making places the focus solely on the
achievement  of  efficiency,  thus  displacing  other  legitimate  values  (such as  political
equality or social justice). There are various reasons why this instrumental rationality is
anti-democratic. On a more philosophical level, Dryzek suggests that the instrumental
rationality inherent to the technocratic attitude is pernicious because it  ‘destroys  the
more  congenial,  spontaneous,  egalitarian,  and  intrinsically  egalitarian  meaningful
aspects of human association’ (Dryzek, 1990, p. 4). On a political level, for its turn,
instrumental rationality is anti-democratic because it concentrates power on a small elite
of enlightened experts  who control decision-making power.  On an operational level,
Dryzek notes, the instrumental rationality is also flawed since it provides methods and
techniques that are inadequate to solve complex social  problems. In all  three levels,
technocracy and democracy are mutually exclusive realms that cannot be reconciled.
In Dryzek’s view, only a communicative approach to policy is capable of challenging
the technocratic orientation in policy-making in such a way that ‘policy analysis might
cease to  be  an agent  of  domination and become a material  force  for  emancipation’
(Dryzek,  1990,  p.  113).  Among the perverse implications  of technocratic  behaviour,
Dryzek points out the discouragement of political debate by focusing analysis solely on
the achievement of efficiency. Moreover, it reduces politics to a game between technical
elites  who  monopolize  expert  knowledge,  thus  strengthening  bureaucratic  and
hierarchical  forces  that  impose  control  and  restrain  freedom.  As  he  observes,  a
technocratic  PA coercively  imposes  a  consensus  that  eliminates  the  possibility  of
contestation:  ‘mainstream  policy  analysis  fails  to  allow  that  the  value  positions
surrounding any interesting policy issue are typically complex, controversial, and fluid’
(Dryzek, 1990, p. 115). 
91
The only solution, in his view, to make PA compatible with democratic aspirations is to
embrace a deliberative approach to public policy53, which will be the fourth paradigm
examined  in  this  thesis,  and  will  be  discussed  in  chapter  4.  For  Dryzek,  from  a
deliberative perspective, democratic participation54 is celebrated and encouraged, and
policy-making is made more democratic. Thus, in Dryzek’s vision, a democratic policy
process cannot be actualized within the type of PA championed by Lasswell. 
This  is  also  the  opinion  espoused  by  Torgerson  (2007)  in  his  re-assessment  of
Lasswell’s  project.  Reviewing  his  earlier  position,  he  now  suggests  that  the  PA
advocated by Lasswell should be conceptualized as technocratic, oligarchic and anti-
democratic: 
In the end, nonetheless, his [Lasswell’s] account of the policy orientation not only
recapitulates  the  old  rationalist  pattern  of  reason  ruling  the  passions,  but  also
repeats  the  gesture  of  making  a  rational  elite  the  hero  of  the  story.  Despite
Lasswell’s pragmatism and careful democratic qualifications, it can be said with
little  exaggeration  that  the  basic  image  is  one  of  reason  on  top,  calming  and
ordering a mass of unruly impulses below (Torgerson, 2007, p. 25). 
Irrespective  of  Lasswell’s  attitude  towards  democracy,  there  is  little  doubt  that  the
implementation of PA in governmental agencies led to the emergence of a technocratic
elite, whose oligarchic behaviour is at odds with democratic values (Fischer, 1993). This
is another limitation evinced by PA, whose fundamental limitation is connected with its
inability to recognize the inescapability of the political55. 
53 Dryzek favours  a  participatory form of  democracy that  is  at  odds  with the  technocratic
inclinations of PA: ‘My own position is that defensible policy analysis must side with open
communication  and  unrestricted  participation;  in  other  words,  with  participatory  and
discursive democracy’ (Dryzek, 1993, p. 229). 
54 Along similar lines, Torgerson (2003, p. 137) argues that public participation in the policy
process works as an antidote to technocratic rationale: ‘Technocratic discourse is now liable
to be exposed not as the voice of reason, but as a device serving irrational and illegitimate
power. Public participation in policy discourse is now more difficult to oppose. No longer
can liberal democratic notions easily resist demands for democratic participation in policy
discourse’.
55 The technocratic implications of PA were also visible in the way policy analysts organize
themselves as a professional cluster. As Torgerson puts it, ‘Yet, contrary to Lasswell’s hopes
for the policy orientation, the actual tendency has been the development of a professional
identity marked by institutional allegiances to a sphere of organizations – that primarily of
state agencies and large private corporations – tends to reinforce tendencies toward oligarchy
and bureaucratism’ (Torgerson, 2007, p. 24).
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The dream of banishing politics, which has seduced Early Public Administration (EPA)
theorists, has also been embraced by PA’s advocates. In reality, however, what appeared
to be a dream turned out to be an illusion. As several scholars argued, the policy process
is  both  technical  and political.  The demise  of  the  politics-administration  dichotomy
undermined the  analytical  power  of  EPA.  Similarly,  the  critique  of  the  technocratic
approach  weakened  PA.  What  was  at  stake  in  the  case  of  both  paradigms  was  a
misrecognition of the political. 
The next two chapters will  examine the emergence of two paradigms that aimed to
connect  politics  with  the  policy  process.  The  Interpretive  Public  Policy  (IPP)  is
discussed  in  chapter  3,  and  the  Deliberative  Policy  Approach  (DPA)  is  studied  in
chapter 4. Both IPP and DPA reacted against the technocratic attitude of PA and adopted
a much more favourable view of politics. Their endeavour, though not uncontroversial,
has the merit of attempting to formulate a political interpretation of the policy process.
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Chapter 3 – Interpretive Public Policy (IPP)
3.1 Introduction
The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  explore  the  cornerstones  of  the  third  paradigm
investigated in this thesis, which will be designated as Interpretive Public Policy (IPP).
It aims fundamentally at explaining the meaning of an interpretive orientation in public
policy by presenting its key concepts and ideas. It will be argued that IPP emerged as a
reaction  to  the  type  of  rationalistic  and technocratic  Policy Analysis  (PA)  that  was
practised particularly in  the United States during the 1960s and 1970s.  Although of
mainly a theoretical (and philosophical) nature, IPP represents a crucial episode in the
evolution of public policy that deserves to be described appropriately.
It is worth noting at the outset that because IPP can be depicted rather as a framework
than a technique, this chapter will focus more on theory than practice. Different from
Early  Public  Administration  (chapter  1),  and  Policy  Analysis  (chapter  2),  which
comprised both theory and practice, IPP remains primarily an analytical tool. In fact,
this  is  precisely  one  of  IPP’s  main  challenges:  the  identification  of  appropriate
methodologies  and  techniques  capable  of  making  it  operationalizable  in
administrative/policy settings (Hastings, 1998).
Although IPP still lacks implementation tools, there are other reasons that justify the
importance of dedicating a  whole chapter  to  study it.  First,  it  provides a  consistent
critique  of  (rationalistic  and  technocratic)  PA  revealing  that  its  foundations  are
problematic.  Second,  it  sets  the  ground  for  the  emergence  of  innovative  policy
orientations, such as the Deliberative Policy Approach (DPA) that will be discussed in
chapter 4. Third, it  offers key insights that can be applied to the development of an
Agonistic Policy Model (APM) that will be delineated in chapter 5. Fourth, it represents
an attempt to integrate the study of public policies with broader social and political
concerns.
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Indeed,  of  crucial  importance to  the theme of this  thesis  – the reluctance of public
administration/policy  inquiry  to  acknowledge  its  political  condition  –  is  how  IPP
attempts to break away from a tradition that persistently ignores politics. Different from
EPA (that  enshrined  a  politics-administration  dichotomy)  and  PA (that  favoured  a
technocratic and anti-political approach), IPP attempts to connect policy and politics.
Therefore, a study whose chief aim is to grasp how administration/policy and politics
are intertwined is strongly encouraged to take seriously the advent of IPP.
Another important remark concerns the choice for the title of this chapter. The notion of
‘interpretive’ public policy should be read as encompassing a myriad of policy schools
and  trends  that  share  at  least  two  features:  i)  a  sceptical  view  of  positivistic  (or
empiricist) PA; ii) an emphasis on the centrality of discourse to understand how policy-
making operates.  The term  ‘interpretive’ has  gained traction more  recently with the
periodic  organization  of  conferences  under  the  title  Interpretive  Policy  Analysis
(currently  in  its  9th edition)  in  which  scholars  and  students  identified  with  post-
empiricist  approaches  to  public  policy  gather  together  to  share  their  intellectual
contributions.
IPP does not exactly constitute an unified body of knowledge. Instead, it is most aptly
characterized as an intersection of disparate theoretical strands whose unifying theme is
the  rejection  of  (positivistic)  PA. As such,  IPP interweaves  contributions  emanating
from different intellectual fields. This is illustrated, for instance, by the fact that scholars
have employed a variety of different terms to refer to this type of theorizing. Here are a
few examples: discursive policy inquiry (Fischer, 2003), narrative policy analysis (Roe,
1994), interpretive policy analysis (Yanow, 2000), interpretive policy inquiry (Healy,
1986), rhetorics of policy analysis (Throgmorton, 1991), argumentative policy analysis
(Fischer and Forester, 1993; Gottweis, 2006), discursive policy analysis (Fairclough and
Fairclough,  2012),  postmodern  policy  analysis  (Schram,  1993;  Danziger,  1995),
postmodern  public  administration  (Fox  and  Miller,  1996),  post-structuralist  policy
analysis  (Gottweis,  2003),  post-positivistic policy analysis  (Torgerson, 1986; Ascher,
1987, Fischer, 1998; Durning, 1999; Dryzek, 2002) and post-empiricist policy analysis
(Fischer, 2009).
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In order to analyse and discuss the key ideas of IPP, this chapter is structured in six
sections  (apart  from  this  introduction).  Section  3.2  examines  the  emergence  of  an
interpretive account of public policy as a critique of PA, and draws mainly from the
work of  Giandomenico  Majone.  Section  3.3  investigates  the  antecedents  of  IPP by
exploring  the  contribution  of  five  important  scholars  who advocated  an interpretive
view of public policy (in the 1970s and 1980s). Section 3.4 describes the main features
of IPP by examining an important interpretive framework known as Narrative Policy
Analysis (NPA). It also shows how this specific interpretive strand departs from PA.
Section 3.5 emphasizes one important dimension of IPP, namely its politicization of the
policy process, and describes different renderings of politics implicit in some accounts
of IPP. Section 3.6 takes issue with the problem of IPP operationalization and argues
that  despite  the  absence  of  fully-fledged  workable  interpretive  models,  there  are
interesting attempts that deserve attention. Section 3.7 closes the chapter by pointing out
how critics of IPP envisage its main shortcomings.
3.2 The emergence of the interpretive account as a critique of PA
Descriptions of IPP usually start with a reference (or more accurately with a critique) of
PA. Fischer, Miller and Sidney (2007) provide a convenient illustration. They note that
the foundation of PA is traditionally associated with Lasswell’s policy sciences, which
called for an ambitious multi-disciplinary project through which scientific knowledge
would  be  applied  to  improve  policy  decisions.  When  PA was  implemented  in  the
government,  however,  it  ‘largely failed to  take up Lasswell’s  bold vision,  following
instead a much narrower path of development’. As they write,
Policy analysis,  as it  is  known today,  has taken an empirical orientation geared
more to managerial practices than to the facilitation of democratic government per
se .... In contrast to a multidisciplinary methodological perspective, the field has
been  shaped  by  a  more  limiting  methodological  framework  derived  from  the
neopositivist/empiricist theories of knowledge that dominated the social sciences of
the day … In no small part,  this has been driven by the dominant influence of
economics and its  positivist  scientific methodologies on the development of the
field (Fischer, Miller and Sidney, 2007, p. xix).
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Although PA has achieved some success (with its methods being adopted not only in
public agencies, but also in think tanks, research centres, academic groups), its practical
results were not encouraging. Introduced in the federal agencies of the United States in
the decades of the 1960s and 1970s, PA (whose main implementation tool was PPBS)
addressed  a  large  range  of  societal  problems  such  as  criminality,  poverty,
unemployment, social inequality, inadequate health and education. 
The appraisal  of the outcomes of PPBS has generated a significant literature,  which
outlined  the  gap  between  the  expectations  and  the  concrete  results.  There  is  a
recognition that although massive financial  commitments had been made and highly
qualified experts had been employed, the results achieved by policy analysts fell short
of  the  expectation.  For  instance,  Botner  (1970,  p.  424)  contends  that  ‘while  some
worthwhile results have been achieved with PPBS to date, the system has failed to fulfil
the  expectations  of  its  more  ardent  proponents’.  Similarly,  Harlow  (1973,  p.  86)
discussing the decline of PPBS, writes that ‘it is not surprising to anyone that some of
the  exaggerated  claims  originally  made  for  PPBS have  not  been  fulfilled.  What  is
surprising to many is that even modest progress seems hard to identify’.
In spite of a general agreement that PPBS has not been successful, the literature does
not offer a consensual view about the reasons why it did not deliver robust outcomes.
Attempting to critically evaluate the initial four years of the implementation of PPBS,
Botner (1970) suggests that the explanation for the poor achievements of PPBS can be
found in the hasty manner in which it was introduced in the government. He suggests
that  ‘with  the  benefit  of  hindsight,  it  appears  that  PPBS was introduced in  civilian
agencies abruptly, on too large a scale, and without adequate advance preparation and
study’ (Botner, 1970, p. 424). For his turn, Harlow (1973) contends that  PPBS failed
mainly because it was not suitable for dealing with the complex and uncertain political
environment  in  which  decisions  are  characterized  by  high  levels  of  conflict  and
disagreement. In his view, despite the sophistication of PPBS, it was insufficient to cope
with the complexity of social problems. 
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Although critics differ in their assessment of why PA failed in its implementation (when
assessed from the experience of PPBS), they generally agree that the outcomes were
disappointing  when  confronted  with  the  initial  expectations56.  Prompted  by  the
shortcomings of PPBS, policy theorists searched for promising alternatives that could
provide more suitable frameworks for designing and implementing public policies. In
particular,  as  Fischer  (1993)  suggested,  attention  has  turned  to  the  epistemological
foundations of PA, most notably to its positivistic assumptions. If the discipline of PA
was to renew itself, it had to reconsider its own ontology (Hawkesworth, 1988; Dryzek,
1993).  On  similar  lines,  Ascher  (1987)  contended  that  in  order  to  discover  new
foundations, PA had to distance itself from positivism and follow a distinct (ontological)
path.  In  addition,  as  Fischer,  Miller  and  Sidney  (2007)  intimated,  the  perceived
inadequacies eventually led to an interpretive ‘turn’ in policy inquiry.
As mentioned in the beginning of this section, the advent of IPP is commonly associated
with a critique of PA. With the purpose of describing how the interpretive approach
emerged  in  the  field  of  public  policy,  this  text  will  now  turn  to  the  work  of
Giandomenico Majone, which provides both an account of PA’s main limitations but
also indicates the new (interpretive) directions followed by policy inquiry. Majone is an
important  reference  in  IPP and his  critique of  PA frequently appears  in  interpretive
analysis of public policy.
For the purposes of this chapter, Majone’s investigation is particularly relevant for two
reasons.  First,  he  convincingly  showed  that  the  deficiencies  displayed  by PA were
intrinsic to its theoretical assumptions. He contested the idea that PA was a sound and
workable  method  whose  failure  derived  from the  (empirical)  way in  which  it  was
implemented. In his view, the problems of PA rested on the ontological assumptions, or
more  properly,  in  its  positivistic  approach  to  knowledge.  His  second  important
contribution was going beyond a critique57 and advocating a new policy agenda. Thus
he proposed a vision of public policy that transcended the rationalistic tenets of PA and
56 In  his  essay  ‘Rescuing  Policy Analysis  From PPBS’,  Wildavsky (1969)  argues  that  PA
should be preserved in spite of PPBS’s shortcomings.
57 A critique of PA’s assumptions had already been formulated by various scholars.  See for
instance Lindblom (1959), Wildavsky (1966), and Tribe (1972).
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instead ventured into the realm of interpretation, language and discourse. In terms of
structure,  this  section  is  divided  into  two  parts.  Section  3.2.1  examines  Majone’s
critique of PA and then section 3.2.2 depicts his defence of an interpretive/discursive
orientation in public policy.
3.2.1 Majone’s critique of PA
In his book Evidence, Argument, and Persuasion in the Policy Process Majone (1989)
sets the task of understanding the theoretical assumptions of PA. He notes that PA and
its  precursors  (operations  research  and  systems  analysis)  were  developed  with  the
primary purpose of guiding the decision process of policy-makers. In his view, because
PA  was  essentially  geared  to  provide  a  reliable  decisional  tool,  it  followed  a
methodology that  could be appropriately called  ‘decisionism’ (the term is  borrowed
from Judith Shklar). By decisionism58, he meant an analytical orientation that focuses on
how rational policy-makers make choices when confronted with alternative courses of
action. 
Depicting  the  features  of  decisionism,  Majone  explains  that  i)  it  presupposes  a
positivistic separation of facts and values and ii) it is oriented toward the maximization
of outcomes. In fact, PA based on a decisionist methodology interprets the task of the
policy-maker as the selection of the most convenient means to attain certain goals. And,
in order to identify the best means that will lead to the desired outcomes, the decisionist
rationale is structured as a sequence of policy stages: set objectives, define possible
alternatives, evaluate their consequences, and choose the alternative that maximizes the
attaining of the objectives at the least cost. 
58 It should be noted that the notion of ‘decisionism’ has been employed in political science by
other authors (e.g. Carl Schmitt) albeit in a very different connotation. To avoid confusion, it
is advisable to quote the whole paragraph in which Majone situates his conceptualization of
the term:  ‘The image that lies behind this methodology has been called decisionism – the
“vision of a limited number of political actors engaged in making calculated choices among
clearly conceived alternatives”. An actor’s choices are considered rational if they can be
explained as the choosing of the best means to achieve given objectives’ (Majone, 1989, p.
12). 
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Although  widely employed  in  public  agencies59,  Majone argues,  decisionism is  not
without  troubles.  In  his  view,  decisionism offers  a  partial  description  of  the  policy
process. The problem is not that decisionism is wrong, but that it is misleading: ‘it has
led to a serious imbalance in the way we think about policy-making’ (Majone, 1989, p.
20). Throughout his book, Majone enumerates a series of deficiencies of the decisionist
methodology60.  Here  four  of  them  will  be  outlined:  i)  suppression  of  values;  ii)
disregard  for  justification;  iii)  lack  of  advocacy  role;  iv)  inaccurate  description  of
organizational  behaviour.  It  is  worth  briefly  discussing  each  of  these  problematic
features of decisionism, because they will help to elucidate why PA has been enmeshed
with difficulties since its inception. 
1. Suppression of values. Within the decisionist framework, PA is conceived as a
fact-based, scientific-oriented approach that regards ‘values’ as exogenous to the
policy  process.  As  discussed  previously  in  this  thesis,  this  strict  separation
between facts and values leads to a politics-administration divide (the case of
EPA discussed  in  chapter  1)  and  to  an  over-emphasizing  of  technique  over
politics (the case of PA examined in chapter 2). The problem, however, is that
this  fact-value  dichotomization  is  untenable,  because  facts  and  values  are
intertwined when it comes to the real life of policy-making. Thus, by privileging
exclusively what is factual, and thus suppressing any legitimate role for values61,
PA provides an inaccurate picture of the actual policy process.
59 Echoing Wildavsky, he contends that ‘since political science seemed unable to provide a set
of  concepts  and  analytic  techniques  comparable  to  the  strong  normative  structure  of
microeconomics, the majority of policy analysts remained firmly committed to a decisionist
methodology’ (Majone, 1989, p. 15).
60 One important  limitation of  the decisionism is its  focus placed on outcomes rather than
processes.  But  processes  are  a  crucial  dimension  of  policy-making  that  should  not  be
neglected. In his influential essay, Tribe (1972) sustains that it is mistaken to believe that the
maximization of outcomes is independent of the respective (policy) process. For example,
one might consider that any process that leads to a desirable result is satisfactory. However,
policy practice shows that the choice of a particular process is determinant to the result of the
action. The selection of a process is consequential for the success or failure of the policy as
whole.
61 PA focuses exclusively on factual data, thus excluding values from the concern of the policy
analyst. The belief that only facts are relevant for policy decision ‘relegates values, criteria,
judgements, and opinions to the domain of the irrational or the purely subjective’ (Majone,
1989, p. 23).
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2. Disregard for justification.  Majone also argued that the lack of concern with
‘justification’ is another limitation of decisionism. In policy-making, at least in
democratic regimes, decisions must always be justified. Because political agents
are  held accountable for  their  actions,  decisions  need to  be  explained to  the
public. When policy-makers decide for the adoption of a particular public policy,
they are usually required to expose the reasons why that choice was made, for
example, by showing which benefits it brings to the citizens. Failure to justify
decisions might raise doubts about its legitimacy. ‘To decide,  even to decide
correctly, is never enough in politics. Decisions must be legitimated, accepted,
and carried out. After the moment of choice comes the process of justification,
explanation and persuasion’ (Majone, 1989, p. 31). The problem, however, as
Majone outlined,  is  that  decisionism does  not  take justification into account,
although it is nonetheless fundamental in policy-making.
3. Lack  of  advocacy  role.  The  decisionist  methodology  also  fails  to  properly
acknowledge  the  role  of  advocacy  in  policy-making.  By focusing  solely  on
factual  data  and efficiency maximization,  the  advocacy dimension  (which  is
inherent  to  policy-making)  is  ignored.  Majone  (1989,  p.  38)  distinguishes
various types of policy advocacy (instructive, advisory and prescriptive), which
although pervasive in the daily life of policy-making, are systematically omitted
by  decisionism.  For  instance,  the  policy-maker  might  be  advised  by  policy
analysts about issues of problem definition or policy implementation, which are
not  related  to  efficiency maximization.  In  other  situations,  the  policy-maker
might be interested in getting clarification or general advice. These examples
illustrate circumstances in which the activity of policy-making is devoid of an
instrumental concern with outcomes. Again, the role of advocacy, recurrent in
daily life of organizations, is overlooked by a decisionist methodology. 
4. Inaccurate description of organizational behaviour.  A fourth limitation of the
decisionist  methodology  is  the  assumption  that  organizations  always  decide
according to the criteria of goal maximization. What is neglected, however, is
that  other  factors  often  play a  decisive  role  in  the  decision-making process.
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Majone noted the relevance of two constraints that often divert policy-makers
from picking the  ‘optimal’ solution: political commitments and administrative
loyalties. On one hand, political commitments include listening to demands of
powerful  groups  and  deciding  whether  to  acquiesce  to  their  exigencies.  For
example,  the pressure of an interest  group might compel the policy-maker to
discard a policy that would be more efficient on a purely technical basis. On the
other hand, administrative loyalties might prompt the policy-maker to decide in
such a  way as  not  to displease a particular  agency (for  example,  the budget
office).  In  either  situation,  political  commitments  or  administrative  loyalties,
decisions are not taken according to the maximization criterion, as assumed by
decisionism.
These four points suggest that decisionism is problematic because it does not properly
reflect how public policies effectively happen in practice. Thus, Majone proposes that
PA should question its  decisionist  roots.  The adoption of decisionism is  particularly
harmful  because  it  is  predicated  on  an  instrumentalist  view  of  policy-making  that
construes  policies  purely  in  terms  of  (efficiency)  maximization.  In  conclusion,  the
decisionist  view is  too  narrow and  does  not  accurately  capture  how policy-making
unfolds in practice. In order to find a framework that more appropriately mirrors the
policy  process,  Majone  recommends  a  departure  from  the  decisionist  tradition.  As
examined in the next section, he urges PA to revisit its assumptions by redirecting its
attention to the crucial role played by language and interpretation in the policy process. 
3.2.2 From decisionism to argumentation: toward an interpretive  orientation of public
policy
After delineating a critique of decisionism, Majone analyses how the policy process
actually  unravels  in  real  life.  In  his  view,  the  empirical  investigation  of  the  policy
process reveals a different picture than that portrayed by decisionism. Public policies
are not means to achieve specific ends, as the decisionist view assumes. Instead, they
are discursive artefacts mediated by language and interpretation. Policies, Majone notes,
are  the  product  of  exchange  of  opinions.  In  fact,  policy-makers  decide,  not  by
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instrumentally  pursuing  the  best  means  to  achieve  specific  ends,  but  through  a
continuous process of argumentation.
In order to justify why an interpretive view is more adequate to describe the policy
process, Majone calls attention to the distinction between science and policy. He argues
that  the  trend  of  assimilating  public  policies  to  scientific  procedures,  as  PA has
attempted  to  do,  is  profoundly misleading.  In  his  view,  science  and policy are  two
distinct domains, with their own rationales and procedures. He proposes to clarify their
differences and explains that scientific knowledge follows a deductive method, whereas
the  policy  process  is  fundamentally  geared  by  argumentation.  Moreover,  scientific
knowledge is based on formal proof and logical deduction with theories being formally
demonstrated by drawing logical inferences from axioms. 
Policy-making,  however,  does  not  follow  scientific  procedures,  as  enthusiastically
suggested by PA’s advocates (Lasswell, in particular). The main reason is that public
policies  are  not  primarily  concerned  with  formulation  of  theories,  verification  of
hypotheses,  control  of  experiments,  prediction  of  events.  In  contrast,  policies  are
produced in the same way as daily informal conversations are structured, that is, as a
continuous  exchange  of  opinions  (that  eventually  culminate  in  a  decision).  Majone
explains that the policy process does not have the purpose of generating ‘formal proofs
but  only persuasive  arguments’ (Majone,  1989,  p.  7).  In  his  view,  public  policy is
concerned  with  debate,  dialogue,  conversation  and  not  with  logical  and  abstract
reasoning or formal demonstration. 
This  distinction  between  science  and  policy  has  important  implications  (not
acknowledged by PA though). Since policy-making is construed as being similar to an
informal conversation, anyone can enter in a policy dialogue. Again, there is a radical
departure  from how science  proceeds:  the  policy dialogue  is  open  and  unrestricted
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instead  of  being  confined  to  the  interplay  of  experts62.  Different  from  scientific
demonstration that is a purely intellectual exercise performed by experts, policy-making
is an interactive process that builds on practical reasoning63 (Majone, 1989, p. 22-3).
There is no reason why experts should play a special role in the policy process since the
aim is  not  to produce scientific  knowledge but rather  to  enable the expression of a
diversity of viewpoints. The outcome of policy-making is  ‘not a formal proof, but a
shared understanding of the issue under discussion’ (Majone, 1989, p. 7).
Science  and  policy  differ  in  other  aspects  as  well.  Majone  discusses  the  role  of
empirical evidence. In science, empirical evidence is indispensable and hypotheses are
confirmed  or  rejected  depending  on  the  existence  of  evidence.  In  policy,  however,
factual evidence is relevant, but only insofar as it is articulated within an argument.
Policy actors are  not data-collectors  but rather  producers of arguments,  whose main
concern is to ‘provide evidence which, together with other sources of information, may
be used in  arguments  supporting  a  certain conclusion or  recommendation’ (Majone,
1989, p. 51).
There is yet another key distinction between science and policy. Whereas science aims
for the development of the best theoretical model, which will excel in explanatory or
predictive powers, policy does not value theoretical sophistication per se, but only if it is
62 By asserting that policy is an open domain that requires no previous expertise, Majone offers
a more democratic understanding of the policy process when compared with the technocratic
view espoused by PA. In fact, he recognizes that an interpretive view is more attuned to the
democratic  regime.  For  him,  both  policy  and  democratic  politics  are  fundamentally
persuasive activities, since ‘political parties, the electorate, the legislature, the executive, the
courts,  the  media,  interest  groups,  and  independent  experts  all  engage  in  a  continuous
process  of  debate  and  reciprocal  persuasion’ (Majone,  1989,  p.  1).  When  conceived  in
interpretive terms, the democratic potential of public policies can be more acknowledged. 
63 Practical reasoning  – frequently associated with the Greek concept of  phronesis – offers a
more adequate ground (than purely theoretical reasoning) to understand the nature of public
policies.  Because  phronesis  points  out  to  a  type  of  reasoning  that  connects  theory and
practice, ideas and action, it is better positioned to elucidate the meaning of public policies.
Along these lines, Canadian policy theorist Douglas Torgerson suggests that phronesis offers
a  more  convenient  epistemic  standpoint  not  only  to  study  policy-making  but  also  to
challenge the ‘persistence of positivistic and technocratic expectations in the wider context
of discourses associated with contemporary administrative institutions’ (Torgerson, 1995, p.
227). On the subject of phronesis in social sciences, see also Flyvbjerg (2001) and Flyvbjerg,
Landman and Schram (2012).
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capable of being incorporated into a persuasive argument64. In this sense, Majone writes
that ‘a good model is merely one type of evidence among others, not the end of the
argument,  much  less  the  ultimate  authority’ (Majone,  1989,  p.  51).  Again,  Majone
attempts to prove his point: unlike science, policy is an interpretive practice. 
Having delineated important distinctions between science and policy,  Majone (1989)
suggests that  public  policies should be conceived in  interpretive – not  decisionist  –
terms. Contrary to Lasswell’s enthusiastic vindication of a scientific PA, as discussed in
chapter 2, the terms ‘scientific’ and ‘policy’ do not dovetail. Science is about deduction
and formal  proof,  whereas  policy is  about  exchange of  arguments.  A scientific  PA,
therefore, attempts to connect elements whose logic are distinct. 
As stated in the beginning of this section, Majone’s contribution is twofold. On one
hand, he outlines a critique of decisionism, depicting some of its shortcomings. On the
other  hand,  he proposes that  Policy Analysis  (PA) could be restructured by shifting
away from the  decisionist  methodology toward  a  more  interpretive  (argumentative)
view of the policy process. Having presented Majone’s advocacy for an interpretive
view, it is convenient to explore how the Interpretive Public Policy (IPP) began to be
gradually delineated through the contributions of several policy scholars. This is the aim
of the next section.
3.3 A diachronic view of IPP
More heterodox interpretations of public policy were disseminated in the 1970s. That is
when scholars in the field of public policy started to question some of the positivist and
empiricist assumptions of the discipline and turned their attention to alternative lines of
thought. Scholars of different intellectual traditions expressed their discontent against
the  dominant  problem-solving view of  public  policy – whose model  was PA – and
proposed different ways of regarding the policy process. Five important contributions
will now be examined in this section. Their writings exemplify not only a discomfort
64 In  fact,  policy is  structured  around arguments,  which are  ‘typically a  complex  blend of
factual propositions, logical deductions, evaluations, and recommendations’ (Majone, 1989,
p. 44).
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with (positivistic) PA but also illustrate theoretical endeavours to construct innovative
paths.
In an influential essay titled  ‘Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?’,  published in the
early 1970s, Tribe (1972, p. 67) critiqued  ‘the techniques and principles of problem-
solving  variously  referred  to  as  policy  science,  cost-benefit  analysis,  operations
research,  systems  analysis,  and  decision  theory’  and  argued  that  they  ‘present
difficulties  shared  by dominant  or  emerging  styles  of  thought  in  a  wide  variety  of
disciplines’.  Interestingly,  he  pointed  out  that  the  limitations  of  PA derived  from a
positivistic  approach  to  knowledge,  or  as  he  put  it,  from  ‘a  conviction  of  their
transparency to considerations of value and their neutrality with respect to fundamental
world views and to more or less ultimate ends’ (Tribe, 1972, p. 75). As a consequence of
this belief in the possibility of sharply distinguishing between facts and values, a false
notion of the neutrality of technique was produced and thus, ‘the myth endures that the
techniques  in  themselves  lack  substantive  content,  that  intrinsically  they  provide
nothing beyond value free devices for organizing thought in rational ways – methods for
sorting  out  issues  and  objectively  clarifying  the  empirical  relationships  among
alternative actions and their likely consequences’ (Tribe, 1972, p. 75). Tribe, however,
was not a lonely voice in his view of positivism as the undermining factor of PA.
In Social Science and Public Policy, Rein (1976) also questioned the positivistic logic
of PA and went beyond by suggesting that an interpretive orientation would arguably
transcend the hindrances posed by positivism. Reflecting on the relationship between
social  science  and  public  policies,  he  set  the  task  of  identifying  an  alternative  to
positivism in PA, which he considered incapable of dealing with the complex, uncertain
and controversial problems that characterize the daily life of policy-making. Opting for
a ‘value critical’ perspective, Rein (1976) suggested that the focus of PA should shift
away from the search for universal laws proper to positivism. In his view, attention
should  be  placed  on  discursive  artefacts65,  such  as  narratives,  storytelling,
argumentation, analogies and metaphors that are more apt to describe the policy world
65 Thus he contends that an ‘important alternative to the search for general predictive laws, in
the positivist tradition, is the narrative method of linking together isolated events, empirical
studies and policy intentions which I call “storytelling”’ (Rein, 1976, p. 87).
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than the positivistic means-ends instrumental approach (Rein, 1976, p. 14). Although
Rein did not fully provide an interpretive account of public policy, his contribution was
nonetheless significant  because he not  only described the limitations of PA but also
anticipated  the  interpretive  research  direction  that  would  be  more  systematically
embraced later on.
The departure from a positivistic toward an interpretive approach to public policy has
also been anticipated by Smith (1982) who argued in his work ‘Phenomenology of the
Policy Process’ that the methodological foundations of PA remained fragile. In his quest
for stronger principles, he drew on the phenomenology developed by Alfred Schutz.
Smith  believed  that  only phenomenology could  offer  consistent  conceptual  tools  to
ground the study of public policy. In particular, he argued that phenomenology was best
suited  for  the  task  because  of  its  capacity  to  deal  with  the  indeterminacy  and
contingency inherent  to  the policy process.  In Smith’s (1982,  p.  10)  view,  ‘because
preferences and expectations diverge, the world of policy is a changing world’, and only
a policy typology based on  phenomenological  principles could properly capture this
instability and unpredictability. By focusing attention on the subjective meaning of the
action,  phenomenology would  help  PA to  carve  out  its  transition  from instrumental
problem-solving to a meaning-centred policy interpretation.
Also sympathetic to phenomenology, Dryzek inscribed the policy process within the
broader  realm of hermeneutics and claimed that  the role  of the policy analyst  went
beyond that of ‘provider of technical solutions’. In  ‘Policy Analysis as a Hermeneutic
Activity’, Dryzek (1982, p. 309) noted that 
We have indeed travelled far from the heady days of the 1960s, when it was widely
believed  that,  given  enough  analysis  and  federal  government  money,  it  was
possible to solve any social problem. Today, one finds widespread doubt among
both policy-makers and social scientists  – not least policy analysts themselves –
concerning the ability of social science to contribute to social problem solving.
In his view, the challenge faced by the discipline of PA in the early 1980s could be
synthesized as the need ‘to carve out a constructive role for social science and policy
analysis  while recognizing the reality of decision processes’ (Dryzek, 1982, p. 310).
107
Critical of positivistic PA that over-emphasized the role of technique and expertise66,
Dryzek  argued  in  favour  of  a  contextual  approach  to  policy  analysis,  to  which  a
hermeneutic  approach  might  offer  a  significant  contribution.  After  examining  the
literature on policy models, he noted that insufficient attention has been paid to public
policy as hermeneutic activity. Delineating a hermeneutic policy model, Dryzek noted
that  ‘the  hermeneutic  image  is  of  discourse  and  dialectic  rather  than  instrumental,
purposive action’. Dryzek’s (1982) hermeneutic approach also largely anticipated many
of the tenets of IPP.
Although writing in the early 1990s, Forester (1990) offered a pioneering illustration of
how a non-positivistic PA could be applied in the field of public planning. He presented
a case study in which the processes of policy formulation and implementation were
interpreted through the lenses of phenomenology. In particular, he justified his claim for
a  phenomenological  approach  on the  grounds  that  it  was  more  suitable  to  describe
policy-making than the dominant positivistic PA. He argued that policies should not be
primarily defined as technical means to achieve certain ends. Instead, they could be
construed as a narrative in  which  ‘arguments  are  given,  interpreted,  and elaborated’
(Forester, 1990, p. 58). In his view, a phenomenological account that focused on the
meaning of action was more apt to describe the policy process. Thus, he considered that
‘by  revealing  the  phenomenological  character  of  the  planners’ and  administrator’s
practice, we can make the strongest argument for the necessity of phenomenological
analysis’ (Forester, 1990, p. 58).
In  their  different  ways,  these  five  scholars  conveyed  not  only  a  widespread
dissatisfaction with a positivistic type of PA, but  also (with the exception of Tribe)
displayed  their  sympathy  for  a  vision  of  public  policy  as  an  interpretive  artefact.
Although they disseminated  important  critical  ideas,  they did  not  elaborate  a  (more
fully-fledged) interpretive view of public policy,  which would have to wait until the
1990s (White, 1999). But, they had the merit of pointing to the research direction that
would be later followed by interpretive theorists, whose ideas are examined next.
66 Dryzek (1982, p. 323) clarifies, however, that his hermeneutic model does not imply that
positivistic approaches to policy analysis should be completely abandoned.
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3.4 What is IPP: the example of Narrative Policy Analysis (NPA)
Different from PA, which was largely identified with Lasswell’s writings, IPP cannot be
associated with the work of a single scholar. Instead, it  is usually understood as the
culmination of a wide range of theoretical perspectives developed by theorists writing
within different intellectual traditions67. In spite of not belonging to a common policy
‘school’, these scholars share a mutual recognition of the limitations of (positivistic) PA.
This  section  discusses  what  IPP proposes,  and  how  it  operates,  by  examining  an
interpretive policy framework that is known as ‘Narrative Policy Analysis’ (NPA)68. 
The depiction of NPA is taken in three steps. First, the emergence of NPA is (briefly)
contextualized within the wider landscape of policy studies. Second, the meaning of
NPA is explored and its key ideas are presented. Third, the main differences between
NPA and (positivistic) PA are stressed.
Initially,  it  is  convenient  to  situate  NPA within  the  broader  field  of  policy inquiry.
Described by Fischer (2003, p. 161) as an ‘emerging and promising orientation in policy
analysis’,  NPA  has  mostly  drawn  from  post-structuralism  and  its  emphasis  on
discourse69.  The pioneer study of Kaplan (1986) is  usually cited as the inception of
NPA, with Roe (1994) and Stone (2001) having offered the most well known theoretical
67 Thus, Fischer (2003, p. 12) writes that ‘influenced by the contributions of critical theory,
post-structuralism, social constructionism, postmodernism, and discourse analysis emerging
in other fields, these scholars began to take a more distinctively epistemological approach,
which can for general purposes loosely labelled “postpositivism” or “postempiricism”’.
68 The choice for presenting NPA as an exemplar of IPP derives from the fact that different
from other interpretive approaches that take into account only some elements of IPP, NPA
draws on all the key aspects of IPP: i) the story-telling dimension of public policies (whose
constitutive elements are plot, message, characters); ii) the collapse of the fact-value divide;
iii) the notion that policies embody both a problem (what is at stake) and a course of action
(what should be done); iv) a qualitative methodology that can be useful to detect not only the
explicit intentions of actors but also to uncover the hidden meaning of their actions.
69 Of paramount importance for the development of an interpretive view of public policy is a
major  epistemological  shift  within  the  social  sciences.  The  ‘discursive  turn’,  as  it  is
frequently labelled, questioned the very foundations of human knowledge and introduced
innovative ways of thinking about epistemic issues, such as agency, power, subjectivity. It
had important implications for the humanities in general and, as this section will discuss,
also for the field of public policy. For an analysis of the influence of the ‘discursive turn’ in
public policy theorizing, see Fischer and Forester (1993) and Fischer (2003).
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contributions.  Recent  policy scholarship has been paying significant  attention to  the
narrative approach (e.g. Bevir, 2011).
The advent of NPA, as part of the wider interpretive movement in the field of public
policy,  has  advanced alternative ways of  depicting the policy process.  Moreover,  as
Jones  and  Mcbeth  (2010,  p.  332)  clarify,  NPA offers  a  convenient  way to  critique
positivistic  assumptions  in public  policies70.  Instead of envisaging public policies as
problem-solving devices, NPA portrays them as narrative storylines. 
Given that stories are the language of human action generally, it comes as no great
surprise to learn that policy-makers (and other policy participants generally) also
convey their interpretations through the telling of stories, whether for purposes of
argument, claims-making,  or expression of individual  identity (Fischer,  2003, p.
167-8).
Indeed, the similarities between the policy process and the structure of narratives have
raised the attention of a large number of researchers71.  In his book  Narrative Policy
Analysis:  Theory  and  Practice,  Roe  (1994)  notes  that  NPA  can  ‘improve  our
understanding and making of public policy’ and provides an illustration of how policy
inquiry might benefit from the narrative method. He draws an example from the budget,
which although customarily understood as a highly technical process largely dominated
by experts, can nonetheless be interpreted through narrative analysis. 
Roe (1994, p. 22-26) argues that the budget (or other public policy) can be conceived
fundamentally  as  a  narrative.  This  happens  because  the  budget  shares  many of  the
features of a narrative: i) it is a written text (the budget document that is published every
year); ii) it is fictional (because it is based on figures that simplify a more complex
reality); iii) it is anonymous (insofar as there is no single author of the budget); iv) as
text, it  is open to multiple (and conflicting) interpretations; v) it  is inter-textual (the
meaning of budget can be clarified with the use of other texts). 
70 Thus, they write that ‘consequently, in public policy narrative has become synonymous with
post-positivist  methods and post-structural  philosophical orientations’ (Jones and Mcbeth,
2010, p. 332).
71 Among  others,  important  references  include  Gusfield  (1981),  Kaplan  (1986),  Hummel
(1991), Roe (1994), White (1999), Yanow (2000), Fischer (2003), and Czarniawska (2004).
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This example from the budget makes explicit the key insight of NPA: public policies
can be interpreted as narratives. This approach represents a departure from conventional
positivistic assumptions in which public policies are conceived, first and foremost, as
problem-solving  devices.  Instead,  NPA  shows  that  public  policies  are  similar  to
narratives in the sense that they offer explanations of what is problematic about the
current situation (policy problem) and also delineate what possible alternatives can be
envisaged to resolve the problem (policy solution). Or in Kaplan’s (1986, p. 770) words,
public policies are narratives that communicate ‘how we arrived at a current dilemma,
what we should do to address the dilemma, and why a particular proposal about what to
do is a good one’.
NPA advocates  argue  that  their  interpretive  view  of  public  policy  improves  our
understanding of the policy process. In her often-cited book The Policy Paradox Stone
(2001)  notes  how an  interpretive  perspective  better  captures  the  meaning  of  public
policies (when compared with problem-solving approaches). In particular, she argues
that public policies can be conceived as narratives in the sense that they are constructed
in  a  temporal  sequence,  that  is,  with beginning,  middle and end.  Both policies  and
narratives start with a problem to be addressed and end up with a solution that tackles
the  initial  problem72.  In  addition,  as  Fischer  elucidates,  policies,  when  viewed  as
narratives, express a particular interpretation of events and recommend a specific line of
action: ‘A good narrative, as such, not only conveys a meaning to the listener, but offers
the  listener  or  reader  a  way  of  seeing  and  thinking  about  events  that  points  to
implications requiring further attention or consideration’ (Fischer, 2003, p. 163). 
Another  relevant  feature  of  public  policies,  when  construed  as  narratives,  is  their
capacity to condense a large amount of information in a coherent and non-ambivalent
way. In fact, policies knit together different sources of elements (facts, ideals, beliefs,
values, images) and present them in a cohesive way. As NPA proponents emphasize,
public policies operate as narratives since they replace the disorderly (and conflictual)
reality of policy life with a clear, convincing and unambiguous picture of what should
be done: ‘Good analytic stories are also rich in the sense that they integrate all factors
72 Not infrequently, the narratives involve the interplay of good and evil forces that culminate
in the construction of heroes and villains.
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needing consideration. The best stories, indeed, can perform that integrating function as
well as any other mechanism, imposing a kind of natural order on a complex world’
(Kaplan, 1986, p. 773).
From a NPA perspective, public policies are devices that organize disparate set of events
by integrating them in a well-ordered narrative. Thus, they help to communicate basic
information  about  the  policy  situation:  who  (policy  actors)  should  do  what  (policy
message)  for  which  reasons  (policy  justification).  As  such,  narratives  perform  a
clarification role of explaining to an audience what is to be expected from a certain
course of action. As Kaplan (1986, p. 771) writes, ‘The narrative form, better than any
other, can depict in specific terms how a proposed program will operate and the changes
it is intended to accomplish, information that policy-makers often like to have before
making resource allocation decisions ’. 
After  presenting its  main ideas,  it  is  convenient  to  spell  out  how NPA differs  from
(positivistic) policy analysis (PA). Four important distinctions will be examined here: i)
integration  of  facts  and  values  (White,  1999);  ii)  contextual  account  of  the  policy
process  (Rein  and Schön,  1993);  iii)  interpretive  view of  the  policy  cycle  (Yanow,
1996); iv) communicative device (Kaplan, 1986). Each of these points is examined in
turn.
1. Integration of facts and values. NPA rejects the assumption that facts and values
can be clearly dissociated. Contrary to this dualistic view73, NPA sustains that
when policy actors produce public policies (that is, tell stories), they mix facts
and values. There is no claim, as in positivistic PA, that in order to be objective,
values  must  be  ignored.  Within  NPA,  descriptive  and  normative  aspects  are
intertwined. As White (1999, p. 22) correctly pointed out, narratives not only
offer an explanation of the current situation, but they also provide normative
73 Drawing on a  more positivistic  conception of  science,  this  dualism is  predicated on the
assumption that subjects are clearly independent from the objects they observe. From an
interpretive/discursive perspective, however, this strict dissociation is questioned. In contrast
to  the  dualism subject-object,  discourse  theories  emphasize  the  impossibility  of  clearly
distinguishing between subject and object and challenge the notion that there is an external
reality lying ‘out there’.
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guidance. Therefore, by integrating empirical data with prescriptive ideals, NPA
overcomes the fact-value divide. 
2. Contextual account of the policy process. From a NPA perspective, the policy
process is inscribed within a wider social context (Rein and Schön, 1993). This
happens because public policies are interpreted as an expression of underlying
political  discourses.  As  such,  narratives  reveal  implicit  beliefs,  values,  and
ideologies  that  are  reflective  of  broader  social  and political  structures.  With
appropriate methodological tools74, the researcher can read storylines with the
purpose of uncovering the macro-structures of society75. By connecting policies
to  their  context,  NPA treats  policy  and  politics  as  intermingled  rather  than
independent activities. Due to its  relevance,  the issue of policy as a political
phenomenon will be further elaborated later in the chapter (section 3.5). 
3. Interpretive view of the policy cycle. Another important contribution provided by
NPA lies in its interpretive understanding of the policy cycle. This task has been
carried  out  by  various  interpretive  policy  scholars,  most  notably  by  Dvora
Yanow who proposes to explain the policy cycle as a sequence of storylines
(instead of a sequence of problem-solving stages). In her important contribution,
Yanow (1996) describes  how the policy cycle  is  viewed through interpretive
lenses. 
An interpretive account of the policy cycle would be somewhat like this: when policy-
makers formulate policies, they tell stories of what a problem is, describe how certain
solutions might address successfully that problem (formulation stage). When policies
74 Yanow’s (2000) interpretive policy approach illustrates what kind of methodologies might be
employed  to  identify  the  different  layers  of  meaning  embedded  in  a  storyline.  Her
methodology,  which departs  from empiricist  attitudes  that  emphasize  data collection and
quantitative  measurement,  shifts  the  focus  to  the  expression  of  social  meanings,  and
concentrates the investigation on the the symbolic level where beliefs, values and meanings
are produced and ‘stored’. 
75 Fischer makes an important distinction between the macro and micro levels of analysis: ‘At
the macro-level of analysis, the investigator is able to focus on how political and economic
elites construct and maintain a societal-wide hegemonic discourse that makes clear what is
on the agenda and what  is  not  … At the micro level  of  analysis,  the focus turns to the
relationships between discourse and specific institutional practices’. (Fischer, 2003, p. 89).
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are implemented, the details of the policy are defined on an argumentative basis. Those
individuals responsible for implementation process have to talk in order to decide the
operational details of a policy (implementation stage). Next, individuals explain what
they think the outcomes of the policy will  be,  arguing about  the main benefits  and
shortcomings.  Successful  strategies  or  the  negative  factors  will  be  highlighted  by
making  use  of  stories.  Even  when  graphics,  tables  and  charts  are  produced  in  an
explanation,  they  are  usually  inserted  within  a  broader  story  of  success  or  failure
(evaluation  stage).  In  all  the  policy  stages,  from a  NPA perspective,  policy  actors
operate by exchanging arguments, that is, by employing storylines.
4. Communicative device. An interpretive account of public policies, as illustrated
by NPA, has another important difference when compared with positivistic PA.
It  helps to understand not only how policies are constituted (that is,  through
exchange  of  arguments)  but  also  how  they  are  communicated  to  external
audiences (for instance to the media, or to the local community). In contrast,
positivistic PA is silent about how policies are explained to society.  ‘Another
important use of stories’, Kaplan (1986, p. 771-2) notes, ‘is that they can form
the currency of the policy-maker’s communication on a particular issue to the
wider  public’.  In  this  sense,  storylines  facilitate  the  task  of  explaining  why
policy decisions were taken, which alternatives were available, what risks were
associated  with  each  policy  option.  As  a  communicative  device,  therefore,
storylines  enable  the  policy-maker  to  rationalize  her  actions  and  justify  her
decisions to the public opinion.
In short, by depicting policies as storylines, NPA offers a convenient framework that
shows how public policies can be understood from an interpretive perspective. It shifts
the focus from positivistic accounts of public policies as problem-solving strategies to
an interpretive reasoning of public policies as narratives. The main thrust of this section
has been to explain what IPP is, and how it operates, by looking at one of its most
accomplished frameworks: NPA. By understanding the main ideas of NPA, it is possible
to capture the key features of IPP.
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But our description of IPP is far from complete. Another crucial aspect of an interpretive
view resides in the politicization of the policy inquiry.  This is  the topic of the next
section.
3.5 The politicization of policy inquiry
As intimated in the previous section,  within an interpretive perspective,  there is  the
recognition that politics is at the heart of the policy process. This is another important
departure from the positivistic orientation that tends to exclude politics by envisaging
the policy process as a purely technical activity. The issue of politicization of public
policies deserves particular attention, it is worth reminding, because it is the main topic
of this thesis. 
As argued in chapters  1  and 2 respectively,  Early Public  Administration  (EPA) and
Policy Analysis  (PA)  only  reluctantly  accepted  the  importance  of  including  politics
within  policy/administrative  studies.  Only  after  empirical  facts  –  the  advent  of  the
interventionist state in the case of EPA, the failure of PPBS in the case of PA – indicated
the distortions caused by the exclusion of political factors, did policy theorizing accept
the need to take politics seriously. A significant contribution to the politicization of the
policy/administration  debate  has  been  given  by the  Interpretive  Public  Policy (IPP)
paradigm  examined  in  this  chapter.  Different  from  EPA  and  PA,  IPP  correctly
acknowledges  the  importance  of  thinking  of  public  policies  as  part  of  the  political
system. 
The integration of politics in policy/administrative scholarship does not mean, however,
that all IPP theorists conceive the meaning of politics in the same way. On the contrary,
different interpretive theorists define politics differently. Three visions of politics will be
examined here: i) the policy process as a political manifestation (Fischer, 2003); ii) the
policy  process  as  a  confrontation  of  systems  of  meaning  (Healey,  1993);  iii)  the
contestability of public policies (Rein and Schön, 1993). Each argument, which reflects
a particular interpretation of what politics is about, will now be detailed in more depth.
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3.5.1 Policy process as political manifestation
An initial portrait of how politics is frequently described in IPP can be found in the
notion that public policies are part of a broader picture: they are depicted as embedded
in the larger political landscape. As such, public policies reflect complex disputes about
influence, authority and domination that take place at the political level. From an IPP
perspective,  the  policy process  is  construed as  power-laden activity in  which social
groups  compete  not  only  for  material  resources  and  tangible  benefits,  but  also  for
symbolic rewards (Edelman, 1964).
Fischer  contrasts  the  technocratic-apolitical  approach  (associated  with  PA)  with  the
political approach (associated with IPP) that defines public policies primarily in terms
of political struggle. He emphasizes that the technocratic-apolitical approach conceives
of public problems, not as conflict-ridden issues, but as technical challenges solvable by
the application of managerial techniques. 
Policy analysis, in this model, strives to translate political and social issues into
technically defined ends to be pursued through administrative means. Vexing social
and economic problems are interpreted as issues in need of improved management
and  better  programme  design;  their  solutions  are  to  be  found  in  the  objective
collection of data and the application of the technical decision approaches (Fischer,
2003, p. 4-5).
By  striving  to  ‘sidestep  the  partisan  goal  and  value  conflicts’,  PA has  frequently
regarded politics as manipulation or bargaining.  In addition,  as Fischer  (2003, p.  5)
notes,  ‘if  politics  does  not  fit  into  the  methodological  scheme,  then  politics  is  the
problem. Some have even argued that the political system itself must be changed to
better accommodate policy analysis’. Conversely, IPP takes a different stance towards
politics, which is not disparaged as manipulation or bargaining, but redefined as the
very  terrain  in  which  the  policy  process  is  actualized.  Politics  is  not  pejoratively
envisaged as an evil to be exorcized, but as a site in which competing interests and
claims  are  disputed.  This  is  an important  departure  from the  apolitical  (if  not  anti-
political)  view  embraced  by  PA.  But  as  the  next  sections  show,  within  IPP other
conceptualizations of politics are also present.
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3.5.2 The policy process as a confrontation of systems of meaning
There is a second important way in which IPP attempts to politicize policy-making.
Because IPP challenges PA, policy is not construed as a purely technical process, but as
a  political  activity  in  which  competing  positions  are  negotiated.  Or,  in  the  jargon
employed by British planning scholar Patsey Healey, policy-making becomes a terrain
for the dispute of systems of meaning. This section examines her argument. 
In her study, Healey (1993) compares different planning theories and concludes that an
interpretive view (although she dubs it  ‘intercommunicative planning’) contributes to
politicize policy-making. Her main argument is that, in contrast to technocratic planning
that  forecloses  debate  by  imposing  only  one  perspective  (that  of  the  expert),  an
interpretive view enables competing political positions to express their differences and
negotiate their different systems of meaning.
Her point of departure is the idea that in liberal-democratic regimes, pluralistic societies
will be characterized by the existence of a wide range of distinct moral and political
positions. Healey (1993) argues, however, that the dominance of a narrow technocratic
type of reasoning in planning has privileged a scientific and rationalistic attitude that
asserts the primacy of the technical and the managerial. This technocratic attitude has
stifled the expression of diversity and pluralism, typical of contemporary democratic
societies.  In  her  view,  the  advent  of  an  interpretive  account  of  public  policy offers
analytical tools to challenge the hegemony of instrumental reasoning.
From an IPP perspective, the focus shifts from instrumental problem-solving to debate
and argumentation. In Healey’s view, this move should be celebrated, because it enables
the politicization of policy-making. For her, IPP breaks with the apolitical view of the
technocratic  approach  and  redefines  the  policy  process  as  a  political  site  in  which
‘meaning systems and knowledge forms and ways of reasoning and valuing’ can be
confronted. 
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The merit of Healey’s analysis is to elucidate the political implications of an interpretive
account  of  public  policies.  She  convincingly argues  that  when policy-making  is  no
longer reduced to problem-solving but instead conceived as an arena of argumentation,
then it can fulfil emancipatory roles. To put it differently, when the policy process is
opened up to  debate between communities (who have their  particular  set  of values,
interests,  and  demands),  policy-making  becomes  a  space  for  the  confrontation  of
systems of meaning. 
If Healey (1993) is right, then new democratic possibilities are created with the shift
from PA to IPP. By conceptualizing the policy process as an arena in which different
systems  of  meaning  compete  with  each  other,  communities  that  were  previously
excluded can struggle for their  inclusion in  the policy debate.  The interesting point
raised  by  her  analysis  is  that  when  the  interests  and  perceptions  of  different
communities clash, it is up to the policy process to accommodate them. This means that
the policy process is signified as a political arena, in which conflictual visions of the
common good are negotiated. Thus, the policy process76 is envisaged as political terrain
in which ‘programs are formulated and conflicts are identified and mediated’ (Healey,
1993, p. 242). 
In conclusion, if the policy system creates appropriate conditions for the expression of
multiple  narratives  (typical  of  pluralistic  societies),  then  communities  will  have
legitimate forums to express their own claims (or ‘epistemics’, in Healey’s vocabulary).
In this case, the policy system wields its political function of processing difference and
managing  diversity  without  imposing  a  particular  view  (as  happens  with  the
technocratic rule proper to PA). This is a second way of conceptualizing what politics
means within the paradigm of IPP.
76 This  political  vision  of  the  policy process  has  important  implications.  Among  others,  it
enables the distinction between a good and a bad policy process. In Healey’s view, a good
policy process is capable of performing two tasks: i) to operationalize a decision-making
system in which dissent  is  not  only expressed but  also properly settled;  ii)  to  safeguard
minimum  conditions  of  tolerance  and  respect  so  that  dissenting  communities  can
communicate their worldviews without embarrassment or intimidation.
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3.5.3 The contestability of public policies
There is yet a third form of envisaging politics from an interpretive perspective, which
has been elaborated by Rein and Schön (1993), who are also important contributors to
IPP.  In  their  view,  public  policies  are  an  expression  of  deeper  social  and  political
factors. By articulating the notion of ‘framing’, they have attempted to demonstrate how
policy  is  inherently  disputable.  By  transposing  the  notion  of  framing,  originally
developed by sociologist Erving Goffman, to policy research, they examine how policy
actors formulate public policies. Their description of frame is now examined.
Instead  of  considering  policy  objectives  as  exogenous  to  the  policy  process,  as
suggested by PA’s advocates, Rein and Schön (1993) argue that policy actors construct
reality through ‘frames’77. By frames, Rein and Schön mean that policy actors always
operate selectively, that is, according to a point of view. Or in their own words,
In our use of the term, framing is a way of selecting, organizing, interpreting, and
making sense of a complex reality to provide guideposts for knowing, analysing,
persuading, and acting. A frame is a perspective from which an amorphous, ill-
defined, problematic situation can be made sense of and acted on (Rein and Schön,
1993, p. 146).
When policy actors formulate policies, they reach an opinion by contrasting different
possibilities and identifying desirable and undesirable courses of actions (again,  this
differs  from  PA in  which  there  is  an  ‘optimal  solution’ for  public  problems).  By
employing  frames,  policy  actors  devise  coherent  narratives  that  offer  guidance  for
decision-making. Frames, therefore, refer to decisional tools (cognitive schemes) that
provide orientation by giving salience to certain policy aspects while excluding others. 
By showing that policy formulation always entails inclusion of certain aspects (deemed
as relevant) and exclusion of others (discarded as not relevant), it follows that policy
choices are necessarily selective (because they privilege a particular point of view). In
consequence, different policy actors, motivated by different values will employ distinct
77 Breaking with the dualistic tradition, they ‘construct the problems of their problematic policy
situations through frames in which facts, values, theories, and interests are integrated’ (Rein
and Schön, 1993, p. 145).
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frames, and therefore recommend distinct courses of action. For instance, customers of
public services, lobbyists for governmental contracts, policy advisers, politicians will
frame policies according to their own (and contrasting) perspectives.
By  suggesting  that  there  are  always  alternative  ways  of  constructing  policies,  the
framing  perspective  adopted  by  Rein  and  Schön  suggests  that  public  policies  are
necessarily disputable78. As they put it,
Framing is problematic because it leads to different views of the world and creates
multiple social realities. Interest groups and policy constituencies, scholars working
in different disciplines, and individuals in different contexts of everyday life have
different frames that lead them to see different things, make different interpretations
of the way things are, and support different courses of action concerning what is to
be done, by whom, and how to do it (Rein and Schön, 1993, p. 147).
The framing approach contrasts sharply with the assumption embraced by PA’s theorists
that for every policy problem there is an  ‘optimal solution’ (the one that maximizes
efficiency). By conceiving the policy process as fundamentally contestable, the frame
perspective  advocated by  Rein  and Schön  insinuates  that  the construction  of  public
policies cannot be described as exclusively technical. Instead, it encourages a political
interpretation of the policy process in which different actors struggle for the affirmation
of their particular claims. The idea that policy issues are intrinsically controversial – and
therefore contestable – represents a politicized view of public policies79. This is a third
form  of  conceptualizing  politics  within  the  IPP  tradition.  Remarkably,  as  will  be
discussed later in chapters 5 and 6, the framing perspective shares some similarities with
the Agonistic Policy Model. 
The arguments elaborated by Fischer (2003), Healey (1993) and Rein and Schön (1993)
converge in their  insistence on the political  condition of the policy process.  Indeed,
policy  when  interpreted  through  an  interpretive  orientation  tends  to  construed  as  a
78 The meaning of public policies, from an interpretive perspective, is depicted as inherently
contestable. As one policy scholar puts it,  ‘policy is likely to have different meanings for
different participants; that the exact meaning of a policy, then, is by no means self-evident,
but, rather, is ambiguous and manipulable; and that the policy process is – at least in part – a
struggle to get one or another meaning established as the accepted one’. (Steinberger, 1995
cited in Hoppe, 2010, p. 64).
79 As Rein and Schön (1993, p. 162) put it, ‘frame-critical policy analysts would uncover the
multiple, conflicting frames involved in a given policy dispute’.
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political  phenomenon  (although  each  author  offers  a  particular  conceptualization  of
what the ‘political’ means). This is indeed an important step in the evolution of policy
studies. At least theoretically, it has been possible to think of public policies as political
phenomena. The question that follows immediately, however, is whether the interpretive
orientation  is  confined  to  theory  or  if  it  has  practical  applications.  Can  IPP  be
implemented in actual policy settings? In order to answer this question, the next section
examines the issue of the operationalization of IPP.
3.6 IPP in practice
The  challenge  of  implementation  faced  by IPP has  already  been  mentioned  in  the
introduction of this chapter. Focusing on the issue of implementation, this section will
outline different  views on the prospects of the development  of practical  interpretive
policy techniques. It  will  also describe Yanow’s framework, which has been applied
empirically to study a policy organization.
In  spite  of  the  growing interest  in  public  policy,  there  is  still  a  dearth  of  practical
examples of IPP. Durning (1999, p. 391) considers that none of the  ‘post-positivistic’
variants provide  ‘a compelling, coherent alternative model of practice to replace the
traditional model’. In his assessment, policy theorists remain committed to positivism
and  are  ‘reluctant  to  embrace  an  epistemology  that  undermines  the  validity  of  the
assumptions that underlie their work’ (Durning, 1999, p. 391). He also notes that PA as a
discipline is strongly rooted in the positivistic tradition and there are no signs that it will
suddenly abandon its foundations. In his view, the practice of PA is likely to change, but
only incrementally ‘with a series of small changes in practice ultimately leading to a
displacement of positivism’ (Durning, 1999, p. 406).
A similar view is sponsored by Dryzek and Torgerson (1993) who detect the difficulties
in  finding  concrete  illustrations  of  non-positivistic  accounts  of  public  policy.  They
conclude their  essay warning that ‘the policy sciences of democracy promise a new
shape dramatically at odds with prior technocratic expectations’ and suggest that ‘there
is less an accomplishment now to be celebrated than a project to be pursued’ (Dryzek
and Torgerson,  1993,  p.  136).  They point  to  the critical  power (and the  democratic
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potential)  of  policy  approaches  that  challenge  PA.  They  note,  however,  that  these
challenges are yet mostly confined to theoretical speculation and have not been properly
converted into applicable policy methodologies. 
The view that IPP, and more generally policy approaches that contest the positivistic
tradition, has not produced a workable tool is echoed by various scholars. Howlett and
Ramesh  (1998,  p.  468)  contend  that  policy  studies  that  depart  from  positivistic
foundations ‘have been pitched at the level of meta-theoretical critique and have had
little  to  say  about  exactly  how  very  broadly  defined  political  variables  are  to  be
incorporated into the analysis  of specific policy processes and how, outside of very
broad generalizations, policy ideas affect policy outcomes and policy change’. 
In spite of the widespread dominance of sceptical views on the possibility of a practical
implementation  of  IPP,  illustrations  can  arguably  be  found.  Although  rare,  the
interpretive orientation in  the policy field  has  advanced methodological  frameworks
(such as narrative policy analysis, NPA, discussed earlier) and occasionally provided
empirical results.  This section now discusses  Dvora Yanow’s interpretive framework
and  shows how it  has  been applied  to  a  public  organization  in  Israel,  whose  main
activity is the design and implementation of social and educational policies. 
Yanow’s interpretive  framework  exemplifies  how  IPP can  be  operationalized  as  a
methodological  tool.  Her  work  has  the  merit  of  attempting  to  identify  how  the
theoretical concepts proper to interpretive views can be adapted to study the activities of
organizations. Different from PA, it recommends that the focus of inquiry should be
placed in the meaning of actions and not solely on strategies of problem-solving. First,
her  framework  will  be  briefly  described  and  later  her  empirical  findings  will  be
summarized.
In the book How does a policy mean? Yanow (1996) attempts to define the meaning of
public  policies  from an  interpretive  standpoint.  She  argues  that  public  policies  are
communicative processes (messages) that are produced by policy players (senders) and
transmitted to specific communities (receivers). In her view, the policy process can be
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envisaged as an argumentative context that promotes the integration of sender, receiver
and message.
Interestingly, Yanow notes that the meaning of policies needs to be understood at the
symbolic  level80.  By  deciphering  the  symbols  of  an  organization,  she  argues,  it  is
possible  to  find  out  how the  policy process  is  structured,  how policy problems are
defined,  how  decisions  are  made,  how  consensus  is  achieved.  Departing  from  the
positivistic orientation, the interpretive framework embraced by Yanow focuses on the
multiplicity of meanings policy actors impart to their actions (Yanow, 1996, p. 222). By
drawing  attention  to  the  symbolic  dimension  of  policy/administrative  organizations,
Yanow’s interpretive framework shifts the focus of policy studies from problem-solving
to the interpretation of meaning81.
Yanow’s symbolic rendering of the policy process will arguably become clearer when
illustrated by a case study. In ‘The Communication of Policy Meanings: Implementation
as Interpretation and Text’, Yanow (1993) offers an interesting illustration of how IPP
can arguably be  implemented  in  the  practice  of  public  organizations.  Her  object  of
analysis is an Israeli policy organization, the Israel Corporation of Community Centres
(ICCC).
The ICCC was set up as a government-funded agency of the Israeli government in 1969
with the purpose of developing social and educational policies. The main target group
addressed  by  the  organization  were  the  ‘residents  of  urban  housing  projects  and
geographically isolated development towns’ and its purpose was twofold. On one hand,
the organization aimed to provide recreational centres and improve the welfare of local
80 As Yanow (1996, p. 10) notes, symbolic language has its own specific features: i) it is never
private,  but  always  public;  ii)  it  is  the  product  of  a  social  convention;  iii)  it  has  to  be
interpreted  against  a  historical  and  cultural  background  because  its  meaning  is  context
specific;  iv)  its  potency results  from the  incorporation  of  a  multiplicity  of  (sometimes
ambiguous  or  even contradictory)  meanings;  v)  it  conveys  three  layers  of  signification:
emotive (feelings), cognitive (values) and moral (beliefs). On the symbolic nature of policy-
making, see also Edelman (1964, 1988).
81 As she argues,  ‘much of policy analysis focus on organizational outputs, service delivery,
meeting  of  targets,  and  is  couched  on  the  language  of  public  programs,  thus  ignoring
substantial aspects of policy making. Public policy, as taught by interpretivist lenses, is a
polyglot environment in which many different languages are spoken’ (Yanow, 1996, p. 229).
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communities. On the other, the ICCC would also attempt to encourage social integration
between two important ethnic groups, the Sfaradim and the Ashkenazim.
Yanow notes that after 12 years of existence, the project had expanded significantly,
with more than 100 centres built. Yet, paradoxically, when it came to the assessment of
the performance of the agency the results were disappointing. Its organizational goals
had not been achieved, the economic gap between groups had not decreased,  social
services for the local communities had not improved, and ethnic integration had not
advanced. What raised her attention, however, was that in spite of the agency’s poor
performance, local residents struggled for the preservation of the ICCC. Besides, the
central  government  (of Israel)  not  only approved of  the project  but  also decided to
expand it. 
Trying to make sense of this apparent contradiction, Yanow (1993, p. 46) asks  ‘How
might we explain public acclaim for the ICCC, given that the gap was no narrower after
12  years  of  operation?’  She  reckons  that  when  appraised  through  performance
indicators, the agency failed to accomplish its mission goals. Yet, the agency managed
to develop a positive image among its stakeholders, who not only held a favourable
account of the project but even joined public demonstrations to call for the expansion of
community centres. 
Employing her  interpretive  framework (which  she  designates  as  ‘implementation  as
interpretation’),  Yanow  draws  attention  not  only  to  the  material  aspects  of  the
organization (measured by performance indicators) but also to the symbolic aspects of
the implementation process. Exploring how ICCC constructed its image and identity,
she emphasizes the importance of uncovering the hidden meanings ‘stored’ in symbols. 
One interesting achievement of the ICCC was the construction of new spaces for the
local residents. Yanow explains that ICCC buildings created a spatiality that was distinct
from other areas of the town. ‘Siting and landscaping established a physical distance: to
enter most centres, one had to cross a plaza or a stepped expanse which set the building
apart from the street’ (Yanow, 1993, p. 48). Besides the sense of physical distance from
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the town streets, various attributes – such as the scale of the buildings, their interior
design,  and the expensive furniture – contributed to promote psychological distance.
Because the ICCC buildings were clearly different from residences or other public sites,
they projected a message of ‘otherness’. The symbolic power of the building illustrates
how an interpretive approach can help to uncover the meaning of policy action. This is
an interesting contrast with PA whose positivistic inclinations place the focus solely on
empirical facts.
Another illustration of Yanow’s interpretive framework can be found in her analysis of
the activities of the organization. Contrary to conventional analyses that would focus on
the declared mission of the organization or would rely on its  operational  chart,  she
looked for meanings that were not readily apparent. What she found out was that the
functions of the ICCC were usually described with the use of a metaphor.  Through
interviews,  she  identified  that  the  activities  of  the  centres  were  referred  to  as  a
‘supermarket’.  This  meant  essentially that  the centres  were construed as  places that
provided a large variety of products for consumption. The importance of the metaphor,
Yanow explains, is that it reveals the meaning underlying the action of policy actors,
that is,  of the workers of the ICCC (staff) and the residents of the local community
(clients). As she puts it,
clients were to come into the centre, with ‘shopping lists’ (lists of desired courses),
to  ‘consume’ centre  offerings;  staff  would  ‘sell’ programs  to  clients  inside  the
building; and centre success would be evaluated by ‘turnover of goods’ (numbers
of registrants, inquiries or attendance figures) (Yanow, 1993, p. 51).
Another  important  conclusion  of  her  study is  the  understanding  of  how  the  ICCC
managed to construct its identity. In Yanow’s view, the identity of the organization was
reinforced by rituals, such as the Annual Meetings, in which the leaders of the ICCC
initiated discussions on goal mission and organizational values. Yanow suggests that
these rituals communicated values that were important not only for the organization
itself  but  also for  the  broader  community.  In  the  case  of  the  Annual  Meetings,  for
example, she argues that the agency attempted to engage participants in the definition of
organizational goals. However, this strategy of engaging the local community did not
necessarily mean empowerment. In contrast, it could also be read as a form of avoiding
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complicated  issues,  such  as  the  persistence  of  the  social  and  ethnic  gaps  in  the
communities. It was also an opportunity to persuade the community that the agency was
a ‘rational’ actor that acted sensibly and responsibly to accomplish its mission goals.
Yanow notes that by constructing a ‘myth of rationality’ the ICCC was able to reconcile
its mandate (particularly the objective of bridging the social and ethnic gap) with its
apparent failure. 
Yanow’s  analysis  illustrates  how  organizational  policy  behaviour  can  be  examined
through interpretive lenses. Her ‘implementation as interpretation’ method exemplifies
how IPP can be applied in practice. Although it is widely acknowledged that interpretive
implementation tools have not yet been developed, it can nevertheless be argued that
there are interesting possibilities (as Yanow’s case study suggests), though still inchoate
at the present stage.
3.7 The limits of IPP
The final section of the chapter will close with some reflections on the limits of IPP. As
with  any policy orientation,  IPP has  its  shortcomings.  One aspect  has  already been
intimated:  the  difficulty  in  operationalization  by  finding  applicable  methodological
tools. Although different suggestions have been formulated, such as Q-methodology82
(Durning, 1999) or policy subsystems (Howlett and Ramesh, 1998)83, they still have not
been  extensively  adopted  to  allow  a  conclusive  verdict  (as  is  the  case  of  Q-
methodology) or still require further research before being suitable for empirical tests
(as is the case of policy subsystems). 
82 Durning  (1999,  p.  403)  notes  that  ‘Q-methodology  has  been  widely  used  in  research,
especially in psychology, sociology, social psychology, and political psychology’ and defines
it as a set of ‘procedures for the empirical study of human subjectivity’. Devised by British
psychologist  William  Stephenson  in  the  1930s,  the  Q-methodology  aims  primarily  at
uncovering the viewpoints of participants over a specific topic.
83 According to Howlett and Ramesh (1998, p. 469), policy subsystems comprise two elements:
i) a larger set of individuals who are knowledgeable about a particular policy issue, but who
are  not  directly  involved  on  a  daily  basis  (also  referred  to  as  knowledge-based  policy
community);  ii)  a smaller set  within the larger set  of  those who regularly  ‘participate in
relationships with each other to further their own ends or interests’ (closer to the concept of
policy network).
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In relation to the merits of IPP, scholars have displayed different levels of appreciation.
Lawlor  (1996)  echoes  a  recurrent  criticism  against  the  interpretive  orientation.  He
claims that besides being theoretically obscure, post-positivistic views of public policy
face several problems that might discourage their adoption. Moreover, the benefits of
pursuing an interpretive agenda are offset by the myriad of troubles that it entails.
To disconnect policy analysts from their disciplinary roots and charge them with
the general communicative functions espoused by the new argumentative school
would not only remove  ‘tools’ as a defining feature of the field, it would further
undermine the already shaky intellectual identity of the field. Post-positivism and
so-called post-modernism in policy analysis is a swamp of ambiguity, relativism,
and self-doubt. The new argumentation, framed as an integral part of the policy
process, and with an unapologetic normative agenda, creates more problems for the
policy analysis business than it solves. To paraphrase a famous Texas politician,
‘This new argumentative dog can’t hunt’ (Lawlor, 1996, p. 120).
Lynn (1999) also rejects IPP and highlights its limitations. He notes that the idea that
PA is technocratic is in fact a caricature, a straw man contrived by its critics, which is
empirically inaccurate. Besides, it  is incorrect to speak of PA as if it  were a single,
homogeneous entity. In his view, PA is better understood as multifaceted practice which
has followed not one but a variety of different inclinations such as ‘progressive, critical,
pragmatic, optimistic, and reformist. Policy analysis has never been monolithic, never
beyond the sobering influences of  political  and social  life,  and never  about  making
policy according to strict positivist canon’ (Lynn, 1999, p. 417). Although he recognizes
the instrumental and empirical tendencies of PA, he argues that PA remains committed
to the pursuit of the public interest. Thus, in his view, by relying on a false account of
the evolution of PA, its critics assault nothing more than a caricature and thus miss the
real target.
Lynn offers a second argument against  the advocates  of a  ‘post-positivistic’ PA. He
contends that it is naive to suppose that the adoption of an interpretive account can lead
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to a rosy democratic world just because it has been freed from the tyranny of expertise84.
It  might  otherwise  elicit  a  ‘nightmare  of  discourse’.  The purported  politicization  of
public policies enabled by IPP might be strengthening even further entrenched interests
and persistent hierarchies. In addition, Lynn considers that the adoption of interpretive
views  would  mean  that  ‘nontransparent  methods  would  again  go  unchallenged  and
become even more pervasive. Secrecy, obscurantism, corruption, deception, distortion,
unfounded assertion, dishonesty, narrow ambition, ideological excess, and all the other
temptations  to  which  flesh  is  heir  might  well  be  even  more  widely  and  securely
practised’ (Lynn, 1999, p. 417).
Moreover, for Lynn, the sort of PA advocated by ‘post-positivistic’ theorists is riddled
with another serious limitation.  Ideas as those sponsored by IPP are not empirically
verifiable  and therefore drastically constrain the possibility of their  assessment.  The
extolled virtues of interpretation should not be praised but deplored because they lead
policy  theorization  into  ‘a  dark,  pre-enlightenment  age  dominated  by  the  clash  of
metaphysical absolutes in which issues are settled by essentialist assertions, power and
manoeuvre, and deliberate distortion or outright suppression of issues and opposition. It
will be a politics of absolutist claims, bad numbers, and worse arguments; of emotion
and unreason’ (Lynn, 1999, p. 421). For these reasons, in his view policy scholarship
should keep the interpretive orientation at bay85. 
84 In contrast, Fischer (2009) suggests that the interpretive policy approach can illuminate our
understanding of the intricate relationship between democracy and expertise in contemporary
complex societies. He notes that we now live in an age of expertise in which most policy
problems  display  a  complex  nature.  In  his  view,  the  problematic  relationship  between
politics and expertise is the consequence of a paradox. The advancement of democracy in
Western societies has simultaneously expanded not only legal rights and political liberties
but also increased the power of corporations and modern bureaucracies (both of which are
under the command of technical expertise). In order to reflect on the appropriate connection
between  democracy  and  expertise,  Fischer  (2009)  argues  that  a  new  ‘epistemics’  is
necessary.  In  his  view,  this  epistemics  can  be found in the  interpretive  (post-empiricist)
perspective of public policy. See also Torgerson (2003).
85 Another  critique  that  might  be  levelled  against  IPP is  that  other  policy models  –  issue
networks (Heclo, 1978), multiple streams (Kingdon, 1984), punctuated equilibrium model
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993), advocacy coalition networks (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier and
Jenkins-Smith,  1993;  Sabatier,  2007)  –  present  alternatives  to  PA without  necessarily
employing a post-empiricist methodology. An enumeration of policy models that emerged
after Lasswell’s (1951) stage cycles framework can be found in Appendix 1.
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But these critiques take the indictment against IPP too far. Although they correctly point
out  some  of  the  shortcomings  faced  by  IPP,  in  particular  the  lack  of  convincing
empirical  methodologies,  they  exaggerate  the  problems  an  interpretive  account
generates. In particular, the critics fail to recognize the important step taken by IPP in
politicizing  the  policy  process  (as  discussed  in  section  3.5).  This  is  a  significant
advancement that should not be missed. It might be worth noting as well that advocates
of IPP do not usually consider that (positivistic) PA is completely wrong and should be
utterly abandoned, but only that it is problematic. As Majone (1989) has emphasized,
the case of an interpretive account rests on the assumption that a purely technical view
of public policy is insufficient and misleading. In any case, IPP introduces a new set of
questions  and  challenges  that  significantly  improve  our  knowledge  of  the  policy
process. 
More  recent  developments  in  the  interpretive  policy  literature  suggest  that  serious
efforts are being made to move IPP beyond the realm of theoretical analysis so that
besides  an analytical  framework IPP can also endow decision-makers  with a  policy
‘tool-kit’ capable  of  instrumentalizing  their  daily  administrative  activities.  Two
illustrative cases are worth mentioning.
Policy theorist Hendrik Wagenaar in his book Meaning in Action acknowledges that the
interpretive approach, in spite of its important theoretical advancements, has not yet
developed a fully-fledged implementable policy orientation. He recognizes the ‘elusive
relation between interpretation and public policy’ and raises the meaningful question of
how IPP can contribute to improve policy-making. As he puts it:
I  confess  to  an  omission.  I  have  failed,  so  far,  to  address  an  issue  that  sits  –
uneasily, as we will see – at the centre of interpretive policy analysis (IPA), both as
a  theory  and  as  an  actively  practised  professional  discipline:  the  relationship
between an interpretive approach to social inquiry and the analysis of public policy.
The  productive  relationship,  as  the  italicized  terms  suggest,  between  a
methodology  of  interpretivism  and  the  large,  institutionalized  endeavour  of
formulating, implementing, and evaluating public policy. Or, to put the issue as a
question: What has IPA to offer to elected officials, administrators, professionals,
and citizens over empiricist, technical-rational approaches?  (Wagenaar, 2011, p.
275; italics in the original).
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In his view,  an answer to the question of how to implement IPP can be envisaged in
terms of its democratic potential. He argues that IPP could perhaps help to reshape the
relationship between policy analysis and democratic practices86. IPP could for instance
foster stronger democratic action by ‘amplifying the voice of the policy targets;  the
meaning that  a  problem has  for  different  audiences’ (Wagenaar,  2011,  p.  296).  The
relation between policy and democracy to which Wagenaar alludes is an interesting (and
certainly promising) way of connecting interpretive theory with policy practice87.
Furthermore, in his insightful analysis, Wagenaar (2011, p. 285) suggests that IPP can
provide both diagnostic and therapeutic tools in the more applied realm of public policy
and administration. In relation to the former, he mentions that an interpretive orientation
might improve policy analysis by offering better analytical devices geared to expand our
understanding of empirical issues (e.g.  global warming).  In relation to the latter,  he
argues  that  IPP can  contribute  to  the  design  of  more  accurate  policy  models  (that
seemingly  would  take  into  account  the  diversity  of  policy  positions  competing  for
attention in a particular situation). The topics of pluralism and representation will also
be discussed in the next chapter,  when the deliberative approach to public policy is
examined.
Another important publication in the IPP literature that signals the concern with policy
practice can be found in Interpretation and Method (originally published in 2006) edited
by  interpretive  theorists  Dvora  Yanow  and  Peregrine  Schwartz-Shea.  In  this  book,
Yanow and Schwartz-Shea  (2014) organized  a  series  of  scholarly contributions  that
further  our  knowledge  on  the  meaning  and  significance  of  IPP.  Discussing  the
ontological and epistemological assumptions of the interpretive view, the aim of their
study  is  to  present  ‘in  a  more  positive  vein  the  contributions  of  interpretive
86 Interestingly,  Wagenaar (2011, p. 294) provides a discussion of political pluralism whose
emphasis  on  conflict  and  power,  which  are  depicted  as  pervasive  in  political  and
administrative institutions, resembles some of the elements of the Agonistic Policy Model
(APM) that will be analysed in chapters 5 and 6.  
87 Indeed, the democratic implications of public policies are a topic of fundamental importance
not only for IPP but also for other policy paradigms. And, as will be discussed in the next
chapter of thesis, the investigation of the democratic role wielded by public administration is
one of the crucial contributions of the Deliberative Policy Approach (DPA) to the policy
literature.
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methodologies and methods to empirical social science’ (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea,
2014, p. xiv).
Sharing similarities with Wagenaar’s contrast between diagnostic and therapeutic tools,
Yanow and Schwartz-Shea contend that an interpretive perspective is committed both to
theory and practice (or, as they put it, with  ‘understanding’ and ‘action’).  They claim
that different from  ‘traditional’, evidence-based, positivist methodologies, interpretive
analyses are sensitive to the meaning underlying social action, and is therefore better
positioned to make sense of empirical reality. In their view, IPP can be useful both as a
method (theory) and as an ‘intervention’ in a wide range of policy situations (e.g. such
as  organizational  activities,  administrative  behaviour,  management  practices,
governmental decision-making). Although specific interpretive policy tools applicable
to  public  policies  and  capable  of  being  empirically  implemented  in  administrative
settings are not detailed, their study has merit in showing how attention to the meaning
embedded  in  policy/administrative  organizations  can  help  not  only  to  improve  our
knowledge of  how individual  and institutions  operate  by revealing  their  values  and
beliefs (theoretical dimension) but also indicate strategies to introduce policy change
(practical dimension).
In conclusion, there is reason to be optimistic about the ability of IPP to find innovative
ways of linking theory and practice. Recent research developed by interpretive scholars
– such as Hendrik Wagenaar, Dvora Yanow and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea – evince their
awareness  of  the  importance  of  bridging  understanding  (method)  and  action
(instrument). This is an encouraging sign that reveals the potential of IPP to improve
both policy theory and practice.
As  intimated  earlier,  the  advent  of  IPP has  inspired  the  development  of  alternative
policy  frameworks  and  stimulated  the  flourishing  of  new  (and  arguably  fruitful)
research directions. A new paradigm in particular, here designated as the Deliberative
Policy Approach (DPA), which can be considered an off-spring of the IPP, is a case in
point. For its importance in the policy inquiry, it deserves a detailed examination. 
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Chapter 4 – The Deliberative Policy Approach (DPA)
4.1 Introduction
The Interpretive Public Policy (IPP) paradigm has revealed new ways of theorizing the
policy process. As discussed in the previous chapter, IPP questioned several of the most
fundamental assumptions of Policy Analysis (PA). In particular, it took issue with the
‘decisionist’ methodology followed by PA whose main emphasis is placed on problem-
solving. The limitation of decisionism, according to an interpretive view, is that it fails
to capture the real nature of policy-making. For interpretive scholars – such as Frank
Fischer,  Dvora  Yanow,  Deborah  Stone,  Douglas  Torgerson  –  the  policy  process  is
defined,  not  as  a  technical  activity  to  be  carried  out  by  experts,  but  rather  as  an
argumentative  terrain  in  which  policy  actors  exchange  their  opinions  about  public
problems.
Deliberative  Policy  Approach  (DPA)  is  also  critical  of  PA,  and  therefore  it  is  not
surprising that DPA shares many of the assumptions of IPP. As this chapter will attempt
to show, the deliberative and interpretive views have a mutual suspicion of problem-
solving approaches. In addition, both DPA and IPP recognize that public policies are
better construed as embedded in broader political and social contexts. Reacting against a
purely  technical  view  of  public  policy,  DPA as  well  as  IPP  are  committed  to  a
‘politicized’ view of policy-making.
Another important similarity between the deliberative and the interpretive paradigms is
their common scepticism of technocratic styles of policy-making (Dryzek, 2000). As
discussed in chapter 2, the belief that scientific knowledge could provide guidance for
decision-makers, which is the cornerstone of PA, has contributed to the empowerment
of experts and to the ‘technification’ of policy-making. In marked contrast to the more
‘elitist’ conception of technocracy, both DPA and IPP propose to shift the focus from
expertise to more ‘democratic’ forms of engagement in the policy process.
132
For these reasons, these two paradigms – DPA and IPP – are suspicious of instrumental,
expertise-centred interpretations of public policy. The existence of important similarities
between these two approaches, however, should not obscure their differences. In fact,
their  contribution to the policy field is quite distinct,  as this chapter will  attempt to
show. It can be argued that a crucial difference – perhaps the key one – is that whereas
IPP is primarily concerned with the narrative structure of public policies, DPA focuses
on deliberation and public participation. Therefore, in the case of IPP, attention is given
to how policy actors ‘tell’ stories and hence impart meaning to their action. In contrast,
DPA centres  on  how  public  deliberation  can  strengthen  the  legitimacy  of  policy
decisions88. 
The  deliberative  orientation  here  examined  has  been  strongly  associated  with  the
philosophical  writings  of  Jürgen Habermas  whose  ideas  have  inspired  an  important
literature in the field of public administration (Denhardt and Denhardt, 1979; Denhardt,
1981;  Zanetti,  1997;  McSwite,  2000;  Kelly,  2004;  Sager,  2007)  and policy analysis
(Forester,  1982,  1989,  1999;  Deleon,  1994b;  Deleon  and  Deleon,  2002;  Innes  and
Booher,  2003).  As  will  be  discussed  in  this  chapter,  Habermas’s  emphasis  on
communicative  action  and  public  deliberation  has  had  important  (although  mostly
indirectly)  implications  in  the  fields  of  public  policy  and  administration89.  It  has
provided an analytical framework that offers an alternative interpretation of the policy
process,  and which encourages  a  shift  of focus,  away from expertise  and technique
88 Apart from this more fundamental difference, these two paradigms can be distinguished in
other grounds as well. First, DPA has been particularly influenced by theories of democratic
deliberation, most notably by the political philosophy of Habermas. In contrast, IPP has been
inspired by a  disparate set  of  intellectual  traditions  (linguistics,  post-structuralism,  social
constructivism, critical  theory).  Second,  DPA is both a theoretical  construct  and a set  of
empirical practices (Dryzek, 2000). Conversely, IPP is still very much of a theoretical nature
lacking convincing practical illustration. Third, DPA has gained ascendancy (and popularity)
in  the  field  of  public  policy and public  administration,  whereas  IPP is  less  well  known
especially outside academia (White, 1999).
89 The potential of Habermas’s critical theory has been acknowledged by scholars in different
fields  of  public  administration.  Within  organizational  theory,  for  instance,  Denhardt  and
Denhardt  (1979)  outlined  a  critical  theory  of  public  organizations  that  repudiated  the
prevalent  orientation  in  public  administration  and  policy  analysis.  In  their  view,  this
alternative model (which strongly draws on Habermasian ideas) would enable us to envisage
public organizations less in terms of hierarchy,  control  and regulation,  and instead place
emphasis on the ‘discussion of the substantive ends of society’ and take into account ‘the
reasonable  conditions  of  human  life’ (Denhardt  and  Denhardt,  1979,  p.  117;  see  also
Denhardt, 1981).
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toward more deliberative and collaborative policy approaches. As such, it has enabled a
critique  of  technocratic  styles  of  policy-making  whilst  emphasizing  the  democratic
potential of public deliberation. 
The intention of  this  chapter  is  to  examine the emergence  of  DPA and describe its
fundamental claims. It will be argued that DPA proposes to view the policy process as
an interactive activity that involves not only the administrative institutions of the state
(public  administration)  but  also  civil  society.  Inspired  by  Habermas’s  ideas  on
communicative  action  and  public  deliberation,  DPA emphasizes  the  importance  of
engaging civil society in decision-making. The participation of citizens in the process of
policy  formulation  is  perceived  as  indispensable  for  neutralizing  the  pervasive
instrumental rationality that dominates administrative agencies. This deliberative view
of  the  policy  process  is  understood  as  enhancing  the  legitimacy of  the  democratic
regime insofar as it enables civil society to express its values and preferences.
In order to explore the tenets of DPA, the chapter is divided into four sections (not
counting this introduction). Section 4.2 analyses Habermas’s philosophical contribution
by probing his theory of communicative action and his deliberative view of policy-
making.  Section  4.3  investigates  the  theoretical  side  of  DPA  and  examines  its
fundamental analytical claims. Section 4.4 addresses the empirical dimension of DPA
and discusses the issue of institutional designs. Section 4.5 offers a critique of DPA and
examines its limitations. 
4.2 Habermas: the philosophical foundations of DPA
Since the late 1960s,  the literature on public policy started a soul-searching process
aimed at renewing its theoretical foundations. Particularly after the dramatic failures of
PPBS to solve public problems, it became clear that there were limits to the ambitions
of  Policy  Analysis  (PA).  Policy  theorists  increasingly  questioned  the  positivistic
assumptions of the discipline, which in their view were incapable of providing a reliable
intellectual basis for understanding the policy process.
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The philosophical underpinnings of the deliberative orientation in the field of public
policy have been associated with the work of the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas.
Although not writing directly on applied policy-making, except occasionally, his ideas
have sparked a considerable literature in public policy and administration90. He provides
an analytical background that offers a suitable ground for the critique of PA.
Habermas’s  anti-technocratic  views  are  clearly expressed  in  his  critique  of  postwar
planning. For Habermas the intervention of the state (especially in the aftermath of the
Second World War) has been characterized by a technocratic attitude, whose distinctive
feature is  the  alienation of  citizens  from the policy process.  In  Legitimation  Crisis,
published originally in 1973, Habermas (1988) spoke of a  ‘structurally depoliticized
public realm’ in which citizens have become passive and apathetic (Habermas, 1988, p.
37).  He  pointed  out  the  existence  of  a  logic  of  decision-making  that  empowered
bureaucrats and technocrats, but discouraged civic engagement:
The  arrangement  of  formal  democratic  institutions  and  procedures  permits
administrative decisions to be made largely independently of specific motives of
the citizens. This takes place through a legitimation process that elicits generalized
motives – that is, diffuse mass loyalty – but avoids participation (Habermas, 1988,
p. 36).
In his view, this type of policy-making that relies on bureaucratic administration and
technical  expertise  has  contributed  to  the  ‘structural  depoliticization’ of  the  public
sphere,  in  which  citizens  are  relegated  to  ‘civic  privatism’.  In  addition,  the
technocratization of the policy process has channelled power from civil society to a
technocratic elite. The recognition that a technocratic style of policy-making, based on
expertise  and  scientific  knowledge,  promotes  depoliticization  has  led  Habermas  to
advocate the need for a re-politicization of the public sphere. 
If the public sphere is to regain its vitality, then policy-making has to shift away from
bureaucracy and technocracy and embrace more democratic forms of participation. This
90 Kelly  (2004)  argues  that  public  administration  has  been  increasingly  recognized  by
Habermas as a privileged site for public participation: ‘in Habermas’s most recent work on
democratic  theory,  public  administration  now stands  as  the  unique  site  of  direct  citizen
participation in democratic governance’ (Kelly, 2004, p. 39). He also notes that ‘Habermas’s
discursive  account  of  decision  making  has  provided  a  sort  of  blueprint  to  guide
citizen/administrator collaboration’ (Kelly, 2004, p. 39).
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is  the  key  contention  of  the  Deliberative  Policy  Approach  (DPA),  which  will  be
explored in this chapter. The main idea is that the introduction of deliberation in public
policy can help to re-politicize the public sphere and make power flow from a small
elite of bureaucrats and experts to the wider realm of civil society. 
This exposition of Habermas’s thought is organized in two parts. Section 4.2.1 examines
how  Habermas  defines  the  public  sphere  and  draws  mainly  from  his  book  The
Structural Transformation of Public Sphere (Habermas, 1989). Although quite removed
from  the  main  issues  discussed  here,  this  historical  background  helps  to  situate
Habermas’s  vision  of  state  and  society,  and  sets  the  context  for  his  analysis  of
deliberation. Section 4.2.2 discusses how Habermas envisages the role of institutions –
such as  public  administration  and policy settings  – in  the  task  of  repoliticizing  the
public  sphere,  and  builds  particularly  on  The  Theory  of  Communicative  Action
(Habermas, 1987) and Between Facts and Norms (Habermas, 1996).
4.2.1 The structural transformation of the public sphere: civil society in opposition to
the state
This section aims to (briefly) describe how Habermas depicted the advent of the modern
public sphere, whose distinctive feature is the separation of the state and civil society
into two separate domains. In particular, it will be shown that for Habermas civil society
had to develop a public dimension in order to protect its freedom from state coercion.
This discussion will set the ground for Habermas’s contention (developed in the next
section)  that  the  task  of  democratic  politics  is  the  development  of  deliberative
procedures capable of reconnecting state and civil society. 
The emergence of the modern public sphere, according to Habermas (1989), harks back
to the consolidation of early capitalism and is marked by the rise of the bourgeoisie as
an economic class. In his view, the modern public sphere91 is characterized by the fact
91 The public sphere originated in ancient Greece. According to Habermas, the public sphere
was formed by the deliberation of citizens (who were released from the chores of productive
labour) when gathered together in the polis. The idea that some issues have a public nature,
he notes, remains to the present day as one of the principles of political order (Habermas,
1989, p. 4).
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that public issues (e.g. administration, law) are concentrated in the state, whereas private
issues (e.g. religion, morality) are relegated to civil society and the market.  ‘The line
between state and society, fundamental in our context’, Habermas (1989, p. 30) writes,
‘divided the public sphere from the private realm’. 
But, as Habermas further notes, civil society has not been thoroughly confined to the
private  sphere.  It  has  developed  a  public  dimension  when  civil  society  groups  –
particularly  the  ascendant  bourgeoisie  –  formulated  their  private  (economic  and
political) demands in the name of the common good. Thus, although civil society was
mainly devoted to private issues, it has also developed a public dimension whose main
channel  of  expression  was  the  parliament92.  In  fact,  as  Habermas  emphasizes,  the
parliament has offered a vehicle for the penetration of the will of the people (namely,
the interests of the bourgeoisie) and ensured that the state was sensitive to the will of
civil society93. 
Habermas (1989, p. 84) argues that the existence of a legislative body that responds to
the claims of civil society has been interpreted as crucial to neutralize the threat of state
domination. Parliaments – as deliberative arenas – perform the function of emancipating
civil society from state encroachment. In fact, to be private has traditionally meant to be
liberated from the rule of state authority (Habermas,  1989, p. 74).  The idea that all
power emanates from the people has usually been taken to express the wish of citizens
to be free from coercion. In practice, a set of rights (e.g. freedoms of speech, opinion,
press,  assembly,  association)  granted  by  parliaments  played  the  role  of  protecting
individual private autonomy from state interference. 
Thus,  the emergence of  the modern public  sphere – that  has  pushed state  and civil
society into two distinct spheres – has also given rise to a concern with the preservation
92 This  happened because  the  bourgeoisie,  although in  their  intimacy remained tied  to  the
private sphere, ‘in their capacity as private owners desired to influence public power in their
common interest’ (Habermas, 1989, p. 56). The (economic and political) demands of the
bourgeois class were couched in the language of the common good. The private interests of
the bourgeoisie were presented as if they represented the collective will of society. Thus, the
‘fiction’ of a public was created. 
93 Or to put it differently, the constitutional state represents the institutionalization of the public
sphere of civil society.
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of the freedom and autonomy of civil society, which has been continuously exposed to
the coercive domination of the state. In Habermas’s view, the violation of civil society’s
private affairs by the state has created problems of legitimacy. Moreover, as the next
section will attempt to show, the restoration of this legitimacy depends upon the creation
of  channels  through  which  civil  society  can  influence  the  decision-making  of  the
political system.
4.2.2 Communicative rationality and public deliberation
In Habermas’s view, the protection of civil society against the intrusive action of the
state is not the only danger that menaces civil society. Modernity, by which he means
the  entrenchment  of  capitalism  and  the  development  of  the  nation-state,  has  also
produced another peril that could disrupt the freedom of civil society. Habermas (1998)
refers  to  the  intrusion  of  instrumental  concerns  into  what  he  designates  as  the
‘lifeworld’.  In  order  to  explain why the logics  of  the state  and the market  (that  he
describes  as  the  ‘systems’ of  power and money)  conflict  with the rationality of  the
lifeworld he takes issue with Weber’s (1946) account of bureaucratic domination.
The problem with Weber’s analysis of the bureaucratic trends that animate modern life,
Habermas  argues,  is  not  only its  ambivalence94,  but  also  its  inability  to  distinguish
between the realms of the system and the lifeworld. In his critique of Weber, Habermas
suggests that society has not only a systemic side (the state and the market) but also a
spontaneous, non-institutionalized side (the lifeworld).
For Habermas, the instrumental rationality typical of capitalist modernity trespasses the
realms of the economy and the state and encroaches (or ‘colonizes’) upon other areas of
life, whose legitimation needs are different. Habermas illustrates the instrumentalization
of the lifeworld by showing how the logic of the market influences individual conduct.
94 Habermas (1998) develops a critique of Weber’s theory of social action, in which he points
out  the  ambivalence  of  Weber’s  analysis  of  bureaucratic  trends.  On  one  hand,  Weber
celebrates the highly developed rationality of capitalism and modernity. On the other hand,
however, he deplores the deprivation of meaning and the loss of freedom caused by the
progressive bureaucratization of society.  For Habermas, Weber’s simultaneous celebration
and denigration of bureaucracy was problematic.
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Capitalist  mentality  intrudes  in  the  lifeworld  and  shapes  private  behaviour  by
encouraging  attitudes  such  as  consumerism,  competition,  possessive  individualism,
excessive  concerns  with  performance.  As  Habermas  (1998,  p.  325)  writes,  ‘the
communicative practice of everyday life is  one-sidedly rationalized into a utilitarian
style’, which contributes to the emergence of a ‘pathology of modernity’, which results
from
the penetration of forms of economic and administrative rationality into areas of
action that resist being converted over to the media of money and power because
they are specialized in cultural transmission, social integration, and child rearing,
and remain dependent on mutual understanding as a mechanism for coordinating
action (Habermas, 1998, p. 330).
The instrumentalization of the lifeworld, however, is problematic. As Habermas (1996)
explains,  the  lifeworld  plays  a  role  in  promoting  social  integration,  in  so  far  as  it
provides stability for social interaction by reducing areas of conflict. The lifeworld is
important because it expands the levels of consensual agreement within society, thus
facilitating the  ‘domestication’ of the social. In modern societies, Habermas suggests,
conflict is widespread because society is characterized by a strong pluralism. ‘Societal
pluralization has fragmented shared identities’, Rehg (1996, p. xix) has indicated, ‘and
eroded the substantive lifeworld resources for consensus’. The presence of multiple –
and competing – political identities in a pluralistic society raises the problem of how
conflict can be processed without disrupting the political order. 
Indeed,  in  highly  differentiated  modern  societies,  social  coordination  is  complex.
Habermas  (1996)  distinguishes  between  the  mechanisms  of  social  coordination
provided by the state and the lifeworld. In his view, the social coordination steered by
the state is usually accomplished by hierarchy (which also dismisses the necessity of
producing consensus) or modern law (which is regulated by rules and codes). For its
turn,  the  type  of  coordination  provided  by  the  lifeworld  is  based  on  mutual
understanding  achieved  through  the  construction  of  communicatively  mediated
consensus.  As  such,  the  lifeworld  is  capable  of  promoting  social  stabilization  by
expanding consensus and reducing conflict.
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But  how does  the  coordination  capacities  of  the  lifeworld  function?  How does  the
consensus produced by the lifeworld  ‘spill over’ to the political system? According to
Habermas  (1996),  the  logic  of  the  democratic  regime  presupposes  that  the
communicative power unleashed in the lifeworld reaches the political system. In the
democratic tradition, he explains, formal political institutions open up their processes of
decision-making to the informal public opinion harboured in the lifeworld (for example
parliaments attempt to make laws that take into account the preferences and interests of
civil society). Thus, the legitimacy of democratic decisions depends on the possibility of
the (informal and unstructured) opinions of the lifeworld penetrating into the (formal
and organized) political system. In other words, the action of the state can be considered
legitimate insofar as it enables ‘authentic’ civic influence over decision-making. 
This is why, Habermas further notes, in modern democracies legitimacy is eroded when
political and administrative systems remain closed and self-referential (responsive and
accountable only to their internal organizational needs) or led by technocratic elites95.
The preservation of freedom and autonomy therefore requires the state to be permeable
to the voices, concerns and claims emerging from the lifeworld. This is a crucial point
that  will  be  later  taken  up  seriously  by  the  proponents  of  the  Deliberative  Policy
Approach (DPA).  Drawing on Habermas’s  advocacy for  political  and administrative
attention to the communicative reasoning of the lifeworld, DPA scholars will defend the
importance  of  designing  participatory  tools  to  engage  civil  society  in  the  decision-
making of public policies. This topic will be developed later in section 4.4.
But  how  does  the  communicative  reasoning  of  the  lifeworld  flow  into  the  state?
Habermas’s analysis of the interaction between the lifeworld and the political system
enables him to articulate his deliberative vision of democracy. In ‘Deliberative politics:
a  procedural  concept  of  democracy’,  Habermas  (1996,  ch.  7)  discusses  how
communicative  power  can  be  channelled  to  social,  political  and  administrative
95 Technocratic domination, whose power derives from its monopoly of knowledge, threatens
to  colonize (that  is,  normatively regulate)  the  lifeworld.  Against  technocratic  trends  and
power concentration in large bureaucratic settings, Habermas encourages the multiplication
of deliberative arenas in which civil society can counter the authority of experts and curtail
the  power  of  technocratic  elites  ‘who  became  independent  oligarchies  that  paternalize
voiceless citizens’ (Habermas, 1996, p. 303). 
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institutions. He proposes a deliberative model of democracy that consists fundamentally
of a set of procedures designed with the purpose of enabling the force of the strongest
argument to prevail96. 
The  democratic  model  advocated  by  Habermas  (1996)  presupposes  the
institutionalization of deliberative procedures that encourage the authentic participation
of citizens. In this case, the vitality and authenticity of civil society penetrate in the
formal political system (still guided by an instrumental rationality but now ‘moderated’
by the communicative reasoning of the lifeworld). The creation of deliberative arenas
contributes to the formation of the collective will: ‘The flow of communication between
public opinion formation, institutionalized elections, and legislative decisions is meant
to  guarantee  that  influence  and  communicative  power  are  transformed  through
legislation into administrative power’ (Habermas, 1996, p. 299). Thus, a deliberative
conception of democracy is predicated upon the establishment of procedures that enable
communicative  reasoning  to  influence  decision-making,  so  that  laws  and  policies97
become the legitimate expression of the will of the people. To put it bluntly, civil society
does not rule, but can shape the decision-making process of the state. 
Habermas’s advocacy of a deliberative conception of policy-making98 would later pave
the  way  for  the  development  of  a  Deliberative  Policy  Approach  (DPA).  In  fact,
Habermas’s ideas were welcomed in the fields of public policy and administration as a
source of renewal. It should be noted, however, that his writings were not primarily
96 The cornerstone of his deliberative model is based on a conception of practical reason that
relies on ‘rules of discourse and forms of argumentation that borrow their normative content
from the validity basis of action oriented to reaching understanding’ (Habermas, 1996, p.
296-7).  In  his  view,  such  a  procedural  view  of  democracy  is  exempt  from substantial
commitments being thus ‘neutral with respect to competing worldviews and forms of life’
(Habermas, 1996, p. 288).
97 For Habermas, legitimate forms of democracy require civil society to influence not only law-
making but also law-implementation. In his view, with the emergence of the interventionist
state, the separation of legislative and administrative spheres is  no longer clear-cut  since
‘legislation sees itself compelled to become so concrete as to penetrate deeply into levels of
administrative discretion. More often administrative jurisdictions are expanded in such a way
that  their  activity  can  hardly  any  longer  be  considered  a  mere  execution  of  the  law’
(Habermas, 1989, p. 179).
98 In principle, as Habermas clarifies, any matter that can be regulated in the interest of all is a
candidate  for  deliberation.  Sometimes,  he  goes  even  further:  ‘every  affair  in  need  for
political regulation should be publicly discussed’ (Habermas, 1996, p. 313). 
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concerned with policy affairs or more practical issues of public administration99. Yet,
although the Habermasian vision ‘at first seems quite removed from the more practical
concerns of policy inquiry’, as Fischer (2003, p. 35) mentioned, they have nonetheless
‘stimulated a  sizeable  literature  devoted  to  the  critique and reconstruction  of  policy
analysis’.
Indeed, Habermas’s ideas were mostly elaborated at a philosophical and quite abstract
level. Even though he discussed at length the nature of the administrative system in
modern democratic regimes,  and provided insights on how a deliberative orientation
might guide public administration, his concepts still  had to be translated into policy
language. The adaptation of communicative action theory and deliberative procedures
into a workable policy orientation, as the next section aims to show, was undertaken by
policy scholars writing mostly within the field of public administration. 
4.3 DPA: from philosophy to public policy and administration
The  task  of  this  section  is  to  explain  how  Habermasian  thinking  has  influenced
contemporary developments in public policy, particularly in public administration. First
of all, it is important to acknowledge that critics have often contended that Habermas’s
theorizing was confined to the realm of philosophical studies and therefore offered little
applicable contribution to the field of public policy (e.g. Zanetti, 1997; Lynn, 1999).
Here, instead, it is considered that Habermas introduced innovative ways of thinking
that, although elaborated outside the policy area,  can provide insights for the policy
field. Moreover, a growing scholarship influenced by Habermas insinuates that his ideas
deserve attention (Forester, 1989; Innes and Booher, 2003; Kelly, 2004; Sager, 2007).
Fischer (2003, p. 37) is correct, therefore, in suggesting that  ‘those who reject critical
theory as irrelevant to the task of building participatory policy institutions generally
99 Although  Habermas’s  philosophical  ideas  have  sparked  interest  in  the  field  of  public
administration, their direct impact should not be over-emphasized. As Zanetti (1997) argues,
discussing the practical applications of critical theory in public administration, Habermas’s
influence still remains marginal mainly because a research program, capable of connecting
theory  and  practice,  has  not  yet  been  developed.  Moreover,  ‘despite  many  attempts  to
operationalize Habermas’s work as a research program’, she argues, ‘a primary difficult is
the fact that he intends his theory to be diagnostic rather than therapeutic’ (Zanetti, 1997, p.
156). 
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miss the point’. In addition, he clarifies that ‘Habermas has provided the philosophical
foundations for building the alternative model,  not a blueprint for a practical model
itself’. 
The purpose of this section is to examine the implications of Habermas’s advocacy of a
deliberative  conception  of  policy-making for  public  policy and administration.  This
discussion is taken in three steps. Section 4.3.1 examines the case for a communicative
rationality in public administration. Section 4.3.2 discusses the role of deliberation in
public  administration.  Section  4.3.3  addresses  the  democratic  implications  of  a
deliberation orientation in the policy field.
4.3.1 Public administration and policy settings: beyond instrumental rationality?
The main idea of the Deliberative Policy Approach (DPA) is that public administration
can  be  considered  as  a  source  of  democratic  legitimacy.  This  claim,  however,  is
predicated  on  the  possibility  of  public  administration  becoming  a  site  of  civic
deliberation. How this is achievable is far from obvious, since public administration has
conventionally been defined as  a  technical  field,  guided by bureaucratic  values  and
animated  by  an  instrumental  type  of  rationality.  This  section  discusses  how  DPA
theorists, drawing on Habermasian concepts of communicative rationality, propose to
envisage public administration as amenable to the influence of civil society. Particular
attention will  be paid to the  ‘turn’ in Habermas thought:  in his early works he was
adamant  that  public  administration  was  purely  instrumental,  but  in  later  books  he
acknowledged  the  possibility  of  public  administration  becoming  a  site  of
communicative rationality as well. 
The idea that public administration (defined as the ensemble of institutions responsible
for the implementation of state policies) is guided by an instrumental type of rationality
has  been  examined  by  Weber  (1946)  in  his  classical  analysis  of  bureaucratic
domination. Bluntly stated, Weber characterized public administration in terms of three
key  features:  i)  instrumental  rationality  (finding  the  most  convenient  means  for
achievement  particular  goals);  ii)  conduct regulated by rules  and codes (that clearly
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specify how tasks  are  to  be  carried  out);  iii)  a  hierarchical  organizational  structure
(based on authority and obedience).
Habermas,  in  his  early  works,  agreed  with  Weber’s  conceptualization  of  public
administration.  Habermas  concurred  with  Weber  that  as  industrial  societies  became
more complex and their activities more specialized, bureaucratic arrangements tended to
supplant previous forms of organization. They departed, however, in their appreciation
of  the  implications  of  bureaucratic  rationality.  For  Weber,  the  progressive
bureaucratization – not only of public administration but also of all spheres of life –
generated a perverse logic that would eventually lock human beings in an ‘iron cage’.
Nevertheless,  for  Habermas  this  analysis  was  not  accurate  because  Weber  failed  to
recognize  that  some  spheres  of  life  could  be  ‘spared’ the  instrumental  logic  of
modernity. 
Contra  Weber,  Habermas  suggested  that  in  spite  of  progressive  bureaucratization
freedom and autonomy were still possible. In his view, although Weber was correct in
positing that the spheres of economy (money) and state (power) remained tied to an
instrumental  orientation,  he  failed  nevertheless  to  recognize  that  the  sphere  of  civil
society (lifeworld) was geared by a different rationality: communicative. 
In  any case,  up to  this  point,  Habermas remained in  agreement  with Weber  on the
instrumental  condition  of  public  administration  (Kelly,  2004,  p.  41).  If  public
administration was animated by instrumental rationality, then it functioned as a source
of coercion that interjected in the lifeworld and threatened the freedom of civil society.
Hence,  in  his  earlier  texts,  Habermas sees public  administration as opposed to civil
society:  whereas  public  administration  is  marked by the  application  of  abstract  and
prescriptive rules, civil society is unregulated, informal, fluid, and spontaneous. At the
roots  of  their  opposition  lie  different  forms  of  rationality:  public  administration  is
instrumental, civil society is communicative. These logics are conflictive100. 
100 ‘When the law is applied administratively into the lifeworld’, Kelly (2004, p. 45) notes, ‘the
fullness of the practical rationality used in the lifeworld comes into conflict with the one-
dimensional rationality of the administrative state’. 
144
In  his  illuminating  study101,  Kelly  (2004)  discusses  the  consequences  of  these
conflicting  logics.  The  main  problem,  he  contends,  is  the  incapacity  of  public
administration to justify its actions to citizens in a legitimate way. Public administration
acts  instrumentally,  according  to  bureaucratic  procedures,  and  has  difficulty  in
expressing its decisions in terms of ethical, moral and normative ideals. The type of
justification  offered  often  frustrates  citizens  who expect  public  administrators  to  be
‘responsive to their moral, ethical, or existential concerns’ (Kelly, 2004, p. 43).
Kelly (2004) argues that the earlier Habermas (of the theory of communicative action)
clearly  opposed  the  state  and  the  lifeworld  as  repositories  of  two  distinct  and
incompatible rationalities (instrumental versus communicative). In his view, however,
the  later  Habermas  (of  deliberative  democracy)  reviewed  his  initial  position  and
presented a new account of the rationality proper to public administration. It is precisely
this ‘turn’ in Habermas’s thought that inaugurates the possibility of a new type of public
administration – the deliberative. This point is crucial to understand the DPA and needs
to be explained in more detail.
After  he  reviewed  his  position,  Habermas  acknowledged  that  public  administration
although  still  guided  by  an  instrumental  type  of  rationality  could  be  open  to  the
‘impulses’ of civil society. In that case the communicative reasoning emanating from
civil society could moderate public administration’s strategic, instrumental orientation.
Thus,  for the later  Habermas (of  Between Facts  and Norms)  if  the spontaneity and
authenticity of civil society could penetrate public administration, the state itself could
become a source of democratic legitimacy. In order words, if the normative claims of
civil society were capable of influencing decision-making the policies formulated by the
state would be more legitimate and democratic. This is in fact the fundamental claim
advocated by DPA theorists.
(The later) Habermas proposes the development of a deliberative public administration
whose  ‘construction  of  accountable,  democratic  procedures  by  which  unstructured
101 Kelly (2004)  helps  to  illustrate  how Habermas’s  concepts  of  communicative  action  and
deliberative theory can be translated from the philosophical level to the policy/administrative
level. His purpose, in his own words, is to ‘provide an account of Habermas’s democratic
theory that highlights his take on public administration’ (Kelly, 2004, p. 39).
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public  opinion  can  counter-steer  administrative  power’ (Kelly,  2004,  p.  49)  could
(partially) redeem it from its instrumental condition. But what is a deliberative public
administration? How does it differ from conventional (bureaucratic and technocratic)
public administration? To put it in a nutshell, Habermas suggests that the introduction of
rational procedures to regulate the participation of civil society can create a flow of
communication from the lifeworld and ‘fertilize’ administrative institutions. In practice,
civil society can participate either in law-making (legislative arena) or in policy-making
(administrative arena)102.
A deliberative public  administration,  as Kelly indicates,  offers the possibility of  the
citizenry wielding some form of  ‘popular sovereignty’. In this case, governments are
encouraged  to  decide  together  with  their  citizens  through  a  more  collaborative
arrangement.  ‘Because  only  norms  and  arguments  that  deliberating  citizens  have
validated  in  the  public  sphere  can  justify legal  and administrative  decisions’,  Kelly
(2004, p. 49) argues, ‘the gap between communicatively generated and administratively
employed power is closed’. 
In recognizing that public administrators deal with values – and not only with rules –
Habermas (1996) is able to break with his earlier account of the administrative state as
purely  instrumental.  Public  administration  is  no  longer  described  as  insulated  and
removed from the public sphere, but on the contrary it is interpreted as having to offer
justification for its decisions through an ‘appeal to normative reasons’. For Habermas,
this  move  from  the  instrumental  to  the  communicative  terrain  means  that  public
administration, instead of performing only the coercive function of a system, becomes a
site of democratization.
102 Habermas (1996) proposes that links between deliberation and the political/policy system
can be established in two instances: i) procedures might be created in order to allow citizens
to influence legislators to pass laws that reflect their will (in this case, laws that are inspired
by the  public  opinion  are  ‘endowed’ with  normative  justification  and thus  carry greater
legitimacy);  ii)  procedures can be introduced to regulate  the  relationship between public
administrators and citizens, so that a reciprocal communicative interaction can be facilitated
(thus, public administration becomes an arena of deliberation and its decisions gain their
normative basis from the accountability to the public).
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A practical  consequence  of  this  change in  Habermas’s  view is  that  ‘if  citizens  and
administrators use communicative reasoning, then direct deliberative decision making is
at least possible’ (Kelly, 2004, p. 55). But in spite of this ‘dramatic break’103, Habermas
himself  would  not  go  very  far  in  delineating  the  features  of  a  deliberative  public
administration.  This  task,  as  discussed  in  the  next  section,  will  be  undertaken  by
scholars working in the fields of public policy and public administration.
4.3.2 The political roles of public administration
In  order  to  illustrate  how DPA has  been theorized,  it  is  convenient  to  examine the
literature  produced  within  the  fields  of  public  policy and administration.  Habermas
offered the philosophical underpinnings for the development of a deliberative view of
public  policy  and  administration.  The  task  that  now  confronted  policy  theorists
consisted  in  the  ‘translation’ of  these  philosophical  insights  into  the  more  applied
domain  of  public  policy.  In  line  with  Habermas’s  views,  scholarship  in  public
administration has also emphasized the opposition between instrumental (bureaucratic)
and communicative (deliberative) attitudes (Kirlin, 1996, 2001; Denhardt and Denhardt,
2007; Stivers, 2008; Nabatchi, 2010). Advocates of DPA have also taken seriously the
idea that public administration has a commitment to democratic legitimacy and civic
participation (Nabatchi, Goerdel and Shelly, 2011).
This section will explore two claims that are crucial for DPA: i) public administration
performs (not only technical but also) political roles; ii) because public administration
performs  political  roles,  it  should  be  organized  along  deliberative  (instead  of
bureaucratic) lines. 
The first claim – public administration performs political roles – has been associated
with  the  deficiencies  of  representative  institutions.  The  key argument  is  that  when
103 Kelly (2004, p. 54) argues that Habermas’s acceptance that public administration performs
according not only to instrumental but also to communicative reason is a ‘dramatic break’ in
which the meaning and potential of public administration are reassessed. Habermas reviewed
his  previous  position,  Kelly notes,  because  he  now perceived  that  public  administrators
enjoyed (certain levels of) discretion in their actions, which raised the problem of how their
decisions were justified.
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formal  democratic  institutions  fail  to  carry  out  their  tasks,  these  tasks  are  then
transferred  to  public  administration.  Meier  (1997)  illustrates  with  the  case  of  the
electoral system. In his view, the political role of public administration is a consequence
of imperfections in the electoral system. Since the electoral process does not provide
clear policy guidelines, policy definitions are relocated to public administration. The
problem,  however,  is  that  public  administration  has  been  originally  designed  to
implement policies, not to formulate them. 
Ideally, the electoral process should be able to identify the preferences of the citizens
and convert them into clear policies. ‘In representative democracies’, Nabatchi, Goerdel
and Shelly (2011, p. 34) contend, ‘electoral institutions are supposed to serve as forums
where through the process of deliberation, social conflicts are resolved and individual
interests are aggregated, resulting in the creation of public goals and policy decisions’.
However, in contemporary democratic regimes, the electoral system seldom provides
unambiguous policy guidance. Their aggregative purposes are not properly fulfilled and
the preferences of the electorate are hardly integrated into a coherent policy agenda104. 
But what happens when the electoral system does not generate the policy decisions it
was conceived for? There is a ‘vicious feedback loop’, according to Nabatchi, Goerdel
and  Shelly  (2011,  p.  38),  in  which  ‘policy  conflicts  are  passed  to  administrative
agencies,  leaving  bureaucrats  to  solve  complex  and  divisive  issues’.  The  deficient
operation of the electoral system will eventually transfer the task of policy formulation
to  the administrative  sphere.  Thus,  the question  raised by Fischer  (2003,  p.  207)  is
pertinent: ‘what to do about the fact that public agencies have become primary policy-
making arenas?’
Moreover,  the  tasks  taken  up  by  public  administration  emanate  not  only  from
imperfections of the electoral system, but also from inadequate legislative performance.
In various cases, the legislature passes laws that are not specific enough in terms of
policy definition, providing only general orientation. In worse circumstances, it often
104 Politicians  might  have  concerns  other  than  the  formulation  of  policies,  being  rather
concentrated with other issues (e.g. re-election, party loyalty).  In certain situations, some
types of policies – especially those that are politically controversial, technically complex,
and resource demanding – discourage political involvement.
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happens  that  the  laws  passed  by  the  legislature  contain  ‘ambiguous  language,
uninformed goals, and contradictory guidelines’. Again, the clarification of the meaning
of policies is transferred to public administration, which is ‘left to make major decisions
on policy matters’ (Nabatchi, Goerdel and Shelly, 2011, p. 35). 
What are the implications of the inability of public administration to carry out political
functions (for which it was not originally designed)? For many scholars sympathetic to
DPA, the answer is the impotence of public administration to solve public problems that
afflict society. Stivers (2008) speaks of public administration in ‘dark times’ due to the
appalling situation of public services and the lack of democratic participation. Other
DPA theorists argue that the dismal condition of public administration is rooted in a
major deficiency, namely, public administration’s reluctance to acknowledge its political
role as mediator between the political system and civil society (Nabatchi, 2010).
According  to  Nabatchi,  Goerdel  and  Shelly  (2011)  new  questions  arise  when  it  is
recognized  that  public  administration  performs  both  technical  and  political  tasks.
Therefore, they ask, ‘how can public administration improve its ability to manage and
arbitrate unresolved political conflicts, represent the public interest, promote sound and
effective  policy,  and remediate  the  persistent  failures  of  democracy within  electoral
institutions?’ (Nabatchi, Goerdel and Shelly, 2011, p. 35). What is the best way to deal
with the fact that public administration is a political actor? 
In their view, the failure of public administration to cope with political demands lies in
its  bureaucratic  orientation105 that  forecloses  the  possibility  of  employing  public
deliberation and civic participation in the policy process. As anticipated by Habermas,
what is at stake here is the presence of conflicting rationalities – the instrumental and
the communicative. The widespread dominance of the bureaucratic ethos shields public
administration from the penetration of the communicative impulses emanating from the
lifeworld.
105 The dominance of the bureaucratic ethos is at odds with deliberative values: ‘agencies are
not set up to serve as core deliberative institutions. Rather, they are almost exclusively bound
by  the  established  norms  of  bureaucratic  ethos,  which  constrain  them  to  focusing  on
achieving administrative efficiency’ (Nabatchi, Goerdel and Shelly, 2011, p. 38).
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The problematic implications of instrumental rationality in public administration are an
important concern in policy studies. In his discussion of the major challenges faced by
public  administration,  Kirlin  (1996,  2001)  notes  how  the  instrumental  orientation
manifested by public administration tends to weaken democratic governance. He calls
for the overcoming of bureaucratic and technocratic behaviour and advocates an explicit
recognition of public administration political roles. In line with Habermas’s ideas, he
claims that public administration should be open to the participation of civil society. The
democratic responsibilities of public administration, Kirlin (1996, p. 418-9) contends,
involve the creation of  conditions  for  effective  civic  participation and protection  of
individual freedom.
In  accordance  with  Habermas’s  vision  of  public  deliberation  as  an  alternative  to
technocratic rule, Stivers (2008) emphasizes the importance of deliberation for political
freedom106. The introduction of a deliberative orientation in the policy field, she argues,
can create channels for the infiltration of the voice of civil society and contribute to
restore the vitality of the democratic regime. Deliberation is the antidote against  ‘the
darkness of dark times’ because it offers an alternative to the technocratic regime: ‘No
government  by experts  in  which  the  masses  do  not  have  the  chance  to  inform the
experts as to their needs can be anything but an oligarchy managed in the interests of the
few’ (Stivers, 2008, p. 134).
Stiver’s  (2008)  analysis  is  in  tune  with  Habermas’s  (1996)  view  that  only  the
communicative  impulses  emerging  from the  lifeworld  can  prevent  the  insulation  of
public  administration.  When  administration  is  fully  removed  from  society,  it  turns
inwards and becomes a self-referential and closed system. Thus, Habermas (1996, p.
356) notes that ‘binding decisions, to be legitimate, must be steered by communication
flows that start at the periphery’. In other words, decisions taken bureaucratically, by
public  administrators  concerned  purely  with  the  imperatives  of  efficiency,  are
problematic insofar as they lack accountability and responsiveness to the public opinion.
106 It should be noted that although sympathetic to deliberative views, Stivers (2008) draws on
Hannah Arendt (not on Habermas).
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This  section  has  emphasized  the  political  roles  of  public  administration.  However,
according to DPA’s advocates, there is yet another reason why the deliberative approach
should be sponsored. It relates to the power of civic deliberation to restore the vitality of
the democratic regime. This is the topic of the next section.
4.3.3 Public administration as a guardian of democracy
This section complements the previous and examines the argument that unless public
administration espouses a DPA it will endanger the viability of the democratic regime
itself.  In  fact,  theorists  writing  within  public  administration  have  voiced  (not
infrequently in stringent terms) that public administration needs to reposition itself in
order to preserve the functionality of contemporary democracies. In order to explore the
democratic implications of the deliberative approach, an interesting essay written by
policy theorist Tina Nabatchi will be analysed. Her main argument, which will be now
explored,  is  that  public  administration  plays  a  key  role  in  promoting  an  active
citizenship and reducing democratic deficits. 
Discussing  the  democratic potential  of  DPA,  Nabatchi  (2010)  suggests  that  a
deliberative orientation has the capacity to revitalize political institutions and reduce
democratic deficits. The idea underlying the DPA is that only the authentic engagement
of civil society in the formulation and implementation of public policies can prevent the
‘toxic’ effects  of  bureaucratic  behaviour  and  technocratic  manipulation107.  Thus  if
citizens are invited to voice their claims, then the policy process no longer needs to be a
source of domination. In addition, by encouraging citizens to freely voice their concerns
and demands,  deliberative public  administration becomes an arena for  dialogue and
exchange of opinions. 
The introduction of DPA in public administration, as Nabatchi has noted, can contribute
to offset  political  dysfunctions  of  contemporary societies,  especially political  apathy
107 This vision is also shared by theorists who argue in favour of collaborative governance. See
Gruber (1997), O’Toole (1997), Kettl (2000), Deleon and Deleon (2002), Meier and O’Toole
(2006), Denhardt and Denhardt (2007).
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which  leads  to  strong  democratic  deficits108.  In  her  view,  which  has  a  strong
Habermasian  tone,  there  are  two  main  reasons  why  DPA is  expected  to  promote
democratization: i) it improves the level of democratic legitimacy; ii) it encourages an
active citizenship. Each reason is now explored in more detail. 
First,  a  deliberative  public  administration  is  well  equipped  to  face  the  democratic
challenge  because  participatory  practices  can  prop  up  legitimacy  for  the  regime109.
When citizens realize that they play a role in the definition of policies, they tend to
strengthen  their  support  for  democratic  institutions110.  In  contrast  to  self-referential
bureaucratic  and  technocratic  models,  a  deliberative  public  administration  is  more
transparent and accountable to their citizens, creating a synergy between public officers
and  civic  society.  Deliberation  encourages  appreciation  for  the  regime  itself,  thus
helping to reduce democratic and citizenship deficits that beset contemporary societies
worldwide. Hence, among the political implications of a deliberative approach is the
support  for  a  democratic  civic  culture111 that  emphasizes  deliberation  as  the  chief
mechanism for coordinating collective action (Nabatchi, 2010).
Second,  a  deliberative  approach  creates  channels  through  which  civil  society  can
influence decision-making. Participants can engage in the discussion of collective issues
and transcend the immediate (and self-orientated) concerns of their private world. The
process  of  deliberation  nurtures  civic  values  (trust,  empathy,  tolerance)  and  thus
discourages individualistic attitudes. A deliberative approach to public administration,
108 Burke (1997) offers an interesting discussion of democratic responsibilities in the context of
public administration. In particular, he highlights the responsibility of the individual policy
practitioner.
109 On similar lines, Kelly (2004, p. 40) considers that ‘the legitimacy of the entire democratic
state is dependent on citizen collaboration at the administration level’.
110 Vigoda (2002) explains that public participation can be described as either responsiveness or
collaboration. Whereas responsiveness represents user’s satisfaction with service delivery,
collaboration is associated with civic engagement in the public sphere. This distinction has
important  democratic  implications:  responsiveness  demotes  citizens  to  customers,  while
collaboration entails  genuine cooperation between citizens and policy analysts.  Thus,  the
appreciation of DPA theorists for collaboration in opposition to responsiveness.
111 Along Habermasian lines, Fischer (2003) explores the connection between deliberation and
the construction of a democratic political culture: ‘By transforming ways of organizing and
knowing, such participatory deliberation has the possibility of building new political cultures
that increase the possibilities of communicative action’ (Fischer, 2003, p. 206).
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Nabatchi suggests,  politicizes the public  sphere because it  transfers decision powers
from bureaucrats and experts to those affected by the issues being discussed. It also
enables citizens to articulate and express their  interests,  demands and preferences112.
Deliberation also prepares individuals to live better collectively since it helps to develop
an other-regarding attitude, in which they learn to listen to different opinions, tolerate
dissenting arguments, and develop an appreciation for the needs of others.
These two claims, which clearly denote Habermas’s influence, have also been espoused
by other DPA theorists. For instance, Berman (1997) contends that the shift to more
participatory  forms  of  public  administration  can  enhance  trust  between  citizen  and
government (and thus revert a long tradition of cynicism). In addition, this shift can also
encourage more active and authentic civic engagement, which in turn nurtures mutual
appreciation  between  citizens  and  public  officials  (Stivers,  1994).  When  citizens
perceive  the  government  not  as  threat,  but  as  partner,  the  satisfaction  with  the
democratic regime tends to increase113. 
The claims formulated by DPA theorists – such as Nabatchi and Berman – seem to
chime with Habermas’s suggestion that citizens should take part in decisional processes
whose outcomes affect their lives. As he puts it,
The  citizens  themselves  become  those  who  deliberate  and,  acting  as  a
constitutional  assembly,  decide  how they must  fashion  the  rights  that  give  the
discourse  principle  legal  shape  as  a  principle  of  democracy.  According  to  the
discourse principle, just those norms deserve to be valid that could meet with the
approval of those potentially affected, insofar as the latter participate in rational
discourses.  Hence the desired political rights must  guarantee participation in all
deliberative and decisional processes relevant to legislation and must do so in a
way that provides each person with equal chances to exercise the communicative
freedom to take a position on criticizable validity claims (Habermas, 1996, p. 127).
112 Similarly, Habermas (1996, p. 311) contends that processes of opinion and will-formation
also contribute to transform the preferences of those that participate in the deliberation.
113 Berman (1997)  also notes  that  deliberation helps  to  increase the knowledge of  how the
government  works.  When citizens learn how agencies operate,  they might  become more
respectful, tolerant and supportive. This can be done in several ways: i) explain to citizens
how the policy process works so that they will be more aware of the government’s activities;
ii) include citizens’ opinions in the decision-making process; iii) enhance efficiency levels so
that citizens will be more satisfied with the performance of the government (Berman, 1997,
p.  106).  In doing so,  he argues,  a deliberative view of public policy will  accomplish its
mission of restoring trust, which is fundamental for democracy.
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This  section  aimed  to  emphasize  the  democratic  implications  of  DPA.  Particular
attention  has  been  given  to  the  potential  of  DPA to  tackle  issues  of  democratic
legitimacy, in particular by contributing to reduce persistent democratic deficits as well
as fostering more active forms of citizenship. 
Before moving on, however, it is worth summarizing the three fundamental claims of
DPA discussed in this section: i) public administration is a site not only of instrumental
but also of communicative rationality; ii) public administration performs political roles;
iii) deliberation contributes to restore the vitality of the democratic regime. The next
section  turns  to  the  investigation  of  the  issue  of  institutionalization  of  deliberative
practices.
4.4 How to institutionalize the DPA?
The purpose of this section is to discuss how the deliberative project can be translated
into  practical  policy  tools.  Given  the  widespread  bureaucratic  and  technocratic
behaviour, how can administrative agencies be adapted to reflect deliberative concerns?
How can public administrators engage with civil society in authentic dialogue aimed at
reaching consensus? Do deliberative arenas have transformative power? An interesting
way to reflect on these questions is to think about how a deliberative approach can be
operationalized in administrative settings, that is, which institutional designs are more
appropriate to translate the theoretical insights into workable policy tools. 
This section is split into two parts. Section 4.4.1 discusses the existence of multiple
institutional  designs  and  argues  that  the  suitability  of  a  particular  design  depends
primarily on the purpose to be achieved. Section 4.4.2 offers a practical illustration of a
deliberative  practice,  namely,  the  participatory  budgeting  as  implemented  in  Porto
Alegre, Brazil. 
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4.4.1 Multiple institutional designs
On the theme of institutional design, the contribution of political theorist Archon Fung
is  particularly illuminating,  because  it  articulates  different  views  on the  problem of
institutionalization in a clear and schematic manner. In several of his writings, Fung has
been concerned with deliberative issues, and has addressed the question of the most
suitable  institutional  arrangements  for  public  deliberation.  In  his  view,  institutional
designs  are  a  crucial  dimension  of  the  policy  process.  Depending  on  institutional
designs, deliberation can be more or less effective. As Fung has argued, institutional
designs can be critical for the effectiveness of the policy process because they affect the
quality of deliberation114. 
Still according to Fung, the rationale for setting up deliberative institutions is to offer a
counterweight  to  the  domination  of  oligarchic  practices  that  distort  democratic
governance.  Deliberative  arenas  can  create  a  genuinely  democratic  process  of  co-
governing where the power to choose policies is not monopolized by economic elites. In
claiming  that  deliberative  public  administration  can  protect  the  public  from  the
influence of self-interested groups, Fung comes close to Habermas (1996, p. 353) who
admits that ‘participatory forms of administration that bring implementing agencies into
discourses with their clients (taken seriously as citizens) have a different sense than do
neo-corporatist bargaining arrangements’.
Fung  mentions  that  the  advocates  of  DPA  ‘often  view  structures  of  representative
legislation  and  insular  administration  as  easily  captured,  or  at  least  biased,  toward
wealthy and socially advantaged sections of the polity’ (Fung, 2003, p. 342). He also
claims that ‘injecting direct, mobilized, deliberative citizen participation into democratic
governance might favour the voices of the least advantaged and so offer a procedural
antidote enhances the equity in legislation and policy making’ (Fung, 2003, p. 342).
Echoing Habermas, Fung points out that the introduction of deliberative practices can
114 Borrowing the concept from Dahl (1989), Fung outlines the importance of minipublics that
are  ‘the  most  promising  actual  constructive  efforts  for  civic  engagement  and  public
deliberation in contemporary politics’ (Fung, 2003, p. 339).
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increase  the  legitimacy of  public  policies  because  they  enable  the  confrontation  of
different opinions and views.
From a DPA perspective, deliberative forums of public participation contribute to the
quality of democratic governance.  According to Fung (2003, p. 347) the democratic
impact of institutional designs is a function of quantitative115 and qualitative116 criteria.
Ideally,  deliberative practices would engage as many people as possible but without
sacrificing  the  attributes  of  rationality,  inclusiveness,  specificity  and  consensuality.
However,  the  democratic  effects  of  deliberation  also  depend  on  what  Fung  calls
‘institutional designs’. Discussing the procedural aspects of a deliberative orientation in
public  administration,  Fung  discerns  four  types  of  designs:  educational  forums,
participatory  advisory  panel,  participatory  problem-solving  collaboration,  and
participatory democratic governance. Each category deserves a brief description. 
The first design, educational forums, emphasizes the pedagogic capabilities of public
deliberation (in line with what Dewey (1927) proposed long ago). When individuals
gather in public meetings, they learn about policy,  improve their  knowledge of how
government  works,  acquire  information  about  the  topics  being  discussed,  listen  to
different points of view etc. In this case, deliberation might teach citizens about the
policy process:  ‘citizens enter into detailed and sustained deliberations with officials
about  the content,  design,  and effects  of particular  projects,  strategies,  or  programs’
(Fung, 2003, p. 349). In educational forums, participants gain knowledge of the policy
process and amass information about public issues, which facilitate the formation of
their opinion. In so far as individuals are exposed to contrasting views, they also get to
115 In quantitative terms, the democratic potential of a deliberative setting is assessed according
to the number of participants. In principle, the higher the number of participants, the more
democratic the deliberative experience. Hypothetically, a fully democratic arena would be
constituted by the totality of those affected by the decision. 
116 As  far  as  qualitative  factors  are  concerned,  the  point  is  to  clarify whether  institutional
designs  allow  for  a  good  or  bad  deliberation.  As  Fung  notes,  a  good  deliberation  is
understood to be rational (with individuals presenting their arguments and offering reasons to
support  their  claims),  equal  and  inclusive  (that  is,  without  any  form  of  coercion  or
discrimination), specific (with a clear focus and purpose), and consensus-orientated (because
deliberation aims at reaching agreement among participants) (Fung, 2003, p. 348).
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know how other groups think and feel about particular topics. The educative function of
public deliberation, Fung notes, has not been stressed enough in the literature117. 
The second mode of participatory design is what Fung called  ‘participatory advisory
panel’.  The purpose of these participatory panels is  twofold.  First,  by disseminating
relevant information to participants,  the government seeks to improve the quality of
public opinion118. This function is similar to that performed by the educational forum
discussed above in the sense that participation operates as a  ‘school of democracy’.
Second,  these  participatory  advisory  panels  also  enable  policy-makers  to  gather
information  from  civil  society  so  they  can  make  decisions  that  better  reflect  their
preferences (Fung, 2003, p. 341). Through advisory panels, the government can learn
how the public reacts to different policies and adapt its strategy in order to avoid taking
unpopular decisions. This type of design, participatory advisory panel, benefits both the
citizenry and the government. Citizens have opportunity to get informed about policy
agenda, whereas the government can improve its decision-making process, by making it
more sensitive and attuned to the public opinion119.
A third  modality  of  institutional  design  is  what  Fung  designates  as  ‘participatory
problem-solving collaboration’, whose purpose is more ambitious than the previous two
variants.  This  participatory  collaboration  aims  fundamentally  at  promoting
interdependence (synergy) between government and civil society. The rationale is that
when the government opens up channels of communication with civil society,  wiser
(and Habermas would add, more legitimate) solutions can be found to address collective
problems. But why would the government voluntarily consult civil society? As Fung has
explained, the government might, for instance, decide to involve civil society because it
acknowledges the limitations of expert knowledge. In some cases, experts lack enough
117 Other theorists have discussed how participation may foster civic aptitudes, and enable a
more democratic civic culture (see for instance Almond and Verba, 1963; Pateman, 1970).
118 This is in line with what Dahl calls ‘enlightened understanding’ (Dahl, 1989, p. 111).
119 As Fischer (2003, p. 206) clarifies, ‘non-specialists may contribute substantially to problem
characterization  by identifying  various  aspects  of  problems  needing  analysis,  by raising
important questions of fact that experts have not addressed, and by offering knowledge about
specific conditions … ’. Moreover, citizens possess local contextual knowledge that experts
usually lack:  ‘Indeed, its ability to deliver first-hand knowledge of the circumstances of a
local context addresses a major limitation of conventional methods’ (Fischer, 2003, p. 206).
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information to decide or the community of experts might also fail to reach an internal
agreement. Alternatively, the government might implement participatory collaboration
designs  with  the  aim of  enabling  social  control  over  its  own policies.  In  this  case,
citizens act like ‘auditors’ who continuously monitor government’s policies, denouncing
possible discrepancies between the policy conception and its actual results.
A fourth,  broader  in  scope and more  ‘radical’ than  the  previous  three,  is  a  type of
institutional design type that Fung designates as ‘participatory democratic governance’.
Allowing the deepest level of civic engagement of the four types of design, the purpose
here is the direct involvement of citizens in the construction of the government’s agenda
(Fung,  2003,  p.  342).  While  the  other  types  raise  more  modest  expectations,  a
participatory  public  administration  is  designed  to  facilitate  democratic  governance
through power sharing, that is, the government enables civil society to influence (and
possibly determine) which policies will be carried out. The aim is not only educative or
restrained to  a narrow set  of policy issues,  but involves  more fundamental  political
choices. This is arguably the most democratic of all four institutional designs, both in
quantitative  and  qualitative  terms.  Through  processes  of  citizen  empowerment,  the
government transfers effective control of the agenda to the citizens, who are free to
choose  which  policies  will  be  prioritized.  In  theory,  transformative  change  can  be
achieved when participatory democratic governance designs are implemented by the
government.
Depending  on the  institutional  design,  a  deliberative  approach  might  have  different
democratic  implications120.  Two  important  corollaries  can  be  derived  from  Fung’s
analysis.  The first  is  that the depth of democratic impact is  a function of the scope
(ambition)  of  the  institutional  design.  Arguably,  situations  that  require  deep
democratization might presuppose the construction of an arena in which citizens are
ultimately empowered to decide. In contrast, when the purpose is knowledge transfer, an
educational forum might be more appropriate. The second lesson is that participation is
not a matter of ‘either or’, but of gradation. Full participation and no participation are
120 James Fishkin has conducted a series of experiments – known as deliberative opinion polls –
that offers an interesting illustration of how deliberative ideas and concepts can be actualized
in civic settings. See particularly Fishkin (1991, 2009).
158
possibilities  that  might  be  suitable  for  particular  circumstances.  Between  those  two
extremes, there is a large range of levels of participation that correspond to different
levels of democratic impact121. Thus public administration and policy settings do not
have to be purely participatory and deliberative but they can accommodate doses of
bureaucracy and technocracy.  Because participation  is  a  matter  of  degree,  it  can be
calibrated according to the policy context and administrative viability.
4.4.2 DPA in practice: participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre
One of the most celebrated deliberative experiences in the literature – which is often
cited by policy theorists of different persuasions – is the Participatory Budgeting (PB),
Orçamento Participativo, which was originally implemented in the city of Porto Alegre,
south of Brazil, in the late 1980s. In fact, it was part of a wider political agenda carried
out by the Workers’s Party (PT) after their victory in the elections of 1988. As a left-
wing party, PT envisaged PB as a tool capable of engaging local communities in the
definition of local policies. Its main purpose was the creation of deliberative fora in
which citizens could express their views on where the budget of the government should
be spent122.
The  extent  to  which  PB  has  effectively  empowered  citizens,  particularly  the  most
disadvantaged, has elicited significant controversy. In his analysis, Fung (2003, p. 342)
classifies Porto Alegre’s PB within the group of ‘participatory democratic governance’
designs,  whose  goal  is  not  only  to  ‘incorporate  direct  citizen  voices  into  the
determination of policy agendas’ but also to establish institutional procedures capable of
strengthening ‘equity in legislation and policy making’. In order to show how PB was
devised in a way as to allow civic engagement in the delineation of public policies, it is
convenient to briefly describe its ‘organizational architecture’.
121 For instance, Fischer asks how realistic is the call for citizen participation, and sustains that
‘citizen participation remains, to be sure, an imperfect practice and it is important not to
exaggerate  the  role  of  citizens  capabilities  in  meaningfully  participating  in  complex
policymaking processes’ (Fischer, 2003, p. 208).
122 Comprehensive and detailed information about the organization of Porto Alegre’s PB can be
found in Orçamento Participativo de Porto Alegre (2013).
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For the discussion of the budget priorities, the municipality of Porto Alegre is organized
into seventeen districts (Humaitá, Lomba do Pinheiro, Restinga etc) and six thematic
areas (education, transportation, housing, economic development, culture and health).
All citizens are permitted to join the discussions either in the region (whose focus is
placed solely on the specific needs of that geographical area) or in the thematic area (in
which all the big investment decisions of the whole municipality are debated). 
The key deliberative events of Porto Alegre’s PB123 are the Preparatory Meetings, the
Regional and Thematic Rounds, the Regional and Thematic Fora, and the Municipal
Assembly, which constitute participatory instances in which citizens (or their delegates
and councillors) have the opportunity to express their views on how the budget of the
municipality should be invested. These events are now briefly described.
 Preparatory Meetings. They take place annually (between April and June) and
are  organized  by  community  leaders.  The  public  attending  these  meetings
usually  comprise  individual  citizens,  grass-roots  groups,  community
organizations.  Topics  of  discussion  encompass  presentation  of  demands,
discussion of priorities, preparation for selection of delegates.
 Regional and Thematic Rounds. Two rounds are convened (between July and
August) and are jointly coordinated by officials of Porto Alegre Government and
PB’s elected delegates and councillors The main purpose of the rounds is to
evaluate the performance of the municipal government (of the previous year), to
review the Investment Plan presented by the government, to elect councillors
and  define  the  number  of  delegates,  and  to  present  demands  and  offer
suggestions (via Web).
 Regional and Thematic Fora. Also occurring on an annual basis (from August to
October), these Fora play the function of electing the delegates and carrying out
the task of ranking the city’s priorities (in terms of investments and services) that
will be consigned in the budget. 
123 Information presented in this section is based on PB web page and on Santos (1998). See
also Wampler (2007).
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 Municipal Assembly. In November of each year, citizens are invited to attend the
Municipal  Assembly,  a  ceremony  in  which  the  councillors  are  officially
nominated. It is also the formal occasion in which the citizens of Porto Alegre
deliver the outcome of their deliberation to the government, which is embodied
in a document ranking the investments and services that have been selected by
the population. 
An  interesting  feature  of  PB  is  the  co-existence  of  direct  citizen  engagement  (for
example  during  the  preparatory  meetings)  with  representative  procedures  (through
delegates and councillors).  The two main representative committees are the  Fora of
Delegates and the PB Council. 
 Fora  of  Delegates.  They  are  composed  of  the  delegates  elected  by  the
population  (there  is  1  delegate  for  every  10  citizens  who  participate  in  an
assembly). The delegates are the ‘direct representatives of the population in the
participatory  process’ and  they  usually  meet  once  a  month.  They  act  as
intermediaries between PB Council and the population.
 PB Council.  As  PB’s  top  deliberative  authority,  it  integrates  the  councillors
elected in the Regional and Thematic Rounds. The Council performs the tasks of
deliberating over the application of financial resources of the municipal budget.
In their weekly meetings, the councillors act as mediators between the citizens
and the government.  They discuss criteria for resource allocation,  defend the
priorities  established  by  the  Regional  and  Thematic  meetings,  prepare  the
Investment  and  Services  Plan  (a  detailed  specification  of  investments  and
services selected by the population for each geographical and thematic area). 
As Fung (2003, p. 361) has noted, the various fora that integrate the structure of PB
generate a vast source of information that contribute to clarify: i) which policies are
preferred by the population; ii) where infrastructure projects (waste, housing, water etc)
should be located; iii) how the population evaluates previous government programs and
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performance of public agencies. In his view, among the important accomplishments of
Porto Alegre’s PB are the disruption of long-standing political practices (corruption and
patronage), higher levels of transparency, greater political and administrative legitimacy,
more public investment in deprived areas of the city (Fung, 2003, p. 361-2).
The  table  4.1  below helps  to  organize  the  information  presented  in  this  section.  It
elucidates how the PB schedule is structured and also summarizes the functions of each
of the meetings held throughout the PB calendar. 
Table 4.1 – Schedule of Porto Alegre’s Participatory Budgeting
Period of the year Type of Meeting Main activities
April to June Preparatory meetings in theRegional and Thematic Rounds
 Evaluation of government performance
 Investment plan presentation
 Definition of general and technical 
criteria
 Suggestion of priorities and demands 
(via Web)
July and August Meetings in the Regional andThematic Rounds
 Voting on the thematic priorities
 Election of councillors
 Definition of the number of delegates
August to October Meetings in the Regional andThematic Fora
 Election of delegates
 Ranking of investments and services
November Municipal Assembly
 Finalization of ranking of investments 
and services
 General discussions
November to 
February
Assessment of demands and
training of councillors
 Government assesses the demands 
formulated by Regional and Thematic 
Fora
 Training of councillors, delegates and 
public officials
February to April Detailing of Investment andServices Plan
 Allocation of resources (regional and 
thematic criteria)
 Presentation and voting of Investment 
Plan in the Regional and Thematic Fora
 Definition of general, regional and 
technical criteria
Source: Orçamento Participativo (2013) with adaptations.
This succinct description of how Porto Alegre’s PB works illustrates how the DPA can
be implemented in order to foster civic participation in the policy process. The case of
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Porto Alegre offers an interesting example of how the tasks of decision-making can be
shared between government and civil society. This type of  ‘collaborative governance’
reflects  a  transition  from  bureaucratic-centred  or  technocratic-led  styles  of  policy-
making toward a deliberative agenda, in which the participation of citizens is deemed
relevant to improve the legitimacy of democratic institutions and enhance the quality of
service provision.
One question not raised so far, however, concerns the actual outcomes of deliberation.
Does DPA in practice deliver its promises? The next section examines the empirical
limitations of DPA and elaborates a critique.
4.5 Deliberative approach to public administration and policy: a critique
The advent of DPA was not the work of a single individual. Instead, it was a gradual
development,  of  a  trial-and-error  nature,  orchestrated  by  policy  theorists  and
practitioners124. Although they are all speaking about a deliberative approach to public
policy  and  administration,  which  is  here  designated  as  DPA,  these  theorists  have
employed a myriad of designations and concepts: citizen-centred collaborative public
management (Cooper, Bryer, and Meek, 2006), collaborative government (Kelly, 2004),
citizen  governance  (Box,  1998),  citizen  participation  (Irvin  and  Stansbury,  2004;
Roberts,  2008;  Bingham,  Nabatchi  and O’Leary,  2005;  Callahan,  2007),  democratic
public administration (Perez, 2004; Denhardt and Denhardt, 2007), deliberative policy
analysis  (Hajer  and  Wagenaar,  2003),  public  philosophy  of  public  administration
(Ventriss, 1997), practical philosophy for the public service (Stivers, 2008), responsive
public administration (Burke, 1997; Bryer, 2007), participatory policy analysis (Deleon,
1994b;  Deleon  and  Deleon,  2002),  civic  public  administration  (Frederickson,  1982,
1991,  1999,  2010),  participatory-deliberative  public  administration  (Baccaro  and
Papadakis, 2009), the human side of public administration (Gawthrop, 1998).
124 Harking  back  at  least  to  the  late  1960s  with  the  forerunner  and  often-cited  ‘ladder  of
participation’ model (Arnstein, 1969), a sprawling literature that been devoted to examine
issues of deliberation in public policy.
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It  should be noted  that  civic  participation  is  not  a  new topic  in  the  field of  public
administration125.  In  fact,  the  importance  of  democratic  participation  in  public
administration  has  ebbed  and  flowed  throughout  the  history  of  the  discipline126.
Frederickson (1982, p.  506) argues that  political  and civic  issues were a  permanent
concern of the first scholars writing in the field of public administration:
In its origins, public administration was closely connected to the great over-arching
issues of government. More than a century ago, when leading theorists began to
construct the underpinnings of the field, it was presumed that public administration
was  directly  associated  with  civism  and  democratic  governance.  The  early
formulations  of  public  administration  dealt  with  concepts  of  majority  rule  and
minority rights, questions of direct citizen participation in government, questions
regarding  the  representational  or  republican  style  of  democracy,  questions  of
justice, freedom, equality, privacy, and due process (Frederickson, 1982, p. 506).
Much has been written about the virtues and hopes raised by DPA. However, one is
tempted to ask, to what extent does DPA live up to the expectations of its proponents? In
this section, some sceptical visions of deliberation are examined. The purpose of this
section is to elucidate the arguments against a public administration structured around
deliberative  practices.  Three  sets  of  arguments  will  be explored.  First,  the  idea that
deliberation  is  a  remedy  that  works  in  some  circumstances  but  that  should  not  be
considered a panacea (section 4.5.1).  Second,  contrary to  deliberative scholars,  it  is
argued  that  it  might  not  be  possible  to  completely  jettison  bureaucratic  structures
(section 4.5.2). Third, it is contended that in spite of its virtues, DPA makes problematic
epistemic assumptions (section 4.5.3).
125 As Lynn (2001b) emphasizes,  the conventional  view that  public administration has been
completely  oblivious  to  issues  of  civism  and  participation  is  nothing  more  than  a
simplification,  if  not  a  caricature.  Early  writers  in  public  administration  have  spent
considerable time discussing how to connect the performance of public administration with
the promotion of  civic  values  and democratic  practices.  See for  example Waldo (1948),
Appleby (1949), Long (1949), and Mosher (1968).
126 One  important  episode  that  deserves  to  be  mentioned  is  the  advent  of  New  Public
Administration,  which brought the issue of participation (albeit  of  a narrow type mostly
focused on the public administrator not on the citizen) to the fore. The search for renewal
within  public  administration  stemmed  from discontent  with  the  (dominant)  bureaucratic
approaches and opened up the way for more participatory schemes. For an analysis of the
New Public  Administration movement,  see  in  particular  Marini  (1971)  and Frederickson
(1982).
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4.5.1 Deliberation is not always convenient
Fung (2006) is highly appreciative of deliberative designs in public administration. He
argues that within DPA ‘citizens can be the shock troops of democracy’ and goes further
to say that ‘properly deployed, their local knowledge, wisdom, commitment, authority,
and even rectitude can address wicked failures of legitimacy, justice, and effectiveness
in  representative  and  bureaucratic  institutions’ (Fung,  2006,  p.  74).  In  spite  of  the
democratic potential of deliberation, he raises some considerations about the limits of
deliberation that are worth paying attention to. Discussing how complex the challenges
of contemporary governance are, he argues that deliberation is not always desirable or
suitable. The question is how much, when and how. For Fung, empirical circumstances
might mitigate the need, relevance or suitability for deliberation. In addition, specific
policy issues might call for technical solutions that might be better addressed by experts
who possess the appropriate knowledge or training127.
Deliberation  is  no  panacea  for  public  administration.  Fung  (2006)  notes  that  if
deliberation is overvalued then it might lead to exaggerated (or false) expectations. The
policy  process  is  complex  and  involves  a  great  number  of  actors,  interests  and
institutions. He argues that ‘actual decision-making processes are frequently composed
of multiple points’ and suggests that policy outcomes are the product of  ‘interactions
among  multiple  arenas,  such  as  planning  agencies,  stakeholder  negotiations,
neighbourhood councils, and public hearing’ (Fung, 2006, p. 67). Thus, deliberation is
only one component of a large, intricate and complex process that comprises a multitude
of policy actors and organizations. Because deliberation is likely to influence a small
part of the policy process, its ability to shape decision-making should not be overstated. 
Another aspect that undermines the power of deliberation to fulfil the expectations of its
proponents is the passive attitude of participants. As a rule, participants tend to stay
quiet  and  behave  like  silent  spectators.  When  participants  fail  to  engage,  their
preferences and concerns are not publicly expressed, and there is hardly any possible
127 Apparently this seems to be the most common situation since ‘most policies and decisions
are determined not through aggregation or deliberation but through the technical expertise of
officials  whose  training  and  professional  specialization  suits  them  to  solve  particular
problems’ (Fung, 2006, p. 69). 
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way to influence the decisions made by the government128. The deliberative process is
paralysed129 when participants are apathetic or disinterested. 
However, these are not the only limitations of DPA. As shown next, it might indeed be
the  case  that  deliberation  strengthens  the  very  enemy  it  attempts  to  eliminate:
bureaucracy.
4.5.2 The return of bureaucracy?
A second  set  of  arguments  against  DPA relates  to  the  widespread  dominance  of
bureaucratic organizations in contemporary societies. Despite claims that bureaucratic
behaviour  should be mitigated by more democratic  types  of  administration (Stivers,
2008),  the  institution  of  deliberative  practices  may be  incapable  of  neutralizing  the
power of bureaucratic forces. On the contrary, as an unintended consequence, the shift
to participation and deliberation might even accrue the power of bureaucrats. 
Moynihan  (2003)  emphasizes  the  role  of  public  administrators  in  enabling  or
constraining deliberative practices. In his view, bureaucratic structures are important to
create channels of communication that connect civil society to government. Ultimately,
how much participation is allowed depends (among other factors) on the good will of
bureaucrats who control agenda power. Bureaucratic administration ‘is crucial because
the degree to which managers either create barriers or promote access to participation
forums and public  decisions  will,  in  turn,  shape the costs  and benefits  that  citizens
consider when deciding whether or not to participate’ (Moynihan, 2003, p. 165). His
128 Another problematic dimension of deliberation relates to its outcomes. What happens to the
results of deliberation? Do they become policy? Are they implemented by the government?
Despite theoretical assumptions, deliberation might not be strongly connected with decision-
making. Deliberation does not seem to strongly influence the actual policies defined by the
government (Fung, 2006). For a discussion on ability of public deliberation to promote social
change, see Young (2000).
129 There  are  also  frequent  problems  in  consensus  building.  Fung  (2006)  argues  that  the
difficulty is not so much citizen apathy but the difficulties inherent in reaching agreement,
especially  when  controversial  issues  are  being  discussed  and  negotiated.  Although
deliberative forums are designed for enabling the attainment of consensus, disagreements
seem to be the norm. Consensus is the exception and is seldom reached by the participants.
166
argument is that the role of public administrators should be examined carefully because
they can significantly influence the results of deliberation. 
In his sceptical view of deliberation and participation, Moynihan (2003) contends that in
practice policy analysts, public administrators, public managers, and civil servants are
not  concerned  with  civic  engagement,  being  mostly  focused  on  finding  technical
solutions to problems. Deliberative attitudes are not strong enough to mitigate (let alone
eliminate)  deep-seated  bureaucratic  and  technocratic  practices  that  pervade  policy
institutions and administrative agencies. In spite of the benevolent aims of deliberation,
the prevailing instrumental rationality and bureaucratic insulation will hardly wane and
policies are likely to continue to be decided by an elite of public administrators and
policy analysts. Thus, he contends that ‘the idealistic nature of the goals of participation,
particularly in relation to the yearning for the democratic ideal, explains much of its
appeal’ and that  ‘such ideals are often considered in abstract terms and tend to evoke
affective rather than cognitive response from individuals’ (Moynihan, 2003, p. 168). 
According to him, the romantic and far-fetched vision of deliberation results from an
inaccurate reflection on the role of public administrators and policy analysts. This does
not mean that deliberation cannot work, but that most deliberative scholars provide a
simplified vision that neglects the various complexities involved in the institution of
participatory  practices.  Among  other  problems,  deliberation  can  end  up  being  an
ambiguous and unclear  process  that  fails  to  enable  preference revelation,  consensus
building, and decision-making130.
Moynihan challenges the assumptions of DPA and dismisses the idea that deliberation
can  lead  to  greater  democratic  legitimacy.  In  his  view,  deliberation  produces  little
benefit and may in fact aggravate current problems. Mainly because, he argues, public
participation is likely to reinforce already existing bureaucratic tendencies:  ‘Ironically,
whereas pro-participation arguments reject and seek to constrain bureaucratic power, the
130 Moynihan (2003) also notes that simplistic notions of public participation that disregard the
complexity inherent to the construction of deliberative settings often neglect the operational
details that are required to implement participatory forums. The advocates of deliberation
have often underestimated the logistical difficulties that are required to allow the realization
of public debates. 
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implementation  of  participation  provides  another  venue  where  administrators  are
provided with  discretion  and power’ (Moynihan,  2003,  p.  170).  Thus,  a  paradox is
created: more deliberation requires more bureaucratic organization. 
In his view, more bureaucratic organization is necessary because the responsibility for
defining the rules and procedures of deliberation, timetables and schedules, is typically
entrusted  to  bureaucratic  agencies.  As  a  consequence,  DPA tends  to  strengthen  the
power of bureaucrats  and reinforce the role of public administrators who will  ‘have
substantial power in shaping the participation forum in terms of how much influence to
share  –  which  relates  to  the  level  of  participation  –  and what  groups  or  individual
citizens to involve – which relates to the range of participation’ (Moynihan, 2003, p.
170). 
Instead of dismissing DPA in toto, however, Moynihan is cautious in his verdict. He
proposes  to  avoid  easy  solutions  and  encourage  DPA  theorists  to  develop  more
sophisticated and adequate conceptualizations of deliberation and civic  participation,
which might prove more effective in translating social preferences into political choices.
For him, the institutionalization of deliberative practices has reasserted the power of the
bureaucracy, which retains the authority to set the agenda, define the procedures, and
ultimately choose whether or not to implement the agreements made by the participants.
Although for different reasons, Meier (1997) also calls for an acknowledgement of the
central role played by bureaucracies. Disagreeing with DPA advocates, Meier (1997)
considers  that  the  case  should  be  for  more  bureaucracy and less  democracy.  In  his
opinion,  deliberation  and  civic  participation  are  not  the  correct  medicines  for  the
illnesses that afflict large-scale contemporary societies. He argues that it is mistaken to
ascribe  the  fragility  of  democracy  to  the  dominance  of  a  bureaucratic-technocratic
attitude. The problem lies elsewhere.
According  to  Meier,  governance  problems  stem  from  deficiencies  in  the  electoral
system  and  not  from  dysfunctions  in  the  bureaucratic  organization  of  public
administration. He criticizes the recurrent argument that bureaucracies are the cause of
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dissatisfaction with the political  regime. Writing in the context of the United States,
Meier suggests that ‘zero-base budgeting, management by objectives, program planning
budgeting systems, civil service reform, and reinventing government are all efforts to
convince us that bureaucracy is the problem’ (Meier, 1997, p. 193). The flaw of the
detractors of bureaucracy, he notes, is that few empirical inquiries have demonstrated
that bureaucracies perform badly. 
At  the  heart  of  dysfunctional  political  systems  are  ineffective  electoral  institutions.
Hence, the picture is quite opposite of what is usually portrayed, because bureaucracy
‘is  performing  fairly  well  while  the  electoral  institutions  seem to  be  deteriorating’
(Meier,  1997,  p.  197).  For  him,  the  source  of  contemporary political  dissatisfaction
resides  in  the  electoral  system  that  has  proved  incapable  of  promoting  public
deliberation and civic  participation.  If  the electoral  system worked satisfactorily,  he
argues,  it  would  provide  politicians  with  sufficient  information  about  what  citizens
really expect, and what kind of policies they want. Nevertheless, the configuration of
the electoral system is inadequate to provide guidance on public policy issues. Thus, the
responsibility of formulating policies is transferred to administrative agencies. 
However,  Meier  notes,  the  solution  for  improving governance  is  not  to  overburden
bureaucracy  with  those  tasks  left  unresolved  by  the  electoral  system.  In  his  view,
administrative agencies, which are bureaucratically organized, are inadequate to cope
with issues of political conflict. They operate on a hierarchical basis, through command
and control, which is hardly compatible with demands for growing participation and
civic  engagement  in  public  administration.  For  Meier  (1997),  the  case  is  for  more
bureaucracy, even if at the expense of democracy, not for more deliberation or civic
participation.
This argument should be taken seriously. As Weber (1946) has suggested, bureaucratic
organization is  not  only a type of  administration but also a  form of domination.  In
addition,  it  is  a  feature  of  modernity that  cannot  be easily suppressed because  it  is
anchored in deep-seated social structures (that are linked with the emergence of mass
democracy, on one hand, and the consolidation of capitalism, on the other).
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Therefore, it is worth raising the question of how feasible is the deliberative project in
its endeavour to mitigate bureaucratic forces. In more simplistic versions, it is implied
that deliberative practices can neutralize, if not replace, bureaucratic behaviour. A more
sceptical  view,  however,  suggests  a  more  cautious  approach.  After  all,  how  can
deliberation undermine – and eventually disrupt – bureaucratic structures,  which,  as
Weber  has  argued,  cannot  be  dissociated  from  the  modern  state  and  the  capitalist
system?
There is reason therefore to suspect that the promises of DPA advocates cannot be fully
accomplished. Not only because deliberation might not be able to eliminate bureaucratic
forces, but also because of its inability to improve the quality of decision-making. The
problematic epistemic assumptions of deliberation are the theme of the next section.
4.5.3 The (epistemic) poverty of deliberation
In this  critique of the DPA two important  limitations have already been considered.
First,  that  deliberation  might  not  be  desirable  in  all  circumstances  (hence  being no
panacea as sometimes is implied from the writings of DPA theorists). Second, contrary
to the prediction of its proponents, DPA might propel a re-bureaucratization of public
administration. There is yet a third set of difficulties faced by the deliberative approach,
which is associated with its epistemic assumptions. Here, the considerations of British
political scientist Mark Pennington will be followed.
Pennington (2010) casts doubts over the capacity of public deliberation to generate good
decisions in a context in which: i) most policy issues involve high levels of complexity;
ii) pluralistic societies tend to produce strong disagreement among its members. In his
view, deliberative theorists seem to neglect the ‘massive epistemic’ demands elicited by
complex and controversial policy issues (e.g. health care). If the fundamental purpose of
deliberative procedures is to raise information from the public, Pennington argues, there
is reason to prefer alternative forms of capturing their preferences, such as the market
system. 
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According to Pennington (2010),  the main problem of DPA resides in the cognitive
demands it places on citizens. If citizens were to significantly contribute to the debate of
public problems, they would have to be experts on the policy issues at stake131. This
would require spending hours acquiring relevant information, collecting data, learning
about different policy alternatives. Therefore, given the complexity of policy issues, the
assumption that individuals have something meaningful to say is problematic. Thus, one
should not be surprised to realize the poor empirical results achieved by deliberation132. 
In his examination of the limitations of DPA, Pennington raises four main objections.
The first problem is what he designates as the  ‘fallacy of representation’ (Pennington,
2010, p. 165). Representation is understood to be fallacious when it misrepresents the
real  preferences  of  the  community133.  Because  only fractions  of  the  population  can
attend participatory meetings, decisions taken in deliberative situations can fail to reflect
the general will of society. After all, how to ensure that the opinions of those engaged in
deliberation fully mirror the interests of the entire civil society?
The second problem is related to the capacity of deliberation to capture information.
Pennington (2010) contends that if the aim of deliberation is the revelation of people’s
preferences, then deliberation might be expendable. Information about societal values
and interests are well known. For example, there is little doubt that people would rather
have free education and health. If preferences are already clear, why should deliberative
settings be introduced? Thus, he argues that ‘eliciting information about people’s values
probably does not require deliberative democracy’ (Pennington, 2010, p. 168). In this
131 He exemplifies with the case of health care provision in which participants would not be able
to cope with the ‘massive epistemic problems involved in the complex questions of resource
allocation’ (Pennington, 2010, p. 172). 
132 Pennington (2010) notes that part of the limitation of deliberative practices is behavioural.
Frequently,  within deliberative settings people tend to reproduce dominant  ideas because
they lack the self-confidence to voice their genuine preferences. Instead of authentic public
deliberation envisaged by participatory theorists, empirical evidence suggests otherwise that
‘deliberative groups are  particularly prone  to  faddish behaviour,  where  people  copy and
repeat what they believe is the prevailing wisdom’ (Pennington, 2010, p. 175-6). 
133 The fallacies of representation might distort deliberation in various ways. What happens if
the leader of a community, who is entrusted to voice a set of concerns, changes her mind
during the debates? Does she still represent the community? Thus, if leaders are persuaded
by other viewpoints, they might cease to reflect the visions of the community they represent.
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case, the main goals, aspirations, claims of the population could be provided by other
sources (surveys, think tanks reports, governmental studies, opinion polls) which would
make deliberation redundant.
There  is  yet  a  third  difficulty.  For  Pennington,  there  is  no  reason  to  expect  that
deliberation will generate more just and legitimate policies, as often expected by DPA
theorists. Empirical evidence shows, on the contrary, that deliberation often results in
failed  policies  (Baccaro  and  Papadakis,  2009).  Thus  he  asserts  that  ‘despite  the
dysfunctions of politics, many things do work well. This is because most elements of
modern society do not depend on deliberation’ (Pennington, 2010, p. 169; italics in the
original). In his view, and contrary to what Habermas proposed, the engagement of civil
society in the decision-making process is unlikely to enhance democratic legitimacy. 
A fourth limitation of public deliberation concerns the type of public who chooses to get
involved  in  participatory  forums.  It  is  ironic,  as  Pennington  observes  that  those
individuals who are best suited for deliberative practices are those most likely to avoid
it. Following Mutz (2006), Pennington (2010, p. 181) explains that ‘those who exhibit
the open-mindedness and tolerance for deliberative democracy are precisely the people
who tend to avoid active politics’. On the other hand, those individuals most prone to
political engagement tend to be partisan and can be resistant to negotiate their beliefs
and  values  in  deliberative  processes.  The  fact  that  those  who  possess  the  virtues
required to participate (tolerance, mutual respect and open mind) tend to refrain from it
and those who have entrenched ideological beliefs are more likely to become involved
curtails the ability of deliberative arenas to achieve the hopes of their proponents: to
promote  a  free  and  rational  exchange  of  opinions  capable  of  unleashing  the
communicative potential of civil society. 
Summing  up,  for  Pennington  (2010),  deliberation  faces  a  series  of  obstacles  that
discourage its adoption: i) it makes irrealistic ‘epistemic’ assumptions (that citizens will
have sufficient information to contribute to policy debate); ii) it incurs in distortions of
representation (by presupposing that leaders will necessarily mimic the preferences of
the community); iii) it mistakenly considers that preferences can be revealed through
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public deliberation; iv) it tends to encourage the involvement of individuals who are less
likely to significantly contribute to the debate. In his view, these reasons disavow the
adoption of deliberative procedures in policy-making.
How should we interpret these critiques laid against DPA? It can be suggested that the
recognition of these limitations does not entail that the aims of DPA theorists are not
commendable.  On  the  contrary,  as  this  chapter  has  argued,  DPA theorists  remain
committed to the improvement of democratic legitimacy, which is much needed in times
of apathy and passive citizenship (Jamieson and Fortis, 2012). Moreover, DPA is part of
an on-going policy debate geared to the construction of alternative views that challenge
mainstream technocratic approaches. 
In  favour  of  deliberative  democracy,  it  should  also  be  mentioned  that  more  recent
developments have engaged with the critiques levelled against it. It can be argued that
DPA has shown increasing sensitivity to the importance of taken into account difference
and  dissent,  thus  moderating  stronger  assumptions  centred  around  the  formation  of
consensus as a condition for an effective public deliberation. Much of the literature on
deliberative democracy has moved toward a  ‘softer’ rendering of consensus-building,
thus frequently speaking in terms of  ‘workable agreement’ or  ‘mutual understanding’.
There is therefore a recognition that the pluralistic condition of contemporary liberal
democracies  (and  the  deep  political  divisions  that  usually  accompanies  it)  might
compete  with  –  and  possibly  thwart  –  the  ability  of  deliberative  systems  to  reach
consensus. 
The recent work of deliberative theorist John Dryzek clearly illustrates the willingness
of DPA scholarship to accept that conflictual discourses should be taken seriously. In his
book  Foundations and Frontiers of Deliberative Governance, Dryzek (2010) offers a
discussion  of  the  pillars  of  deliberative  democracy  –  legitimacy,  representation,
communication,  and  consensus.  Particularly  relevant  for  our  purposes  is  Dryzek’s
contention  that  deliberative  systems  in  the  process  of  reaching  collective  decisions
should not only include a multiplicity of discourses, but more importantly enable their
mutual contestation.
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Noteworthy,  he  clarifies  that  deliberative  democracy  no  longer  operates  under  the
assumption that consensus is a primary requirement. ‘The ideal of consensus’, Dryzek
(2010,  p.  35)  notes,  ‘has  long  been  rejected  by  most  deliberative  democrats’.
Furthermore, he explains that ‘consensus was once thought of as the gold standard of
political  legitimacy  in  deliberative  democracy,  especially  by  Habermas  (1996)  and
thinkers influenced by him. The idea of consensus has also been a soft target for critics
of deliberative democracy in a plural society, because it seems so unrealistic when faced
with political conflicts of any depth’ (Dryzek, 2010, p. 15). In his view, deliberative
democracy is  not necessarily committed to  the formation of  consensus,  although he
argues that a meta-consensus134 is necessary so that distinct discourses can legitimately
express their singular preferences, demands, values, and reasons. 
The legitimacy of decisions within deliberative systems, Dryzek argues,  hinges on the
possibility of the ‘democratic contestation of discourses in the public sphere’ (Dryzek,
2010, p. 39). In this case, collective decision-making is deemed legitimate insofar as it
takes into account the multiplicity of discourses relevant to a particular public policy
issue.  The  idea  that  a  plurality  of  discourses  can  contest  each  other  implies  that
deliberative spaces are deemed capable of recognizing – and ultimately of processing –
difference. This point is crucial, and will be discussed in more depth later, because it
raises  the  question  of  whether  deliberative  democracy  is  moving  toward  a  more
agonistic interpretation of the political system. As will be argued in the next chapter, an
agonistic approach is a promising theoretical framework that offers an alternative view
to  deliberative  democracy,  and  whose  main  thrust  is  the  assertion  that  antagonism,
hegemony and power are at the roots of our understanding of the political.
134 He conceptualizes meta-consensus as ‘agreement on the legitimacy of contested values, on
the  validity  of  disputed  judgements,  on  the  acceptability  and  structure  of  competing
preferences, and on the applicability of contested discourses’ (Dryzek, 2010, p. 15).
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Chapter 5 – Agonistic Policy Model (APM): the ontological underpinnings
5.1 Introduction
Previous chapters have explored four important paradigms in the policy field. Particular
attention  has  been  paid  to  the  relationship  between  politics  and  administration.  As
discussed in  chapters  1  and 2,  both EPA (Earlier  Public  Administration)  and Policy
Analysis (PA) assumed the possibility of drawing sharp boundaries between the two
spheres, though in different ways. On one hand, EPA was grounded on the notion that
politics and administration constituted two independent fields of theory and practice
(the so-called politics-administration dichotomy). On the other hand, PA proposed to
harness  the  latest  scientific  developments  to  improve  the  policy  decision-making
process  and  enshrined  expertise  as  the  supreme  value  of  public  policy.  Although
developed in different contexts, both EPA and PA shared two important commonalities:
i) they privileged the technical side of the policy process; ii) they either ignored the
political dimension or construed it in depreciative ways. 
The  problematic  one-sidedness  of  both  EPA and PA was  subsequently critiqued  by
theorists who warned about the consequences of emphasizing expertise at the expense
of  politics.  In  the case  of  EPA, a  growing awareness  of  the inextricability between
politics  and administration seriously contributed to undermine the dichotomy,  which
was  no  longer  perceived  as  a  workable  concept.  As  Dahl  (1947)  had  shown,  in
pluralistic societies both the means (administration) and the ends (politics) were open to
discussion and debate. Not only that, he also asserted that the definition of the means to
be employed and the ends to be achieved could not be entirely dissociated. A similar
view was also espoused by Dwight Waldo, who depicted the dichotomy as nothing more
than  a  ‘myth’.  The  empirical  observation  of  how  public  administration  works  in
practice, according to Waldo (1948), revealed that the purported separation between the
spheres of administration and politics was simply not true. On the contrary, politics and
administration could hardly be divorced since administrators both decided and executed
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public policies. The Wilsonian dream of a completely de-politicized – which in fact
meant ‘sanitized’ – public administration has proven to be no more than an illusion.
In the case of PA, on the other hand, a similar critique emerged. It cautioned against
reducing policy-making to  mathematical  modelling or  to  purely logical  or  technical
procedures.  Critics  pointed  to  the  problematic  exclusion  of  politics  from the  policy
process.  Lindblom  (1959)  argued  that  PA failed  to  depict  how  the  policy  process
actually evolved in the practice of administrative life. He noted that contrary to PA’s
assumptions,  policy-makers  did  not  employ  scientific  criteria  and  highly  advanced
methodological  tools  to  decide  which  policies  to  implement.  Along  similar  lines,
Majone (1989)  also  contended  that  the  policy process  could  not  be  portrayed  as  a
scientific endeavour centred on expertise. This view, Majone claimed, was only partially
accurate. In order to offer a complete and consistent depiction of the policy process, it
was imperative to introduce the political dimension. This task has been carried out by
Wildavsky (1979) in his influential book Speaking Truth to Power in which he argued
that the policy process was about not only technique and expertise but primarily about
politics. Unless the political dimension was taken into account, the policy process would
inevitably fail to mirror the actual practice of administrative settings.
Public administration and policy studies have since their inception as theoretical fields
grappled with the question of what to do with politics. Their  initial  assumption that
administration and public policy could be theorized exclusively in technical, apolitical
ways has proven to be problematic. The recognition that the political dimension was
part  and  parcel  of  the  administrative  life  led  to  a  long  period  of  soul-searching  in
administrative and policy scholarship and propelled the emergence of new theoretical
movements. This thesis has given salience to two of these paradigms – the Interpretive
Public Policy (IPP) and the Deliberative Policy Approach (DPA) – which attempted to
incorporate the political dimension in the policy process. Instead of emphasizing the
technical dimension, IPP and DPA shifted the focus to the wider social and political
aspects of the policy process. 
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In the case of IPP, political and administrative aspects were considered as interwoven
phenomena.  By  emphasising  the  importance  of  language  to  understand  the  policy
process, IPP strived to offer an integrative view of politics and administration. Politics,
as Frank Fischer noted, was ‘at the very roots’ of the policy process. Along similar lines,
other IPP theorists – such as Donald Schön and Martin Rein – defined policy-making as
a contested process in which facts and values, means and ends, were hard to dissociate.
In  spite  of  this  commendable  attention  to  politics,  however,  IPP  has  important
limitations.  In  particular,  it  has  not  been  able  to  demonstrate  how  its  analytical
framework can be made ‘practical’. Although innovative, IPP remains confined to the
theoretical level. Policy practitioners can employ it as a heuristic device, but not as a set
of operational procedures capable of guiding empirical implementation. 
On the other hand, DPA has developed a policy orientation that is not only theoretical
but also applicable. In fact as several deliberative experiments have illustrated – the
Citizens Summit in Washington D.C., the Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre, the
Decentralized Planning in Kerala, among many others – DPA has proved amenable to
institutionalization. Drawing upon the philosophical insights of Jürgen Habermas, DPA
offers an analytical framework that also purports to encompass political factors. As DPA
theorists,  such  as  Camilla  Stivers  and  Tina  Nabatchi,  have  indicated,  public
administration is a site in which both political and administrative tasks are performed. 
In  line  with  Habermas’s  ideas,  DPA scholars  advocate  a  shift  from  technical  to
deliberative  forms  of  governance.  Their  remedy,  however,  is  problematic.  As critics
have pointed out, the adoption of DPA encourages the reinforcement of bureaucratic
practices  (which was the very ‘enemy’ to  be defeated)  and is  plagued by epistemic
difficulties  that  severely  compromise  its  applicability.  Therefore,  in  spite  of  a
commendable  recognition  of  the  centrality  of  politics  in  public  policy  and
administration, DPA also does not provide a convenient solution.
The cases of IPP and DPA evince that policy scholarship has seriously attempted to
depart  from  the  apolitical  visions  of  public  policy  and  administration,  typical  of
disjunctive paradigms such EPA and PA. In spite of their concern with politics, their
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frameworks  face  important  shortcomings.  This  thesis  proposes  to  delineate  an
alternative approach – the Agonistic Policy Model (APM) – whose analytical potential
remains largely unexplored in policy studies. 
In order to actualize this task, the Agonistic Policy Model (APM) is discussed in two
stages.  Initially,  in  this  chapter  5,  the  thesis  concentrates  on  the  discussion  of  the
ontological  underpinnings  of  APM.  Particular  attention  is  paid  to  the  meaning  of
agonistic  theory  and  how  it  differs  from  other  approaches.  In  addition,  a  detailed
examination of Mouffe’s agonistic vision – which provides the theoretical foundations
of  APM – is  also undertaken.  This  inroad in  agonistic  political  theory is  crucial  to
clarify the ontological assumptions that ground APM. Arguably, it will make explicit
how the  ‘philosophical’ principles that buttress APM are radically distinct from those
that  inform  alternative  policy  paradigms,  particularly  the  interpretive  and  the
deliberative. The investigation of the (more empirical) policy features of APM will be
dealt in chapter 6.
In  terms  of  structure,  this  chapter  is  organized  in  three  parts.  Section  5.2  defines
agonism and indicates how it contrasts with other theoretical frameworks. Section 5.3
summarizes Mouffe’s agonistic theory and differentiates it  from competing forms of
agonism.  Section  5.4  draws  from an empirical  illustration  taken  from the  Brazilian
health sector to illustrate how the conflictual dynamic of the social process, described
by Mouffe’s agonistic theory, unfolds in practice.
5.2 The agonistic theory
Agonism, like many other strands of political thought, is a broad  ‘church’. There is a
long list of names of political theorists who are frequently associated with the agonistic
approach135.  In  order  to  clearly  understand  the  version  proposed  by  Mouffe  it  is
convenient to start by discussing what agonism is (section 5.2.1) and to indicate which
135  An  agonistic  view  of  politics  has  been  delineated  by  various  scholars  and  has  been
frequently associated  with  theorists  such  as  Chantal  Mouffe,  William Connolly,  Jacques
Rancière, Alain Badiou, Bonnie Honig, David Owen, James Tully. This list is not exhaustive
and occasionally there is controversy about who it should include (Hannah Arendt is one
case in point).
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variants  exist  (section 5.2.2).  This initial  inroad in  the agonistic  theory will  help to
clarify not only the chief claims of the agonistic theory but also to distinguish it from
alternative approaches (e.g. the aggregative and the deliberative).
5.2.1 What is agonism?
Agonistic  theories  are  inscribed  within  a  post-foundationalist  tradition  of  political
thought (Torfing, 1999). They are part of an intellectual orientation that rejects the idea
that the social  realm is  anchored in solid  and permanent foundations.  Instead,  post-
foundationalism posits the contingency and instability of every foundation. The main
idea embraced by post-foundationalist theorists is the ‘assumption of the impossibility
of a final ground’ (Marchart, 2007, p. 2).
Post-foundationalist theorizing usually presupposes what Lefort (1988) has called the
‘dissolution of the markers of certainty’, that is, the absence of stable foundations to
ground social action. It departs from foundationalism, which claims that society and
politics  are  firmly  established  upon  immutable  principles.  An  illustration  of  a
foundational approach can be found in the concept of ‘homus economicus’ formulated
by English liberal thinker John Stuart Mill in the nineteenth century. He defined the
‘homus economicus’ as an abstract individual whose primary aim is the maximization of
self-satisfaction. This concept of agency, which has been influential not only in political
liberalism but also in the field of public policy136, is predicated on the assumption that
individual behaviour is well-known and can be defined a priori (hence independent of
empirical considerations). In this sense, the notion of ‘homus economicus’ operates as a
foundational concept, which is universal and invariable.
In  contrast,  from a  post-foundationalist  perspective,  the  political  subject  is  usually
interpreted as lacking a substantive and unified essence, being instead conceived as the
bearer of multiple,  fragmented,  and contingent  identities.  The political  subject  is  no
longer  depicted  as  having  a  fixed  identity  (or  acting  according  to  fixed  criterion).
136 The  concept  of  agency proposed  by Mill  (1844)  underpins  for  instance  rational  choice
theories that construe individuals are maximizers of their self-benefit. See for instance the
classical work by Buchanan and Tullock (1962).
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Instead, it is construed as a ‘lack’ that constantly defers the moment of stabilization and
closure (Marchart, 2007, p. 6; Torfing, 1999, p. 57). 
Post-foundational theories emphasize the construction of the social as ‘negativity’. This
means  that  the  process  of  the  actualization  of  the  social  is  always  partial  and
incomplete. The lack of a metaphysical essence that would provide a firm, stable ground
entails that the social can only constitute itself in contingent, precarious forms that are
inevitably open to transformation.  Thus, agonistic theories interpret political action as
situated within an indeterminate, open terrain characterized by the impossibility of a
final ground. As such, political agency takes place in a context in which competing
grounds vie for anchorage. This ‘ontological undecidability’ means that the foundations
have to be continuously constructed and re-constructed without ever achieving a full,
definitive stabilization. 
For agonistic thinkers, this impossibility of a final grounding of the social leads to a
distinction  between  the  ‘political’ and  politics.  Whereas  the  ‘political’ refers  to  an
ontological dimension, politics relates to the more empirical (or ontical) everyday side
of political activity. The  ‘political’ represents the  ‘moment whose full actualization is
always  postponed  and  yet  always  achieved  partially’ (Marchart,  2007,  p.  6)  and
contrasts  with  politics,  which is  associated with the concrete  set  of  institutions  and
practices of the political system. This distinction, which will also be found in the work
of Chantal Mouffe, is crucial for agonistic theorists and will be later developed in more
detail. 
Although this section seems removed from the primary concerns of this chapter – to
delineate  the  ontological  underpinnings  of  an  APM  –  it  is  nevertheless  important
because it  helps to situate agonism within the broader  landscape of political  theory.
Mapping agonism, however,  requires also discerning its  main versions,  which is  the
topic of the next section.
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5.2.2 Competing variants of agonism
Evidently, there is no settled, definitive ‘cartography’ of agonism. An interesting way of
understanding  its  different  versions  can  be  found  in  Wingenbach  (2011).  Although
peculiar137, his analysis is useful because his main concern is whether agonistic ideas
can lead to institutional politics. He divides agonism in two large groups, depending on
whether institutionalization is admitted or not. The first group – agonistic pluralism –
accepts the possibility of actualizing agonism through institutions, whereas the second –
agonism of resistance – argues that institutions need to be dismantled if agonistic ideas
are to be carried out138. It is convenient to explain the difference between the two groups
in more detail.
The first group, of agonistic pluralists, acknowledges that contemporary societies have
given  rise  to  a  multiplicity  of  political  identities  whose  coexistence  requires  the
development of institutions capable of accommodating their difference. In the view of
agonistic pluralists, even if these differences are very pronounced they can be processed
within democratic boundaries. Thus, they are not hostile to political institutions. On the
contrary, they understand politics as the terrain where these fundamental, deep-seated
differences can be legitimately expressed and negotiated. For agonistic pluralists, like
Chantal  Mouffe  and  William  Connolly,  the  pluralistic  character  of  contemporary
societies,  marked by the emergence of groups with irreconcilable political  demands,
does not necessarily degenerate into violence or destruction of the democratic regime.
Thus,  agonistic  pluralists  advocate  the  feasibility  of  dealing  with  difference  within
democratic  settings  and  accept  the  possibility  of  actualizing  agonism  through
institutional practices (Mouffe, 2000; Connolly, 2002).
Differently,  theorists  classified  under  the  cluster  ‘agonism  of  resistance’  are  not
sympathetic to the idea of institutionalizing agonism. Suspicious of any form of power,
137 Wingenbach (2011) presents a classification of agonism that is  ‘elastic’ since he includes
authors like Badiou and Rancière who are not typically depicted as agonistic theorists. In
spite of his heterodox choice of authors,  his  analysis  remains  nonetheless  useful  for the
purposes of this chapter. 
138 According to Wingenbach (2011) advocates of pluralistic agonism include Mouffe, Connolly
and Tully,  while proponents of agonism of resistance are illustrated by theorists  such as
Rancière, Badiou, Owen and Honig. 
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they conceive  of  democracy not  in  terms  of  a  permanent  set  of  institutions,  but  as
occasional breaks of the constituted order. They construe institutions ‘as the repositories
of  power,  expressing  and  maintaining  sedimented  relations  of  domination’
(Wingenbach, 2011, p. xv-xvi). Therefore, those scholars that advance an agonism of
resistance (e.g.  Rancière,  1999; Badiou, 2005) tend to show disaffection not only to
institutions  but  also  to  the  democratic  regime,  which  they  interpret  as  irreversibly
tainted by forms of oppression and subordination. In their view, if difference is to be
genuinely processed,  the social  and institutional  orders  need to  be disrupted so that
political identities can be re-articulated in new terms.
The  distinction  between  agonistic  pluralism  and  agonism  of  resistance  is  helpful
because it classifies agonistic theorists according to their acceptance of institutions. It is
then clear that for the purposes of this thesis – the development of an APM – the ideas
advanced by those who advocate agonism of resistance cannot offer guidance. Hence,
insights have to be taken from within the variant of agonistic pluralism139. Moreover, as
the  next  section  will  discuss,  the  work  of  Chantal  Mouffe  can  provide  a  suitable
framework for guiding the delineation of an APM. In particular, her ideas will help to
demonstrate  that  ‘attempts  to  solve  administrative  problems  in  isolation  from  the
structure of power and purpose in the polity are bound to prove illusory’ (Long, 1949, p.
264). The next section discusses the specifics of Mouffe’s agonism.
5.3 Mouffe’s agonism
The work of Chantal Mouffe has received significant attention in political science140.
Her agonistic framework has been applied in a variety of intellectual domains, ranging
from law to cultural studies, and from environmental analysis to international relations.
The  popularity  of  Mouffe’s  ideas  stems  perhaps  from  her  ability  to  articulate
emancipatory concerns without having to forsake the gains of liberal democracy (such
139 Although it should be mentioned that even for agonistic pluralists, there is no consensus on
how to institutionalize agonism. As Wingenbach (2011, p. ii) noted, ‘It is difficult to find a
careful articulation of the institutions and practices that might constitute agonistic democracy
in action’.
140 Mouffe’s agonism has inspired a significant scholarship in political science. See for instance
the interesting studies of Smith (1998), Torfing (1999) and Tormey (2010).
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as human rights and rule of law)141. In times when the Left is struggling to reconstruct
its  political  agenda,  after  the  demise  of  the  socialist  experience,  Mouffe’s  agonism
provides  an  original  theoretical  standpoint  that  contributes  not  only  to  challenge
conventional  ways  of  understanding  politics  but  also  opens  up  new and  promising
alternative venues through which more fair, equitable and democratic aspirations can be
actualized. 
Mouffe’s ideas offer a valuable analytical source that deserves to be studied seriously
because  it  not  only  elucidates  the  very  meaning  of  the  political  (to  which  it  was
primarily intended), but also yields enlightening insights into the  policy process. Her
vision of conflict as the  leitmotiv of political life when adapted to the level of public
policy reveals the limitations of other policy paradigms – particularly Policy Analysis
(PA) and the Deliberative Policy Approach (DPA) – and instigates new visions of the
policy  process.  An  Agonistic  Policy  Model  (APM),  whose  policy  features  will  be
discussed in chapter 6, represents an original interpretation of the policy process that
indicates new theoretical and practical possibilities not acknowledged by conventional
models of public policy.
To be sure, the adaptation of Mouffe’s agonism to the context of policy-making can also
contribute to bridge an important gap in the public policy literature since agonistic ideas
remain confined to the realms of political theory and political philosophy. The lack of an
agonistic model in the fields of public policy and administration seems puzzling taking
into account the fact that the emergence of analytical frameworks in political theory has
often influenced the direction of policy theorizing142. This is the case with aggregative
and deliberative theories that represent the two most important analytical frameworks in
political theory. 
141 Democratic politics should be concerned with the radicalization, not elimination, of liberal
democratic  values  and institutions.  In  her  preface to  Dimensions of  Radical  Democracy,
Mouffe discusses the tasks of the Left in contemporary politics and argues that it should not
aim at a  ‘rejection of liberal democracy and its replacement by a completely new political
form of society,  as the traditional  idea of revolution entailed,  but  a radicalization of the
modern democratic tradition’ (Mouffe, 1992, p. 1).
142 Bäcklund and Mäntysalo (2010) in their study of public planning in Finland suggest  the
importance  of  political  theory  and  public  policy scholarship  moving  in  tandem so  that
developments in the latter do not neglect advancements in the former.
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In the field of public policy, the aggregative model has motivated different intellectual
trends  such as  the  public  choice  school  (e.g.  Downs,  1957;  Buchanan and Tullock,
1962; Olson, 1965; Niskanen, 1971) or political economy approaches (e.g. Dahl and
Lindblom, 1953; Lindblom, 1965; Lindblom, 1968). For its turn, the deliberative view
in political theory has inspired a large literature (e.g. Stivers, 2008; Nabatchi, 2010) that
has gained increasing recognition in recent years. However, the agonistic orientation,
which has already been entrenched in political philosophy and political theory, has not
yet been adapted to the field of public policy and administration. The absence of an
agonistic  strand  in  public  policy  is  surprising  given  that  agonism  is  a  powerful
analytical tool to think about politics, policy and administration.
There is yet another reason for opting to ground the Agonistic Policy Model (APM) on
Mouffe’s agonism. In the fields of public policy and administration, there is a strong
tradition  of  disaffection  with  politics,  which  has  conventionally  been  construed
pejoratively (quite often taken as a by-word for undesirable practices such as corruption,
fraud or manipulation). In contrast to expertise that has quite often been hailed as an
exemplar  of  rationality  and  efficiency,  politics  has  been  demoted  as  a  sphere  of
arbitrariness  and  uncertainty.  Mouffe’s  agonism  provides  a  sound  standpoint  to
challenge  the  contemporary  disenchantment  with  politics.  Her  celebration  of  the
political,  which  in  her  view  is  constitutive  and  therefore  cannot  be  overcome  or
transcended, sheds new light in public policy scholarship and helps to bring politics
back to the limelight. In addition, as she wrote in her first book Gramsci and Marxist
Theory, politics should not be conceptualized as one of the various compartments of the
social but as a ‘dimension which is present in all fields of human activity’ (Mouffe,
1979, p. 201). As the analysis of her work will hopefully make clear, the fields of public
policy  and  administration,  which  have  endeavoured  to  develop  politics-free
frameworks, can certainly learn meaningful lessons from agonistic ideas.
In terms of structure, the explication of Mouffe’s agonism is divided in five parts. The
first  comments  on  her  post-foundational  assumptions  and  helps  to  clarify  how  she
conceptualizes political identity. The second part discusses her definition of the political
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and draws attention to the centrality of antagonism and conflict. The third part focuses
on her interpretation of democratic politics. The fourth presents Mouffe’s critique of
post-political  theories  of  democracy  while  the  fifth  part  examines  how  Mouffe’s
framework differs from the variant developed by other agonistic theorists.
5.3.1  Mouffe’s  conceptualization  of  the  political  subject:  the  process  of  identity
formation
In order to grasp how Mouffe articulates her vision of agonism, it is convenient to start
by pointing out her (epistemological) allegiance to post-foundationalism. As mentioned
earlier, a commitment to the post-foundationalist view is a common trace of agonistic
theories.  Just  to  recap:  the  key claim advanced  by post-foundationalism lies  in  the
impossibility of establishing a final, permanent ground to anchor the social. It does not
argue that grounds do not exist (which is the position of another intellectual orientation,
anti-foundationalism), but that grounds are always contingent, temporary,  partial  and
precarious. 
The post-foundationalist view asserts the ‘open and incomplete character of any social
totality’ and rejects essentialist and fixed renderings of the subject. Subscribing to this
post-foundationalist approach, Mouffe contends that ‘to be capable of thinking politics
today’ metaphysical foundations should be replaced by a new theorization of political
subjectivity. In her view, the very notion of political agency has to be re-examined in
order to reflect the absence of a final ground. Thus, a post-foundationalist depiction of
the  political  agent  needs  to  consider  that  the  lack  of  an  essence  requires  some
‘mechanism’ of stabilization and closure, which for Mouffe will be found in the process
of hegemonic articulation. She notes that
it is indispensable to develop a theory of the subject as a decentred, detotalized
agent, a subject constructed at the point of intersection of a multiplicity of subject
positions between which there exists no a priori or necessary relation and whose
articulation is the result of hegemonic practices. Consequently, no identity is ever
definitively  established,  there  always  being  a  certain  degree  of  openness  and
ambiguity in the way the different subject positions are articulated (Mouffe, 1993,
p. 12).
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Her post-foundationalist vision of the subject has been initially formulated in the book
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, co-authored with Ernesto Laclau, and published in
1985. Drawing on Gramscian political concepts, Laclau and Mouffe (2001) argued that
the  post-foundational  character  of  the  social  formation  ascribed  an  especial  role  to
hegemony and antagonism. Their contention that  ‘the openness and indeterminacy of
the social, which gives a primary and founding character to negativity and antagonism,
and assures the existence of articulatory and hegemonic practices’ (Laclau and Mouffe,
2001, p. 145) shows clearly their refusal of a foundational conceptualization of society,
which would depict political agents in terms of unitary, pre-given identities (such as the
‘homus economicus’ discussed earlier). Since these identities are no longer conceived as
fixed substances, they have to be created and maintained, though always in contingent
and provisional ways. 
The process of identity formation is the result of articulatory practices that stabilize the
social,  hence  momentarily  suspending  its  contingency.  Among  the  important
contributions offered by Laclau and Mouffe – both in their joint and separate work – is
the idea that the construction of collective identities is itself a political phenomenon.
‘Since any political order is the expression of a hegemony’, Mouffe (2000, p. 99) writes,
‘political  practice  cannot  be  envisaged  as  simply  representing  the  interests  of
preconstituted identities, but as constituting those identities themselves in a precarious
and always vulnerable terrain’. 
According to Mouffe, an agonistic approach presupposes a reconceptualization of the
subject, which is not construed as a recipient of rights ‘but as the articulation of an
ensemble  of  subject  positions,  constructed  within  specific  discourses  and  always
precariously  and  temporarily  sutured  at  the  intersection  of  those  subject  positions’
(Mouffe, 1992, p. 10). Different from the unitary view of the subject, forwarded by
liberal theories, in Mouffe’s agonistic approach, the subject is defined as fragmented. 
For Mouffe, identities are not substantialized essences (e.g. the worker, the woman, the
citizen) that can be defined a priori. Instead, they are constituted in a relational process,
in which the  ‘self’ is affirmed against an  ‘other’. Borrowing the concept from Henry
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Staten (in his  analysis  of the work of French philosopher  Jacques Derrida),  Mouffe
suggests that in order to be articulated, identities require a ‘constitutive outside’, that is,
an external point of reference. As Mouffe (1993, p. 2) emphasizes, ‘every identity is the
affirmation of a difference’.
An agonistic approach operates according to a relational interpretation of the subject: to
be  ‘A’ signifies not to be  ‘non-A’. In this view, that radically departs from the liberal
perspective,  political identities are construed not as fixed and stable essences but as
contingent and provisional articulations (which can always be dis-articulated and then
re-articulated in different terms). Identities, Mouffe (2000, p. 56) contends, are formed
‘through multiple and competing forms of identifications’. And, as discussed next, this
post-foundational interpretation of identity formation has significant consequences for
her definition of the political.
5.3.2 Mouffe’s definition of the political
In her work, Mouffe has formulated an original concept of the political, which deserves
to be analysed in detail.  In her view, the political should not be envisaged as ‘mere
technical issues to be solved by experts’, which is the implicit notion that informs much
of  contemporary  political  theory.  In  contrast,  ‘properly  political  questions  always
involve decisions which require us to make a choice between conflicting alternatives’
(Mouffe, 2005, p. 10). In her analysis, the political is about power and antagonism. This
section now attempts  to  clarify how Mouffe defines  the political  and draws special
attention to her emphasis on conflictuality as its defining feature.
As  intimated  earlier,  in  Mouffe’s  view,  a  proper  conceptualization  of  the  political
depends upon an understanding of how political identities are formed. First of all, it is
necessary to examine what are the implications of interpreting identities in a relational
way. Remarkably, she points to the relevance of retrieving the contribution of German
theorist Carl Schmitt (whose role in Mouffe’s agonism will be analysed later).
Once we have understood that every identity is relational and that the affirmation
of a difference is a precondition for the existence of any identity, i.e. the perception
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of something  ‘other’ which constitutes its  ‘exterior’, we are, I think, in a better
position  to  understand  Schmitt’s  point  about  the  ever  present  possibility  of
antagonism and to see how a social relation can become the breeding ground for
antagonism (Mouffe, 2005, p. 15).
Mouffe’s understanding of subjectivity is made particularly explicit when she argues
that in the political terrain collective identities always assume the configuration of a
‘we’ that is opposed to a ‘they’. Because identities are conceptualized relationally, it is
only the existence of a ‘they’ that enables the constitution of a ‘we’. The affirmation of
difference (or ‘otherness’) is the condition of possibility for the emergence of collective
identities. 
Mouffe notes that in contemporary pluralistic societies, political identities can assume a
variety of forms: some more conflictive than others. In her view, what is important is
that the possibility of this interaction becoming antagonistic cannot be ruled out. ‘The
we/they  distinction,  which  is  the  condition  of  possibility  of  formation  of  political
identities’, she writes, ‘can always become the locus of antagonism’ (Mouffe, 2005, p.
16).  Moreover,  it  is  precisely  this  antagonistic  potential  (that  underpins  collective
identities) which is at the roots of the political. 
The notion of antagonism is central to Mouffe’s agonism. According to her, collective
identities  ‘can  always  become  transformed  into  antagonistic  relations.  Antagonism,
then, can never be eliminated and it constitutes an ever-present possibility in politics.’
(Mouffe, 2000, p. 13). The role played by antagonism in politics is indispensable to
grasp the meaning of the political  in Mouffe’s theorizing.  Drawing on Carl  Schmitt
(1976),  Mouffe  defines  the  political  as  that  dimension  in  which  the  ‘we’/  ‘they’
interaction takes the shape of a friend-enemy relation type. She notes that collective
identities can be interpreted in terms of friend-enemy ‘when the other, who was until
then considered only under the mode of difference, begins to be perceived as negating
our identity, as putting in question our very existence’ (Mouffe, 1993, p. 3).
This  conceptualization  of  the  political  as  a  friend-enemy relation  has  an  important
implication  that  differentiates  Mouffe’s  political  theory  from  other  intellectual
traditions.  Instead  of  envisaging the  political  as  a  set  of  institutions  or  in  terms  of
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particular regime types, which are recurrent views in liberal political theory, Mouffe
envisages  the  political  in  ‘constitutive’ terms  interpreting  it  ‘as  a  dimension  that  is
inherent to every human society and that determines our very ontological condition’
(Mouffe, 1993, p. 3). 
In order to differentiate between the ‘constitutive’ (or ontological) dimension from its
empirical forms (or the ontic) dimension Mouffe proposes to distinguish between ‘the
political’ and ‘politics’. In her own words:
‘The political’ refers to this dimension of antagonism which can take many forms
and can emerge in diverse social  relations.  It  is  a dimension that  can never be
eradicated.  ‘Politics’,  on  the  other  hand,  refers  to  the  ensemble  of  practices,
discourses and institutions that seeks to establish a certain order and to organize
human coexistence in conditions which are always potentially conflicting,  since
they are affected by the dimension of the ‘political’ (Mouffe, 2013, p. 3). 
This distinction is useful for many reasons. It shows that the political has a constitutive
nature that needs to be distinguished from its empirical actualizations. In addition, as
examined next, it also reveals the task of democratic politics.
5.3.3 The task of democratic politics: from antagonism to agonism
Earlier,  it  has  been  indicated  that  from  a  Mouffian  perspective  the  potential  of
antagonism  inherent  in  social  relations  can  never  be  suppressed.  Because  of  its
constitutive condition, antagonism cannot be eradicated. It can nonetheless be ‘handled’
in different ways by political institutions. As Mouffe explains, the ‘aim of democratic
politics is to transform antagonism into agonism’ (Mouffe, 2000, p. 103; italics in the
original).  In  order  to  formulate  the  task  of  politics,  Mouffe  undertakes  an  original
reinterpretation of Schmitt’s friend-enemy understanding of the political.
Although concurring with Schmitt  that ‘antagonisms can take many forms, and it is
illusory to believe that they could be ever eliminated’,  she nevertheless takes a step
further and argues that democratic institutions ‘if properly understood, can shape the
element of hostility in a way that defuses its potential’ (Mouffe, 1993, p. 5). In fact, the
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main  task  of  democratic  politics  should  be  located  in  the  attempt  to  moderate
antagonism. As she puts it,
One of the main tasks for democratic politics consists  in defusing the potential
antagonism that exists in social relations. If we accept that this cannot be done by
transcending the we/they relation, but only by constructing it in a different way,
then  the  following question  arises:  what  could  constitute  a  ‘tamed’ relation  of
antagonism, what form of we/they would it imply? (Mouffe, 2005, p. 19).
The  solution,  Mouffe  notes,  lies  in  the  possibility  of  converting  antagonism  into
agonism. What does this mean? Reinterpreting Schmitt’s friend-enemy understanding of
the political, Mouffe argues that although antagonism is an ever present possibility that
can never be fully eliminated, the political community can organize itself in ways that
domesticate  it.  The  idea  that  the  friend-enemy  distinction  can  lead  to  different
modalities of conflict has not been foreseen by Schmitt. In his view, the conflictuality
proper to the political could manifest itself only as antagonistic confrontation. Mouffe,
however, envisages the possibility that the conflictual condition of the political shifts
into an agonistic struggle.  In her  analysis  with and against  Schmitt,  she revisits  his
friend-enemy  distinction  and  re-describes  it  as  a  contestation  between  adversaries
(Mouffe, 1999b). 
When the ‘we/they’ relation takes an agonistic form, then different political opponents
do not regard each other as enemies but as adversaries. ‘Antagonism is struggle between
enemies,  while  agonism is  struggle  between  adversaries’,  Mouffe  (2000,  p.  102-3)
clarifies.  While  enemies  want  to  destroy  each  other,  adversaries  recognize  the
legitimacy of their interlocutors and they never question their right to express their ideas
and desires. 
Conflict, in order to be accepted as legitimate, needs to take a form that does not
destroy the political association. This means that some kind of common bond must
exist between the parties in conflict, so that they will not treat their opponents as
enemies to be eradicated, seeing their demands as illegitimate, which is precisely
what happens with the antagonistic friend/enemy relation (Mouffe, 2005, p. 20).
An agonistic type of relation consists of an interaction between ‘we/they’ in which the
legitimacy of the opponent is not put in question. It is accepted that their differences
cannot  be  finally  resolved  through  rational  means.  The  conflict  persists  –  since
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antagonism is not suppressed – but it does not degenerate into violence. In fact, the
propensity  to  violence  is  defused  precisely  because  dissent  is  acknowledged  as
legitimate. 
It  is  convenient  to  distinguish  Mouffe’s  conceptualization  of  adversaries  from  the
definition offered by other political traditions. Mouffe’s adversary is certainly distinct
from the rational, self-interested subject assumed by liberal views of political theory. In
contrast, Mouffe disavows the idea that a rational solution that overcomes conflict can
be  instantiated.  The liberal  adversary is  in  fact  a  competitor  in  pursuit  of  personal
interests that do not confront the prevailing forms of hegemony. 
I would like to stress that the notion of the ‘adversary’ that I am introducing needs
to be distinguished sharply from the understanding of that term that we find in
liberal discourse because in my understanding the presence of antagonism is not
eliminated but ‘sublimated’ so to speak. The field of politics is for them a neutral
terrain in which different groups compete to occupy the positions of power; their
objective is merely to dislodge others in order to occupy their place. They do not
put into question the dominant hegemony and there is no attempt at profoundly
transforming  the  relations  of  power.  It  is  merely  a  competition  among  elites
(Mouffe, 2005, p. 21).
In this sense, the type of agonistic struggle delineated by Mouffe goes much deeper (in
terms of social  structures and power relations) than the sort of political contestation
advocated by liberal pluralists (such as Arthur Bentley or Charles Lindblom). Instead of
envisaging  politics  as  competition  among  self-interested  groups,  Mouffe’s  agonism
involves  questioning  the  power  structures  of  society.  Whereas  liberal  theorists  are
primarily concerned with how conflicts can be negotiated and superseded by rational
means,  Mouffe’s  framework  emphasizes  the  impotency  of  rationality  to  eliminate
antagonism.
What is at stake in the agonistic struggle, on the contrary, is the very configuration
of  power  relations  around which  a  given  society is  structured:  it  is  a  struggle
between opposing hegemonic projects which can never be reconciled rationally.
The antagonistic dimension is  always present,  it  is a real  confrontation but one
which is played out under conditions regulated by a set of democratic procedures
by the adversaries (Mouffe, 2005, p. 21).
For Mouffe, the agonistic struggle is the ‘condition of existence’ of modern democracy.
From her perspective, the task of democratic politics in its contemporary form resides in
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the  construction of  institutional  channels  that  enable the  manifestation  of  dissenting
views. When democracy is structured in a way that acknowledges the ineradicability of
antagonism and hence provides mechanisms for the legitimate expression of adversarial
political  positions,  then  dissenting  voices  do  not  need  to  resort  to  authoritarian  or
violent strategies to exteriorize their ideas and desires (Mouffe, 1999a). Democracy, she
argues, should allow disagreement, which is not only ‘legitimate but also necessary’. 
Conceptualized  in  these  agonistic  terms,  democracy  is  much  more  than  a  set  of
procedures or an ensemble of institutions geared to the protection of individual rights. It
is otherwise the legitimate space in which adversaries play out their struggle. Different
from  the  liberal  view  that  frequently  associates  democracy  with  rule  of  law  and
constitutional principles, a Mouffian agonistic interpretation depicts democratic politics
as the terrain where different hegemonic articulations are disputed. ‘Adversaries fight
against each other because they want their interpretation of the principles to become
hegemonic’ (Mouffe, 2013, p. 7). 
The indication of democratic success therefore should be measured not by the degree of
consensus attained among political competitors, as liberal theories of democracy would
suggest,  but  by  the  existence  of  legitimate  channels  through  which  opponents  can
manifest  their  dissent.  In  addition,  as  Mouffe  has  frequently  warned,  a  vision  of
democracy that  is  consistent  with  agonism requires  relinquishing the  expectation of
reaching a final consensus that would reconcile the plurality of political perspectives
existing in a given society. On the contrary, as she explains in her book The Democratic
Paradox,  ‘we have to  accept  that  every consensus exists  as a temporary result  of a
provisional hegemony, as a stabilization of power, and that it always entails some form
of exclusion’ (Mouffe, 2000, p. 104). 
The notion that rational consensus could be achieved through democratic institutions is
not only problematic, Mouffe suggests, but it is dangerous to the vitality of democracy
itself. When dissenting groups are denied democratic channels to express their claims,
they are encouraged to employ non-democratic means to vent out their disagreement.
‘When the agonistic dynamic of the pluralist system is hindered because of a lack of
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democratic identities that one could identify’, Mouffe (1999a, p. 756) writes, ‘there is a
risk that this will multiply confrontations over essentialist identities and non-negotiable
moral values’. Such an antagonistic confrontation would take the shape of a friend-
enemy relation, in which ‘we’/‘they’ regard each other as enemies to be destroyed. This
is  precisely  what  democratic  politics  should  avoid.  Although  the  potential  hostility
inherent  to  social  relations  cannot  be  finally  suppressed,  it  can  nevertheless  be
organized in less confrontational ways. When their conflict is envisaged as agonistic
struggles  opponents  no  longer  perceive  each  other  as  enemies,  but  as  legitimate
adversaries. 
Mouffe’s agonistic framework points out to the centrality of antagonism and conflict, on
one hand, and to the pervasive condition of the political, on the other. Recent – and
influential  – trends in political  theory,  however,  have asserted the advent  of a post-
political age in which both conflict and politics have become obsolete. As discussed
next, by refusing to accept the hegemonic condition of the political order and denying
the constitutive character of the political, the emergence of post-political theories might
endanger the future of democracy.
5.3.4 Contemporary political theory and the evasion of the political
An  agonistic  approach  of  a  Mouffian  persuasion  also  plays  an  important  role  in
clarifying the limitations of political theories that assert a post-political vision. Mouffe
(2005)  takes  issue  with  the  idea  that  the  political  is  now in  decline  and  has  been
superseded  by  post-traditional  forms  of  collective  engagement.  She  criticizes  in
particular the post-political theories developed by Beck (1997) and Giddens (1998) in
their contention that the partisan, divisive lines that have characterized modern societies
– left and right being the most distinguished form of political division – have become
outdated with the advent of a logic of individualization, in which collective solidarities
have lost their centrality. 
According  to  post-political  theorists,  the  traditional  sites  of  politics  –  parliaments,
political parties, trade unions – have been replaced by a type of ‘identity politics’ in
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which individuals enjoy stronger forms of autonomy and are charged with the task of
continuously redefining their selves in contexts marked by uncertainty and instability.
The  rise  of  the  individual  and  the  demise  of  the  collective,  from the  post-political
perspective,  entails  that  democratic  practices  no  longer  depend  on  politics  to  be
expanded and deepened. Democratization has ceased to depend on politics as a result of
the growing relevance of the role played by the individual. ‘To put it in a nutshell –
individualization is becoming the social structure of the second modernity itself ’ (Beck
and Beck-Gernsheim, 2001, p. xxii; italics in the original). The focus is placed – not on
traditional  political  institutions  that  have  become  obsolete  –  but  on  issues  of  self-
actualization and personal choice. 
Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2001) contrasts the ‘old value system, [in which] the self
always had to be subordinated to patterns collectivity’ and points to the emergence of a
new set of values that foster cooperation and altruism. ‘Thinking of oneself and living
for others’,  they argue,  ‘once considered a contradiction in terms, is  revealed as an
internal connection’ (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2001, p. 28). They also note that the
rise of individualism in the second modernity, which superseded the collective values
that predominated in the first modernity, is consequential for political life.
In  their  view,  processes  of  individualization  pose  a  challenge  to  the  way in  which
representative  democracy  has  been  traditionally  structured.  Because  now  only  the
individual  matters  –  what  they refer  to  as  the  ‘living  your  own life  society’ –  the
capacity of representative institutions to  aggregate the preferences of a  multitude of
individuals is put into question, particularly because the integrative function performed
by ‘traditional’ political organizations such as parties and trade unions has waned. 
The main problem that currently confronts representative politics stems from the fact
that ‘it is not possible to admit more and more actors in the game of political power,
because that would multiply the arenas of conflict without increasing the potential for
consensus’ (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2001, p. 28). This situation creates a process in
which society is increasingly politicized without a correspondent ‘activation of politics’.
The  multiplication  of  conflict,  which  no  longer  can  be  channelled  and  processed
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through political  institutions,  implies that the construction of agreement has become
harder.  Hence,  they  conclude  that  individualization  is  ‘eroding  the  social-structural
conditions for political consensus, which until now has made possible collective action’
(Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2001, p. 29). 
The main problem with the type of analysis developed by post-political advocates, as
the vision sponsored by Beck and Beck-Gernsheim clearly illustrates, is their inability
to recognize the adversarial condition of politics (Mouffe, 2005). In essence, they fail to
acknowledge  that  the  political  order  necessarily  entails  a  hegemonic  condition  that
cannot be overcome even in the advent of a post-industrial modernity. Moreover, by
being oblivious  to  the  ‘hegemonic  dimension of  politics’,  their  analyses  tend to  be
dismissive of the role played by power in social relations. Thus, emphasis is given, not
to how dominant hegemonic projects can be challenged, but on how the individual can
best actualize his/her existential concerns.
Conversely,  from an agonistic perspective,  power and hegemony are at  the heart  of
democratic politics, whose main concern is the ‘profound transformation of the existing
power relations and the establishment of a new hegemony’ (Mouffe, 2005, p. 52). From
an agonistic view, it becomes clear that this shift from the collective to the individual
promotes a strong (and perverse) depoliticization. By refusing to engage with the crucial
dimensions  of  power  and  hegemony,  post-political  theorizing  ends  up  evading  the
political itself. Such a post-political view that dislocates the emphasis away from power
and  hegemony is  inscribed  within  a  broader  tendency –  dominant  in  contemporary
political theory – that refuses to accept the constitutive character of antagonism and
conflict. Such neglect is consequential for both the theory and practice of democracy:
Whatever theorists might dream, conflicts and antagonisms will always be with us
and instead  of  producing  theories  about  the  world  as  it  should  be,  democratic
theorists  would  be  more  helpful  if  they  would  dedicate  their  attention  to  the
different  ways in which this dimension of conflictuality could be played out  in
ways compatible with a democratic order (Mouffe, 2002, p. 616).
When envisaged from an agonistic perspective, which recognizes that every political
order is hegemonic, the task of democratic politics is conceptualized in very different
terms.  As  Mouffe  (2000,  p.  100)  argues  ‘if  we  accept  that  relations  of  power  are
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constitutive of the social, then the main question for democratic politics is not how to
eliminate power but how to constitute forms of power more compatible with democratic
values’.  Power is  at  the centre  of democratic  concerns  and in  spite  of  the fact  that
contemporary  political-economic  phenomena  (particularly  globalization)  have  given
rise to important societal changes the aim of deepening democracy cannot ignore it. 
Therefore, for Mouffe, the task of democratic politics lies obviously not in the attempt
to eradicate power but instead in the creation of mechanisms that enable a legitimate
confrontation  among  hegemonic  articulations.  This  adversarial  view  of  politics  is
completely  at  odds  with  the  post-political  vision  that  asserts  the  primacy  of  an
individualistic logic that is supposed to have undermined the importance of collective
identities. From a post-political perspective, and as a consequence of their inability to
envisage  politics  in  collective  and  adversarial  terms,  power  relations  cannot  be
challenged, which raises serious doubts about the democratic vision it advances. 
The  critique  of  post-political  ideas  is  helpful  to  elucidate  the  tenets  of  Mouffe’s
agonistic approach. It also makes clear the crucial role played by hegemony, power and
antagonism in  her  view of  politics.  Just  to  be sure:  ‘Politics,  especially  democratic
politics, can never overcome conflict and division’ (Mouffe, 1996, p. 8). It should be
mentioned that other versions of agonism have also grappled with the concepts of power
and antagonism that  are  central  to  Mouffe’s  approach.  Therefore,  in  order  to  avoid
confusion, it is convenient to single out Mouffe’s vision by clarifying how it differs
from the versions advocated by other agonistic theorists. 
5.3.5 Mouffe’s agonism: a comparative perspective
As mentioned earlier, however, other political theorists have emphasized similar views
that conflict-driven agonism can invigorate democratic practices. Obviously, Mouffe’s
agonism is  not  the  only one that  emphasizes  the  potential  of  antagonism in human
associations  and  proposes  to  alleviate  its  propensity  to  hostility  through  legitimate
democratic struggle.  In her book  Agonistics Mouffe (2013) clarifies the specificity of
her version of agonism by explaining how it differs from those espoused by Hannah
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Arendt, Bonnie Honing and William Connolly143. Mouffe’s critique, which is helpful to
elucidate  her  framework,  deserves  a  very  succinct  examination.  These  different
conceptions of agonism are now briefly examined.
According to Mouffe, the problem of the agonism developed by Hannah Arendt is that it
constitutes  ‘agonism  without  antagonism’.  For  Mouffe,  although  Arendt  correctly
ascribes priority to the pluralistic character of political  life, she nevertheless fails to
recognize that this plurality is also the source of irreconcilable division that will lead to
the emergence of antagonistic political identities. The problem, therefore, with Arendt’s
version of agonism144 is that it cannot take into account ‘the hegemonic nature of every
form of consensus and the ineradicability of antagonism’ (Mouffe, 2013, p. 11). 
A Mouffian conceptualization of agonism is also different from that proposed by Bonnie
Honig, who conceptualizes the process of identity formation as perpetually open to the
challenge  posed  by  dissenting  views.  According  to  Mouffe  (2013,  p.  11),  such  a
description of agonism is correct but gives insufficient attention to ‘the crucial role of
hegemonic articulations’. In this case, the problem with Honig’s (1993) agonism is the
lack of explanation of how new political identities and institutions can overcome those
that are being supplanted.
Mouffe also questions the type of agonism proposed by William Connolly. Although she
accepts  Connolly’s idea  that  democracy has  to  be radicalised so that  new forms of
engagement (that are reflexive of a deep respect for the difference) can emerge, she
nonetheless raises doubts about the extent to which his version of agonism recognizes
the  ineradicability  of  antagonism.  Thus,  she  asks  if  within  Connolly’s  agonistic
framework  ‘can  all  antagonisms  be  transformed  into  agonisms  and  all  positions  be
accepted as legitimate and accommodated within the agonistic struggle?’ Her answer is
that Connolly’s insistence on the deep respect for the other, while enabling a strong
143 A cautious note is  important  here.  By suggesting that  Mouffe’s agonistic theory is  more
suitable for grounding an Agonistic Policy Model (APM), it is not presumed that the versions
of agonism developed by Arendt, Honig and Connolly cannot be helpful to offer important
insights into policy-making. 
144 Moreover, as Mouffe (2013) mentions, Arendt favours an interpretation of the political –
based on the notion of ‘inter-subjective agreement’ – that ultimately accepts that the task of
the political is the formation of rational consensus. 
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form of pluralism, blinds him to the need of establishing boundaries between different
forms  of  conflict  and  disagreement  (for  instance,  respect  for  the  other  might  be
impossible when stronger forms of conflict that threaten the very foundations of social
coexistence are at stake). Similar to the case of Arendt, Mouffe (2013, p. 14) notes,
Connolly fails to properly acknowledge the role of antagonism in pluralistic societies.
The versions of agonism developed by Arendt, Honig and Connolly have the merit of
emphasizing the centrality of pluralism in contemporary democratic societies. However,
they  do  not  sufficiently  stress  the  crucial  dimensions  of  the  ‘political’,  that  is,  the
ineradicability of antagonism, neither the process of hegemonic articulations. Although
there  is  nothing  wrong with  the  celebration  of  pluralism –  with  its  implications  of
tolerance for difference – politics cannot avoid the ‘moment of decision’ or ‘closure’, in
which  a  hegemonic  configuration  is  formed.  Hence,  the  specificity  of  Mouffe’s
approach lies in its recognition of the ‘constitutive character of social division and the
impossibility  of  a  final  reconciliation’ that  is  not  properly  acknowledged  by  other
agonistic theorists such as Arendt, Bonig and Connolly. 
This  section  has  examined the  tenets  of  the  agonistic  version  proposed by Chantal
Mouffe.  It  has drawn attention to her interpretation of the political  as a constitutive
dimension of human coexistence that cannot be transcended or overcome. It has also
examined  how she  envisages  the  task  of  democratic  politics  as  the  construction  of
institutional structures that contribute to domesticate the antagonistic character inherent
to social relations. When this antagonism is converted from a fight between enemies
into  a  struggle  between  adversaries  then  hostility  is  defused  and  conflict  can  be
‘handled’ in ways that do not menace the existence of democratic values, institutions
and practices.
Mouffe’s agonistic framework, which has been developed at the political level, has an
explanatory (and emancipatory) potential at the policy level that has not yet been fully
appreciated. It is high time policy studies and public administration theory engage with
Mouffe’s agonism and tap into her insightful analyses. In what follows next, the chapter
will discuss how her central concepts – hegemony, antagonism and power – are not only
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abstract  categories  of  political  philosophy but  useful  and applicable  analytical  tools
capable of dissecting how the social process evolves. 
5.4 Hegemony, antagonism and power: an examination of the Brazilian health sector
through agonistic lenses
Arguably, Mouffe’s ideas are enriching not only in the field of political theory, to which
they were originally addressed, but also to the domain of public policy. Her framework
can offer innovative ways of envisaging policy-making,  and hence contribute to the
development  of  policy  scholarship.  As  the  previous  chapters  of  this  thesis  have
emphasized, the problem of how to properly integrate politics and administration has
represented a challenge to the field of public policy since its inception.  In addition,
although important paradigms – such as IPP and DPA – have had an explicit concern
with the integration of politics and administration their solutions remain problematic. In
contrast,  an  APM  can  arguably  offer  an  adequate  way  of  welding  politics  and
administration  together  without  incurring  the  limitations  of  IPP  and  DPA.  Before
attempting to delineate the policy features of the agonistic model,  which is the task
undertaken  in  chapter  6,  it  is  worth  showing  how  the  dynamic  of  conflict  and
antagonism  central  to  the  agonistic  project  unfolds  in  practice.  In  this  section,  an
empirical  illustration  drawn from the  Brazilian  health  sector  helps  to  envisage  how
Mouffe’s key concepts – hegemony, antagonism and power – are heuristic devices that
enlighten the logic of the social process. This is an initial step in showing how Mouffe’s
ideas are a valuable framework to understand how public policy effectively operates in
practice. As a preliminary discussion, it will also pave the way for the full articulation of
agonistic concepts within the policy process, which will be discussed in detail in the
next chapter.
5.4.1 Conflict and antagonism: an empirical illustration of Mouffe’s agonism
From a Mouffian perspective, as argued earlier, the centre of analysis gravitates around
the notion of conflict. Her vision of agonism is essentially a framework for coping with
the  conflictual  character  of  contemporary  pluralistic  societies.  ‘What  is  important’,
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Mouffe  (2013,  p.  7)  contends,  ‘is  that  conflict  does  not  take  the  form  of  an
“antagonism”  (struggle  between  enemies)  but  the  form  of  an  “agonism”  (struggle
between  adversaries)’.  So  how  do  agonistic  concepts  help  to  illuminate  the
understanding of the social process? 
Consider  for  a  moment  the  policy configuration – which is  typical  of  many policy
domains – of the health system in Brazil.
The modern health system in Brazil dates back to the formation of the Single Health
System (SHS) in the early 1990s. It was the result of a wide recognition that the existing
health structures were inadequate to deal with the complex demands of a country with a
large population.  Thus,  the creation of the SHS aimed primarily at  the provision of
health care to which every Brazilian citizen had become entitled with the promulgation
of the Federal Constitution of 1988. Notably, the Constitution asserted the principle of
universality, which meant that health care become enshrined as a constitutional right of
every individual regardless of ability to pay. The Constitution also determined that the
design  of  the  health  system  should  be  decentralized  with  the  localities  wielding
significant political power to decide which policies to implement (although the broad
guidelines of the health policy remained under the purview of the federal government).
Another important novelty of the new Brazilian health system was the institution of
participatory decision-making arenas (health councils) in which societal groups – health
care  consumers  and  providers,  professional  associations,  trade  unions,  social
movements,  interest  groups,  politicians,  experts,  policy researchers,  civil  servants  –
could potentially influence the definition of health policies.
The health policy system in Brazil helps to visualize how the policy process carries out
an ineradicable antagonistic potential that nevertheless can be processed ‘agonistically’.
In  addition,  the  health  sector  exemplifies  how  the  policy  process  is  not  a  purely
technical exercise of policy-making in which experts can ‘reveal’ optimal and impartial
solutions  that  are  capable  of  satisfying  the  collective  interests  of  the  whole  polity.
‘Political  questions  are  not  mere  technical  issues  to  be  solved  by experts’,  Mouffe
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(2013,  p.  3)  argues,  since  ‘proper  political  questions  always  involve  decisions  that
require making a choice between conflicting alternatives’. 
In contrast to the technical view, the health system shows that the policy process is a
contentious, conflict-ridden, power-laden arena in which different policy actors vie for
the privilege of having their policy project internalized by the government. Far from a
neutral, expertise-led activity, the policy process is fundamentally a political terrain in
which differences are asserted and negotiated. This conflictual condition of the health
policy process has been a pervasive feature (Marques and Mendes, 2007) with multiple
groups advocating different – and irreconcilable – solutions. 
An illustration – which is also typical of many other policy sectors – can be found in the
examination of the conflictual projects advanced by policy protagonists. In the case of
the Brazilian health system, for instance, three main groups have articulated their policy
projects in antagonistic ways: social  actors, state actors, market actors. Social actors
have engaged in participatory deliberative forums (particularly the health councils) in
order to voice their demands and influence policy formulation at the grass-roots level;
state actors have strived to preserve their privileged position in the policy process from
the  encroachment  of  other  groups;  market  actors  have  systematically  developed
strategies so secure, and whenever possible to expand, their profits as health providers
(Cortes, 2009). 
The  conflictual  character  of  the  relation  between  the  groups  –  the  ‘we’ and  ‘they’
distinction – is one of the key features of the health policy domain. The preferences
advanced by the policy actors (and in fact their identities) are not reconcilable since the
satisfaction  of  their  demands  cannot  be  attained simultaneously.  Empowering social
actors, for instance, would imply dis-empowering state actors. Alternatively, meeting
the  demands  of  the  social  actors  would  require  challenging  the  design  of  health
provision thus thwarting the position of market actors. These situations point to the fact
that their differences are constitutive, and though they can be negotiated in different
ways, they cannot be eradicated. ‘In a modern democratic society there can be no longer
a substantive unity and division must be recognized as constitutive’ (Mouffe, 1993, p.
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147). The existence of incompatible demands suggests that the health policy process
should be characterized as a political arena. 
Although the purpose here is evidently not to tell the history of Brazilian public health
sector, it is worth nonetheless emphasizing that the politicized character of Brazilian
health policy is not a new phenomenon145. In the 1970s, the health policy agenda was
roughly hegemonized by a collusion between federal agencies (Ministry of Health) and
pharmaceutical companies, which led to the formation of an urban-based, profit-driven
policy design. This hegemony was challenged in the 1980s and 1990s by the emergence
of counter-hegemonic policy movements that advocated a structural reform of the health
policy system. 
The current design of the health system, which largely represents the assertion of a
particular  policy-political  project,  harks  back  to  the  promulgation  of  the  Federal
Constitution  (1988),  which  redefined  the  overall  design  of  the  health  system  and
established the new regulatory framework146. In spite of the more ‘democratic’ features,
the health model is still state-centric147, not society-led148. Some scholars (e.g. Campos,
2007; Cortes, 2009; Paim, 2013) have characterized it as a much-politicized arena, in
145 The developments  of  the  health  system in  Brazil  are  based  on  Cortes  (2009).  See  also
Gerschman and Santos (2006).
146 The Constitution of 1988 emphasized the principles of universalization, decentralization and
civic participation. The role of policy formulation was transferred to two key bodies, the
National  Health  Council  in  articulation  with  the  Tripartite  Commission  (composed  of
representatives  from  the  federal,  state  and  municipal  levels).  The  task  of  policy
implementation was ascribed to the nascent Single Health System (SHS), the operational
body of  the  health  system (similar  to  the  NHS in  England,  from which  it  drew partial
inspiration).
147 The adoption of the state-centric model, however, came at the price of (partially) meeting
corporate  demands  from the  (powerful)  medical  lobbies  and  market  interests  of  private
companies. For instance, private hospitals were not nationalized and health users can still opt
for  the  private  health  market.  Not  only  that,  the  Single  Health  System  operates  in
‘partnership’ with private hospitals thus operating as a consumer of health services provided
by the private  market.  The combination  of  public  and private  arrangements  generated  a
problematic fragmentation of the health system (Campos, 2007). The hybrid character of the
system elicits  dysfunctional  consequences  that  negatively affect  the  efficiency of  health
service delivery. 
148 Gerschman and Santos (2006) argue that in spite of the principles of decentralization (that
transfers responsibilities to states and municipalities) and participation (that empowers civil
society)  the health policy decision-making still  preserves a state-centric condition with a
privileged role played by the federal level (Ministry of Health).
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which  (powerful)  interest  groups  –  insurance  companies,  pharmaceutical  lobbies,
medical  professional  associations,  trade  unions  –  vie  for  the  affirmation  of  their
projects. 
To simplify a complex picture, the health system has been interpreted as a blend of
strong bureaucratic power (wielded by federal agencies under the Ministry of Health)
and highly influential market forces (evinced by a significant participation of the private
health  insurance  companies  and  providers)  with  the  exclusion  of  an  aspiring  civil
society that is eager to influence the decision-making process (Cortes, 2009). What does
the current hegemonic configuration tell us about the health policy domain in particular,
and the broader policy-making system in general? 
From this brief description, it becomes clear that policy dynamics is fundamentally a
political issue in which multiple actors compete for primacy. In order to understand the
policy process, according to the agonistic approach advocated here, the researcher is
encouraged to examine – not books on policy optimization as the mainstream literature
would suggest – but the configuration of hegemonic forces and how they are articulated.
When depicted through agonistic lenses, the policy process has a fundamental political
character. Politics, policy, and administration are inextricably linked. Although technical
aspects  (e.g.  finance,  budgeting,  organizational  charts,  legal  frames)  are  certainly
relevant,  the political dimension is crucial to explain how a particular policy design
comes to be established. As Geva-May and Maslove (2000, p.  717) contended,  ‘the
debates and processes of change to health care systems must be seen as arenas in which
political  power contests  occur’.  In  their  study of  the  health  reforms in Canada and
Israel,  they  have  concluded  that  ‘developments  in  health  care  systems  are  the  by-
product  of  power  struggles  between  political  forces’ (2000,  p.  718).  Their  point  is
precisely what  an  APM suggests,  that  ‘political  struggles  determine  policy making’
(2000, p. 719).
Before closing this section, and taking the example of the Brazilian health system in
consideration, it is worth considering how APM departs from other policy paradigms.
An APM, by emphasizing the impossibility of effacing the conflictive character of the
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policy  process,  rejects  the  claims  advanced  by  both  Policy  Analysis  (PA)  and  the
Deliberative Policy Approach (DPA). In relation to PA, an agonistic perspective makes
clear that there is no formula capable of finding a neutral solution to policy problems.
Returning to the example of the health case, it becomes clear that even if the design of
health policies were entrusted to experts, what they could provide is only a point of
view that can always be challenged. Expertise cannot abolish the conflictive nature of
the policy process. In fact, important  ‘scientific’ journals such as  Cadernos de Saúde
Pública [Reports of Public Health] have dedicated significant attention to the Brazilian
health model.  The dialogue between experts  reveals expressive disagreement among
different scientific communities and the existence of die-hard controversies. In a recent
issue that assessed the quarter-century since the creation of the Single Health System
(SHS),  experts  were  still  unsure  about  which  path  to  follow.  Although the  medical
academic community concurred on the prevalence of a perverse yet significant health
care deficit there was no consensus on the ideal solution to prescribe (Scheffer, 2013). 
An APM, predicated on the notion of the ineradicability of antagonism between policy
actors, also departs widely from the DPA, explored in chapter 4. Contrary to the idea
that rational debate can lead to the identification of a consensual point of view capable
of reflecting the diversity of the interests of the participants, APM contends that their
differences cannot be overcome since they are constitutive. Although the aim of DPA is
laudable, it does not place the focus on the essence of the policy process: power. Again,
‘political struggles determine policy making’. Coming back to the Brazilian health case,
it  is  possible  to  clearly  discern  how  policy  actors  embraced  different  –  and
irreconcilable  – projects.  Social  actors  pushed for  the  strengthening of  participatory
forums so that  they could express their  demands to  the health  authorities and exert
control  over  the  government;  state  actors  were  primarily  concerned  with  the
preservation of their central role in policy formulation, hence attempting to foreclose
power-sharing agendas; finally, market actors ‘infiltrated’ federal agencies and other key
decision-making bodies in order to expand their market opportunities and increase their
profitability. Thus, how can deliberative procedures hammer out the construction of a
consensual view when the policy projects at stake mutually negate each other? APM
calls attention to the dimension of power in the policy process. As Long (1949, p. 257)
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presciently wrote,  ‘the lifeblood of administration is power’. The power dimension is
not  properly  captured  by  DPA,  and  its  attempt  to  ‘dissolve’ it  through  rational
deliberation eventually contributes to undermine its explanatory credentials.
APM  contends  that  the  policy  process  is  fundamentally  a  power  dispute  among
competing  policy  projects.  It  brings  to  the  fore  the  idea  that  although  power  and
antagonism cannot be eradicated, they can be negotiated in different ways. In fact, as
discussed next, this is the task of democratic politics.
5.4.2 From antagonism to agonism: the task of democratic politics and public policy
How to prevent the antagonistic vision of the policy process held by different policy
actors from degenerating into non-democratic forms of negotiation? How to ensure that
policy differences are processed democratically,  that is,  through existing institutional
structures  and  procedures?  As  previously  discussed,  from  a  Mouffian  agonistic
perspective, there is reason to suggest that even deep-seated conflict – for instance the
intractable controversies alluded by Schön and Rein (1995) – can be negotiated within
democratic boundaries, that is, through policy institutions.
There is a growing recognition among scholars that the task of dealing with political
conflict has been transferred from the electoral system to public administration (Meier,
1997; Nabatchi, 2010). This issue has been explored in chapter 4, but it is worth briefly
recalling the key argument. The idea was that although electoral and parliamentarian
institutions were originally designed to convert the preferences of the electorate into
well-defined, clear and unambiguous public policies, they have not been able to execute
their assignments. ‘Since the parties have failed to discuss issues, mobilize majorities in
their terms, and create a working political consensus on measures to be carried out, the
task is left for others – most prominently the agencies concerned’ (Long, 1949, p. 258).
Consequently,  public  administration  ended  up  both  formulating  and  implementing
public policies. 
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In practical terms, the assumption of the task of dealing with conflict has meant not only
that  public  administration enacted political  and administrative roles,  but  also that  it
became a guardian of democratic practices and values (Stivers, 2008; Nabatchi, 2010).
Through public policies, democracy is ‘engineered’. The question, however, is how well
prepared  is  public  administration  to  cope  with  (deep-seated)  conflict?  Although
deliberative scholars have correctly recognized that public administration is a political
actor (entrusted with the responsibility of handling conflict), the solution they provide is
inadequate. 
As chapter 4 has shown, they propose to transform public administration in deliberative
policy settings so that conflict can be negotiated and eventually overcome (Nabatchi,
2010). From our agonistic standpoint, this solution is highly problematic since it fails to
acknowledge that  the  conflictual  condition  of  the  policy process  is  constitutive  and
hence ineradicable. Moreover, contra deliberative policy scholars, an APM posits that
conflicts  should  be  celebrated,  not  deplored.  Conflict  –  not  consensus  –  is  what
energizes democracy149.
Returning to the domain of health policies, scholars also diverge on the significance of
conflict.  While  Campos  (2007)  insinuates  that  there  is  room  for  building  a  wide
consensual  view  that  integrates  a  vast  range  of  disparate  interests,  Paim  (2013)
considers  that  the  hegemonic  configuration  of  the  health  system  precludes  the
achievement  of  consensus  since  multiple  policy  actors  hold  irreconcilable  policy-
political projects150. 
149 It is nonetheless important to acknowledge that contemporary deliberative scholarship has
refrained from advocating consensus as the chief purpose of deliberation. For Gutmann and
Thompson (2004), for instance, the crucial aspect is the justification of decisions, that is,
reasons  underlying  decisions  must  be  publicly  expressed.  Thus,  the  ultimate  aim  of
deliberate democracy is  not  to reach consensus,  but  to produce justifiable decisions.  For
more recent developments on deliberative democracy, see also Warren and Pearse (2008) and
Fishkin (2009).
150 According to Campos (2007), there are two projects operating within the Brazilian health
system:  the state-centric and the liberal-privatist.  On one hand,  the state-centric tradition
emphasizes free public health care for all regardless of capacity to pay (this is the model
dominant for example in the UK). On the other hand, there is a liberal-privatist vision that
construes health care as a private affair that should be dealt individually with the state setting
only the  regulatory framework that  defines  the  rights  and  responsibilities  of  health  care
providers (as happens in the United States). 
206
Campos (2007) raises the pertinent  question of  whether  the definition of  a national
health model could be the result of a wide agreement among different segments of the
Brazilian population. Could the disparate interests of multiple segments – poor citizens,
urban middle class, health workers association, health managers, health care providers,
social movements, political parties – be welded together in a comprehensive consensus?
From an agonistic perspective, the answer is negative because any form of consensus
would deny the  ‘political’,  that  is,  it  would be blind to  the fact  that  antagonism is
constitutive  and  hence  ineradicable.  Along  similar  lines,  Paim  (2013)  emphasizes
conflict and antagonism as the key to develop the health system. 
Progressive forces of civil society should rely on the bearers of antithesis who tend
to  emerge  from  social  movements  that  identify  distinct  antagonism  in
contemporary society. Special attention [should be paid] to the plurality of voices
in a democratic society would enable the constitution of individual and collective
political subjects, who would question the subversion of social rights, inequities in
health and relations of subordination, hence triggering new political actions (Paim,
2013, p. 1934; own translation).
The evolution of the Brazilian health system, as noted earlier, has witnessed a series of
struggles that opposed groups with contentious policy-political agendas (Marques and
Mendes, 2007). Since the 1970s, for instance, the Public Health Reform community
(known as sanitaristas) have laboured in favour of universal health care system based
on state-led provision. They were highly influential in the design of the health model
enshrined  by  the  Brazilian  Federal  Constitution  (enacted  in  1988)  and  in  the
implementation  of  the  Single  Health  System.  In  spite  of  their  support  for  a
comprehensive  health  care  system –  construed  as  part  of  an  ideology of  inclusion,
freedom  and  democracy151 –  the  configuration  of  the  policy  model  has  remained
fragmented (and for many dysfunctional). 
151 The construction  of  an  efficient,  responsive,  accountable  health  system,  sensitive  to  the
preferences of the polity, is frequently portrayed as a token of democratic progress (Shimizu
et  al,  2013).  ‘SHS  [Single  Health  System]  project  is  a  policy  for  the  construction  of
democracy that aims to enhance the public sphere, social inclusion and inequality reduction’
(Paim and Teixeira, 2007, p. 1820; own translation). In the contemporary Brazilian context,
health and democracy are twin processes and permeate each other (Fleury, 1997). 
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The literature on Brazilian health policy tends to indicate the existence of (an uneasy
and  constantly challenged)  consensus  that  brings  together  state  actors  (who control
significant  organizational,  decisional  and  financial  resources)  and  market  actors
(notably private hospitals and health insurance companies) but which excludes societal
groups  (particularly  health  care  consumers  and  health  workers)  (Cortes,  2009).
Currently,  there  is  a  strong  debate  whether  deliberative  practices  can  challenge  the
power of state and market actors. Evidence152 indicates that in spite of health councils
being a constitutional obligation, power has not yet flowed to civil society (Shimizu et
al, 2013). 
From an agonistic point of view, there are two important lessons to be retained. The first
concerns the ineradicability of conflict. The conflictive condition of the health system is
not contingent, but constitutive. Although the configuration may change (for instance by
constructing an alliance between state and societal actors through deliberative forums),
the  existence  of  conflict  cannot  be  superseded.  This  is  why  the  expectation  of  a
consensual  view  (Campos,  2007)  is  deceptive.  Any  consensus  will  be  a  partial
representation  of  the  social  and  therefore  unable  to  mirror  the  totality  of  societal
preferences.  ‘Every consensus exists’, Mouffe (2000, p. 104) argues,  ‘as a temporary
result of a provisional hegemony, as a stabilization of power, and that it always entails
some form of exclusion’. 
There is yet a second reason to suspect consensus. Because it precludes opposition, it
has perverse democratic implications. A vibrant democracy, as Mouffe has persistently
warned, depends on the creation of institutional channels for the expression of dissent
and disagreement. This is why the task of democratic politics is to allow for agonistic
confrontation, that is, contestation between adversaries. A contest between adversaries
who mutually respect the legitimacy of their opponent to make explicit their differences.
The emphasis is certainly not on consensus, which is pernicious for democratic vitality.
152 In their discussion of participatory forums (health councils), Shimizu et al (2013) contend
that power is still concentrated in the government. In most cases, health councillors (that
represent civil society) get acquainted with the decisions being made, but they do not get
involved in the process of decision-making. In their view, the organizational logic of health
councils – bureaucratic and centralized – does not contribute to empower civil society. In
their view, health consumers lack voice and influence, hence remaining passive spectators. 
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‘The illusion of consensus’, Mouffe (1993, p. 5) argues, is  ‘fatal for democracy and
should therefore be abandoned’. 
This  discussion  has  broader  implications  for  the  fields  of  public  policy  and
administration, which frequently accept that the aim of policy-making is the production
of consensus. An APM cautions against the emphasis on consensus and encourages the
field to acknowledge the benefits of dissent. This claim might seem counter-intuitive at
first. However, when read against the background of its democratic implications it can
make  sense.  Through  agonistic  lenses,  ‘conflicts  are  not  seen  as  disturbances  that
unfortunately cannot be eliminated, as empirical impediments that render impossible the
full realization of harmony’ (Mouffe, 1993, p. 8). 
Therefore, politics and policy-making should be committed not to the establishment of
consensus, but to the instigation of agonistic struggle. Only when contending policy
actors  construe  their  opponents  as  adversaries  –  and  not  as  enemies  –  can  the
antagonistic  potential  of  their  difference  be  defused.  This  is  the  test  of  democratic
strength: to what extent can the policy process enable conflict, dissent and disagreement
to emerge. 
Evidently, the agonistic emphasis on dissent does not mean that policy-making should
be discouraged from taking decisions.  In her writings,  Mouffe has clarified that her
vindication of conflict  does not imply a thorough rejection of consensus.  In policy-
making, decisions need to be taken and there is nothing wrong with it.  But they are
construed as  ‘temporary respites in an ongoing confrontation’ (Mouffe, 2000, p. 102).
Therefore, it is possible to speak of a ‘conflictual consensus’.
Therefore,  an  APM assumes  that  ‘consensus  is  no  doubt  necessary,  but  it  must  be
accompanied by dissent’ (Mouffe, 2005, p. 31). This means that policy organizations are
encouraged  to  operate  according  to  the  logic  of  ‘conflictual-consensus’,  that  is,
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decisions are taken and consensuses are (provisionally) accepted, but the constitutive
character of conflict is not dismissed153. 
A critic  of  agonism might  interject  and  argue  that  an  emphasis  on  conflict  in  the
pragmatic  field  of  public  policy  and  administration  is  easier  said  than  done.  This
argument should be taken seriously because it reveals the danger of making abstract
prescriptions that lack empirical feasibility. Therefore to avoid the risk of proposing a
policy model  that  is  not  implementable,  it  is  advisable  to  examine  how a  conflict-
centred, power-driven, dissent-led APM can be delineated. In order to understand how
conflict can be handled within the policy process, the next chapter will focus on the
policy  features  of  the  APM.  In  particular,  attention  will  be  given  to  the  work  of
contemporary  policy  scholars  whose  ideas  are  attuned  with  the  theoretical  work
developed by Chantal Mouffe.
153 When policy-making follows the ‘conflictual-consensus’ logic, it accepts that conflict cannot
be transcended and also recognizes that the unavoidable consensus can be ‘institutionalized
in different ways, some more egalitarian than others’. Depending on how the consensus is
built, new hegemonic configurations can be devised (Mouffe, 2013). 
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Chapter 6 – Agonistic Policy Model (APM): the policy features
6.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the policy features of the Agonistic Policy Model (APM). The
theoretical cornerstones presented in chapter 5, which concentrated on the examination
of Mouffe’s agonism and set the ontological underpinnings of APM, are now analysed
from a policy orientation. The purpose here is to explore the policy dimension of the
APM with a particular focus on its democratic implications. 
The examination of the policy aspects of APM is relevant for various reasons. First, it
helps to understand how the policy process unfolds when considered from an agonistic
perspective.  Second,  it  spells  out  the  reasons  why the  agonistic  approach  to  public
policy  proposed  here  challenges  the  theoretical  claims  of  the  four  other  paradigms
addressed in this thesis. Third, it delineates the democratic implications of APM. Fourth,
it enables the visualization of how APM integrates politics and administration. 
The key argument  put  forward here  is  that  an APM deserves  to  be taken seriously
because it offers both a theoretical framework and a policy tool that has not yet been
fully  appreciated  in  public  policy  and  administrative  studies.  An  examination  of
contemporary policy scholarship suggests that research has occasionally dabbled with
agonistic  ideas  but  never  in  a  systematic  and  explicit  way.  Although  fundamental
agonistic  concepts  have  been discussed by policy scholars,  they still  have not  been
completely integrated into a body of thought. By developing an Agonistic Policy Model
(APM), this thesis aims to contribute to fill this gap. 
In terms of structure, this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 examines how
policy studies have interpreted the role of conflict in the policy process and suggests
that it has usually been cast in rather negative terms. Section 6.3 discusses the ideas of
policy  scholars  whose  vision  of  the  policy  process  can  be  characterized  as
‘embryonically’ agonistic. Section 6.4 discusses the work of Robert Hoppe and critiques
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his  typology of  public  policy.  Section  6.5 engages  with  the  situational  approach of
Carlos  Matus,  whose  vision  of  the  policy  process  chimes  with  Mouffe’s  agonism.
Section  6.6 shows how the  Agonistic  Policy Model  (APM) can be  implemented  in
practice by drawing illustrations from the field of urban planning. Finally, section 6.7
closes the chapter and attempts to formalize the Agonistic Policy Model (APM).
6.2 Conflict in public policy
Before analysing how policy literature has grappled with agonism, it is convenient to
briefly  discuss  how  public  policy  and  administration  have  dealt  with  the  issue  of
conflict,  which is  at  the very roots of the agonistic orientation.  In this  section,  it  is
argued that  in spite  of  a  recognition that  conflict  is  an important  component  of the
policy process, public policy scholarship has tended to construe it in depreciative terms.
The  negative  perception  of  conflict,  however,  is  at  odds  with  the  APM,  which
understands conflict not only as constitutive of the policy dynamic, but also as a source
of vitality for democracy. In this section, the overall (derogatory) perception of conflict
is  initially  investigated,  then  an  exemplification  drawn  from  contemporary  policy
scholarship of how conflict can be conceived differently (in a way that is more attuned
to the agonistic view) is presented.
Conflict does not enjoy a favourable reputation in policy studies. In general, as a rule,
although conflict is recognized as inevitable, it is depicted as a detrimental aspect of the
policy process that needs to be eliminated as quickly as possible. Thus, it is primarily
portrayed as nuisance or disturbance: public policy scholarship ‘accepts the existence of
conflict, but it concentrates on minimizing the effects of conflict’ (Chappell, 2007, p.
37). The lack of appreciation for conflict is perhaps the reason why it is not among the
most popular subjects in public policy studies.
Policy theorizing has refrained from engaging with conflict, which is often denigrated
as a source of paralysis  and anarchy.  ‘Policy makers and planners have always had
difficulty with conflict management and have not yet developed a respect for strife and
its forms as a recurrent feature of power and decision-making structures’ (Pløger, 2004,
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p. 79). To be sure, the celebration of conflict is not one of the hallmarks of public policy
scholarship.  Instead,  modern  policy studies  tend  to  displace  conflict  and emphasize
other  aspects  of  public  organizations,  such  as  coordination  (Bouckaert,  Peters  and
Verhoest, 2010), creation of public value (Moore, 1995), tools of government (Hood,
1983), policy learning (May, 1992; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993), just to cite a few
examples. No doubt, these aspects are central to public policy, but they push the focus
away from conflict.
There is reason, however, to suggest that conflict is not always problematic. As a lone
voice in the field of public policy contends, ‘conflict is inevitable and yet desirable part
of organizational life’ (Montgomery and Cook, 2005, p. 6 cited in Chappell, 2007, p.
34).  The  pejorative  interpretation  of  conflict  is  problematic,  because  it  neglects  the
constructive role that it might play not only in public organizations but more broadly in
the political regime. As Chappell (2007, p. 33) notes, ‘There is a general belief that all
conflict must be resolved or terminated. This perspective would have us believe that all
conflict is bad. Actually, this is contrary to the democratic process and demonstrates a
lack of understanding regarding the importance of conflict’. In fact, appreciation for
democratic values is intimately connected with an endorsement of conflict in politics
and public policy.
A vindication for the positive role of conflict154 within pluralist democracies has been
put forward by Mouffe (1996, p. 10) when she argues that ‘when we accept that every
consensus exists as a temporary result of a provisional hegemony, as a stabilization of
power, and that it  always entails some form of exclusion, we can begin to envisage
democratic  politics  in  a  different  way’.  She  argues  not  only for  recognition  of  the
legitimacy  of  conflict  but  also  for  the  construction  of  institutional  venues  for  its
expression.
154  From an agonistic perspective, however, even a positive interpretation of conflict is not
enough to qualify a scholar or a framework as ‘agonistic’. This is an important distinction
that needs to be made. In fact, renowned liberal policy theorists, such as Arthur Bentley and
Charles  Lindblom,  have  ascribed  conflict  crucial  importance  in  explaining  the  policy
process. In spite of their conflict-driven analyses, their conceptualization cannot be properly
defined  as  agonistic.  For  an  interesting  discussion  of  the  agonistic  elements  in  Bentley
(1908) see Spicer (2011).
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Attention to broader democratic values can encourage a more appreciative vision of
conflict. Perhaps, a shift in the perception of conflict is not far-fetched. An interesting
illustration,  taken from contemporary policy scholarship that  duly acknowledges  the
importance of conflict – and does not propose to suppress it – can be found in the work
of policy scholar Steven Ney. His account of conflict respects the (agonistic) notion that
conflict is not a hindrance to be overcome, but the very condition in which the policy
process takes place, as will be clarified in subsequent sections.
In his book Resolving Messy Public Problems, Ney (2009) asserts the conflictual nature
of the policy processes and argues that this conflictuality should be interpreted as giving
rise to an ‘irreducible plurality of views’. Thus, departing from the standard treatment in
the field, that envisages conflict as a temporary stage to be superseded by some form of
consensus or agreement, Ney acknowledges its constitutive character. 
In his study, Ney focuses on ‘messy’ (also referred to as ‘wicked’ or intractable in the
literature) problems, which can be defined as those situations that ‘seem to be uncannily
adept at developing immunities to any cure policy-makers have so far administered’
(Ney,  2009, p.  1). Problems are messy,  he notes, not only because of their  inherent
complexity but  also  as  a  result  of  the  intricacy of  the  policy process.  In  his  view,
democratic societies operate according to a multi-layered policy process populated by a
multitude of institutions. ‘Pluralist democracies’, Ney (2009, p. 3) writes,  ‘more than
any other  political  system,  encourage  value-driven conflict’.  Public  policy decisions
need  to  be  worked  out  through  a  myriad  of  policy  participants  (politicians,  public
officials, courts, interest groups, experts, the media, civil society) who hold different
ideas of what should be done and how. The presence of a high number of actors, some
of  them  acting  as  ‘veto-players’,  contribute  to  congest  the  policy  channels.  Thus
‘instead of enabling swift and decisive policy action, political systems – particularly
pluralist democracies – ensnare decision-makers in slow, circular and mindbogglingly
complicated policy processes’ (Ney, 2009, p. 2).
Different from mainstream approaches to public management, which construes conflict
negatively as a source of trouble and disruption, Ney argues that the policy process is
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more  properly  interpreted  as  the  coexistence  of  an  ‘irreducible  plurality  of  views’.
Instead of forcing conflictual situations to succumb to rational decision-making or other
forms of consensus building (although sometimes he seems somewhat ambivalent), the
different perspectives expressed by different policy actors should be admitted as equally
valid and acceptable. Ney offers a vision of conflict that is compatible with the tenets of
the Agonistic Policy Model (APM) proposed here.
Analysing the policy domains of transport, health and pensions, and drawing on cultural
theory (inspired especially by Mary Douglas) and advocacy coalitions theory (from the
work of Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith), Ney (2009, p. 183) concludes that 
The case studies show how policy debate about complex and uncertain problems
generates  an  irreducible  plurality  of  voices  and narratives.  None  of  the  stories
within any of the policy domains can be readily reduced onto another. Neither are
the contending stories close substitutes for each other. Each argument is suffused
with  the  kind  of  interpretation,  judgement  and  values  that  makes  them
incompatible, each argument containing facts and evidence that make them hard to
dismiss.
The  idea  that  conflict  is  at  the  core  of  the  policy  process,  especially  in  pluralistic
democracies, is certainly not new. Nonetheless, what is appealing in Ney’s examination
of messy problems is his willingness to accept the legitimacy of the coexistence of an
‘irreducible plurality of views’. This important recognition is attuned to Mouffe’s (2013,
p. 7) agonistic vision of conflict:
Conflict in liberal democratic societies cannot and should not be eradicated, since
the  specificity  of  pluralist  democracy  is  precisely  the  recognition  and  the
legitimation of conflict. What liberal democratic politics requires is that the others
are not seen as enemies to be destroyed, but as adversaries whose ideas might be
fought, even fiercely, but whose right to defend those ideas is not to be questioned.
An Agonistic Policy Model (APM), which is being built in this chapter, attempts to fill a
gap in the literature. It should be recognized, however, that in spite of the absence of an
APM,  important  contributions  –  such  as  that  provided  by  Steven  Ney  –  offer
conceptualizations  that  can  be  construed  as  consistent  with  an  agonistic  approach.
Although it was never his purpose to engage with agonistic ideas (his background is in
cultural  theory  and  the  advocacy  coalitions  approach),  his  rendering  of  conflict
nonetheless displays significant commonalities with the agonistic orientation advocated
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here, hence helping to elucidate what configuration an agonistic view might assume in
the field of public policy.
As this chapter will attempt to show, not only Ney but also other theorists can facilitate
the  task  of  envisaging  how  an  APM  can  be  delineated.  As  the  following  sections
indicate, various policy theorists (explicitly engaging with agonistic ideas or not) have
developed frameworks that can be  ‘appropriated’ by an APM. Along these lines, the
(agonistic)  contributions  of  contemporary  policy  researchers  Richard  Box,  Douglas
Torgerson, Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram are examined next.
6.3 Intimations of agonism: the contributions of Box, Torgerson, Ingram and Schneider
The absence of fully-fledged agonistic models does not mean that interesting inroads in
agonistic theory have not been made by policy theorists. In order to exemplify how the
agonistic perspective has sporadically influenced policy research, three illustrations are
worth describing:  Box’s  hegemonic interpretation  of  the policy process,  Torgerson’s
conceptualization  of  the  policy  professional  as  ‘voices  of  dissent’,  Ingram  and
Schneider’s  understanding  of  the  policy  process  as  exclusionary.  They  are  briefly
examined now with the purpose of showing that agonistic themes are not a complete
novelty in policy scholarship.
Embracing a hegemonic view of the policy process, American policy theorist Richard
Box in several of his writings has acknowledged the need of rethinking public policy
theory and practice. He has argued that policy studies hardly evoke their critical power
to challenge hegemonic power arrangements. Through silence over societal issues such
as (capitalistic) regime exploitation, (undemocratic) relations of subordination, growing
inequality among social classes, policy studies end up being complicit with the status
quo  (Box,  2004).  Box  encourages  policy  theory  and  practice  to  adopt  a  more
‘progressive’ attitude  that  recognizes  its  civic  responsibilities  to  promote  a  more
democratic, equitable and fair society.
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His emphasis on the hegemonic character of the policy process leads him to envisage
the  task  of  public  administration  as  the  construction  of  alternatives  capable  of
challenging  dominant  forms  of  subordination.  In  his  view,  public  policy  and
administration  should  not  be  confined  to  interpret  the  world.  They should  actively
pursue to change it. He notes that the idea that public policy and administration should
enact a passive role stems from the dichotomous vision that has construed politics as the
source  of  decision  and  administration  as  the  realm  of  execution.  ‘Since  public
administration is thought to be an instrumental field tasked with implementing policy,
not  making  it,  one  might  assume  that  the  appropriate  role  of  practitioners  and
academicians is  to  deal with the consequences of societal  conditions,  not  to  change
them’ (Box, 2008, p. 4). There are, however, many reasons why this dichotomous vision
is problematic,  since in practice public administrators and policy practitioners either
decide or strongly influence those who decide. When it becomes clear that the politics-
administration dichotomy is an unreliable descriptor of the policy process, it  can be
more  easily  accepted  that  public  administration  is  itself  a  site  of  power  capable  to
promoting  transformative  change155.  The  political  power  of  public  administration
therefore  can  be  channelled  to  question  deep-seated  forms  of  subordination  and
oppression. Clearly, agonistic tones can be detected in Box’s analyses particularly in his
emphasis on the hegemonic logic of the policy process.
Another variant of the idea of public administration as transformative site can be found
in  the  work  of  Canadian  policy  theorist  Douglas  Torgerson.  In  his  essay  ‘Policy
professionalism  and  the  voices  of  dissent’,  Torgerson  (1997)  challenges  the
(conventional)  assumption that  policy professionals  are  disengaged,  ‘neutral’ experts
whose tasks are purely technical. He indicates that this technocratic, apolitical view of
the policy professional has usually been portrayed as entirely opposed to the strongly
155 Public administration’s commitment to progressive values and social change prompted Box
(2007) to conceive of the ‘public service practitioner as an agent of social change’. In his
view, those individuals working within public policy institutions should actively strive for
reversing unequal social conditions. His key argument is that ‘public professionals might use
the administrative discretion and legal and organizational resources available to them to shift
“downward” the distribution of goods such as education, infrastructure, public safety, access
to public decision-making, and so on, with the intent of narrowing the widening gap between
the wealthy and everyone else, especially the poor’ (Box, 2007, p. 194-5). Therefore, the
public administrator is invited by Box to act politically on behalf of those groups that are
under-represented and usually lack voice and power to make their claims heard.
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politicized  approach  adopted  by  social  movements.  Drawing  on  the  case  of
environmentalism, he notes that social movements have traditionally been committed to
a transformative, disruptive agenda that question power structures and challenge social
patterns perceived as unfair or oppressive. 
But is it really the case, Torgerson asks, that policy professionals are purely technical
whereas social movement (activists) are purely political? In his view, this opposition
should be seen as problematic. Instead of the conventional dualistic view that construes
policy professionals as technocrats concerned with the preservation of organizational
procedures  and  institutional  routines  in  opposition  to  social  movements  that  are
conceived  as  spaces  of  dissent,  disruption  and  disturbances  to  the  political  order,
Torgerson suggests that this binary might be misleading.
Torgerson’s key argument appears to be that the ‘voices of dissent’ typical of social
movements  are  not  irreconcilable  with  policy  professionalism.  ‘The  sphere  of
environmental politics’,  he says, ‘thus forms a particularly prominent site of contact
between  the  distinct,  largely  antagonistic  worlds  of  policy  professionalism  and
dissenting social movements’ (Torgerson, 1997, p. 346). When the conduct of policy
professionals  is  analysed  through  the  lenses  of  dissent  and  transformative  politics
typical of social movements, there is reason to suppose that public administration itself
can  become  a  site  of  contestation  of  power  structures  capable  of  disrupting  the
prevailing order. He does not explain whether this is practically feasible, although he
does argue that this is theoretically conceivable. His article has nevertheless the merit of
giving salience to the possibility of public administration and policy settings emerging
as sites of resistance and counter-hegemony. In addition, his discussion of the policy
professional as an agent of change has some clear affinities with the agonistic ideas
embraced by Chantal Mouffe.
The concept of target population developed by Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram has
interesting  agonistic  elements  that  are  worth  pointing  out  and  represents  a  third
illustration  of  agonism  in  policy  scholarship.  In  Deserving  and  Entitled:  Social
Constructions in Public Policy, Ingram and Schneider (2005) indicate the exclusionary
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logic of the policy process, which in their view always operates by excluding certain
groups and including others. In order to become the recipient – or in their jargon the
‘target’ – of a public policy, and hence eligible to the material and symbolic benefits
provided by the government, a particular group needs to be perceived as ‘deserving’.
This  positive  discrimination  that  privileges  a  specific  group,  however,  should  not
obscure the fact that competing groups are depreciated and treated as undeserving and
unentitled.
In their work, Schneider and Ingram explore the dynamics of the policy process, which
in their view follows an exclusionary, oligarchic logic that tend to reward a few – those
that are socially constructed as honoured and dignified – as well as marginalize others
who are deemed responsible for their own situation and therefore judged ineligible for
obtaining support (especially funding) from the government to remedy or improve their
(unfavourable)  situation.  The  allocation  of  resources  among  social  groups  is  not
therefore  a  neutral  mechanism  based  on  technical  criteria,  as  more  conventional
approaches  to  public  policy  would  suggest.  This  allocation,  in  contrast,  is  a
policy/political process that divides society into opposing camps: the deserving and the
undeserving156. It is not difficult to realize that this exclusionary logic to public policy
has a strong agonistic connotation, since, as Mouffe has often argued, every social order
has a hegemonic structure, which means that politics is necessarily based on relations of
exclusion.
What can be learned from Box’s hegemonic reading of the policy process, Torgerson’s
conceptualization of the policy professional as an agent of transformative politics and
Ingram and Schneider’s exclusionary public policy vision? Their contributions evince
the existence of agonistic ideas in contemporary policy scholarship (although none of
these authors claims to be working within an agonistic framework). The agonistic traces
that surface in their writings are a positive indication of the potential of agonism to
challenge dominant forms of thinking and to propose alternative views of the policy
156 The policy process is depicted not only as an instrument for rewarding specific groups (with
material and symbolic benefits) but also as a mechanism of confirmation (or disavowal) of
particular social constructions. ‘Public policy’, Schneider and Ingram (2005, p. 5) note, ‘is
the  primary  tool  through  which  government  acts  to  exploit,  inscribe,  entrench,
institutionalize, perpetuate, or change social constructions’.
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process. The absence of a systematic account of agonism in public policy persists as a
(lamentable) gap in the literature and provides the main justification for the elaboration
of this thesis.
There  is  yet  one  more  crucial  element  missing  in  the  (partially  and  fragmentary)
agonistic analyses  advanced by Box, Torgerson and Ingram and Schneider.  None of
them – and it has never been their purpose in the first place – indicate how an agonistic
policy configuration can be conceptualized. In order to show how an agonistic view of
public policy might be articulated, the thesis will explore the contributions of policy
theorists Robert Hoppe (section 6.4) and Carlos Matus (section 6.5).
6.4 Agonism in policy theory: Hoppe’s policy typology
Policy and administrative scholarship has accepted that policy-making is fundamentally
political. Either in earlier research (Levitan, 1943; Waldo, 1948; Appleby, 1949; Long,
1949;  Stein,  1952;  Dimock  and  Dimock,  1953;  Sayre,  1958;  Kaufman,  1969;
Wildavsky, 1979) or in modern policy and administrative studies (Healey, 1993; Rein
and Schön,  1993;  Fischer,  2003;  Nabatchi  2010;  Spicer,  2010;  Lodge and Wegrich,
2012) it has been recognised that policy and administration can hardly be dissociated
from politics.
Despite  the  recognition  of  the  political  character  of  policy  and  administration,
scholarship has not yet fully acknowledged the potential contribution of agonistic ideas
for  the  understanding  of  the  policy  process.  However,  recent  essays  have  shown
awareness of the agonistic strand (Fox and Miller, 1996; King, 2000; Patterson, 2001).
An exception in  the field,  which devoted more systematic attention to the agonistic
dimension of public policies, can be found in the work of Dutch policy scholar Robert
Hoppe. In his book The Governance of Problems, Hoppe (2010) explores the features of
an agonistic style of policy-making, along side other three types: deliberative, advocacy
coalitions, and the technical. His investigation has the merit of showing that in certain
circumstances the policy process should be construed as agonistic.  This section will
probe Hoppe’s depiction of the policy process with emphasis placed on the agonistic
220
component. Initially, his conceptualization of the policy process is described. Later, his
argument  that  the  agonistic  style  should  be  collapsed  into  the  deliberative,  so  that
conflict can be overcome, is examined.
Hoppe (2010) employs an approach that he designates as ‘governance of problems’ 157.
It is based on the idea that public policies are an instrument to convert political demands
into administrative solutions. Critical of analytic policy models that focus only on the
technical aspects of policy-making – such as Lasswell’s (1971) sequential policy cycle
framework  –  Hoppe  argues  that  the  policy  process  should  be  envisaged  as  a
combination of political, policy and administrative elements. Thus, he posits that the
policy process should be interpreted not only in terms of problem-solving (expertise), as
analytical  models  propose,  but  should  also  be  sensitive  to  broader  political  issues
(power and participation).
In his governance of problems approach, Hoppe suggests that the policy process should
be conceptualized in  terms of what  he designates as  ‘policy-politics  styles’,  that  is,
specific modes of policy-making that help to transform political problems into policy
and administrative solutions. Each policy-politics style corresponds to a particular type
of problem. The table 6.1 below helps to visualize how Hoppe’s model connects the
four types of policy problems with the four styles of policy-politics.
157 Hoppe  (2010,  p.  43)  qualifies  his  understanding  of  the  term,  ‘I  coin  the  concept  of
governance  of  problems.  By this  concept  I  mean the  ensemble  of  all  those  institutions,
beliefs,  rules  and  practices  that  are  used  by citizens  and other  policy players  in  public
problem processing in a political system’.
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Table 6.1 – Hoppe’s policy-politics typology
Type of problem Policy-politicsstyles Definition Features
Unstructured problems Agonistic
Dissent on policy 
objectives and policy 
tools
Policy issues are 
highly politicized, 
conflictive and 
passionate
Moderately structured 
(agreement on means) Deliberative
Dissent on policy 
objectives and 
consensus on policy 
tools
Policy issues are 
depoliticized by the 
adoption of 
deliberative institutions
and procedures
Moderately structured 
(agreement on goals) 
Advocacy
coalitions
Consensus on policy 
objectives and dissent 
on policy tools
Policy issues are 
decided by coalitions 
of individuals who 
share similar beliefs
Structured problems Technical
Consensus on policy 
objectives and policy 
tools
Policy issues are 
handled by experts 
through the application
of rational problem-
solving
Source: adapted from Hoppe (2010, ch. 5)
In his view, each of these four policy-politics styles – agonistic, deliberative, advocacy
coalitions  and  technical  –  are  adequate  for  coping  with  a  specific  type  of  policy
problem. The agonistic approach is construed as appropriate to deal with ‘unstructured’
problems, that is, problems that lack consensus on either the policy objectives (ends) or
policy tools (means). A typical example would be media regulation, in which there is
strong dissent on both the policy objectives (should it be regulated?) and on the policy
tools (how to regulate it?).
One may speak of unstructured problems when policy makers observe widespread
discomfort  with  the  status  quo,  yet  perceive  persistent  high  uncertainty  about
relevant knowledge claims, and high preference volatility in mass and elite opinion
or strong, divisive, even community-threatening conflict over the values at stake …
any solution  effort  immediately spawns  new dissent  and  more  intense  conflict
(Hoppe, 2010, p. 73).
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For Hoppe,  agonistic  policy-politics styles  are  appropriate  to  deal  with unstructured
(contentious) problems that involve highly politicized issues that generate intractable or
‘wicked’ controversies. Rarely a set of core assumptions is shared and ‘the number of
belief systems in the policy issue area is large, with multiple belief systems vying for
dominance  in  rather  chaotic  processes.  Issue  networks  breathe  an  atmosphere  of
political strife, adversarial debate and agonistic participation’ (Hoppe, 2010, p. 134).
The disorganized and unstable process of policy formation is not easily managed158 and
tends  to  be  experimental  with  motivated  individuals  fighting  passionately  for  their
beliefs. 
In contrast  to the agonistic style (that is concerned with unstructured or contentious
problems), the technical style is appropriate to deal with structured problems, that is,
policy issues marked by high levels of certainty on both the objectives (ends) and tools
(means). Therefore the technical style – centred on expertise and scientific problem-
solving – is appropriate to handle situations in which there is agreement on what to
(ends)  do  and  how to  do  it  (means).  Hoppe  (2010,  p.  72)  explains that  structured
problems are similar to ‘puzzles’, in the sense that for every puzzle there is only one
possible  solution.  Thus,  when dealing with structured problems policy-makers know
that solutions are certain and undisputed. Policy problems become a matter of either
expertise or bureaucratic routine.  In between the agonistic and the technical styles of
policy-politics,  there  are  two  intermediate  types,  the  deliberative  and  the  advocacy
coalitions, which though important will not be further examined here. 
The description of the agonistic framework provided by Hoppe is precise and useful.
His attention to power and participation in the construction of an analytic of the policy
process is commendable (Hoppe, 2010, p. 44). In addition, his policy model has the
virtue of avoiding linear and sequential analyses of the policy process (e.g. Lasswell
(1971)). Moreover, Hoppe’s model – that he designates as ‘governance of problems’ –
has the merit of integrating political, policy and administrative aspects. 
158 In more extreme agonistic circumstances, Hoppe (2010, p. 135) argues, the policy process
might  come to a paralysis.  ‘In the case of truly agonistic and agitating populist  politics,
process management boils down to crisis management and political “fire fighting”’. 
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Unfortunately,  Hoppe  remains  faithful  to  the  structuration  methodology159,  which
recommends the conversion of unstructured into structured problems, so that they can
be resolved by problem-solving techniques. This allegiance to the structuration process
leads Hoppe to propose that the agonistic style should succumb to more  ‘structured’
stages of the policy process. An agonistic policy process ‘cannot succeed in processing
unstructured policy problems into successful,  feasible  forms of collective,  organised
action.  They  remain  locked  into  a  populist  type  of  politics,  with  agonistic,  highly
adversarial modes of ad-hoc participation’ (Hoppe, 2010, p. 137). Cautioning against
optimistic celebration of conflict, Hoppe (2010, p. 136) notes that agonistic issues can
lead to  ‘random decision’ or in even worse cases to  ‘non-decision’. The propensity of
agonistic  policy  process  to  chaos  and  anarchy  might  require  ‘crisis  management’
measures to contain violence. Thus he says that ‘in situations of prolonged deadlock and
controversy,  politicians  and  other  policy  makers  sometimes  resort  to  a  politics  of
transformative  discourse  coalition  construction,  conflict  management,  and
accommodation and pacification of conflicting values’ (Hoppe, 2010, p. 142).
The solution, in Hoppe’s view, lies in the transformation of the policy process toward
less agonistic, more stable and rational forms of policy-making, in which negotiation
can proceed in less anarchic ways. Only when the agonistic stage is transcended, can
decisions be taken. Unstructured problems are pushed into the direction of structured
problems. In order to convert  ‘divergent views and mutual criticism into opportunities
for policy change’, strongly contentious issues need to be de-politicized (Hoppe, 2010,
p. 139). Only a ‘politics of accommodation’ can collapse conflict into consensus. In this
case, agonistic forms of policy-making have to be replaced by deliberative styles. 
Evidently,  Hoppe’s  analysis  is  at  odds  with  the  APM proposed  here.  Although  his
depiction of the policy process has room for agonism, which is an important step in
policy scholarship and deserves to be praised, it does not sufficiently acknowledge the
constitutive  character  of  antagonism.  He mistakenly proposes  to  overcome agonism
with the deceptive expectation that the antagonistic component will be wiped out when
159 See Thompson and Tuden (1959) and also Mason and Mitroff (1981).
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the policy problem becomes increasingly more structured. Hoppe suggests for instance
that agonistic issues can be more structured if they are processed through deliberation.
Because policy adversaries ‘come to realise that their predicament may end in serious,
potentially  harmful  conflict’ (Hoppe,  2010,  p.  139)  they  opt  for  the  formation  of
deliberative networks capable of ‘accommodation of conflicting values, principles and
goals’ (Hoppe, 2010, p. 140). Deliberative venues would then be more adequate to deal
with rife and divisive conflict. 
The  solution  offered  by  Hoppe  is  problematic.  Although  his  idea  of  a  progressive
‘structuration’ of policy problems makes sense, his intimation that antagonism can be
dissipated does not. His analysis fails to realize that antagonism is constitutive of the
policy  process  and  cannot  be  overcome.  It  can  be  negotiated  in  different  ways,  as
Mouffe often argued, but it cannot be removed. Hence, Hoppe’s attempt to transcend
antagonism represents an (equivocated) attempt to supersede the political condition of
the policy process. 
The limitation of Hoppe’s model does not mean that his typology of policy problems is
not useful. It should be acknowledged that he elaborated an elegant and sophisticated
synthesis of the policy process. When it comes to the problem of dealing with deep-
seated – or  ‘wicked’ – conflict,  however,  there  is  reason to  suspect  that  alternative
approaches might offer interpretations that are more attuned to Mouffe’s understanding
of the ‘political’. One interesting policy model, closer to Mouffe’s agonistic views, can
be located in  the policy model  developed by Latin American policy theorist  Carlos
Matus, whose ideas are now examined.
6.5 Agonism in public policy: Matus’s situational approach
The  ideas  of  Carlos  Matus,  which  will  be  explored  in  this  section,  offer  important
insights on how an agonistic policy process can be conceptualized. Although he never
makes use of the term  ‘agonism’, his vision of public policy has striking similarities
with  the  theoretical  framework  developed  by  Chantal  Mouffe.  To  be  sure,  it  is
convenient to start by showing some shared views between Mouffe’s agonistic theory
and Matus’s situational approach. 
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Remarkably, both theorists construe the political activity (in the case of Mouffe) and the
policy process (in the case of Matus) as pluralistic, hegemonic, adversarial, non-rational
and indeterminate. Since Mouffe’s ideas (that set the ontological underpinnings of the
agonistic model) have already been discussed in chapter 5, it is convenient to focus on
Matus’s views of the policy process. His model of public policy (Matus, 2007d, p. 30-1)
is grounded in five main assumptions:
1. Pluralistic condition of social life: ‘in the social system there is an indeterminate
number of subjects who govern and plan from distinct perspectives so that no
actor is granted the ability to control all the variables involved in the conduction
of the social process’160.
2. Hegemonic conception of society: ‘each of these actors are inserted in a different
way in reality, opt for different ideologies, have distinct interests and intentions
… In consequence, reality can be explained in different ways by each one of
these  actors  and  this  particular  explanation  will  be  the  foundation  of  their
action’.
3. Adversarial  interpretation  of  policy  behaviour:  policy  actors  engage  in  a
conflictual dispute over goals and resources since the policy/planning process
‘should necessarily encompass the problem of coping with – and winning over –
the resistance displayed by others against the plan’.
4. Creativity – not rationality – as the foundation of human agency: ‘these social
actors are creative and therefore nothing can predict their behaviour except only
foresee and prepare to react rapidly against the contingencies that result from the
creativity of the social actors who interact in a system pervaded by uncertainty’.
5. Open,  dynamic and indeterminate view of  social  interaction:  ‘planning is  an
unceasing and continuous process  in  which calculation,  action,  evaluation  of
160 All citations of Matus’s works are my own translation.
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actions,  and  correction  of  plans  are  constantly repeated.  The  plan  is  always
ready, but at the same time it is always being made’.
Mouffe  and  Matus,  besides  displaying  a  common  allegiance  to  these  philosophical
principles, also exhibit another important similarity. Both theorists assert the primacy of
conflict as the driving force of the political/policy process. This is the main reason why
Matus’s policy framework can offer significant lessons on agonistic policy. In fact, the
examination of the contemporary policy repertoire has indicated that the ideas proposed
by Matus  are  those that  are  more  attuned to  Mouffe’s agonistic  framework.  In  this
section,  it  will  be argued that  the ontological underpinnings of the Agonistic  Policy
Model (APM) are clearly visible in Matus’s work. 
The argument is presented in three parts. Initially, because Matus is not well known in
the European (and American) literature, the context in which he developed his ideas is
briefly discussed (section 6.5.1). Then, his situational approach, which represents his
key contribution to policy studies, is analysed (section 6.5.2). After that, the chapter
indicates how Matus’s policy views provide a important way of integrating politics,
policy and administration (section 6.5.3).
6.5.1 Carlos Matus: a post-war Latin American planning theorist
The  policy  models  elaborated  by  Carlos  Matus,  a  Chilean-born  policy  scholar  and
practitioner, whose books have never been translated into English and are available only
in  Spanish  and  Portuguese,  have  sparked  considerable  interest  in  Latin  American
countries,  where  they  are  widely  adopted  and  taught  in  schools  of  government.
Noteworthy, his planning method – known as Situational Planning (SP) – has enjoyed
expressive recognition in Brazil, and has been  ‘officially’ embraced by several public
institutions (Gonçalves, 2005; Paula, Tanaka and Araújo, 2010). Outside Latin America,
however, Matus’s ideas are virtually unknown. Due to the lack of studies on Matus’s
work  in  the  European  and  American  policy  literatures,  it  is  convenient  to  briefly
mention the context in which they were produced.
227
Much  of  Matus’s  writings  are  a  response  to  the  type  of  planning  orientation  that
dominated Latin American scholarship since the Post World War. As he reiterated in
several of his books, the ‘traditional’ approach to planning asserted a technocratic view
centred on expertise and efficiency (Matus, 1997). Based on a top-down, hierarchical
and  deterministic  interpretation  of  the  policy  process,  the  traditional  variant  was
embodied in the elaboration of national plans aimed to foster economic development,
thus being largely silent  about more democratic  issues,  such as public participation,
civic engagement, power sharing that would inform much of the later planning theory
(Forester, 1989; Healey, 1993; Bäcklund and Mäntysalo, 2010). 
Matus pointed out the limitations of the traditional planning approach, which in his
view had achieved modest  results  in  practice  and was problematic  in  theory161.  For
Matus, planning was not an abstract exercise controlled by a narrow technocratic elite,
but a dynamic activity embedded in the broader social landscape (Fortis, 2010). The
planning process, he argued, should be envisaged as a deeply politicized arena in which
policy actors struggled for the attainment of their (irreconcilable) objectives. Traditional
planning,  however,  was  unable  to  acknowledge  the  pluralistic  condition  of  modern
societies. 
By conceptualizing  planning  as  a  purely  instrumental  activity  to  be  carried  out  by
experts, the traditional methods were ultimately  ‘precluding other social forces from
planning and from creating a conflict of objectives and means’ (Matus, 2007b, p 159).
This  emphasis  on  technique  and  scientific  reasoning  had  depoliticizing  effects,
especially because it ended up ‘eliminating the existence of opponents’.
In contrast to the one-dimensional and apolitical tendencies evinced by the traditional
planning,  Matus  proposed  the  adoption  of  a  new  orientation  that  he  designated  as
‘situational’.  The Situational Planning (SP) developed by Matus operated according to
an interactive and conflictual logic – which in later works he would associate with the
notion of a game – that emphasized the pluralistic character of governing. Echoing his
161 In a famous interview he proffered to journalist Franco Huertas, Matus defined the notion of
planning.  In  his  view,  ‘to  plan means thinking before  doing,  to  think with method in a
systematic way; it is to explain possibilities and examine its advantages and disadvantages,
to set goals, project toward the future’ (Huertas, 1993, p. 6). 
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view of public planning as a contentious struggle between adversaries, Matus indicated
that ‘organizations should be conceived as permanent arenas of negotiation and conflict’
(Azevedo, 1992, p. 130). 
His Situational Planning (SP) approach conceptualizes the policy process as a game in
which opponents struggle for  the actualization of their  aspirations  and goals.  Matus
(1997, p. 171-172 cited in Gonçalves, 2005, p. 106) notes that his situational theory
is a theory of a game, but not in the mathematical sense of game theory, but in the
sense of kriegspiel (war game) … the problem of the plan consists in that each
force should win over an active and creative resistance of the opponent in order to
attain her situation-objective … Therefore, whatever the construction of feasibility
for one force is, it is the destruction of feasibility of its opponent.
Matus contended that his Situational Planning (SP) methods could be interpreted as a
‘method of governing’ capable of offering advice for Latin American policy-makers.
‘Modern planning’, Matus claimed, ‘is or should be the working tool of the politician’
(Huertas, 1993, p. 3; Matus, 2007a; Matus, 2010). In his view, Latin American politics,
policy and administration were rife with improvisation, which led to ineffectual public
policies  that  failed  to  meet  their  targets,  and  also  contributed  to  foster  strong
disaffection  with  democratic  values.  Matus  contended  that  what  was  needed  was  a
‘science of governing’ capable of organizing political and administrative activity so that
the policy objectives could be properly accomplished (Matus, 2008). In order to more
accurately describe Matus’s planning methods, it is important to investigate his policy
framework.
6.5.2 Situational Planning: conflict in the policy process
Although never labelled as an agonistic thinker, the analysis of Matus’s policy model
convincingly demonstrates  that  his  views  of  the  policy process  can  be  qualified  as
agonistic (in a Mouffian sense). To put concisely, Matus in his prolific work proposed to
envisage  the  policy  process  as  an  open  arena  in  which  actors  struggled  with  their
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opponents  for the actualization of  their  objectives162.  As this  section will  attempt to
demonstrate, Matus’s ideas evince a surprisingly agonistic tenor, which derives from the
way he  conceptualizes  the  policy process.  An examination  of  Matus’s  major  works
shows that his situational approach operates according to the key agonistic concepts:
1. Hegemony: Matus’s situational approach conceptualizes the social process as an
arena  in  which  different  policy  actors  contend  for  the  attainment  of  their
particular objectives and goals. Since not all policy actors can accomplish their
purposes  simultaneously,  the  policy  process  will  always  privilege  a  specific
group (Matus, 2007a).
2. Antagonism: policy actors sustain antagonistic views of the common good that
can be negotiated only partially; their deep-seated differences, however, rule out
the possibility of building a consensus capable of amalgamating their distinctive
positions. Thus, every policy decision can be construed as a partial agreement
that is always open for renegotiation (Matus, 1985). 
3. Power: the policy process is conceptualized as a power dispute. Policy actors
engage in a contestation for scarce resources (e.g.  budgetary funds, technical
information,  administrative loyalty,  symbolic benefits)  that  frequently mirrors
their asymmetric power. In order to enhance their chances of accomplishing their
objectives, policy opponents establish a ‘system of alliances’ (Matus, 2000).
Thus, the policy process as envisaged by Matus is based on theoretical principles that
are central to Mouffe’s agonistic project. By embracing a hegemonic, antagonistic and
power-laden conception of the policy process, it is not surprising that Matus construes
the interaction between policy actors as fundamentally conflictive. Instead of attempting
to suppress antagonism, which is the standard view in the policy literature, he depicts
the policy process as constitutively antagonistic.
162 According  to  Matus,  the  planning  activity is  structured  in  four  main  steps:  explanatory
(identification  and  selection  of  problems),  prescriptive  (choice  of  particular  courses  of
action),  strategic  (analysis  of  political  viability),  tactical-operational  (implementation  of
actions).
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Similar to Hoppe’s policy model, the framework developed by Matus is sensitive to
conflictual situations that cannot be decided rationally.  The advantage though is that
Matus  does  not  attempt  to  collapse  the  agonistic  into  the  deliberative  style  so  that
institutional designs and procedures can be introduced with the purpose of overcoming
conflict.  For  Matus,  conflict  is  the  essence  of  the  policy  process  and  cannot  be
eliminated.  His  policy  orientation  assumes  that  conflict  and  power  are  inherent  to
governing (Azevedo, 1992). This is the main reason why Matus’s views can be qualified
as  ‘agonistic’.  By  embracing  a  dissent-driven,  power-centred  understanding  of  the
policy process, he suggests that conflict among contending groups cannot be dealt in
purely  rational  terms.  Thus,  discussing  the  conflictuality  inherent  to  the  social  and
policy  processes,  Matus  (1987,  p.  20)  writes  in  his  book  Política,  Planificación  y
Gobierno (Politics,  Planning  and Government)  that  the  nature  of  public  problem is
‘conflictive, because each social force represents distinct social views and intersections,
and as a consequence they struggle for distinct designs for the future’.  This way of
conceptualizing  public  problem  evinces  the  inadequacy  of  the  traditional  forms  of
planning. Thus, Matus continues, ‘if the goals of men [sic] concerning the future are
conflictive, planning is not undertaken in a bed of roses guided by technical-scientific
calculation’.
A conflict-orientated interpretation of the policy process, as Matus clarifies, does not
imply the impossibility of reaching decisions. Contrary to Hoppe’s theory,  discussed
earlier, the acknowledgement of the ineradicability of antagonism is not incompatible
with  decision-making.  On  the  contrary,  according  to  Matus,  decisions  even  in
circumstances  of  rife  disagreement  can  be processed by the  policy arena  (Belchior,
1999). Evidently, the acceptance of conflict as intrinsic to the policy process raises the
question: how can conflict be processed when actors hold deep-seated differences that
are  not  amenable  to  rational  agreement?  In  order  to  understand  the  solution  Matus
advocates to this issue, it is necessary to examine his concept of ‘situationality’.
The policy model developed by Matus is construed as ‘situational’ because policy actors
are depicted as holding particular views of what should be achieved. The concept of
‘situationality’, which was borrowed from the philosophical work of Ortega y Gasset, is
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linked to the idea that policy actors necessarily reason and act from a specific point of
view163. Thus, multiple policy actors are bound to differ and sustain distinct views of
which  policy  objectives  should  be  given  priority.  Different  from  the  traditional
planning,  predicated on the  existence  of  one single logic,  Situational  Planning (SP)
operates according to a multiplicity of logics derived from the  ‘situationality’ of the
actors contesting in the policy arena. 
The  concept  of  situation  has  important  implications.  In  particular,  it  encourages  an
agonistic interpretation of policy process, which is construed as an arena of dispute in
which  contending  groups  struggle  against  each  other  for  the  affirmation  of  their
particular objectives. As Matus argues, the situated character of policy actors implies the
inevitability  of  conflict  since,  ‘our’ criteria  needs  to  be  distinguished  from  ‘their’
criteria.  Policy  actors  operate  according  to  their  situated  perspectives  that  stand  in
opposition to the perspective of their opponents. The  ‘situational explanation’, Matus
(2007b, p. 151) notes,  ‘is always made by “us” or by  “them”’. In a language that is
reminiscent of Mouffe’s agonistic analysis, Matus envisages the planning activity as a
contested terrain in which multiple actors are confronted with the different views of
their opponents.
In a contradictory and conflictive social process reality consists not only in what I
believe, but also in what others believe. This is of paramount importance for the
strategic  planning,  because  the  interactive  calculation  requires  attempting  to
uncover  the  possible  motivations  and actions  of  the  opponent  and  they do  not
depend upon my situational explanation, but of their explanation (Matus, 2007b, p.
152; my italics). 
It  is  true  nonetheless  that  the  adversarial  nature  of  the  planning  activity  requires
mechanisms for the settlement of disputes164. For Matus, the government was the arch-
arbiter of the policy process and as such fulfilled the role of mediating the confrontation
between different policy positions. The role of the government was to ‘coordinate’ the
163 Matus noted that ‘situational analysis requires the differentiation of explanations. Each actor
values  the  social  game  in  a  particular  way  and  acts  in  it  according  to  his  specific
interpretation of reality’ (Huertas, 1993, p. 19).
164 Matus (2007c) distinguished between three different sources of conflict: cognitive (frames
employed  by  policy  actors  that  lead  to  different  interpretation  of  events),  emotional
(sympathy for certain people or adherence for particular values), interests (the notion that the
victory of my opponent represents my defeat). 
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struggle so that the diversity of perspectives could be respected. According to Matus
(cited  in  Huertas,  1993,  p.  63-5;  see  also  Matus,  1991,  p.  38),  conflict  could  be
‘managed’ in various different ways, which he dubbed ‘tactical and strategic means’ that
ranged from more conciliatory (negotiation) to openly confrontational forms (war):
1. imposition: based on authority or hierarchy; 
2. persuasion: based on the charismatic power of the leader;
3. negotiation: based on mutual concessions among contestants;
4. mediation: based on the intervention of an external actor;
5. court action: based on legal decision;
6. coercion: based on threats;
7. confrontation: based on the relative power of the opponents;
8. dissuasion: based on threat of physical action and intimidation;
9. war: based on violent action (only when the stakes are very high).
The  solution  for  coping  with  conflict  cannot  be  predicted  a  priori  because  it  is
dependent  on the  contextual  circumstances  of  the  interaction.  Matus  offered several
tools for mapping the conflict so that the best way to handle it could be identified. He
recommended the drawing of different types of matrix – such as the ‘weight vectors’ or
‘critical  resources’ –  that  would  measure  the  configuration  of  forces  and  therefore
display the relative power of each actor. 
In  fact,  the examination of the power relations  – a  crucial  element  of the agonistic
framework – in every policy process had a pivotal importance in Matus’s model. He
argued that unless the (asymmetric) power of actors was taken into account the viability
of the plan could be compromised165. In order to visualize how power was dispersed, he
suggested  that  policy  actors  could  be  clustered  around  categories  of  ‘friendship’,
‘enmity’ or  ‘indifference’ so that  the existence of alliances could be identified.  The
importance Matus ascribes to the distribution of power within the policy process, it is
165 In  his  view,  power  has  four  dimensions:  political  (control  over  decision-making);  ii)
economic (control over budgetary and financial resources); iii) communicative (control over
production  and  dissemination  of  information);  iv)  organizational  (control  of  technical
knowledge) (Matus, 1991, p. 37).
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worth remarking,  is  another  significant  similarity he shares  with Mouffe’s agonistic
framework. The role of power in Matus’s planning model will be further examined in
the next section when the issue of politics-administration is addressed. 
Before closing this section, however, it is helpful to point out how an agonistic vision of
public  policy,  construed  through  Matus’s  lenses,  challenges  competing  policy
approaches.  As  mentioned  earlier,  the  cornerstone  of  Matus’s  agonistic  policy
framework is the notion that the policy process is fundamentally a conflictive arena in
which different groups strive for the attainment of their objectives, which are always
resisted  by  their  opponents.  Different  from  other  policy  models,  conflicts  are  not
expected to be solved rationally (as the Policy Analysis paradigm suggests) or through
the formation of consensus that harmonizes distinct moral views (as the Deliberative
Policy Approach paradigm recommends)166.
In the case of Policy Analysis, although Matus employs problem-solving devices in his
method, his conceptualization of the policy process is techno-political, that is, it blends
elements of expertise (technical side) and power (the political side). In contrast, Policy
Analysis tends to emphasize the neutral, exclusively technical dimension of the policy
process. In most policy analysis  textbooks politics is sidestepped as if  it  were not a
legitimate concern. For Matus, politics and expertise are constitutive of the governing
process and neither can be relinquished. 
Moreover, advocates of Policy Analysis often suggest that with scientific progress and
the sophistication of policy methods politics might eventually become redundant. From
Matus’s  point  of  view,  however,  although  politics  and  expertise  are  constitutive
dimensions of the policy process, expertise ultimately remains subordinate to politics,
166 The contrast between Matus’s planning methods and the Early Public Administration (EPA)
and the Interpretive Public Policy (IPP) paradigms is difficult, albeit for different reasons.
EPA has been largely discarded after the 1940s when its politics-administration dichotomy
proved no longer tenable (either as explanatory device or as organizational practice) and IPP
remains confined to the theoretical domain thus lacking an implementation framework that
would  enable  comparison  with  Matus’s  model.  See  Appendix  2  for  a  more  systematic
comparison of the policy paradigms examined in this thesis.
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since  the  primary  purpose  of  his  planning  methodology  is  to  serve  the  needs  of
politics167.
In relation to the Deliberative Policy Approach (DPA), the crucial  difference is that
while the deliberative orientation conceives of the policy process as an exchange of
arguments by rational policy actors within deliberative arenas, Matus depicts the policy
process as an arena of struggle in which creative – not rational – actors strive to attain
their goals. Whereas DPA operates according to the assumption that the exchange of
opinions can eventually lead to the formation of a consensus that mirrors the common
good, Matus considers that although cooperation is possible, society has a hegemonic
configuration that precludes a single view from representing the general interest. In his
view,  the policy process  has a  situational  logic,  which means that  policy actors  are
construed as adversaries who are engaged in a conflictive dispute. Every consensus is
therefore  only  a  partial  representation  of  the  common  good  that  can  always  be
challenged by dissenting views.
Because the struggle is adversarial (or in Matus’s jargon, ‘situational’), conflicts cannot
be  processed  in  exclusive  rational  grounds.  Instead,  the  management  of  conflict  is
subordinated to a power dynamics. In tune with Mouffe’s agonism, Matus contends that
the policy process cannot be interpreted as a purely scientific problem-solving exercise.
Instead, it should be viewed as a situation in which power and technique, politics and
administration,  are inextricably linked. The integration between the political  and the
technical is another seminal contribution of Matus’s policy model that deserves to be
analysed. This is the topic of the next section.
167 Matus indicates the primacy of politics particularly when he argues that political leadership
should perform three main roles: ‘a) the design of the rules of the social system under which
we desire to live or the acceptance of the current [rules], which defines the type of game in
which we participate, b) the design of the government project for a determinate period …  c)
the conduct  and guidance of the game of each day,  evaluating and amending its  results’
(Matus, 2008, p. 26; italics in the original).
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6.5.3 The integration between politics and administration: Matus’s concept of technical-
reasoning
Before concluding the study on Matus’s work, it is important to outline how his policy
model  operates  according  to  an  integrative  vision  that  welds  politics,  policy  and
administration together. Matus’s advocacy of the techno-political reasoning offers an
interesting  and  innovative  way  of  answering  the  question  of  how  politics  and
administration, power and expertise, are connected.
The  inability,  either  in  theory  (policy  and  administrative  studies)  or  in  practice
(governmental action), to properly balance politics and administration generates what he
designates as ‘dysfunctions’. The political dysfunction emerges when attention is placed
solely on politics with an utter neglect of policy and administrative matters. For its turn,
technocratic  or  administrative  dysfunctions  results  from  exclusive  concern  with
technical or organizational affairs thus overlooking the importance played by politics
(Matus, 2007a). Because both dimensions – the political (power) and the administrative
(expertise) – are constitutive of the policy process, they need to be carefully balanced.
In order to explain in more detail how Matus conceived of the relationship between
politics and administration, his techno-political perspective is now probed. 
In his book La Teoría del Juego Social (The Theory of the Social Game), Matus (2000)
elaborates on why he decided to adopt a situational approach to the planning process.
His  explanation  is  interesting  because  it  sheds  light  on  his  view  of  politics  and
administration as integrated phenomena. The ‘concept of situation’, he says, developed
initially  in  his  book  La  Planificación  de  Situaciones  (The  Planning  of  Situations)
emerged
in  our  experience  in  the  government  of  Chile,  of  realizing  the  significant
deficiencies of traditional planning and the lack of methods of governing; of the
abrupt gap between the political calculation and the technical calculation. At that
time I had an inkling of the need of what today I call the techno-political reasoning
… (Matus, 2000, p. 176; italics in the original).
Rejecting  either  purely  technical  or  purely  political  interpretations,  Matus  defines
planning  as  the  privileged  locus  of  the  techno-political  reasoning.  Critical  of
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technocratic  views  that  construe  planning  solely  in  technical  terms,  he  argues  that
‘planning is  not  something identifiable  with a mere legal-bureaucratic instrument or
with a technocratic model that you can either accept or reject’ (Matus, 1985, p. 5). In
addition,  he  also  disavows  an  exclusive  political  rendering  of  the  plan,  which  he
suspected  could  degenerate  into  decisions  being  motivated  by  sheer  improvisation,
feeling or personal experience. Instead, he conceptualizes the planning process as an
activity that operates according to a techno-political logic. In order to understand why
Matus  claimed  that  planning  implied  both  technical  and  political  dimensions,  it  is
indispensable to distinguish between two types of problem: the ‘well-structured’ and the
‘quasi-structured’168. 
‘Well-structured’ problems are like puzzles, in which there is one possible solution that
is uncontroversial and acceptable by all those involved in the policy process. Puzzles
admit one and only solution, which is knowable and achievable. However, most of the
problems  that  afflict  society  are  not  of  this  kind.  Because  they  are  much  messier,
contentious, and hard to define, these problems are defined as ‘quasi-structured’. This is
precisely  the  type  of  problem  planning  copes  with.  Quasi-structured  are  complex
because  they  take  into  account  ‘the  creativity  and  subjectivity  of  social  actors,  the
multiplicity of scarce resources and rationalities, the coexistence of actors with distinct
visions and objectives’ (Matus, 2000, p. 325).
The  contrast  between  well-structured  and  quasi-structured  problems  is  crucial  to
understand why Matus suggested that the logic of the planning process was techno-
political.  In  the  case  of  well-structured  problems,  solutions  are  likely  to  be  clear,
rational,  precise  and  determinate.  Well-structured  problems  are  similar  to  scientific
challenges, solvable by purely logical or technical means. The case of quasi-structured
problems  is  different.  The  definition  of  the  problem  depends  on  who  defines  it.
Moreover, instead of one solution, quasi-structured problems may admit a potentially
infinite number of solutions. These features led Matus (2000, p. 330) to suggest that
apart from their technical status, quasi-structured problems inevitably involve a ‘socio-
political dimension’.
168 Matus borrowed the concepts of well-structured and quasi-structured problems from Mitroff
(1974). 
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If planning dealt only with well-structured problems, the technocratic solution would be
adequate. By employing scientific methods and collecting data, indisputable solutions
could  be  drawn to  resolve  problems.  Like  a  puzzle,  all  the  pieces  could  nicely  fit
together after  a  technical  solution had been identified.  However,  very few problems
have  a  well-structured  nature.  In  that  case,  the  technocratic  approach  is  clearly
insufficient.  When  it  is  accepted  that  most  of  the  issues  that  beset  contemporary
societies have a quasi-structured condition, then it is necessary to recognize the limits of
expertise. 
Matus’s  Situational  Planning  (SP)  deals  with  quasi-structured  problems  and
acknowledges  that:  i)  the  planning  process  takes  place  in  circumstances  that  are
unstable, indeterminate and changeable; ii) problems are a social construction not an
external, given fact; iii) ‘the solution of a problem generates other connected problems
because the system has continuity and does not end like a game or a solution of a
puzzle’; iv) solutions to problems are not pre-given, they need to be invented (Matus,
2000, p.  330).  When the quasi-structure nature of public problems is accepted,  then
solutions cannot be exclusively based on expertise. According to Matus, only a techno-
political  reasoning  that  takes  into  account  the  dimension  of  power  is  capable  of
providing an adequate framework to explain how the policy process operates. 
Unless the power (political) factor is introduced in the analysis, it  is not possible to
properly  explain  how  problems  are  defined,  how  solutions  are  constructed,  which
strategies  are  designed,  and  ultimately  which  results  are  achieved.  Far  from purely
technical matters, these questions are always decided in a contentious arena in which
different  social  groups  strive  to  impose  their  (particular)  definitions.  The  plan  is  a
terrain of conflict: ‘Therefore, the actor who plans is not facing feeble forces but fierce
resistances. This is what we need first of all to take into account, because planning,
sometimes more than others, always refers to a context of conflict among opponents’
(Matus, 1985, p. 5). 
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This is why Matus sometimes refers to planning as ‘una lucha’ (a struggle) because
decisions are never the outcome of a neutral decision-maker that attempts to maximize
the benefits  of a particular policy (as in Policy Analysis)  or the product of a moral
agreement  between  rational  individuals  (as  in  the  Deliberative  Policy  Approach).
Instead, the policy process is depicted as a power arena in which contenders fight for the
attainment of their objectives and goals. In almost belligerent terms, Matus describes
planning as a situation in which ‘standing from opposite, distinct or similar positions,
actors align themselves before the game plan of the others’. The confrontational nature
of the policy process evinces not only its agonistic nature but also the insufficiency of
technical reasoning to interpret it. 
The  fact  that  the  policy  process  is  mostly constituted  by quasi-structured  problems
means that solutions cannot be purely rational or technical. They are the result of a
hegemonic struggle, in which policy actors contest – and not merely compete – for the
imposition of their  desires and aspirations,  by making use of their  power resources.
Therefore, the plan is not only about technical issues (although Matus never dismissed
their importance), but also about the relative strength of those involved to enforce their
projects over their opponents. This means that the logic of the plan articulates both the
technical and the political, expertise and power. Thus, Matus spoke of a techno-political
reasoning as the appropriate form of construing the policy activity.
Matus’s  policy  framework  offers  a  convenient  way  of  theorizing  the  relationship
between politics and administration. It also provides insights on how the ontological
underpinnings of the Agonistic Policy Model (APM) can be thought at the policy level.
In addition, as the next section will attempt to show, the agonistic model is not only a
theoretical  abstraction but  also an orientation that  can already be observed in  some
fields of public policy. 
6.6 Agonistic Policy Model (APM) in practice: the case of urban planning
This section illustrates how the APM can be actualized in practice. Exemplifications,
drawn from the field of urban planning, are described in order to show how the APM
can be implemented in policy settings. The key argument proposed here is that the case
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of urban planning evinces the applicability of the APM, which is not only a theoretical
framework but also a policy tool. In addition, it is also argued that the introduction of
the APM, by legitimizing the expression of conflict, can deepen democracy. 
The argument is developed in two steps. First, it examines how agonistic approaches
have inspired a policy literature that is critical of dominant instrumental approaches in
the field of urban planning. Second, it indicates how the adoption of agonistic practices
in policy settings can be conducive to citizen empowerment and thus encourage deeper
forms of democracy. 
6.6.1 The limitations of instrumental and rationalistic views in public planning
An interesting illustration of the potential of the APM as an applicable policy tool can
be found in recent (particularly Scandinavian) studies on urban planning (Hillier, 2002;
Pløger, 2004; Bäcklund and Mäntysalo, 2010). Moreover, as will be now discussed, this
literature  engages  with  current  analytical  developments  in  democratic  theory  –
particularly Mouffe’s theoretical framework – and offers insights on how a conflictual
vision of the policy process can be empirically actualized.
As a background, it is worth noting that these authors – Hillier, Pløger, Bäcklund and
Mäntysalo  – are  inscribed within  a  theoretical  trend  in  the  field  of  urban planning
(which is part of the broader field of public policy) studies whose primary concern is to
challenge  the  mainstream  instrumentalist  approach  that  construes  planning  as  a
rationalistic activity based on objective knowledge (thus emphasizing data-collection,
quantification,  measurement,  empirical  designs  etc).  Drawing from a  wide range of
theoretical  perspectives  –  including  the  agonistic  –  these  studies  argue  that  the
instrumental view is narrow since it takes into account a single perspective: that of the
expert. 
The  salience  ascribed  to  expertise,  as  discussed  in  chapter  2,  tends  to  encourage
technocratic forms of decision-making. ‘Such notions assume that policy- and decision-
making proceed in a relatively technocratic and value-neutral, unidirectional, step-wise
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process  towards  a  finite  end  point’ (Hillier,  2002,  p.  4;  my  italics).  Besides  its
technocratic  – ‘one-dimensional’ – attitude,  the  instrumentalist  and  rationalistic
approaches tend to depoliticize, since they do not encourage active civic engagement
and restrict the decision-making process to a few enlightened experts.
Among  its  major  limitations,  the  technocratic  inclinations  of  the  instrumental-
rationalistic  orientation  fail  to  recognize  the  political  nature  of  public  planning.
‘Planning practice’, as Healey (1997, p. 84) suggests,  ‘is thus not an innocent, value-
neutral activity. It is deeply political. It carries value and expresses power’. In the light
of contemporary urban planning scholarship, the instrumental-rationalistic vision can be
challenged  by recent  developments  in  democratic  theory.  Drawing on  the  agonistic
perspective developed by Chantal Mouffe, urban scholars sympathetic to agonistic ideas
criticize  the  insensibility  evinced  by  public  planning  (theory  and  practice)  to  the
political dimension.
An agonistic perspective, these scholars  – Hillier, Pløger, Bäcklund and Mäntysalo  –
contend, can help to theorize planning practices as conflictual practices pervaded by
power,  a  conceptualization  that  is  at  odds  with  the  technocratic,  apolitical  view
expressed  in  instrumental-rationalistic  approaches.  Not  only  that,  in  their  view,  an
agonistic analysis brings to the fore another crucial dimension that is neglected by the
instrumental-rationalistic approach: its potential to politicize the policy process.
6.6.2 The Agonistic Policy Model (APM) in practice: power and conflict in the policy
process
In their own ways, these urban theorists (Hillier, Pløger, Bäcklund and Mäntysalo) tend
to  conceptualize  the  planning  and  policy  processes  as  predicated  on  power  and
antagonism. Remarkably, they highlight how policy interaction is permeated by conflict
and  dissent.  Moreover,  as  Pløger indicates,  agonism  and  democracy  are  linked:
‘agonism could be said to be the ethos of a democracy respecting the legitimacy of
difference and interests through public participation’ (Pløger, 2004, p. 72). 
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Pløger argues that strife should be recognized as the very core of public policy since it is
constitutive – or as he puts it: immanent – to the planning activity. He notes, however,
that agonistic conflict only takes a productive shape when it is capable of empowering
citizens,  who are  deemed legitimate  actors  to  influence  political  process  and policy
decision-making. ‘Politics, planning and democracy projects’, he suggests, ‘need to find
ways of working with agonism without automatically recurring to procedures, voting,
representativity,  forced  consensus  or  compromises’ (Pløger,  2004,  p.  87).  In  other
words, from an agonistic perspective, deeper forms of democracy require going beyond
mechanisms of representation or communicative consensus-building strategies. 
A similar position is also expressed by Jean Hillier in her book Shadows of Power in
which  she  discusses  different  theoretical  approaches  to  land-use  planning.  She  is
suspicious not only of instrumental-rationalistic views, but also of the communicative,
consensus-building orientation (strongly influenced by Habermas) that tends to regard
conflict as a temporary disagreement that can be superseded by moral reasoning. As
Hillier  testifies,  emphasis  on  rational  deliberation  and  consensus  is  ineffective  in
capturing the essence of the policy process – power and antagonism – and ultimately
fails to encapsulate its political dimension. This is why an agonistic approach provides a
more suitable framework to understand how policy operates.
In  developing  new  explanatory  theory  I  suggest  an  alternative  to  the  core
Habermasian concept of rational consensus. This alternative introduces the notion
of agonism, i.e.  the possibility of permanence of conflict,  inequality,  difference,
nonreciprocity and domination which I believe may engage more productively in
explanation of power games enacted in planning decision-making (Hillier, 2002, p.
14).
The limitations of both the instrumental-rationalistic and communicative views are also
echoed by Finnish planning scholars Pia Bäcklund and Raine Mäntysalo who analyse
how  agonistic  conflict  can  be  processed  by  policy  institutions.  Enthusiasts  of  the
Mouffian agonistic approach, Bäcklund and Mäntysalo (2010) investigate the planning
practices adopted in Finland with a particular interest on the role of citizen participation.
In their  study,  they examined how participation is  stimulated or discouraged in five
different cities (Helsinki, Espoo and Vantaa, Tampere and Turku).
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The study carried out by Bäcklund and Mäntysalo is illuminating because it empirically
illustrates  APM’s  potential  to  be  implemented  in  policy  settings.  This  evidence  is
important since it enables a visualization of the applicability of the APM proposed here.
In  addition,  by  alluding  to  the  democratic  implications  of  the  APM,  it  reveals  its
capacity to strengthen democratic values and institutions. In fact, they conclude their
essay  arguing  that  the  agonistic  approach  (more  than  any  other  competing  policy
orientation) enables the ‘strongest’ form of participation.
Initially,  Bäcklund  and  Mäntysalo  pose  the  question  of  whether  planning  practices
mirror the evolution of planning (and democratic) theories. In their study, they test the
hypothesis  that  theoretical  progress  in  planning  theory  has  spurred  corresponding
developments  in  actual  planning  activities.  In  order  to  find  out,  they  develop  a
theoretical  framework  that  construes  the  evolution  of  planning  theory in  four  main
stages: comprehensive-rationalist, incrementalist, communicative and agonistic. Each of
these models reveal a particular interpretation of how citizen participation should be
envisaged. These four models are now briefly described:
1. Comprehensive-rationalist:  based  on  instrumental  rationality,  this  vision  of
planning operates according to the assumption that knowledge is  neutral  and
objective (and can be captured by quantification tools). This approach depicts
planning  as  scientific,  apolitical  activity  led  by  experts.  The  emphasis  on  a
technocratic  approach  to  governing  drastically  reduces  the  scope  for  citizen
participation  since  citizens  are  not  construed  as  carriers  of  meaningful
knowledge  that  could  improve  the  quality  of  decision-making  (they  are
otherwise identified as passive spectators whose participatory role is confined to
voting).
2. Incrementalist:  critical  of  the  comprehensive-rationalist  approach,  the
incrementalist  view  suggests  that  policy-makers  ground  their  decisions  on
partial, value-laden knowledge. In the absence of complete information, interest
groups  are  welcomed  to  supply technical  knowledge (expertise)  to  decision-
makers.  Because  the  interests  of  different  groups  conflict,  processes  of
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negotiation  and  bargaining  are  introduced.  Participation,  in  this  model,  is
restricted  to  the  competition  between  self-interested  groups  (thus,
conceptualizing participation in rather elitist terms). 
3. Communicative:  largely  inspired  by  Habermas  (especially  his  notion  of
communicative  rationality),  the  emphasis  on  planning  theory  shifted  from
aggregation  of  interests  to  rational  deliberation  and  consensus-building.  ‘A
decision would be found to be legitimate only if each person with a stake in the
issue  had been equally involved in  all  the  phases  of  planning and decision-
making’ (Bäcklund and Mäntysalo, 2010, p. 340). The communicative approach
broadens the realm of civic participation, since citizens are now perceived as
repositories  of  knowledge,  whose  expression  is  deemed  essential  to  restore
legitimacy to the democratic process.
4. Agonistic: an agonistic approach asserts that the notion of subjectivity embraced
by the communicative model suppresses the differences that are constitutive to
the  social.  ‘Habermasian  communicative  planning  theory  is  unable  to
acknowledge  conflicting  conceptions  of  reality  as  being  equally  valid’
(Bäcklund  and  Mäntysalo,  2010,  p.  341).  Participants  have  conflictive
interpretations of reality that cannot be thoroughly accommodated in a single
view (a fully inclusive consensus). For instance, citizens engaged in planning
practices  might  contest  not  only  the  arguments  but  the  very  knowledge
frameworks employed by the authorities to discuss public issues. An agonistic
model stresses the inability of communicative processes to solve difference by
rational debate and consensus-building. 
According  to  Bäcklund  and  Mäntysalo,  each  of  the  approaches  offers  a  particular
understanding of what the role of participation should be. They argue that participation
can  thus  be  visualized  in  a  spectrum  that  ranges  from  more  restrictive  (in  the
comprehensive-rationalist and incrementalist) to more participatory orientations (in the
communicative  and  agonistic  approaches).  Indeed,  this  is  a  convenient  way  of
portraying not only the role played by participation in different theoretical frameworks,
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but also of depicting the ‘evolution’ of planning and democratic theories. Their heuristic
model is transcribed in the figure below.
Figure 6.1 – Shifts in planning and democratic theory and
their correspondent perception of citizen’s role
Source: Bäcklund and Mäntysalo (2010, p. 344) 
To what  extent,  Bäcklund and Mäntysalo ask,  does the planning activity reflect  the
transition from comprehensive-rationalist and incrementalist models to the more recent
(and participatory) deliberative and agonistic models? Is the evolution depicted in the
figure only a portrait of theoretical developments or also an accurate description of how
the planning process has evolved? To put it differently, to what degree does (planning)
practice mirror (democratic) theory?
From the outset,  they note that the planning system in Finland has historically been
deeply influenced by the first approach – the comprehensive-rationalist – which means
that  public  planners  have  construed  their  plans  as  if  they  were  an  objective  and
comprehensive  representation  of  reality.  The  dominant  planning  culture  is  strongly
pervaded by an instrumental view that interprets knowledge as neutral, value-free and
apolitical. This more ‘traditional’ approach, which is very much alive, tends to restrict
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public  participation  to  low  levels169.  Hence,  the  capacity  of  citizens  to  influence
government decisions is limited170.  In spite of the dominance of the comprehensive-
rationalist approach, the empirical examination carried out by Bäcklund and Mäntysalo
has revealed two different patterns. 
There  is  a  first  group  (corresponding  to  the  cities  of  Espoo  and  Vantaa)  in  which
traditional forms of planning are more entrenched, and not surprisingly, participation
seems to be rather narrow and restricted. In the second group (as illustrated by Tampere
and Turku), however, public authorities are less suspicious of citizen involvement in
public  planning  and  stimulate  civic  engagement.  There  are  wider  opportunities  for
participation.  Meetings  are  open  and  anyone  can  join.  Reflecting  the  planners’s
encouragement for broader participation, citizens are able to influence the construction
of  the  policy  agenda.  Moving  beyond  the  sphere  of  representation,  citizens  are
empowered to decide together with public officials. And, as Bäcklund and Mäntysalo
(2010, p. 346) suggest, this participatory approach has aimed ‘to offer a social space for
the active politicization of issues’. 
By enabling direct participation, these two cities (Tampere and Turku) are depicted as
potential exemplars of agonistic democracy. Inputs provided by citizens are taken into
account  and  ‘with  the  politicization  of  issues,  decision-making  becomes  openly
political, too – instead of being disguised as aiming for an abstract common good with
reference to expert knowledge’ (Bäcklund and Mäntysalo, 2010, p. 346). In their view,
these more radical forms of public participation, in which citizens are empowered to co-
decide along side with the planning authorities, can be associated with the agonistic
democratic theory. 
169 Interestingly, the comprehensive-rationalist model also tends to enshrine a type of politics-
administration dichotomy: ‘the political actors make value decisions and the civil servants
operationalize them’ (Bäcklund and Mäntysalo, 2010, p. 345).
170 Thus,  the  participatory  role  of  citizens  is  confined  to  representational  mechanisms,
particularly electoral  voting.  ‘Embedded in the  institutionalized structures  and normative
prescriptions  of  good  governance,  the  deep-seated  comprehensive-rationalist  model  of
planning and the associated aggregative model of democracy is still lurking, framing what is
possible  or  even  conceivable  in  local  participatory  planning  in  Finland’ (Bäcklund  and
Mäntysalo, 2010, p. 348).
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This  is  indeed  an  important  contribution  to  the  agonistic  policy  literature.  First,  it
suggests that an APM is not only a theoretical abstraction but that it is an implementable
policy tool. Second, it shows that by politicizing decision-making an agonistic policy
process is  more conducive to forms of participation that empower citizens,  who are
considered  legitimate  co-authors  of  public  policies.  In  this  case,  Bäcklund  and
Mäntysalo’s study reveals that agonistic theories of democracy are much better placed
(than either aggregative or deliberative theories) to deepen democratic values171. 
In this sense, the type of citizen empowerment enabled by agonistic public policy can be
associated with the idea of participation proffered by Sherry Arnstein in her classic text
A Ladder of Public Participation, in which (although writing in a completely different
context) she clarifies what she means by participation.
My answer to the critical  what question is  simply that citizen participation is a
categorical term for citizen power. It is the redistribution of power that enables the
have-not citizens, presently excluded from the political and economic processes, to
be deliberately included in the future. It is the strategy by which the have-nots join
in determining how information is shared, goals and policies are set, tax resources
are allocated, programs are operated, and benefits like contracts and patronage are
parcelled out. In short, it is the means by which they can induce significant social
reform which enables them to share in the benefits of the affluent society (Arnstein,
1969, p. 216; italics in the original).
An agonistic policy process, therefore,  by emphasizing citizen empowerment can be
construed  as  an  instrument  for  the  deepening  of  democracy.  Only when  the  policy
process encourages the expression of conflict and does not attempt to collapse it into
rational forms of decision-making (either through technocratic or deliberative means),
then can the  ‘irreducible plurality of views’ be fully taken into account. This happens
when  actors  holding  irreconcilable  perspectives  recognize  each  other  as  legitimate
171 It is true, however, that Bäcklund and Mäntysalo point out to the danger of pushing theory
too far ahead of practice. They note that ‘while each paradigm shift in theory purports to
replace the former theory with a new one, in practice the new theory emerges as a new
addition to the palette of coexisting theoretical sources, to be drawn upon as a source of
guidance and inspiration in  organizing participatory planning’ (Bäcklund and Mäntysalo,
2010,  p.  346).  The asymmetry between theory and practice  could lead to  a  situation of
‘institutional  ambiguity’,  in  which  successive  theoretical  developments  (in  planning  and
democratic  theory)  are  not  accompanied  by corresponding shifts  in  actual  governmental
practice. 
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adversaries  whose  right  to  disagree  is  fully  respected.  When  agonistic  conflict  is
accepted as part and parcel of the policy process, democratic values are reinvigorated. 
Having delineated the democratic implications of an agonistic policy orientation, the
next section attempts to bring together the insights collected through the chapter and
formalize the Agonistic Policy Model (APM).
6.7 An Agonistic Policy Model (APM)
An exploration of the policy literature indicates the existence of agonistic ideas (even
when not explicitly interpreted or labelled as such). These ideas can provide important
insights and help to elucidate how an Agonistic Policy Model (APM) can be delineated,
which is the main purpose of this thesis: to fill this gap in the literature by offering a
description of how an agonistic view of the policy process can be articulated. In this
final section, the key aspects of the Agonistic Policy Model (APM) are recapitulated and
organized so that it can be presented in more formal terms.
Thus,  in  order  to  describe  the  tenets  of  the  APM,  this  section  will  weave  the
contributions  of  the different  policy and planning theorists  analysed  throughout  this
chapter (with particular salience given to Matus’s situational approach, which arguably
best  represents  agonism in public  policy).  Together,  the  ideas  put  forward by these
scholars enables the visualization of the APM. 
The APM proposed here is predicated on a set of ontological assumptions that have
been inspired by Chantal Mouffe’s agonistic framework. It is worth summarizing its
three key concepts: the notion of the hegemonic formation of the social process, the
antagonistic condition of political identities, and the idea of power as constitutive to the
political arena. 
First, Mouffe’s agonistic theory assumes that the social has a hegemonic constitution,
which means that its foundations are always the accomplishment of a specific group
(who nonetheless asserts its vision of the common good as if it represented the general
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interest of society). Second, her framework is also grounded on the notion that political
identities have a relational character so that the construction of a ‘we’ presupposes the
existence of a ‘they’. Since, at the political level, the affirmation of ‘we’ depends on the
exclusion of ‘they’,  the interaction between groups displays  an antagonistic character.
Third, and reflecting Mouffe’s post-foundationalist epistemic affiliations, the social is
not  conceived  a  priori  in  essentialist  terms.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  depicted  as  a
contingent formation that is impregnated with power. Thus, the articulation of political
forces  is  fundamentally  a  power  dispute  for  the  mastery of  the  social.  These  three
elements  –  hegemony,  antagonism and  power  –  can  be  thus  conceptualized  as  the
ontological terrain in which the agonistic policy process evolves. 
Underpinned by these ontological features, the policy process can be construed as: i)
open-ended; ii) conflictive; iii) deeply democratic; iv) integrative. These components
are now theorized. 
1. Open-ended. In line with the post-foundationalist epistemological perspective,
the  agonistic  vision  conceives  the  policy  process  as  having  an  uncertain,
contingent and indeterminate configuration. As indicated by Matus’s situational
approach, the policy process cannot be demarcated in terms of beginnings and
endings since it is a continuous activity. In contrast with alternative views of
public policy (e.g. Lasswell’s stages) that depict the policy process as having a
clear beginning and end, from an agonistic perspective, it is not interpreted in
terms of sequential phases, but as open-ended since it is always amenable to
revision.  The  APM construes  policy decisions  as  temporary stabilizations  of
power, thus provisional and precarious.
2. Conflictive. Conflict is the core of an agonistic policy process, which is defined
(by Matus as well as by several other policy scholars) as a conflictual arena in
which contending actors struggle for the attainment of their purposes and goals.
The  reason  why  the  policy  process  is  constitutively  conflictual  lies  in  the
hegemonic  or  situational  condition  of  the  policy  contestation:  actors  hold
different – and irreconcilable – views of the common good that will inevitably
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elicit tension and friction.  The nature of their  disagreement cannot be solved
rationally, as suggested by alternative approaches, but it can be handled in ways
that are more or less democratic (antagonism becomes agonism when those who
disagree are treated as adversaries rather than enemies). 
3. Deeply  democratic.  In  tune  with  Mouffe’s  theoretical  framework,  the
introduction of an agonistic policy orientation contributes to deepen democratic
values  and  practices.  From  an  agonistic  perspective,  public  policies  are
conceived as contentious arenas of struggle in which adversaries express and
negotiate their differences. Such a conflict-driven conceptualization of the policy
process, as indicated by Bäcklund and Mäntysalo (2010), can greatly contribute
to the expansion of democratic opportunities for citizen participation. When the
policy  process  respects  agonistic  contestation,  democratic  boundaries  can  be
enlarged with citizens playing a significant role in choosing which policies will
be implemented. Different from alternative policy models that emphasize either
technocratic or deliberative solutions, an agonistic policy process has a potential
to deepen democracy.
4. Integrative.  Another  key  feature  of  APM  is  its  integrative  role  in  bringing
politics  and  administration  together.  As  Matus  has  persuasively  argued,  the
policy process operates according to a techno-political form of reasoning, which
combines  expertise  and  power  (by-words  for  administration  and  politics).
Because the vast majority of public problems are quasi-structured, they cannot
be decided on purely rational or technical grounds. Instead, a policy decision
(which is  always a partial  and temporary form of  closure)  incorporates non-
rational  elements,  particularly power.  Thus,  solutions  to  public  problems  are
better described as precarious and temporary agreements pervaded by a mixture
of  technical  and  coercive  elements.  The  coexistence  of  power  and  expertise
indicates that politics and administration are inextricably linked in the policy
process.
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The table 6.2 below attempts to summarize the discussion above and present the key
features  of the APM. It  emphasizes the distinction between the level  of ontological
underpinnings (inspired in Mouffe’s framework) and the level of policy configuration
(drawing mostly on Matus’s situational approach).
Table 6.2 – The Agonistic Policy Model: key features
Feature OntologicalUnderpinning
Policy
Configuration Policy Proponents
Intellectual mentor Chantal Mouffe Several (withsalience for Matus)
Dominant
framework Agonistic pluralism
Agonistic public
policy Fortis
Epistemic
foundations
Post-foundationalist,
Anti-essentialist
Uncertain,
contingent,
indeterminate
Matus, Fox and
Miller
Key concepts
Hegemony,
antagonism and
power
Contestation,
dispute, dissent
Matus, Hillier,
Pløger, Bäcklund and
Mäntysalo
Nature of the policy 
process
Conflictual or
Adversarial Situational Matus
Policy process Agonisticcontestation Arena of struggle
Box, Ingram and
Schneider, Matus
Decision-making Conflictual-consensus
Power-laden,
dissent-driven Box, Matus
Human agency
Emphasis on
passions and
emotions
Creativity Hillier, Matus
Role of institutions
Venues for
transformative
change
Sites of counter-
hegemony and
resistance
Box, Wingenbach
Democratic
orientation Deep democracy
Citizen
empowerment
Box, Torgerson,
Pløger, Bäcklund and
Mäntysalo
Relationship 
between politics and 
administration
Primacy of the
‘political’
Integration between
politics and
administration
Matus
Source: the author
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The  distinctive  features  of  the  APM indicate  its  potential  to  think  public  policy in
innovative  ways.  Next,  in  the  conclusion,  the  main  advantages  of  the  APM  over
alternative  policy  approaches  are  highlighted.  In  addition,  suggestions  for  the
development of an agonistic policy research agenda are also put forward. 
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Conclusion
This  thesis  advocates  an  Agonistic  Policy  Model  (APM),  an  innovative  policy
framework  that  has  not  yet  been  systematically  considered  by  contemporary
scholarship.  The APM delineated here helps to elucidate how agonistic ideas, so far
confined primarily to the realm of political theory, can be put in practice. In line with
Mouffe’s vision, agonism is depicted as a framework suitable for institutionalization.
Moreover,  as  empirical  illustrations  drawn  from  the  field  of  urban  planning  have
revealed agonistic practices have already been implemented in actual policy settings.
In  order  to  clarify the  advantages  of  the  APM over  alternative  policy models,  it  is
convenient to spell out five basic reasons that recommend its adoption: i) it provides an
innovative (non-rationalistic) view of the policy process; ii) it  integrates politics and
administration; iii) it is sensitive to the complex nature of public policies; iv) it has the
potential to deepen democracy; v) it can offer a new vision of policy advocacy.
Innovative  (non-rationalistic)  view  of  the  policy  process.  First  of  all,  one  of  the
important features of the APM resides in its originality. Predicated on the ineradicability
of  hegemony,  antagonism  and  power  (aspects  that  play  a  constitutive  role  in  the
agonistic framework), the APM developed in this thesis conveys an innovative view of
the  policy  process.  It  draws  attention  to  the  limitations  of  other  approaches  –
particularly Policy Analysis  and the Deliberative  Policy Approach – that  emphasize
rationalistic forms of decision-making. The APM, for its turn, rejects the notion that
policy  actors  should  be  characterized  as  essentialized  subjects  whose  behaviour  is
dictated by a rationalistic form of reasoning. 
In the case of Policy Analysis, for example, it is assumed that an instrumental type of
reasoning (that tries to find the best means to achieve certain ends) is conducive to the
identification of the most efficient policy choices. Although departing substantially from
Policy Analysis (PA), the Deliberative Policy Approach (DPA) preserves an allegiance
to the rationalistic conception of the policy actor. For deliberative policy proponents,
some sort of agreement – or mutual understanding – can usually be achieved through
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rational debate in which reasons and arguments are exchanged172. In both cases, though
in different ways, PA and the DPA are committed to a rationalistic form of reasoning.
Differently,  the APM does not assert  that policy actors are guided by a rationalistic
conduct.  As  Mouffe  (at  the  political  level)  and  Matus  (at  the  policy  level)  have
convincingly shown, agency has a non-rational dimension that needs to be taken into
account. In the policy process, individuals and groups are also motivated by passion.
The  role  of  emotions  and  creativity  is  overlooked  by  PA and  DPA,  thus  severely
compromising their ability to explain how the policy process unfolds in actual practice.
The APM, however, is attentive to the inadequacy of positing the policy subject as a
rationalistic individual whose attitude is based on instrumental calculation (in the case
of PA) or civic deliberation (in the case of DPA).
Integration  between  politics  and  administration.  Second,  the  APM  envisages  how
politics and administration can be construed as integrated phenomena, thus helping to
answer one of the perennial questions of public administration: how should politics be
conceived  from  an  administrative  perspective?  Are  they  mutually  exclusive  or
interdependent spheres? To be sure, the APM conceptualizes politics and administration
as  spheres  that  are  inextricably  linked.  It  concurs  with  Wildavsky’s  assertion  that
political questions are administrative questions, as much as administrative questions are
political questions. The inextricability between these two mutually dependent spheres is
clearly revealed in Matus’s contention that the logic of the governing process is techno-
political, that is, a combination of power (politics) and expertise (administration).
The reason why the  APM can offer  an  integrative  view that  combines  politics  and
administration results from its recognition of ‘the political’. Because it is grounded on
genuine political  elements – hegemony,  antagonism and power – the APM is better
positioned (than alternative policy orientations) to provide a political interpretation of
172 It should be recognized, however, that deliberative scholarship has evolved since the original
– and seminal – contributions of Habermas. Recent developments have acknowledged the
importance  of  dealing  with  difference,  and  to  some  degree,  accepted  that  under
circumstances of strong division deep-seated differences might not be negotiable (Young,
2000). For an analysis of how the deliberative perspective has responded to the agonistic
critique, see Dryzek (2005). 
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the policy process. To envisage policy and administrative phenomena as embedded in
the  political  dimension  is  an  important  contribution  of  the  APM  to  contemporary
scholarship that deserves to be highlighted. 
Sensitivity  to  the  complex  nature  of  public  policies.  Third,  by placing  emphasis  on
conflict and antagonism, the APM more aptly mirrors the condition of contemporary
public policies, which can be portrayed as dealing with ‘intractable’ (Schön, and Rein,
1995) or ‘messy’ (Ney, 2009) public problems. Because it defines the policy process as
a  continuous  dispute  that  is  never  permanently  settled,  the  APM  is  attuned  to  the
increasingly complex condition of policy-making.
Due to its post-foundationalist epistemic affiliations, which assert the lack of final and
permanent  ground for the formation of the social,  the APM captures the instability,
uncertainty and complexity typical  of most  policy issues.  The conflict-driven,  open-
ended conceptualization of the policy process embraced by the APM is in line with
Sørensen  and  Torfing’s  (2007)  characterization  of  contemporary  governance  as  a
‘complex and potentially chaotic process in which numerous interests, identities and
rationalities  fuse  and  collide’ (p.  25),  and  which  is  ‘never  formed,  established  or
institutionalized once and for all’ (p. 52). In their  view, instability is at  the roots of
contemporary forms of governance, which they depict as:
complex  and  dynamic  systems  in  which  centripetal  and  centrifugal  forces
constantly undermine each other so that order and stability only exist as a partial
limitation of disorder and instability … Conflicts sustained by the cultural, social
and  political  differences  between  the  relatively  autonomous  actors  prevent
governance  networks  from  being  transformed  into  stable  political  institutions
(Sørensen and Torfing, 2007, p. 26-7).
The  emphasis  on  instability,  conflict  and  difference  suggests  possible  similarities
between network governance theory and the APM. Further research might indicate to
what  extent  these  frameworks  are  compatible.  In  principle  Sørensen  and  Torfing’s
(2009)  metagovernance  approach  appears  to  share  some  similar  concerns  with  the
agonistic  vision  developed  here.  For  example,  when  they argue  that  policy-making
should be interpreted, not in fixed and essentialist terms, but as a continuous activity
that ‘will eventually lead to the formulation of a framework of rules, norms, values and
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ideas  that  is  both  precarious and  incomplete’ (Sørensen  and Torfing,  2009,  p.  236;
emphasis added).  The possible affinity between these two approaches – the APM and
the metagovernance developed by  Sørensen and Torfing – elicits interesting research
questions that might motivate a prospective ‘agonistic’ public policy research agenda.
Potential to  deepen democracy.  A fourth argument  in favour of the APM lies in its
potential to strengthen democratic values and institutions. A truly democratic society
requires institutions that recognize the legitimacy of different – and irreconcilable –
positions. This is precisely the task of the APM: to encourage policy actors to contest
their goals without attempting to impose consensus. This is an important departure from
alternative visions of the policy process that insist  on consensus-building and hence
disavow contestation. Again, the contrast with Policy Analysis (PA) and the Deliberative
Policy Approach (DPA), two influential policy paradigms, is fruitful.
On one hand, proponents of PA aim for the identification of the  ‘one right answer’, a
type  of  consensus  based  on  technical  knowledge  (expertise).  On  the  other  hand,
advocates  of  DPA  defend  the  construction  of  mutual  agreements  through  rational
deliberation,  thus  suggesting  that  difference  can  be  ultimately  harmonized  (and,  in
stronger  versions,  reconciled).  In  both  cases,  the  policy  process  is  geared  to  the
formation  of  a  consensual  view  that  inhibits  the  expression  of  diverse  and
heterogeneous perceptions. 
Because the APM celebrates the co-existence of multiple views, it allows policy actors
to  express  their  disagreement  through  policy  venues.  When  the  policy  process  is
conceptualized as an arena of struggle, policy actors (motivated by irreconcilable views
of the common good) are recognized as contenders who can freely assert their particular
preferences  and  demands.  By legitimizing  conflict  in  the  policy  process,  the  APM
contributes to foster democratic practices and institutions. Dissent – not consensus – is
indispensable to vitalize democracy and reverse the  ‘democratic deficits’ that pervade
contemporary societies.
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As the agonistic planning experience in Finland makes clear, when public authorities
accept the existence of dissenting views and refrain from imposing (either technocratic
or deliberative forms of consensus) then the policy process can lead to deeper forms of
democracy. As noted by Bäcklund and Mäntysalo (2010), more democratic ‘agonistic’
policy processes have the potential to make power relations more transparent and hence
create conditions for counter-hegemonic groups to challenge structures of oppression
and domination.
A new vision of policy advocacy. There is a fifth reason that justifies the adoption of the
APM.  In  times  when  scientific  advice  is  no  longer  accepted  as  incontrovertible
(Jasanoff, 1990), science is described as just one, among many other, forms of knowing
in  the  policy  process  (Healey,  1993).  In  this  case,  the  APM  is  particularly  well
positioned to provide guidance to help governments improve their decision-making.
What kind of policy advocacy could ‘agonistic advisers’ offer to governments? First of
all, the penetration of agonistic ideas within administrative agencies would question the
emphasis on purely technical means to solve public problems. Modern administrative
reforms,  for  instance,  have  attempted to  enhance  the  quality of  decision-making by
insisting on rationalistic, managerial tools (e.g. zero-base budgeting, management by
objectives,  strategic  planning).  Differently,  from an  agonistic  orientation,  the  focus
should be placed on the legitimation of conflict  in policy arenas. As such, it  should
encourage the construction of venues for the legitimate expression of difference, so that
dissenting views can confront each other. 
Second,  ‘agonistic advisers’, because they are sensitive to the hegemonic condition of
the  social  order  (and  thus  aware  that  every  policy  position  is  only  a  partial
representation the common good), can act as intermediators between a multiplicity of
policy perspectives. The agonistic ‘arbiter’ could for instance make explicit how power
is  allocated  within  a  specific  policy situation (and perhaps suggest  the existence of
alternative arrangements that could foster more equal and fair configurations)173. As an
173 Empirically, this can be accomplished by the construction of a ‘power weight vectors’ table
(Matus, 2000) in which the relative strength of policy actors is revealed.
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arbiter, the agonistic practitioner operates as an ‘interpreter’ between different policy
epistemics.
These five reasons suggest the convenience of adopting the APM proposed here. As the
example of urban planning (discussed in chapter 6) confirms, the significant potential of
the APM is only beginning to be realized.  There is reason to suggest that other fields
can benefit  from an agonistic  orientation as well.  In particular,  two fields of public
policy stand out in their potential to embrace the agonistic vision. One is accounting; the
other, budgeting.
Agonistic potential in the field of accounting. New Zealand policy theorist Judy Brown
has published a series of studies highlighting the potential of agonistic ideas to renew
accounting.  Brown  (2009)  comments  that  accounting  is  a  discipline  searching  for
alternative  paradigms.  She  draws  attention  to  the  emergence  of  recent  trends  that
conceive accounting as a ‘politicized’ terrain pervaded by power, thus challenging more
entrenched  instrumentalist  views  that  emphasize  data-gathering  and  production  of
technical reports. Scholars, critical of the positivistic affiliations of the discipline, have
called  for  new  theoretical  paths  capable  of  moving  accounting  beyond  expertise-
centred, technocratic theorizing.
Attempting to contribute to this debate, Brown proposes the adoption of agonistic ideas
as way to link accounting with democratic theory. She notes that  ‘there is a dearth of
explicit  acknowledgement  or  engagement  with,  for  example,  agonistic  critiques’
(Brown, 2009, p. 315). In her view, mainstream accounting is unable to acknowledge
the  pluralistic  condition  of  modern  societies  because  it  insists  in  finding  the  ‘right
answer’.  However,  this  belief  on  the  possibility  of  the  ‘right  answer’  is  very
problematic, because it precludes the recognition of the existence of conflicting views.
Not only that, these empiricist approaches disregard that accounting is a social practice
permeated by power disputes, thus ultimately ignoring the political dimension. Brown
argues for an ‘accounting that is more receptive to the needs of a plural society; one that
is  “multi-voiced”  and  attuned  to  a  diversity  of  stakeholders’ values  and  interests’
(Brown, 2009, p. 317). 
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In line with the APM developed here, Brown suggests that accounting should not aim
for  definitive  closure,  final  truth  or  ‘incontrovertible  accounts’.  In  her  view,  new
accountings should be oriented to make power relations more visible, facilitate citizen
engagement  in  the  decision-making  process,  and  promote  accountability  and
responsiveness. In particular, the agonistic approach developed by Chantal Mouffe has a
strong potential to challenge mainstream accounting that embraces a technocratic and
apolitical orientation. For Brown, the main advantages of the agonistic approach are
derived from its ability to:
 enable the expression of multiple perspectives
 promote the engagement of non-experts
 recognize power dynamics (and expose relations of domination and inequality)
 discourage instrumental reasoning and technocratic decision-making
 foster transparency, accountability, and citizen engagement
 admit the subjectivity and contestability of information (Brown, 2009).
The  ‘agonistic’ accounting advocated by Brown is  an illustration of the potential  of
agonistic  ideas  to  challenge  expertise-led,  technocratically-driven  views  that  are
pervasive in  a  wide range of  policy and administrative fields.  The dissemination of
agonistic interpretation can contribute, as Brown correctly suggests, to neutralize the
depoliticizing  tendencies  of  public  policy  and  open  up  new  ways  of  conceiving
democratic participation in the policy process. Moreover, by making power relations
more transparent, agonistic views can potentially facilitate transformative change so that
marginalized groups are given legitimate spaces to express their (counter-hegemonic)
perspectives. 
Agonistic potential in the field of budgeting. The field of accounting, however, is only
one exemplification of the vast potential of agonism to renew public policy, theory and
practice.  Another  domain  that  remains  captive  to  restrictive  forms  of  instrumental
reasoning  and  technocratic  forms  of  decision-making  is  public  budgeting,  whose
dominant orientation resembles what Brown designates as ‘monologic’ (that is, based on
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the assumption of objectivity and neutrality of knowledge). It is therefore reasonable to
recommend the application of agonistic ideas to the important field of public budgeting.
It should be acknowledged that other policy approaches, particularly the interpretive,
have already attempted to discuss how budgeting could be understood in less technical
ways. For instance, Roe (1994) suggests that budgeting can be conceived as a narrative
in which authors (budget authorities) communicate their message (the budget text) to an
audience (politicians,  experts, journalists, civil  society).  It  is  true that this  approach,
which Roe designates as narrative policy analysis, has some advantages. For example,
by employing semantic analysis, researchers can uncover meanings hidden in policy
documents and thus detect underlying power structures. However, as argued in chapter
3, although the interpretive vision has the merit of pointing out the limitations of more
technocratic,  expertise-led  approaches  to  public  policy,  it  remains  confined  to  the
theoretical  level.  Thus,  it  does  not  offer  convincing  indication  of  how  dominant
rationalistic and instrumental forms of reasoning can be challenged in practice. 
The  Agonistic  Policy  Model  (APM),  on  the  other  hand,  is  not  only  an  analytical
framework  but  also  a  ‘form  of  intervention’.  It  can  thus  be  suggested  that  the
application of agonistic  ideas in the field of budgeting can inspire the construction of
tools  that  operate  according to  a  techno-political  logic.  The penetration of  agonistic
practices can arguably elucidate the shortcomings of ‘monologic’ views that search for
the  ‘right  answer’, and  thus  disregard  the  diversity  and  heterogeneity  typical  of
pluralistic democratic societies. 
An  ‘agonistic vision of public budgeting’ can bring to the fore the notion that every
budget represents a choice over how society is managed. By making power relations
more  visible,  an  agonistic  perspective  may  evince  the  hegemonic  nature  of  the
budgeting  process,  which  always  privileges  certain  groups  and  exclude  others
(Schneider and Ingram, 2005). Apart  from this  ‘diagnostic’ contribution (how things
are),  the agonistic  perspective can also indicate  a  ‘therapeutic’ solution (how things
should be). 
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It can be suggested, for example, that an ‘agonistic budgeting’ would place emphasis on
the idea that the budget is a contested terrain, whose configuration cannot be decided in
purely technical terms. In this case, the budget would be depicted as a hegemonic and
contingent articulation (liable therefore to be re-articulated in different ways). From this
agonistic perspective, the budget is construed not as a technical activity to be carried out
solely by experts, but as a correlation of forces that struggle for the recognition of public
authorities (every budget allocation can be seen as a reward for a ‘deserving’ group). To
put  it  differently,  from an  agonistic  perspective,  the  budget  can  be  construed  as  a
provisional consensus that can always be disrupted. 
This conceptualization represents a departure from the conventional idea (that informs
much of contemporary budget theorizing) that budget is a neutral and objective activity.
An illustration helps to visualize to what extent budgeting is rooted on positivistic and
empiricist  approaches  to  knowledge.  The  analytical,  ‘technicist’  orientation  that
pervades budgeting can be clearly detected in contemporary discussions over budget
innovation.  As  Allen  Schick,  one of  the  most  renowned experts  in  the  field,  in  his
conceptualization of public budgeting, puts it
Budgeting  is  a  process  that  transforms  information  into  decision.  Requests
submitted by spending units or generated by central budget staffs are inputted into
the process, and allocations to entities, projects and other recipients are outputted.
The quality of these decisions depends on the data available to decision makers, as
well  as  on  the  analytic  tools  they use  to  process  the  information.  One  of  the
perennial aims of budget innovation has been to influence the decisions that flow
from the process by modifying the classification or content of budget data and by
introducing new analytic methods (Schick, 2007, p. 110).
This citation reveals how entrenched analytical, expertise-led views are in the field of
budget. Furthermore, as Ebdon and Franklin (2006) argue, mainstream budgeting, by
emphasizing an instrumental orientation, ends up being insensitive to the pluralism of
contemporary  societies  and  thus  blind  to  democratic  values.  According  to  these
scholars, current budgeting practices evince the following features:
 rationalistic  and  positivistic  types  of  reasoning  (that  encourage  data
collection, statistical analysis, surveys, technical reports)
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 technocratic  styles  of  policy-making  that  favour  expertise  and  depreciate
non-expert forms of knowledge
 top-down  structures  that  concentrate  power  on  government  officials  and
‘insulates’ budget technocrats from societal forces
 emphasis on efficiency as the main criterion for the allocation of financial
resources (e.g. cost-benefit analysis)
 inattention to citizen empowerment and democratic participation
How  can  the  agonistic  policy  perspective  proposed  here  contribute  to  the
democratization  of  the  budget?  Which  recommendations  can  it  offer  for  the
politicization of budget practices and techniques? These are interesting questions that
can be addressed by a prospective ‘agonistic budgeting debate’. 
It  might  be  worth  indicating  that  recent  publications,  both  by  policy  scholars  and
practitioners, have alluded to the potential of non-technocratic, political views of public
budgeting. An illuminating illustration can be found in the idea of a ‘gender-responsive
government budgeting’ (Sarraf, 2003). This is an innovative budget tool that is already
being implemented in civil society and non-governmental organizations (besides under
consideration by some national governments). It draws attention to the importance of
connecting  budget  allocations  (funds)  to  gender-sensitive  policies.  Although  still  a
fledgling initiative that is gradually getting traction, the ‘gender-perspective budgeting’
has  a  vast  democratic  potential  (especially  to  promote  equality  of  gender)  that  is
beginning to be recognized (within and outside academia). 
The ‘gender-responsive government budgeting’ is a promising way of promoting (much
needed) innovation in the field of public budgeting. It has the ability to politicize a field
that  is  overwhelmingly  centred  on  expertise  and  thus  insensitive  to  the  democratic
implications  of  its  attitudes.  Furthermore,  by  drawing  attention  to  the  political
dimension of public policy, the ‘gender-responsive government budgeting’ exemplifies
how agonism can be practically implemented in policy and administrative settings.
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Accounting and budgeting, however, are only two fields in which agonism can arguably
contribute  to  improve  policy-making.  There  are  many  more.  For  the  five  reasons
mentioned earlier  in  this  conclusion,  the case can be made for the dissemination of
agonism, a new policy approach whose potential is only beginning to be actualized. The
introduction of the APM in a multiplicity of policy and administrative sites might well
be the cure of an old illness: the persistent denial of the political in public policy and
administration.
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Appendix 1 
Important policy streams developed after Lasswell (1951)
Policy model Proponents Key ideas
Stages Lasswell (1971)
Policy  process  as  a  sequence  of  phases:
intelligence,  recommendation,  prescription,
invocation,  application,  appraisal,  and
termination.  It  revises and improves Lasswell’s
(1951) original formulation.
Public Choice
Buchanan and
Tullock (1962),
Olson (1965),
Niskanen
(1971), Ostrom
(1973)
Drawing on neoclassical economics, it  portrays
individuals as weighing costs and benefits with
the  purpose  of  maximizing  satisfaction.
Government should produce  public goods and
services  only when  the  market  is  incapable  to
operate.  When  ‘market  failures’  occur,  the
government should try to mimic the competitive
logic of the market that seeks efficient solutions.
Policy 
communities 
and issue 
networks
Heclo (1978)
Policy-making is  interpreted in terms of policy
communities, which are groups unified by a set
of  beliefs,  values  and  interests  that  provide  a
common ground for the operation of a network.
One  important  off-shoot  is  policy  advocacy
coalition  model  (Sabatier  and  Jenkins-Smith,
1993).
Policy politics Lowi (19641972)
Lowi  stressed  that  policy  determines  politics,
and constructed a typology that reduced policy-
making to four distinct (mutually exclusive and
exhaustive)  categories:  regulatory,  distributive,
redistributive  and  constituent.  Each  category,
Lowi  (2009)  clarifies,  is  a  separate  arena  of
power that contains with its specific structure of
power.
Implementation
studies
Pressman and
Wildavsky
(1973), Bardach
(1977)
When  it  was  realized  that  policies  are  often
carried  out  in  a  way  that  differs  from  their
original design, theorists argued that the process
of policy implementation should also be studied
in order to understand when policies succeed or
fail.
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Multiple 
streams Kingdon (1984)
The multiple streams model is an adaption of the
garbage can model  (Cohen,  March, and Olsen,
1972).  It suggests that the setting of the political
agenda is  the result  of  a  flow of  three  sets  of
processes  or  streams:  problems (public  matters
that  require  attention),  policies  (proposals  to
solve the problems) and politics (the interplay of
political institutions and groups).
Punctuated 
equilibrium 
model of public
policy
Baumgartner
and Jones
(1993)
Aimed at explaining policy change, stability and
variation, it depicts decision-making as the result
of  interaction  between  institutions,  ideas,
socioeconomic  factors,  and  policy  actors.
Agendas  in  the  political  system  can  change
rapidly  disrupting  existing  consensus.
Equilibrium  is  an  exception  in  policy-making,
which is  predominantly marked by change and
disequilibrium
The new-
institutionalism
Hall and Taylor
(1996), March
and Olsen
(1989, 1995)
and North
(1990)
New-institutionalism  has  been  particularly
important  in  rescuing the  pivotal  role  of  ideas
and  beliefs  in  policy  research.  It  asserts  that
institutions are influential or determinant in how
actors  define  their  policy  preferences.
Institutions provide ideas, symbols, rituals, rules,
communication  patterns,  and  roles  that
contribute to shape the preference of individuals.
Source: the author
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Appendix 2
Comparison of policy paradigms I – theoretical perspective
Paradigm Dominant ethos Intellectualbackground
Theoretical
underpinnings
Early Public 
Administration
(EPA)
Bureaucratic
Politics-administration
dichotomy (Wilson),
Scientific management
(Taylor)
Efficiency, hierarchy,
specialization of tasks
Policy 
Analysis (PA) Technocratic
Operations analysis,
systems analysis,
policy sciences of
democracy (Lasswell)
Problem-solving,
instrumental rationality;
reliance on scientific
knowledge
Interpretive 
Public Policy 
(IPP)
Argumentative
or narrative
Symbolic
interactionism,
hermeneutics, post-
structuralism (e.g.
Fischer)
Framing, storytelling,
practical reason
(phronesis)
Deliberative 
Policy 
Approach 
(DPA)
Democratic
legitimacy
Deliberative theories
of democracy (e.g.
Nabatchi, Stivers)
Communicative
rationality, civic
participation,
deliberative arenas
Agonistic 
Policy Model 
(APM)
Ineradicability
of conflict and
antagonism
Post-foundationalism,
Mouffe’s agonistic
theory
Open-ended,
conflictive, deeply
democratic, integrative
Source: the author
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Appendix 2 (cont.)
Comparison of policy paradigms II – view of politics
Framework
Contribution to
policy
theorization
Limitations Perception ofpolitics
Early Public 
Administration 
(EPA)
Dichotomy
politics-
administration
Formalism, insulation,
lack of accountability;
aversion to politics
Dichotomy
politics-
administration
Policy Analysis 
(PA)
Policy as
problem-solving
and technical
expertise
Policy is broader than
problem-solving; disregard
for politics; instrumental
rationality
In theory, policy
should seek
democratic ends;
in practice,
apolitical
Interpretive 
Public Policy 
(IPP)
Public policy as
interpretive
artefacts
Lack of practical
guidance; relativism
Politicization of
public policy
Deliberative 
Policy Approach
(DPA)
Policy arenas as
spaces of public
deliberation and
civic engagement
Convenient only in
specific cases; depend on
bureaucratic acquiescence;
strong cognitive
requirements
Democratization
of the policy
process
Agonistic Policy
Model (APM)
Policy process as
arena of struggle
To be developed by policy
scholarship
Integrative view
of the policy
process
Source: the author
267
References
Adams, G. B. (1992)  ‘Enthralled with modernity: the historical context of knowledge
and theory development in public administration’, Public Administration Review, 52 (4):
363–373.
Almond, G. and Verba, S. (1963) The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy
in Five Nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Appleby, P. (1949) Policy and Administration. Alabama: Alabama University Press.
Arnstein, S. (1969) ‘A ladder of citizen participation’, Journal of the American Institute
of Planners, 35 (4): 216–224.
Ascher, C. (1987) ‘Editorial comment: policy science in the postpositivist era’,  Policy
Sciences, 20 (1): 3–9.
Azevedo, C. (1992) ‘Planning and management in the strategic-situational approach of
Carlos Matus’, Cadernos de Saúde Pública, 8 (2): 129–133.
Baccaro,  L.  and  Papadakis,  K.  (2009)  ‘The  downside  of  participatory-deliberative
public administration’, Socio-Economic Review, 7 (2): 245–276.
Bäcklund, P. and Mäntysalo, R. (2010) ‘Agonism and institutional ambiguity: ideas on
democracy and the role  of  participation  in  the  development  of  planning theory and
practice – the case of Finland’, Planning Theory, 9 (4): 333–350.
Badiou, A. (2005) Being and Event, trans. Oliver Feltham. London: Continuum.
Barber, B. (1984) Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Bardach, E. (1977) The Implementation Game: What Happens After a Bill Becomes a
Law. Cambridge and London: MIT Press.
Baumgartner,  F.  and Jones,  B.  (1993)  Agendas  and Instability  in  American politics.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Beck, U. (1997) The Reinvention of Politics: Rethinking Modernity in the Global Social
Order. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Beck,  U.  and  Beck-Gernsheim,  E.  (2001)  Individualization:  Institutionalized
Individualism and its  Social and Political Consequences.  London: Sage Publications
Ltd.
268
Belchior, M. (1999) A Aplicação de Planejamento Estratégico Situacional em Governos
Locais:  Possibilidades  e  Limites.  MsC  Dissertation.  São  Paulo:  Fundação  Getúlio
Vargas.
Bentley, A. (1908) The Process of Government. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Berman, E. (1997)  ‘Dealing with cynical citizens’,  Public Administration Review, 57
(2): 105–112.
Bertelli, A. and Lynn, L. (2006)  Madison’s Managers: Public Administration and the
Constitution. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Bevir, M. (2011) ‘Public administration as storytelling’, Public administration, 89 (1):
183–195.
Bingham,  L.,  Nabatchi  T.,  and  O’Leary R.  (2005)  ‘New governance:  practices  and
processes for stakeholder and citizen participation in the work of government’,  Public
Administration Review, 65 (5): 547–558.
Botner, S. (1970) ‘Four years of PPBS: an appraisal’, Public Administration Review, 30
(4): 423–431.
Bouckaert, G., Peters, B. and Verhoest, K. (2010)  The Coordination of Public Sector
Organizations.  Shifting  Patterns  of  Public  Management.  Basingstoke:  Palgrave
Macmillan.
Box,  R.  (1998)  Citizen  Governance:  Leading  American  Communities  into  the  21st
Century. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
Box,  R.  (1999)  ‘Running  governments  like  a  business:  implications  for  public
administration theory and practice’, American Review of Public Administration, 29 (1):
19–43.
Box, R. (2004) Critical Social Theory in Public Administration. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.
Box, R. (2007) ‘The public service practitioner as agent of social change’, in R. Box
(ed.) Democracy and Public Administration. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe. pp 194–211.
Box,  R.  (2008) Making  a  Difference:  Progressive  Values  in  Public  Administration.
Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.
Brown,  J.  (2009)  ‘Democracy,  sustainability  and  dialogic  accounting  technologies:
taking pluralism seriously’, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 20 (3): 313–342.
Bryer,  T.  (2007)  ‘Toward a relevant  agenda for  a  responsive public  administration’,
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 17 (3): 479–500.
269
Buchanan, J. and Tullock, G. (1962) The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of
Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Burke,  J.  (1997)  ‘Reconciling  public  administration  and democracy:  the  role  of  the
responsible  administrator’,  International  Journal  of  Public Administration,  20 (4–5):
1017–1036.
Callahan, K. (2007) ‘Citizen participation: models and methods’, International Journal
of Public Administration, 30 (11): 1179–1196.
Campos, G. (2007)  ‘O SUS entre a tradição dos sistemas nacionais e o modo liberal-
privado para organizar o cuidado à saúde’, Ciência e Saúde Coletiva, 12 (Sup): 1865–
1874.
Chandler, R. (ed.) (1987)  A Centennial History of the American Administrative State.
New York: Free Press.
Chappell, J. (2007) ‘Conflict administration for the public sector’,  Indiana Journal of
Political Science, 10 (1): 33–40.
Cohen, M., March, J.,  and Olsen,  J. (1972)  ‘A garbage can model of organizational
choice’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 17 (1): 1–25.
Colebatch, H. (2007) Policy. New York: Open University Press.
Connolly, W. (2002) Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Cooper,  T.,  Bryer,  T.,  and  Meek,  J.  (2006)  ‘Citizen-centered  collaborative  public
management’, Public Administration Review, 66 (Suppl. 1): 76–88.
Cortes, S. (2009)  ‘Sistema Único de Saúde: espaços decisórios e a arena política de
saúde’, Cadernos de Saúde Pública, Rio de Janeiro, 25 (7): 1626–1633.
Czarniawska,  B.  (2004)  Narratives  in  Social  Science  Research.  London:  Sage
Publications.
Dahl,  R.  (1947)  ‘The  science  of  public  administration:  three  problems’,  Public
Administration Review, 7 (1): 1–11.
Dahl, R. (1989) Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Dahl,  R.  and Lindblom,  C.  (1953)  Politics,  Economics,  and Welfare:  Planning and
Politico-Economic  Systems  Resolved  into  Basic  Social  Processes.  Chicago:  Chicago
University Press.
Danziger, M. (1995) ‘Policy analysis postmodernized’,  Policy Studies Journal, 23 (3):
435–450.
270
Deleon, P. (1988)  Advice and Consent: The Development of the Policy Sciences. New
York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Deleon, P. (1994a)  ‘Reinventing the policy sciences: three steps back to the future’,
Policy Sciences 27 (1): 77–95.
Deleon, P. (1994b)  ‘Democracy and the policy sciences: aspirations and operations’,
Policy Studies Journal, 22 (2): 200–12.
Deleon,  P.  (2006)  ‘The historical  roots  of  the field’, in  M. Moran,  M. Rein and R.
Goodin (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
pp. 39–57.
Deleon,  L.  and  Deleon,  P.  (2002)  ‘The  democratic  ethos  and  public  management’,
Administration and Society, 34 (2): 229–250.
Denhardt, J. and Denhardt, R. (2007)  The New Public Service: Serving, Not Steering.
Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.
Denhardt,  R.  (1981)  ‘Toward  a  critical  theory  of  public  organization’,  Public
Administration Review, 41(6): 628–635.
Denhardt,  R.  and  Denhardt,  K.  (1979)  ‘Public  Administration  and  the  critique  of
domination’, Administration and Society, 11(1): 107–120.
Dewey, J. (1927) The Public and Its Problems. New York: Henry Holt and Company.
Dimock, M. (1936a) ‘The meaning and scope of public administration’, in J. Gaus, L.
White  and M.  Dimock (eds)  The Frontiers  of  Public  Administration.  Chicago:  The
University of Chicago Press. pp. 1–12.
Dimock, M. (1936b) ‘The criteria and objectives of public administration’, in J. Gaus,
L. White and M. Dimock (eds)  The Frontiers of Public Administration. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press. pp 116–133.
Dimock, M. and Dimock, G. (1953) Public Administration. New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston Inc.
Downs, A. (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.
Dryzek J. (1982)  ‘Policy analysis as a hermeneutic activity’,  Policy Sciences, 14 (4):
309–29.
Dryzek,  J.  (1990)  Discursive  Democracy:  Politics,  Policy,  and  Political  Science.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
271
Dryzek,  J.  (1993)  ‘Policy  analysis  and  planning:  from science  to  argument’,  in  F.
Fischer,  and J.  Forester,  John (eds)  The Argumentative Turn in  Policy Analysis  and
Planning. Durham: Duke University Press. pp. 213–232.
Dryzek,  J.  (2000)  Deliberative  Democracy  and  Beyond:  Liberals,  Critics,
Contestations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dryzek, J. (2002)  ‘A post-positivist policy-analytic travelogue’,  The Good Society, 11
(1): 32–6.
Dryzek, J. (2005) ‘Deliberative democracy in divided societies: alternatives to agonism
and analgesia’. Political Theory, 33(2): 218–242.
Dryzek,  J.  (2010)  Foundations  and  Frontiers  of  Deliberative  Governance.  Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Dryzek, J. and Torgerson, D. (1993) ‘Editorial: Democracy and the policy sciences. A
progress report’, Policy Sciences, 26 (3): 127–137.
Dunn, W. (1981) Public Policy Analysis: An Introduction. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-
Hall.
Durning, D. (1999)  ‘The transition from traditional to postpositivist policy analysis: a
role for Q methodology’, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 18 (3): 389–410.
Ebdon, C. and Franklin, A. L. (2006) ‘Citizen participation in budgeting theory’, Public
Administration Review, 66 (3): 437–447.
Edelman, M. (1964) The Symbolic Uses of Politics. London: University of Illinois Press.
Edelman,  M.  (1988)  Constructing  the  Political  Spectacle.  Chicago:  University  of
Chicago Press.
Fairclough, I. and Fairclough, N. (2012)  Political Discourse Analysis. A Method For
Advanced Students. London: Routledge.
Farr,  J.,  Hacker,  J.,  and  Kazee,  N.  (2006)  ‘The  policy  scientist  of  democracy:  the
discipline of Harold D. Lasswell’,  American Political Science Review,  100 (4): 579–
587.
Fischer, F. (1993)  ‘Policy discourse and the politics of Washington think tanks’, in F.
Fischer and J. Forester (eds) The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning.
Durham: Duke University Press. pp. 21–42.
Fischer, F. (1995) Evaluating Public Policy. Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers.
Fischer, F. (1998)  ‘Beyond empiricism: policy inquiry in post positivist perspective’,
Policy Studies Journal, 26 (1): 129–146.
272
Fischer, F. (2003) Reframing Public Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fischer,  F.  (2009)  Democracy  and  Expertise:  Reorienting  Policy  Inquiry.  Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Fischer, F. and Forester, J. (1993) ‘Editors’s introduction’, in F. Fischer and J. Forester
(eds)  The  Argumentative  Turn  in  Policy  Analysis  and  Planning.  Durham:  Duke
University Press. pp. 1–20.
Fischer, F., Miller, G., and Sidney, M. (2007) ‘Introduction’ in F. Fischer, G. Miller and
M. Sidney (eds)  Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods.
New York: CRC Press. pp. xix–xxv.
Fishkin,  J.  (1991)  Democracy  and  Deliberation:  New  Directions  for  Democratic
Reform. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Fishkin,  J.  (2009)  When  the  People  Speak:  Deliberative  Democracy  and  Public
Consultation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fleury, S. (1997) Saúde e Democracia: a Luta do CEBES. São Paulo: Lemos.
Flyvbjerg, B. (2001) Making Social Science Matter: Why Social Inquiry Fails and How
It Can Succeed Again. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Flyvbjerg,  B.,  Landman,  T.,  and  Schram,  S.  (2012)  Real  Social  Science:  Applied
Phronesis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Forester, J. (1982) ‘The policy analysis-critical theory affair: Wildavsky and Habermas
as bedfellows?’, Journal of Public Policy, 2 (2): 145–164.
Forester, J. (1989)  Planning in the Face of Power. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
Forester,  J.  (1990)  ‘No planning or  administration  without  phenomenology’,  Public
Administration Quarterly, 14 (1): 55–65.
Forester, J. (1999) The Deliberative Practitioner. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Fortis,  M.  (2010)  ‘Rumo à  pós-modernidade  em políticas  públicas:  a  epistemologia
situacional de Carlos Matus’, RAE eletrônica, 9(2): on-line version.
Fox, C. and Miller, H. (1996) Postmodern Public Administration. Thousand Oaks: Sage
Publications.
Frederickson, H. (1976)  ‘The Lineage of New Public Administration’, Administration
and Society, 8(2): 149-174. 
273
Frederickson,  H.  (1982)  ‘The  recovery  of  civism  in  public  administration’,  Public
Administration Review, 42 (6): 501–508.
Frederickson,  H.  (1991)  ‘Toward  a  theory  of  the  public  for  public  administration’,
Administration and Society, 22 (4): 395–417.
Frederickson,  H.  (1999)  ‘The  repositioning  of  American  public  administration’,
Political Science and Politics, 32 (4): 701–11.
Frederickson,  H.  (2010)  Social  Equity  and  Public.  Administration:  Origins,
Developments, and Applications. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe.
Fry, B. (1989)  Mastering Public Administration: From Max Weber to Dwight Waldo.
New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers.
Fung, A. (2003) ‘Recipes for public spheres: eight institutional design choices and their
consequences’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 11 (3): 338–367.
Fung,  A.  (2006)  ‘Varieties  of  participation  in  democratic  governance’,  Public
Administration Review, 66 (Suppl. 1): 66–75.
Gawthrop, L. (1998) ‘The human side of public administration’, Political Science and
Politics, 31 (4): 763–769.
Gerschman, S. and Santos, M. (2006) ‘O sistema único de saúde como desdobramento
das políticas de saúde do século XX’, Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais, 21 (61):
177–227.
Geva-May, I. and Maslove, A. (2000)  ‘What prompts health care policy change? On
political  power contests and reform of health care systems (the case of Canada and
Israel)’, Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 25 (4): 717–741.
Giddens, A. (1998) The Third Way. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Gladden, E. (1972) A History of Public Administration. London: Frank Class.
Gonçalves, R. G. (2005) Modelos Emergentes de Planejamento: Elaboração e Difusão
— Um Estudo do Planejamento. PhD Thesis. Rio de Janeiro: Federal University of Rio
de Janeiro.
Goodnow, F. (1900)  Politics and Administration: A Study in Government. New York:
Macmillan.
Gottweis, H. (2003) ‘Theoretical strategies of post-structuralist policy analysis: towards
an analytics of government’ in  M. Hajer and H. Wagenaar (eds)  Deliberative Policy
Analysis: Understanding Governance in the Network Society. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. pp. 247–265.
274
Gottweis, H. (2006) ‘Argumentative policy analysis’, in B.G. Peters and J. Pierre (eds)
Handbook of Public Policy. London: Sage. pp. 461–480.
Greenberger, M., Crenson, M., and Crissey, B. (1976)  Models in the Policy Process-
Public Decision Making in the Computer Era. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Gruber,  J.  (1997)  ‘Democracy  and  bureaucracy’,  International  Journal  of  Public
Administration, 20 (4–5): 1081–1085.
Gulick, L. (1937)  ‘Notes on the theory of organization’, in  L. Gulick and L. Urwick
(eds)  Papers  on  the  Science  of  Administration.  New  York:  Institute  of  Public
Administration. pp. 1–49.
Gusfield, J. (1981) The Culture of Public Problems: Drinking-Driving and the Symbolic
Order. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Gutmann,  A.  and  Thompson,  D.  (2004)  Why  Deliberative  Democracy?  Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Haber, S. (1964) Efficiency and Uplift: Scientific Management in the Progressive Era,
1890–1920. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Habermas,  J.  (1987)  The  Theory  of  Communicative  Action:  The  Critique  of
Functionalist Reason. Volume 2: Lifeworld and system. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Habermas, J. (1988)  Legitimation Crisis, trans. Thomas McCarthy. Cambridge: Polity
Press.
Habermas, J. (1989) The Structural Transformation of Public Sphere. Cambridge: Polity
Press.
Habermas, J. (1996) Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of
Law and Democracy, trans. W. Rehg. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Hajer, M. and Wagenaar, H. (eds) (2003) Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding
Governance in the Network Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Harlow, R. (1973) ‘On the decline and possible fall of PPBS’, Public Finance Review, 1
(1): 85–105.
Hastings, A. (1998) ‘Connecting linguistic structures and social practices: a discursive
approach to social policy analysis’, Journal of Social Policy, 27 (2): 191–211.
Hawkesworth, M. (1988) Theoretical Issues in Policy Analysis. Albany: SUNY Press.
Healy, P. (1986)  ‘Interpretive policy inquiry: a response to the received view’,  Policy
Sciences, 19 (4): 381–396.
275
Healey, P. (1993) ‘Planning through debate: the communicative turn in planning theory’,
in  F.  Fischer  and J.  Forester  (eds)  The Argumentative  Turn in  Policy  Analysis  and
Planning. Durham: Duke University Press. pp. 233–253.
Healey,  P.  (1997)  Collaborative  Planning:  Shaping Places  in  Fragmented Societies.
London: Macmillan.
Heclo, H. (1978) ‘Issue networks and the executive establishment: government growth
in  an  age  of  improvement’,  in  A.  King  (ed.)  The  New  American  Political  System.
Washington: American Enterprise Institute.
Held, D. (2006) Models of Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hillier, J. (2002)  Shadows of Power: An Allegory of Prudence in Land-use Planning.
London: Routledge.
Holden,  M.  (1996)  Continuity  and  Disruption:  Essays  in  Public  Administration.
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Honig,  B. (1993)  Political  Theory and the Displacement  of Politics.  Ithaca: Cornell
University Press.
Hood, C. (1983) The Tools of Government. London: Macmillan. 
Hoppe, R. (2010) The Governance of Problems: Puzzling, Powering and Participation.
Bristol: Policy Press.
Howlett,  M.  and  Ramesh,  M.  (1998)  ‘Policy  subsystem  configurations  and  policy
change: operationalizing the postpositivist analysis of the politics of the policy process’,
Policy Studies Journal, 26 (3): 466–481.
Howlett, M., Ramesh, M. and Perl, A. (2009) Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and
Policy Subsystem. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Huertas, F. (1993)  El método PES: Entrevista con Carlos Matus. Ecuador: Fundación
Altadir.
Hughes,  O.  (2003)  Public  Management  and  Administration:  an  Introduction.
Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Hummel, R. (1991)  ‘Stories managers tell: why they are as valid as science’,  Public
Administration Review, 51 (1): 31–41.
Hyde, A. and Shafritz, J. (2008) Classics of Public Administration. Boston: Wadsworth.
276
Ingram,  H.  and  Schneider,  A.  (2005)  ‘Introduction:  public  policy  and  the  social
construction  of  deservedness’,  in  A.  Schneider  and H.  Ingram (eds)  Deserving and
Entitled: Social Constructions and Public Policy. Albany: State University of New York
Press. 
Innes,  J.  and  Booher,  D.  (2003)  ‘Collaborative  policymaking:  governance  through
dialogue’,  in  M.  Hajer  and  H.  Wagenaar  (eds)  Deliberative  Policy  Analysis:
Understanding Governance in the Network Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press. pp. 33–59.
Irvin, R. and Stansbury, J. (2004) ‘Citizen participation in decision making: is it worth
the effort?’, Public Administration Review, 64 (1): 55–65.
Jamieson, G. and Fortis, M. (2012)  ‘Participation and citizenship: a case study’, in S.
McMahon (ed.)  Developments in the Theory and Practice of  Citizenship.  Newcastle
upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
Jasanoff, S. (1990)  The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.
Jones, M. and McBeth, M. (2010)  ‘A narrative policy framework: clear enough to be
wrong?’, Policy Studies Journal, 38 (2): 329–353.
Justice,  J.  and  Miller,  G.  (2007)  ‘Decision  making,  institutions,  elite  control,  and
responsiveness in public administration history’, in J. Rabin, W. Hildreth, and G. Miller
(eds) Handbook of Public Administration. New York: Taylor and Francis. pp. 251–314.
Kaplan,  T.  (1986)  ‘The  narrative  structure  of  policy  analysis’,  Journal  of  Policy
Analysis and Management, 5 (4): 761–778.
Karl,  B.  (1976)  ‘Public  administration  and  American  history:  a  century  of
professionalism’, Public Administration Review, 36 (5): 489–504.
Kaufman,  H.  (1969)  ‘Administrative  decentralization  and  political  power’,  Public
Administration Review, 29 (1): 3–15. 
Keller, L. (2007) ‘Public administration and the American republic: the continuing saga
of management and administration in politics’, in J. Rabin, W. Hildreth, and G. Miller
(eds) Handbook of Public Administration. New York: Taylor and Francis. pp. 3–48.
Kelly,  T.  (2004)  ‘Unlocking the  iron  cage:  public  administration  in  the  deliberative
democratic theory of Jürgen Habermas’, Administration and Society, 36 (1): 38–61.
Kennedy, J. F. (1962) ‘Commencement Address at Yale University’.  Public Papers of
the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy. Washington: Government Printing
Office.
277
Kettl, D. (2000) ‘Public administration at the millennium: the state of the field’, Journal
of Public Administration Research and Theory, 10 (1): 7–34.
King,  C.  (2000)  ‘Talking  beyond  the  rational’, American  Review  of  Public
Administration, 30 (3): 271–291.
Kingdon, J. (1984) Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. Boston: Little Brown.
Kirlin, J. (1996)  ‘The big questions of public administration in a democracy’,  Public
Administration Review, 56 (5): 416–23.
Kirlin,  J.  (2001)  ‘Big  questions  for  a  significant  public  administration’,  Public
Administration Review, 61 (2): 140–143.
Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. (2001) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical
Democratic Politics. London: Verso. 
Lane,  R.  (1966)  ‘The decline  of  politics  and ideology in  a  knowledgeable society’,
American Sociological Review, 31 (5): 649–662.
Lasswell, H. D. (1927) ‘The theory of political propaganda’, American Political Science
Review, 21 (3): 627–31.
Lasswell, H. D. (1936) Politics: Who Gets What, When, How. New York: McGraw–Hill.
Lasswell, H. D. (1947)  Analysis of Political Behaviour: an Empirical Approach. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Lasswell, H. D. (1951) ‘The policy orientation’, in D. Lerner and H. D. Lasswell (eds)
The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in Scope and Method.  Stanford: Stanford
University Press. pp. 3–15.
Lasswell, H. D. (1956) The Decision Process: Seven Categories of Functional Analysis.
College Park: University of Maryland Press. 
Lasswell, H. D. (1963) The Future of Political Science. New York: Prentice Hall. 
Lasswell, H. D. (1971) A Preview of Policy Sciences. New York: Elsevier.
Lawlor, E. (1996) ‘Book review of the argumentative turn, narrative policy analysis, and
policy change and learning’, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 15 (1): 110–
121.
Lee, E. (1995)  ‘Political science, public administration, and the rise of the American
administrative state’, Public Administration Review, 55 (6): 538–46.
Lefort, C. (1988) Democracy and Political Theory, trans. D. Macey. Cambridge: Polity
Press.
278
Levitan,  D.  (1943)  ‘Political  ends  and administrative means’,  Public  Administration
Review, 3 (4): 353–359.
Lindblom, C. (1959) ‘The science of muddling through’, Public Administration Review,
19 (2): 79–88.
Lindblom, C. (1965) The Intelligence of Democracy: Decision Making Through Mutual
Adjustment. New York: The Free Press.
Lindblom, C. (1968) The Policy Making Process. New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc.
Lira,  L.  (2006)  ‘Revalorización  de  la  planificación  para  el  desarrollo’,  Public
Management Series, issue 59. Santiago: ILPES.
Lodge,  M.  and  Wegrich,  K.  (2012)  ‘Public  administration  and  executive  politics:
perennial questions in changing contexts’,  Public Policy and Administration,  27 (3):
212–229.
Long, N. (1949) ‘Power and administration’, Public Administration Review, 9 (4): 257–
64.
Lovins, A. (1977) Soft Energy Paths: Towards a Durable Peace. San Francisco: Friends
of the Earth International.
Lowi, T. (1964)  ‘American business, public policy, case studies and political theory’,
World Politics, 16 (4): 677–715. 
Lowi, T. (1972)  ‘Four systems of policy, politics, and choice’,  Public Administration
Review, 32 (4): 298–310.
Lowi, T. (2009) Arenas of Power. London: Paradigm Publishers.
Lynn, L. (1999)  ‘A place at the table: policy analysis, its postpositive critics, and the
future of practice’, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 18 (3): 411–424.
Lynn, L. (2001a) ‘The making and analysis of public policy: a perspective on the role of
social science’, in M. Vinovskis, and D. Featherman (eds)  Social Science and Policy-
Making: A Search for Relevance in the Twentieth Century. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press. pp. 187–218.
Lynn,  L.  (2001b)  ‘The  myth  of  the  bureaucratic  paradigm:  what  traditional  public
administration really stood for’, Public Administration Review, 61 (2): 144–60.
Majone, G. (1989)  Evidence,  Argument,  and Persuasion in the Policy Process.  New
Haven: Yale University Press.
279
March, J. and Olsen, J. (1989) Rediscovering Institutions: The Organisational Basis of
Politics. New York: Free Press.
March, J. and Olsen, J. (1995) Democratic Governance. New York: The Free Press.
Marchart,  O.  (2007) Post-Foundational  Political  Thought:  Political  Difference  in
Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Marini,  F.  (ed.)  (1971)  Toward  a  New  Public  Administration:  The  Minnowbrook
Perspective. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company.
Marques, R. and Mendes, A. (2007)  ‘Democracia,  saúde pública e universalidade: o
difícil caminhar’, Saúde e Sociedade, 16 (3): 35–51.
Mason, R. and Mitroff, I. (1981) Challenging Strategic Planning Assumptions. Theory,
Cases, and Techniques. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Matus, C. (1985)  Planificación Libertad y Conflicto: Fundamento de la Reforma del
Sistema de Planificación en Venezuela. Caracas: Ediciones Iveplan.
Matus, C. (1987) Política, Planificación y Gobierno. Washington: Segundo Borrador.
Matus, C. (1991) ‘O plano como aposta’, São Paulo em Perspectiva, 5 (4): 28–42.
Matus, C. (1997) Política, planejamento e governo. v.1. Brasília: IPEA.
Matus, C. (2000) La Teoría del Juego Social. Caracas: Fundación Editorial Altadir.
Matus, C. (2007a) Los 3 Cinturones de Gobierno. Caracas: Fundación Altadir.
Matus,  C.  (2007b) Adiós,  Señor Presidente.  Buenos Aires:  Universidad Nacional  de
Lanús.
Matus, C. (2007c) ‘Las ciencias y la política’, Salud colectiva, 3 (1): 81–91.
Matus,  C. (2007d)  El método Altadir de Planificación Popular. Buenos Aires: Lugar
Editorial.
Matus,  C. (2008)  El Líder sin Estado Mayor: la Oficina del Gobernante. San Justo:
Universidad Estadual de la Matanza.
Matus,  C. (2010)  Interview  with  professor  Carlos  Matus.  Available  from:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FNuyqy827wU [Accessed 28 December 2013].
May, P. (1992) ‘Policy learning and failure’, Journal of Public Policy, 12 (4): 331–354. 
McCurdy, H. (1986) Public Administration: A Bibliographical Guide to the Literature.
New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc.
280
McSwite,  O. (2000)  ‘On the discourse movement - a self  interview’,  Administrative
Theory and Praxis, 22 (1): 49–65.
Meier, K. (1997) ‘Bureaucracy and democracy: the case for more bureaucracy and less
democracy’, Public Administration Review, 57 (3): 193–199.
Meier, K. and O’Toole L. (2006)  Bureaucracy in a Democratic State: A Governance
Perspective. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Meltsner,  A.  (1976)  Policy  Analysts  in  the  Bureaucracy.  Berkeley:  University  of
California Press.
Mill, J. S. (1844) Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy. London:
Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer.
Mitroff, I. (1974) The Subjective Side of Science. New York: Elsevier.
Montgomery,  J.  and Cook,  E.  (2005)  Conflict  Management  for  Libraries.  Chicago:
American Library Association.
Moore,  M.  (1995)  Creating  Public  Value.  Strategic  Management  in  Government.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Mosher, F. (1968)  Democracy and the Public Service. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Mosher, F. (1976) Basic Documents of American Public Administration. New York and
London: Holmes and Meier Publishers.
Mouffe, C. (1979) ‘Hegemony and ideology in Gramsci’, in C. Mouffe (ed.)  Gramsci
and Marxist Theory. London: Routledge/Kegan Paul. 
Mouffe, C. (1992) ‘Preface: democratic politics today’, in C. Mouffe (ed.) Dimensions
of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship and Community. London: Verso.
Mouffe, C. (1993) The Return of the Political. London: Verso.
Mouffe, C. (1996)  ‘Deconstruction, pragmatism and the politics of democracy’, in C.
Mouffe (ed.) Deconstruction and Pragmatism. London: Routledge.
Mouffe, C. (1999a) ‘Deliberative democracy or agonistic pluralism?’, Social Research,
66 (3): 745–758. 
Mouffe,  C.  (1999b)  ‘Introduction:  Schmitt’s  challenge’,  in  C.  Mouffe  (ed.)  The
Challenge of Carl Schmitt. London: Routledge.
Mouffe, C. (2000) The Democratic Paradox. London: Verso.
281
Mouffe, C. (2002) ‘Politics and passions: introduction’, Philosophy Social Criticism, 28
(6): 615–6.
Mouffe, C. (2005) On the political. London: Verso.
Mouffe,  C.  (2012)  ‘An  agonistic  approach  to  the  future  of  Europe’,  New Literary
History, 43 (4): 629–640.
Mouffe, C. (2013) Agonistics: Thinking the World Politically. London: Verso.
Moynihan, D. (2003) ‘Normative and instrumental perspectives on public participation’,
American Review of Public Administration, 33 (2): 164–188.
Mutz, D. (2006) Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative versus Participatory Democracy.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Nabatchi,  T.  (2009)  ‘Radical  individualism,  instrumental  rationality,  and  public
administration: a paper formerly titled ‘‘Roofied and Rolled’’’, Public Performance and
Management Review, 32 (4): 585–91.
Nabatchi, T. (2010) ‘Addressing the citizenship and democratic deficits: the potential of
deliberative  democracy  for  public  administration’,  The  American  Review  of  Public
Administration, 40 (4): 376–99. 
Nabatchi, T., Goerdel, H., and Shelly, P. (2011)  ‘Public administration in dark times:
some questions for the future of the field’, Journal of Public Administration Research
and Theory, 21 (Suppl): 29–43.
Nagel, S. (ed.) (1990)  Conceptual Theory and Policy Evaluation: Policy Theory and
Policy Evaluation: Concepts, Knowledge, Causes, and Norms. New York: Greenwood.
Nelson, R. (1977) The Moon and the Ghetto: An Essay on Public Policy Analysis. New
York: Norton.
Ney, S. (2009) Resolving Messy Policy Problems: Handling Conflict in Environmental,
Transport, Health and Ageing Policy. London: Earthscan.
Niskanen, W. (1971)  Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Chicago: Aldine-
Atherton.
North,  D.  (1990)  Institutions,  Institutional  Change  and  Economic  Performance.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Orçamento Participativo (2013)  Ciclo do Orçamento Participativo. [online] Available
from:  http://lproweb.procempa.com.br/pmpa/prefpoa/op/usu_doc/ciclo_op_2013_detalhado.pdf
[Accessed 17 February 2013].
282
Orçamento  Participativo  de  Porto  Alegre  (2013)  Orçamento  Participativo.  [online]
Available from: http://www2.portoalegre.rs.gov.br/op/ [Accessed 19 February 2013].
O’Toole,  L.  (1997)  ‘The  implications  for  democracy  in  a  networked  bureaucratic
world’, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 7 (3): 443–459.
Olson, M. (1965) The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Ostrom,  V.  (1973)  The  Intellectual  Crisis  in  American  Public  Administration.
Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. 
Overeem,  P.  (2005)  ‘The  value  of  the  dichotomy:  politics,  administration,  and  the
political neutrality of administrators’,  Administrative Theory and Praxis, 27 (2): 311–
319.
Paim, J. (2013) ‘A Constituição cidadã e os 25 anos do Sistema Único de Saúde (SUS)’,
Cadernos de Saúde Pública, 29 (10): 1927–1936.
Paim, J. and Teixeira, C. (2007) ‘Configuração institucional e gestão do sistema único
de saúde: problemas e desafios’, Ciência e Saúde Coletiva, 12 (Supl): 1819–29.
Parsons, W. (1996) Public Policy: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy
Analysis. London: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Parsons, W. (2005) Public Policy. London: Edward Elgar.
Pateman,  C.  (1970)  Participation  and  Democratic  Theory.  New  York:  Cambridge
University Press.
Patterson, P. (2001) ‘Imagining anti-administration’s anti-hero (antagonist? protagonist?
agonist?)’, Administrative Theory and Praxis, 23 (4): 529–540.
Paula,  L.,  Tanaka,  A.,  and  Araujo,  R.  (2010)  BSC  e  PES.  Principais  Abordagens
Utilizadas no Planejamento Estratégico em Organizações Públicas. Technical Report
17/2010. Rio de Janeiro: Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro.
Pennington, M. (2010)  ‘Democracy and the deliberative conceit’,  Critical Review, 22
(2-3): 159–184.
Perez,  M. (2004)  A Administração Pública  Democrática:  Institutos  de Participação
Popular na Administração Pública. Belo Horizonte: Fórum.
Pfiffner, J. (1949) Public Administration. New York: The Ronald Press Company.
Pløger, J. (2004) ‘Strife: urban planning and agonism’, Planning Theory, 3 (1): 71–92.
Pressman, J.,  and Wildavsky, A. (1973)  Implementation.  How Great Expectations in
Washington are Dashed in Oakland. Berkeley: University of California Press.
283
Price, D. (1965) The Scientific Estate. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Raadschelders, J. (1999) ‘A coherent framework for the study of public administration’,
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 9 (2): 281–304.
Raadschelders, J. (2003) Government: A Public Administration Perspective. New York:
M. E. Sharpe.
Raadschelders,  J.  (2011)  Public  Administration:  The  Interdisciplinary  Study  of
Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Radin,  B.  (2000)  Beyond  Machiavelli:  Policy  Analysis  Comes  of  Age.  Washington:
Georgetown University.
Rancière,  J.  (1999)  Disagreement:  Politics  and  Philosophy,  trans.  Julie  Rose.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Rehg, W. (1996) ‘Translator’s Introduction’ in J. Habermas Between Facts and Norms:
Contributions  to  a  Discourse  Theory  of  Law  and  Democracy,  trans.  W.  Rehg.
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Rein, M. (1976) Social Science and Public Policy. Baltimore: Penguin.
Rein,  M.  and  Schön,  D.  (1993)  ‘Reframing  policy  discourse’,  in  F.  Fischer  and  J.
Forester (eds) The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning. Durham: Duke
University Press. pp. 145–166.
Roberts, N. (2008) The Age of Direct Citizen Participation. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe.
Roe,  E.  (1994)  Narrative  Policy  Analysis:  Theory  and  Practice.  Durham:  Duke
University Press.
Rosenbloom, D. (1993) ‘Editorial: have an administrative Rx? Don’t forget the politics!’
Public Administration Review, 53 (6): 503–6.
Sabatier, P. (1988) ‘An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role of
policy-oriented learning therein’, Policy Sciences, 21 (2–3): 129–168.
Sabatier, P. (2007) Theories of the Policy Process. Boulder: Westview Press.
Sabatier,  P.  and  Jenkins-Smith,  H.  (1993)  (eds)  Policy  Change  and  Learning:  An
Advocacy Coalition Approach. Boulder: Westview Press.
Sager, F. (2007)  ‘Habermas’s models of decisionism, technocracy and pragmatism in
times  of  governance:  the  relationship  between  public  administration,  politics  and
science  in  the  alcohol  prevention  policies  of  the  Swiss  member  states’,  Public
Administration, 85 (2): 429–447.
284
Santos, B. S. (1998)  ‘Participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre: toward a redistributive
democracy’, Politics and Society, 26 (4): 461–510.
Sarraf, F. (2003) ‘Gender-responsive government budgeting’. IMF Working Paper, WP
03/83. Fiscal Affairs Department. Washington: International Monetary Fund. 
Sayre, W. (1958) ‘Premises of public administration’, Public Administration Review, 18
(2): 102–105.
Scheffer, M. (2013) ‘Sistema único de saúde, 25 anos’, Cadernos de Saúde Pública, Rio
de Janeiro, 29 (10): 1921–1923.
Schick,  A.  (2007)  ‘Performance  budgeting  and accrual  budgeting:  decision  rules  or
analytic tools?’, OECD Journal on Budgeting, 7 (2): 109–138.
Schmitt, C. (1976)  The Concept of the Political. New Brunswick: Rutgers University
Press.
Schneider,  A.  and  Ingram,  H.  (1997)  Policy  Design  for  Democracy.  Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas.
Schneider, A. and Ingram. H. (2005) (eds) Deserving and Entitled: Social Constructions
and Public Policy. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Schön, D. and Rein, M. (1995) Frame Reflection: Toward the Resolution of Intractable
Policy Controversies. New York: Basic books.
Schram,  S.  (1993)  ‘Postmodern  policy  analysis:  discourse  and  identity  in  welfare
policy’, Policy Sciences, 26 (3): 249–268. 
Schultz, D. and Maranto, R. (1998)  The Politics of Civil Service Reform. New York:
Peter Lang Publishing, Inc.
Shimizu,  H.,  Pereira,  M.,  Cardoso,  A.,  and  Bermudez,  X.  (2013)  ‘Representações
sociais  dos  conselheiros  municipais  acerca  do  controle  social  em  saúde  no  SUS’,
Ciência e Saúde Coletiva, 18 (8): 2275–2284.
Simon, H. (1946) ‘The proverbs of administration’, Public Administration Review, 6 (1):
53–67.
Simon, H. (1976)  Administrative Behaviour: A Study of Decision-making Process in
Administrative Organization. New York: Macmillan.
Skowronek,  S.  (1982)  Building  a  New American  State:  The  Expansion of  National
Administrative Capacities, 1877–1920. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
285
Smith, A. (1982)  ‘A phenomenology of the policy process’,  International Journal of
Comparative Sociology, 23 (1–2): 1–16.
Smith,  A.  (1998)  Laclau and Mouffe:  The  Radical  Democratic  Imaginary.  London:
Routledge. 
Smith,  B.  (1966)  The  RAND  Corporation:  Case  Study  of  a  Non-profit  Advisory
Corporation. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Sørensen, E. and Torfing, J. (2007) (eds) Theories of Democratic Network Governance.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Sørensen,  E.  and  Torfing,  J.  (2009)  ’Making  governance  networks  effective  and
democratic through metagovernance’, Public Administration, 87 (2): 234–258.
Spicer, M. (2010)  In Defense of Politics in Public Administration: A Value Pluralist
Perspective. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
Spicer, M. (2011) ‘Arthur Bentley and the narrative of politics in public administration’,
Public Administration Review, 71 (4): 645–649. 
Stacey,  R.  (1996)  Strategic  Management  and  Organizational  Dynamics.  London:
Financial Times Pitman.
Stein, H. (1952)  Public Administration and Policy Development:  A Case Book. New
York: Harcourt, Brace and Company.
Steinberger, P. (1995) ‘Typologies of public policy: meaning construction and the policy
process’,  in  D.  McCool  (ed.)  Public  Policy  Theories,  Models,  and  Concepts:  An
Anthology. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. pp 220–33.
Stillman,  R.  (1997)  ‘American  vs.  European  public  administration:  Does  public
administration make the modern state, or does the state make public administration?’,
Public Administration Review, 57 (4): 332–338.
Stillman, R. (1998) Creating the American State: the Moral Reforms and the Modern
Administrative World They Made. Tuscaloosa and London: The University of Alabama
Press.
Stillman,  R.  (2010)  ‘The  study  of  public  administration  in  the  United  States:  the
eminently practical science’, in R. Stillman (ed.) Public Administration: Concepts and
Cases. Boston: Wadsworth. pp. 17–29.
Stivers, C. (1994)  ‘The listening bureaucrat: responsiveness in public administration’,
Public Administration Review, 54 (4): 364–369.
Stivers, C. (2008) Governance in Dark Times: Practical Philosophy for Public Service.
Washington: Georgetown University Press.
286
Stone,  D. (2001)  Policy Paradox: The Art of  Political Decision-Making.  New York:
W.W. Norton and Company.
Svara,  J.  (1985)  ‘Dichotomy and duality:  reconceptualizing the relationship between
policy and administration in council-manager cities’, Public Administration Review, 45
(1): 221–232.
Svara,  J.  (2001)  ‘The  myth  of  the  dichotomy:  complementarity  of  politics  and
administration in the past and future of public administration’,  Public Administration
Review, 61 (2): 176–183.
Svara, J. (2006)  ‘Complexity in political-administrative relations and the limits of the
dichotomy concept’, Administrative Theory and Praxis, 28 (1): 121–139.
Taylor, F. (1911) Principles and Methods of Scientific Management. New York: Harper
and Brothers.
Thompson,  J.  and  Tuden,  A.  (1959)  ‘Strategies,  structures  and  processes  of
organizational decisions’, in J. Thompson, P. Hammond, R. Hawkes, B. Junker and A.
Tuden (eds) Comparative Studies in Administration. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press. pp. 195–216.
Throgmorton, J. (1991) ‘The rhetorics of policy analysis’, Policy Sciences, 24 (2): 153–
179.
Torfing, J. (1999) New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe, Žižek. Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers.
Torgerson,  D.  (1985)  ‘Contextual  orientation  in  policy  analysis:  the  contribution  of
Harold D. Lasswell’, Policy Sciences, 18 (3): 241–261.
Torgerson, D. (1986) ‘Between knowledge and politics: three faces of policy analysis’,
Policy Sciences, 19 (1): 33–59.
Torgerson, D. (1995) ‘Policy analysis and public life: the restoration of phronesis’, in J.
Farr, J. Dryzek, and S. Leonard (eds) Political Science in History: Research Programs
and Political Traditions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 225–252.
Torgerson,  D.  (1997)  ‘Professionalism  and  the  voices  of  dissent:  the  case  of
environmentalism’, Polity, 29 (3): 345–374. 
Torgerson,  D.  (2003)  ‘Democracy  through  policy  discourse’,  in  M.  Hajer  and  H.
Wagenaar  (eds)  Deliberative  Policy  Analysis:  Understanding  Network  in  the
Governance Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 113–138.
287
Torgerson,  D.  (2007)  ‘Promoting  the  policy orientation:  Lasswell  in  context’, in  F.
Fischer, G. Miller, and M. Sidney (eds) Handbook of Public Policy Analysis. New York:
CRC Press. pp. 15–28.
Tormey,  S.  (2010)  ‘Ernesto  Laclau  and  Chantal  Mouffe’,  in  J.  Simons  (ed.)  From
Agamben to Žižek: Contemporary Critical Theorists. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press. pp. 144–160.
Tribe, L. (1972) ‘Policy science: analysis or ideology?’, Philosophy and Public Affairs,
2 (1): 66–110.
Van Riper, P. (1987) ‘The American administrative state: Wilson and the founders’, in
R.  Chandler  (ed.)  A Centennial  History  of  the  American  Administrative  State.  New
York: Free Press. pp. 3–36.
Van Riper, P. (1998) ‘Luther Gulick, public administration and classical management’,
International Journal of Public Administration, 21 (2–4): 187–233.
Ventriss,  C.  (1997)  ‘Toward  a  public  philosophy  of  public  administration:  a  civic
perspective of  the public’,  International  Journal  of  Public  Administration,  20 (4-5):
1041–1069.
Vigoda, E. (2002) ‘From responsiveness to collaboration: governance, citizens, and the
next generation of public administration’,  Public Administration Review, 62 (5): 527–
540.
Wagenaar,  H.  (2011)  Meaning  in  Action:  Interpretation  and  Dialogue  in  Policy
Analysis. New York: M.E. Sharpe.
Waldo, D. (1948) The Administrative State: A Study of the Political Theory of American
Public Administration. New York: Ronald Press.
Walker, H. (1937)  Public Administration in the United States. New York: Farrar and
Rinehart, Inc.
Wampler, B. (2007) Participatory Budgeting in Brazil: Contestation, Cooperation, and
Accountability. Pittsburg: Penn State University Press.
Warren, M. and Pearse, H. (2008)  ‘Introduction: democratic renewal and deliberative
democracy’, in M. Warren and H. Pearse (eds) Designing Deliberative Democracy: The
British Columbia Citizen’s Assembly. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1–
19.
Weber,  M. (1946)  ‘Bureaucracy’, in  H. Gerth and C. Mills (eds)  From Max Weber:
Essays in Sociology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 196–244.
White,  J.  (1999)  Taking  Language  Seriously:  The  Narrative  Foundations  of  Public
Administration Research. Washington: Georgetown University Press.
288
White,  L.  (1926)  Introduction  to  the  Study  of  Public  Administration.  New  York:
Macmillan Company.
White, L. (1936)  ‘The meaning of principles in public administration’, in J.  Gaus, L.
White,  and M. Dimock (eds)  The Frontiers  of  Public  Administration.  Chicago:  The
University of Chicago Press. pp. 13–25.
Wildavsky,  A.  (1966)  ‘The  political  economy  of  efficiency:  cost  benefit  analysis,
systems analysis, and program budgeting’, Public Administration Review, 26 (4): 292–
311.
Wildavsky,  A.  (1969)  ‘Rescuing policy analysis  from PPBS’,  Public  Administration
Review, 29 (2): 189–202.
Wildavsky, A. (1979) Speaking Truth to Power: The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis.
Boston: Little- Brown.
Willoughby, W. (1927)  Principles of Public Administration with Special Reference to
the National and State Governments. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press.
Wilson, W. (1887)  ‘The study of administration’,  Political Science Quarterly,  2 (2):
197–222.
Wingenbach, E. (2011) Institutionalizing Agonistic Democracy: Post-Foundationalism
and Political Liberalism. Farnham: Ashgate.
Yanow,  D.  (1993)  ‘The  communication  of  policy  meanings:  implementation  as
interpretation and text’, Policy Sciences, 26 (1): 41–61.
Yanow, D. (1996)  How Does a Policy Mean? Interpreting Policy and Organizational
Actions. Washington: Georgetown University Press.
Yanow, D. (2000) Conducting Interpretive Policy Analysis. Newbury Park: Sage.
Yanow, D. and Schwartz-Shea, P. (2014)  (eds)  Interpretation and Method: Empirical
Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn. New York: M.E. Sharpe.
Young, I. (2000) Inclusion and Democracy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Zanetti, L. (1997) ‘Advancing praxis: connecting critical theory with practice in public
administration’, American Review of Public Administration, 27 (2): 145–167.
289
